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ABSTRACT
The present thesis examines the effect of the EEC's external 
trade law and practice on the GATT legal system. Reference is made
to the GATT law and to the EEC's law in this field. The question of 
compatibility of the EEC's external trade law and practice with the 
GATT system constitutes a central argument. The issue of the 
participation of the EEC as an entity in terms of international law, 
in the GATT system is raised and the effects of the EEC's policy on 
GATT are evaluated. Furthermore, the notion of direct effects of
GATT within the Community legal order is examined. The EEC's trade 
agreements negotiated with all categories of countries, i.e. associated, 
non-associated (in the context of the GSP), industrialised and state- 
trading countries in the context of the GATT framework, are considered 
in an endeavour to evaluate their impact on the GATT legal system.
In this context the common Community position with particular reference 
to the CCP is considered, while the notion of mixed agreements which 
constitute the majority of the EEC trade agreements, is taken into 
account.
Finally, the Community's participation in the negotiation of 
VER agreements within the GATT system (e.g. MFA) and outside it, is 
examined and the relevant effects are evaluated. It is concluded that 
the EEC has in legal terms been a major influence in both redefining 
international legal concepts and developing new forms of international 
trade rules.
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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION
The present dissertation deals with certain legal issues of 
international trade, in particular with the legal issue of the compatib­
ility of the European Economic Community’s (EEC's) external trade 
law and practice with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
whilst taking into account the legal, economic, political and social 
factors which affect such trade. The dissertation further examines 
the developing legal framework of international trade in this context.
It concentrates particularly on the EEC's Common Commercial Policy and 
its Development Policy in an endeavour to examine the compatibility 
issue and to evaluate the effects of EEC external trade law and practice 
on the GATT legal system.
The GATT, established in 1947, supplied the legal basis for free 
world trade for both developed and developing countries. Since the 
monetary crisis of 1971 and the oil embargo of 1973, international trade 
has been generating problems, and there is growing concern about the 
validity of international trade rules. The emergence of LDCs, as influ­
ential powers on the international trade scene, and the unprecedented 
expansion of Japanese external trade in industrial products, have both 
contributed to changing the pattern of law on which international trade 
has been based. The USA, the protagonist in promoting, the idea of an 
International Trade Organisation (ITO) and subsequently of the establish­
ment of the GATT as the main basis for world trade, is considered to be 
a decisive factor that has shaped the existing international trade system.
The major world trading powers, notably the USA and the EEC, are 
alleged to have tailored GATT to their own needs and to accommodate their 
own interests. In that respect GATT has been criticised by LDCs as 
being an ineffective and inoperative system which fails to respond to 
their development trade needs. While GATT covers trade for developed 
and LDCs alike, the political and economic power of DCs is evident in the 
definition of this relationship. The GATT was intended as a system 
capable of responding to gradual changes in international trade, but the 
unforeseen and too rapid changes in world trade patterns in the last 
decade have called into question the suitability of the GATT system.
The
The EEC as the largest trading bloc in the world - engaged in 
more than 44% of world trade - through its Common Commercial Policy (CCP), 
(Arts, 110-116 of The Rome Treaty), together with the Community agricul­
tural provisions (Arts. 38-47) and its relationship with third countries 
(Arts. 228,238 and Part IV of the EEC Treaty) has an enormous impact on 
world trade.
The EEC's increasing power and influence in external trade relations, 
through its extensive preferential framework and its protectionist CAP, 
have become the centre of criticism from the USA. In this context trade 
relations and conflicts between the EEC and third countries, DCs and LDCs 
alike, are examined in the present dissertation and their impact on the 
GATT legal system is analysed. Moreover, the GATT's contribution to 
solving related disputes is analysed. The relationship between the 
external trade law and practice of the European Community on the one hand 
and international trade law on the other is kept in mind throughout the 
study.
Part I of the thesis, surveys the legal basis, including the G.A,, 
on which international trade rests, and the provisions of the CCP. The 
GATT, a global agreement with a membership of eighty-eight (88) contract­
ing parties and another thirty (30) states which apply on a de. facto basis 
the rules, provides the general guidelines for liberalisation of tariffs 
and trade. It is, in addition, the GATT system which also covers trade 
in both DCs and LDCs, and in both industrial and agricultural products.
As such it has to deal with major trade problems which have been referred 
to it since the transformation of the OEEC into the OECD. Although 
agricultural commodities are largely regulated by international agreements 
outside the GATT framework (coffee, cocoa, sugar, etc.) trade in agri­
cultural products is a particular case within the GATT system. The 
institutional structure and the main principles (MFN clause, reciprocity 
and universality) on which international trade is based, have made the 
GATT the de facto, if not de jure international trade organisation.
Tariffs have been largely liberalised within this framework through the 
seven Multilateral Trade Negotiation (MTN) Rounds, but there is a trend 
for this achievement to be replaced by Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs). With 
all these points in mind, the thesis gives special consideration to the 
role of GATT in resolving international trade disputes.
The /
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The system providing for the establishment of a Panel or a Working 
Party for the consideration of disputes, the importance of the CONTRACT­
ING PARTIES acting jointly, the weaknesses of the enforcement machinery 
and the broad interpretation of international trade rules by Panels or 
Working Parties, are analysed. The dispute procedure, unable to cope 
with current trade disputes, is seen in the context of the consultation 
principle. Improvement of the system and relevant revision through the 
Codes in MTNs has been sought.
According to the norms and techniques of the GATT, the EEC is 
called to submit to GATT rules the operation of its Common External 
Trade Policy. The European Community's Common Commercial Policy, 
together with its Development Policy, constitute the main and most sub­
stantial aspect of the Community's external relations and is designed 
to strengthen the Community as a bloc. The Common Commercial Policy 
embraces a whole set of measures intended to regulate international 
economic relations with third countries, relating to the movement of 
goods, the supply of services and payments connected therewith. This 
is related to the import regime, e.g. tariffs, QRs, protective measures, 
and the export regime, e.g. export subsidies and measures for promoting 
trade. With due regard to the importance of this point, the thesis 
treats the external Community trade law and practice as important topics 
of discussion within the framework of GATT, and this evaluation is under­
taken in the light of tenets found in the Preamble and relevant provis­
ions of the EEC Treaty, to the effect that they are to contribute to 
the harmonious development of world trade and the lowering of customs 
barriers. The EEC, established as a customs union, has, in fact, con­
tributed to the liberalisation of intra-Community trade but the common 
front which it has established in relation to the outside world has not 
been free of criticism. Much of this criticism is directed at spec­
ific policies of the Community, which seem to be in conflict with the 
intentions and provisions of the GATT.
In the second part of the study, the crucial issue of association 
with overseas countries and territories and the compatibility of sub­
sequent practices of existing preferential agreements with the GATT is 
considered as one of the most problematic areas. The EEC Treaty, 
based on a customs union, enjoys exception from the MFN clause of non­
discrimination under Art. XXIV oC the G.A. The provision of Art. XXIV, 
paragraphs 4-9 of the GATT, that customs unions or Free-Trade Areas or 
Interim Agreements leading to either of them, are exempted from MFN 
obligations. The preferential agreements between the EEC and third 
countries /
  '  : :______
countries, particularly the Lome Convention and the Association 
Agreements with Mediterranean countries are specifically considered 
and analysed to the extent necessary to determine their impact on 
the GATT legal system. The legality of such preferential trade 
agreements constitutes the first and most problematic area of the 
Community's compatibility with the G.A. In that respect the GATT 
Committee had had to examine the commercial aspects of the Rome 
Treaty in the context of the rules concerning customs union. The 
favourable or unfavourable effects of the preferential trade agree­
ments on other non-preferred countries and on world trade in general 
are examined.
The thesis then continues with a discussion of the preferential 
trade agreements between the EEC and third countries. All of them, 
e.g. ACP, Mediterranean countries, have been subjected to the scrutiny 
of GATT Committees, with respect to compatibility with the rules of 
GATT. The broad interpretations given by the GATT Committees in the 
first relevant Agreements (EEC - Yaounde Conventions) have become a 
precedent for all subsequent preferential arrangements. The inter­
action of legal, political, social, economic and strategic problems 
have been taken into account by the Community in its endeavour to 
expand its trade, to safeguard its preferential agreements and to 
maintain an open system in international trade. The opposition of 
third countries, particularly that of the USA, as regards the Commun­
ity's preferential network, is considered on several occasions in the 
study. The question of application and interpretation of the GATT 
rules, especially Art. XXIV, is also examined.
Concerning the EEC's preferential trade or co-operation agree­
ments in Asia, Latin America and elsewhere in the world, they are dis­
cussed in the context of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), 
which have been for the benefit of the developing countries, not 
linked with the Community by any kind of preferential agreement. The 
GSP is an effort by the EEC to counterbalance the benefits granted to 
the associated states. It was initiated by the second UNCTAD in 
New Delhi in 1968 in a form of a waiver from the GATT Art. I oblig­
ations. Under it all LDCs' exports have the right of access to the 
Community duty-free, up to a certain point. In relation to Part IV 
of /
I
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of the EEC Treatv and Part IV of the GATT agreement differentiation 
and more favourable treatment is to be granted to the LDCs, with special 
attention to the least developing countries; the question of discrim­
inatory treatment of some LDCs is one of the concerns in this study, 
since Association Agreements give more favourable treatment to associated 
countries. The GSP, by providing only tariff cuts, has not greatly 
contributed to liberalisation of international trade. It is designed to 
benefit all LDCs, but the most advanced of them are its major bene­
ficiaries. For the EEC the economic benefits are not so great but 
there seems to be obvious political, social and diplomatic gains from 
the operation of the scheme.
The EEC's trade relations with industrialised countries, notably 
with the USA and Japan, in both industrial and agricultural products, 
are included in the thesis. Overproduction in both industrial and
agricultural products has led to controversies and growing protection-
'ism on all sides. The emergence of Japan as a great economic power and 
the unprecedented expansion of its industrial exports have created 
stresses on European and American markets. Weak demand and unemploy­
ment in most developed countries, as a consequence of economic recession, 
has favoured protectionism on the part of all industrialised nations. 
Consultations and contacts between the EEC on the one hand and with the 
USA and Japan on the other hand have been frequently taking place in the 
hope of liberalising trade and further reducing barriers to world trade.
However, the most problematic area of EEC trade relations in the 
context of the GATT framework concerns subsidies on agricultural exports. 
These are granted in an effort to promote trade and secure additional 
export markets. Therefore, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) with 
its export refunds has been the most troublesome area and the major bone 
of contention, and it is the most difficult question to be discussed.
First of all the question concerning the GATT's competence to deal with 
agricultural trade has to be analysed. The GATT AGreement makes no 
distinction between industrial and agricultural products, and several 
provisions for agriculture are specifically provided, e.g. in Art.XVI:3 
subsidies to primary products. Since the Kennedy Round and subsequently 
during the Tokyo Round MTNs, and recently in the GATT Ministerial Con­
ference in November, 1982, Agricultural Committees have been established 
within the framework of MTNs under the auspices of GATT to study the 
matter. Trade in certain agricultural commodities is regulated 
through international commodity agreements such as coffee, cocoa, sugar, 
etc., but there is still scope left for the GATT to regulate agricultural 
products.
The / .
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The USA stresses that agriculture should be included in negot­
iations within the framework of MTNs under the auspices of GATT, but 
the EEC is opposed to this view. The question of subsidies granted 
for the promotion of agricultural trade deserves special attention, 
since primary products, i.e. products of farm, forest and fishery can 
be granted subsidies according to the rules of the G.A. The USA and 
the EEC with respect to agricultural subsidies have on several occasions 
come to the brink of a 'trade war’ due to subsidies granted by both 
sides. The EEC in particular has in one form or another, directly or 
indirectly, given subsidies to producers or exporters of.agricultural 
products.
Finally, in the last part of the study, reference to Voluntary 
Export Restraint (VER) Agreements is made in the context of the GATT 
Agreement. The question of their legality under GATT, the EEC's part­
icipation in negotiating VER Agreements with other countries, and the 
nature of the products involved is considered. The Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement (MFA) is the first and unique example of VERs negotiated 
within the GATT system. The question whether the MFA is to become 
the precedent for the proliferation of relevant agreements is discussed 
in this general context. International trade regulation in certain 
products like textiles has caused particular concern when market dis­
ruption has occurred in the importing country through unregulated and 
too rapid expansion of exports by both developed and developing 
. countries. The MFA is a move towards the multilateralisation and legal­
isation of exports of textiles and textile products.
Voluntary Export Restraint (VER) Agreements are negotiated bi- 
’laterally outside the scope of the GATT (except for the MFA), in complete 
absence of international supervision, and therefore fail to take account 
of the interests of third countries. It is submitted in this study 
that the drift towards bilateral regulation or so-called 'managed trade' 
may be dangerous if extended to the international community as a whole, 
VER agreements are also considered in this study in relation to Art.
XIX of the G.A. and a possible replacement by safeguards operated with­
in an agreed international framework, or within an improved or revised 
Art, XIX is discussed.
These /
These current trends can have a significant impact on the devel­
opment of international trade rules. The study favours the view that 
the GATT as an international agreement, constituting the legal basis 
for free world trade, should play a positive role in putting these 
arrangements under multilateral control in order to avoid distortions 
of the international trading system.
International trade law is an extremely complex matter, requiring 
special attention. The present thesis includes a comparative 
analysis between European External trade law and International law.
The complexity of the subject is kept in mind as a matter, due to 
various issues. Legal rules, economic aspects, political decisions 
and diplomatic involvement are interrelated. To extract the legal 
points from such a legal, economic, political and diplomatic background, 
is an exceedingly complex matter. The methodology which has been used 
to carry out research for the thesis had to cope with a number of tech­
nical difficulties. The comparative analysis between GATT and EEC 
law had to face a series of difficulties for various reasons; e.g., 
scarcity of case law from the ECJ and non-availability of all GATT 
documents were among the main obstacles in the consideration of the 
current legal issues. The relationship between GATT and EEC law, and 
in particular, the question of supremacy and that of direct effects of 
the GATT rules over the EEC rules, has not been adequately dealt with 
by the ECJ. Few cases have been referred to the ECJ.
The principal difficulty lies in the fact that the jurisdiction 
of the ECJ has not been adequately extended to the external sphere of 
the Community. The other major difficulty is attributable to the 
GATT's inability , for obvious reasons, to deal with current trade 
problems in dominant legal terms. GATT was established as a temporary 
agreement to deal with short-term commercial problems and be soon re­
placed by the ITO. As a result, studies concerning GATT problems 
have to face dilemmas. The quotation by Professor Jackson in an 
introductory page (P.vii) of his book, 'World Trade and The Law of 
GATT’, "Anyone who reads GATT is likely to have his sanity impaired", 
gives us some idea of the perplexity of the matter.
Extensive recourse to official publications of the EEC has been 
made throughout the study, as well as to various documents published 
by GATT and available to researchers. A great number of GATT Panels' 
or Working Parties' Reports or Recommendations have also been utilised. 
Interviews /
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Interviews with Community officials have greatly contributed to the 
development of the study. Numerous monographs and articles and mis­
cellaneous publications relating directly or indirectly to the study 
have also been consulted.
International trade law falls within the framework of Inter­
national Economic law, which is regulated by diplomatic arrangements 
rather than rules. While the rule of law may in principle play an 
important part in regulating world trading relations, it cannot be 
isolated from diplomacy. GATT is the principal trade forum where 
extensive discussions and deliberations take place. In the context 
of multilateral trade negotiations conducted within the GATT frame­
work, decisions and recommendations, which have been adopted to 
supplement and clarify existing international trade rules, are analysed.
The thesis is not intended to be an exhaustive study of the sub­
stantive rules contained in the various EEC agreements in the context 
of international trade rules. The EEC has negotiated a great number 
of agreements with third countries. The purpose of this study is not 
to examine the substantive rules of these agreements individually but 
to examine the EEC practice in the light of the central question as to 
the compatibility of EEC practice with the international legal frame­
work. Various EEC agreements are examined in order to extract from 
them information relating to their compatibility or incompatibility 
with the international trade rules. Obviously, much more research 
needs to be done in the area of substantive rules; for example, with 
respect to association agreements as a new developing body of law.
A further clarification in the method of the present study needs 
to be made. Having regard to the fact that the same legal issues 
continue to emerge time after time in the controversies over the 
various practices of the European Community, for example, between the 
EEC and the USA, it has been decided to deal with the underlying legal 
issues in the concluding chapter. Chapter 10, This approach enables 
a more systematic and integrated treatment of the relevant questions, 
e.g. some of the more important issues like the problem of dispute 
resolution, the problem of interpretation of difficult legal terms, 
the status of various agreements in international law and the overall 
assessment of the EEC practice in the development of its common 
commercial policy.
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PART 1.
LEGAL ASPECTS QF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
CHAPTER 2.
THE LAW OF GATT.
Theories of International Trade
While International Trade has a long history going back 
thousands of years to the days of the Phoenicians, it is only 
in the last two centuries that attempts have been made to 
create a theoretical framework for a systematic treatment and 
analysis of international trade. Such a systematic treatment 
and analysis is of importance for the specific topic of the 
present thesis.
Economic theories of international trade are of significance 
not only for economists but also for lawyers because there are, 
in international trade,well-established patterns of behaviour and 
relationships. These, in turn, involve mutual economic and 
commercial interests which can also be expressed in terms of rights 
and obligations. Hence the importance of extracting a few legal 
concepts from the sphere of economic theories of international 
trade. These legal concepts in turn will be helpful to assess 
the legal performance of the EEC in the sphere of external 
trade, that is in the light of established categories of commercial 
legal behaviour in general and EEC conformity with them, 
including the possibility of a Community contribution to the 
progressive development of current international trade law.
For this purpose we shall briefly survey some of the past and 
current theories of international trade.
Since the beginning of international trade the price of goods has 
been the most decisive factor. During the Mercantilist period 
(16th-17th Century) the establishment and development of trade 
relations was a principal goal for increasing the power of the 
state and this could be done through the acquisition and 
accumulation of precious metals.^
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As for the classical economists, they believed that the
natural resources with which each country is endowed was the most
important factor for functioning and maintaining the well-being
of the country. Adam Smith's theory of comparative advantage is
the cornerstone on which the idea of establishing free trade
among nations rests. Such free trade enables the increase of
national wealth by taking advantage of the principle of the
division of labour. He believed a country should exchange the
goods in which it has a comparative advantage in terms of
absolute labour costs against goods which it (the country) cannot
produce at all or it can produce at more expensive rates. Free-
trade for Adam Smith meant that all products traded internationally
should be produced in those countries where the absolute labour
costs are the lowest. Adam Smith epigrammatically stated that
"It is the maxim of every prudent master of a family never to
attempt to make at home what it will cost him more to make than 2to buy". David Ricardo developed and supplemented Adam Smith's
theory by showing that a country can benefit from trade not under 
the terms of absolute labour cost in the production of any 
commodity, but by the comparative cost advantage. In his theory 
known as the 'labour theory of value' Ricardo, answering the 
question of competition of more efficient imports, supported the 
idea that the price of commodities depended upon their comparative 
labour costs. According to this theory it is the relative or 
comparative labour cost instead of the absolute labour cost which 
has to be considered in comparing the production of commodities3in two countries.
Later economic writers like John Stuart Mill and Alfred 
Marshall went further and supplemented the classical theory as 
developed by David Ricardo. John Stuart Mill examined the 
question of international values or the ratios at which commodities 
would be exchanged for one another. He pointed out that comparative 
labour costs are an essential element in the gains from international 
trade, but that 'reciprocal demand' functions have to be taken into 
account. Marshall in turn went even further by emphasising not 
only 'reciprocal demand' but also 'reciprocal supply’, which 
played an important role in the specialisation and promotion of4trade.
Therefore /
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Therefore, the classical economists led by Adam Smith 
believed that each country must specialise in the production of 
those goods that it can produce relatively more cheaply and 
exchange the surplus against the surpluses of other countries, or 
against goods which the first country cannot produce at all.
But none of the above summarised theories can individually provide 
a sufficient theoretical explanation for analysing the elements of 
trade between the Community and its international trade partners.
For example, the classical school started from the assumption of 
a single factor (labour): it failed to give a satisfactory
explanation of free trade among nations. How countries will 
specialise, what they will export and import is determined by 
comparative differences in costs. But what determines the 
differences in relative labour costs? Ricardo drew attention to 
the skill of labour and to better machinery, which make labour 
more efficient, while others suggest that differences in climate, 
soil, minerals, inventiveness, play an important role in this 
determination. The classical economists believed that each 
country should specialise completely in the production of the 
commodity in which it has a comparative advantage. At the time 
when the classical theory of comparative advantage was developing, 
i.e. up to the first World War, the choice was between free-trade 
and tariff protection. In general, however, the classical writers 
pointed out the importance of the free-trade doctrine. The 
problem of protectionism was discussed by writers such as Torens 
and Edgeworth. As regards this problem, they distinguished it as 
long-term and short-term. As to long-term tariff protection,
they argued that it may cause injury to all those who practice 
it and benefit none. In particular, countries which do not take 
part in such practices will suffer greater injury. They considered 
tariff protection as an effective instrument for trade promotion 
in the poor countries only. As to short-term tariff protection, 
they recognised its significance for young countries and infant 
industries. Their argument was that they should attach great 
importance to the free-trade approach, while at the same time 
using temporary protection for young countries or infant industries. 
However, the argument for tariff protection even on a temporary 
basis was not favoured among classical economists, on the grounds 
that /
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that protection would become permanent. They saw ’tariff
protection not as an intelligent form of economic planning', but
as contrary to free trade. Thus, the theoretical framework of the
5free trade approach prevailed.
However, after the First World War, some modern trade theories 
developed. The general equilibrium theory, which is also variously 
termed as neo-classical theory or a factor proportions theory, assumes 
not a single factor of production (labour) but several others 
(labour, capital, land, enterprise) in combination, with.emphasis 
on labour and capital. This theory has been developed by 
Heckscher and Ohlin and assumes, contrary to the classical theory, 
that all the production functions are similar in all countries.^ 
Heckscher and Ohlin, the initiators of this theory of international 
trade, considered the endowment of natural resources of a country as 
important but they considered that labour and capital were the most 
important factors. They also believed that each country should 
take advantage of its abundant factor. According to this theory, 
therefore, each country can specialise in the production of goods 
which require a large amount of its abundant factor whose costs are 
cheap, and export them against goods which require the factors of 
production which are more scarce and dearer. This is the so-called 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, which seems to be a revised model of the 
classical theory postulated by Adam Smith and his followers, with 
the only difference being that it involves more than one factor of 
production. Accordingly, each country should specialise in7production of goods in which it has a comparative advantage.
However, the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem has been called into 
question by a new theory postulated by Leontief for the USA, known 
as the Leontief Paradox, He follows the neo-classical theory and 
supports the view that the USA possesses a large amount of labour 
and a small amount of capital. He, in fact, relied upon the 
efficiency of its labour and concluded that USA labour is three 
times more efficient than any other foreign labour and thus the 
labour supply must be multiplied by three to give the true supply. 
After this consideration one can find the USA as a labour-abundant 
country and, therefore, observe that it is the skill (or the human 
capital) which plays a very important role for USA foreign trade. 
Nowadays /
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Nowadays the importance of skill is a very decisive factor for the 
development of trade.^
This is well expressed in the product-cycle theory of 
international trade developed by Hirsch in 1967. This theory 
distinguishes three stages of demand for any one commodity. In the 
first stage demand is small and therefore production could not be 
large. A small amount of labour and capital is required. In the 
second stage, as demand increases more capital, skilled labour, 
better machinery and new techniques for large production become 
necessary, and in the third stage, as the demand increases even 
further product standardisation takes place and large amounts of 
capital and skilled,as well as unskilled labour, should be combined.
Increased demand for goods not produced at home and differences 
in prices of commodities are the principal factors that have led to 
the development of international trade. All the above described 
theories may also have contributed to some extent to this effect. 
Certain writers have attempted to explain how international trade 
works and how international trade based on the above theories has 
developed with the ultimate objective to increase benefits for the 
international community. It is however, an extremely difficult task 
for the policy-maker to adopt the views of the economists and at 
the same time translate them into the normative rules which put into 
effect the theories, and furthermore make their application possible 
in legal practice. The classical theory of comparative advantage 
and specialisation as envisaged by Adam Smith, and further improved 
by David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill, is the theoretical framework 
on which international trade is based, in particular the GATT system 
which has as its foundation this approach. International and 
regional integration also has its foundation in this theory. In 
classical and m o d e m  economic theories of international trade 
the free-trade approach on which international trade should be based 
prevails. Therefore, these theories are favourable to the creation 
of regional arrangements, whose aim and objectives directed to the 
free movement of goods within the preference area, coincide with 
this theoretical framework. Regional arrangements provide the 
opportunity for the application at regional and in the long run 
international /
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international level of the free trade doctrine. Reductions and 
elimination of duties and QRs within the preference area will 
contribute to the gains for the expansion of trade. In particular, 
customs unions provide greater opportunity for specialisation and 
increased trade as envisaged in economic theories and for increase 
in productivity in the trading region as a whole. GATT, which is 
based on the theoretical model advocated by free-trade thinkers, 
lays down the provisions for international and regional economic 
integration and the theory of comparative advantage as they are 
incorporated in Art. XXIV relating to regional arrangements, and 
Art-I relating to the Most Favoured National clause respectively. 
Increasing international trade and specialisation, as developed by 
regional economic arrangements such as the E E C  is to be seen 9in this context, and their effects must be taken into account.
Both economic theories and the law of GATT, although stemming from 
different perspectives, result in the same conclusion; the 
liberalisation of trade. GATT is an attempt to translate the 
technical and economic necessities in question into the language 
of normative rules which have a reasonable degree of predictability.
In fact, the free trade principle was satisfactorily observed in 
the first years of the GATT's existence and free world trade 
developed further through Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Within 
this framework, the reduction or elimination of tariffs, quotas, 
subsidies, dumping measures, and other measures having restrictive 
trade effects, have contributed to the liberalisation of trade.
Trade between DCs and LDCs is first and foremost based on the 
classical theory of comparative advantage and to some extent on the 
product cycle theory developed by Hirsch. It is regrettable, however, 
that in recent years the theory of comparative advantage tends to be 
forgotten. Lately controversy has arisen as to the applicability
of classical theories of comparative advantage and free-trade to the 
developing countries. GATT, which is based on these theoretical 
models, has found it increasingly difficult to accommodate LDCs' 
needs and contribute to the solution of their problems. The 
arguments put forward after the First World War relating to the need 
for protectionism for infant industries have been taken up again 
and to some extent have been incorporated into Part IV of the GATT.
Barriers /
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Barriers are Increasingly erected along national lines as 
nations under various devices restrict imports and put controls on 
the flow of g o o d s  and on exchanges of technology. Nevertheless, 
it remains to be seen in this study as to what extent these theories 
are linked with practice and reality; i.e. to what extent lawyers 
and diplomats, who have drafted the GATT Agreement and the EEC 
Treaty, have taken into consideration these economic perspectives 
and have transformed them into legal rules.
15
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History of GATT
When the International Trade Organisation (ITO), the so- 
called Havana Charteij failed to be established the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) emerged from within it, as 
the central instrument or framework in order to regulate world trade.
The GATT was, in fact, a copy of the ITO's Commercial Policy 
Chapter (Chapter IV) designed to liberalise tariffs, and it was to be 
eventually absorbed into the ITO when the latter would come into 
force. The rationale for the creation of the GATT into a separate 
agreement was that governments wanted to conduct negotiations 
before the establishment of the ITO and they felt the need for a 
trade agreement within which such negotiations would be conducted.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) constituting the 
legal basis for free world trade, was drawn up by the same officials 
who drafted the ITO and on the USA initiative. It was adopted in 
Geneva on 30th October 1947 by twenty-three (23) governments and 
put into effect on 1st January 1948.^^
The USA did not want the establishment of an ITO for
domestic policy reasons and "thereby named the G.A,as an agreement12never thinking to give it an institutional frame". Obviously the
USA was not pleased with the existing trade system which relied upon
bilateral trade agreements, and wanted a revision of this system, A
more flexible multilateral trade agreement might serve better their
commercial interests, especially after the collapse of the Bretton
Woods Monetary Conference in 1944, Therefore, after the failure of
an establishment of an ITO the GATT agreement came into being as
13Jackson says 'by default*.
To achieve its objectives some revision of the GA. had to be 
made to bring it into line with current world trade developments.
In 1954-1955 delegates of the GATT contracting parties met in 
Geneva and agreed upon a revision of its terms with the view to 
accept it as a permanent body capable of regulating world trade 
relations. But this revision just added a few of the ITO provisions. 
No more obligations than tariff negotiations were included. Many 
aspects of international trade regulations were still left out of the 
scope /
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14scope of the GATT revision.
Despite its shortcomings, the existence of the GATT is 
remarkable. Although the GATT agreement has never been formally 
ratified, it has in fact, been treated as an International 
Organisation and it is the only general world agreement ever achieved 
in this f i e l d . T h e  GATT agreement has been provisionally applied 
through the protocol of provisional application since 1st January 
1948.
Therefore, the GATT was to take the place of the non­
existent ITO. Its importance grew rapidly in the 1960s and its 
membership greatly expanded with the influx of LDCs, so that it now 
includes over one hundred and eighteen (118) members, counting those 
countries which apply the G.A.on a facto basis
The GATT covers trade relations of both DCs and LDCs. The 
latter constitute the majority of its membership. In theory GATT 
is controlled by a body composed of all its members, a majority of 
whom are third world states, but in practice the three big partners 
USA, EEC and Japan, are those which, in fact, control the GATT 
trading system and as a consequence GATT is mostly concerned with 
North-North trade problems.
North-South trade problems are not adequately treated by the 
GATT. In the 1964 GATT amendment, Part IV was added relating to 
"Trade and Development" problems of the LDCs. Its aim was to help 
LDCs cope with existing economic difficulties. But even so, this 
addition has not proved sufficient to provide the legal basis for 
eliminating disparities between North and South. The LDCs, through 
their active participation in MTNs conducted within the GATT frame­
work^ have contributed to some extent to the improvement of their 
trade relations. Efforts by the principal LDCs are being made 
towards the adoption of special conditions to meet their development, 
financial and trade needs in international fora, such as GATT,
UNCTAD, IMF, et al.
A fundamentally important question to be considered relates 
to the legal status of GATT. What is the legal status of GATT in 
international /
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international law? Is it a treaty? Does it have legally binding 
effects on the contracting parties? Does it codify customary law?.
The GATT, in order to qualify as an international treaty, 
should, according to the fundamental principle of treaty law (Art. 26 
of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties), have binding effects 
upon the parties and must be performed in good faith. But treaties 
such as GATT need to be ratified in order to create rights and obli­
gations upon the contracting parties. Art. XXVI of the G.A. re.
to acceptance, entry into force and registration, in paragraph 4 
provides: "Each government accepting this agreement shall deposit an
instrument of acceptance with the Director General to the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES, who will inform all interested governments". In the context 
of this Article and of a well established rule of international law, 
parties to agreements which they have not ratified in accordance with 
their domestic practices, are not bound by its rules. In view of 
these legal provisions the GATT, it can be argued, cannot be a legal 
instrument, because it has never been ratified by the contracting 
parties and therefore it cannot produce legally binding effects on 
them.
Nevertheless, the legal character of GATT has never been 
questioned. In fact, since the first days of the GATT's existence, 
the legal question never arose. This can obviously be explained
because the GATT was intended to be a temporary agreement, designed 
to deal mainly with tariffs, and it would be replaced by the ITO soon 
after. In the light of these circumstances the GATT was never 
brought before any national parliament for approval. Yet, in no case 
has any government expressed any negative attitude against the GATT and 
its legal status. The contracting parties might have felt that there 
was no need to discuss legal problems since the GATT was only to last a 
short time. For the ITO, which was intended to be a permanent trade 
organisation, legal questions were of special importance. The refusal 
of the contracting parties and mainly that of the USA to ratify the 
Havana Charter led to the failure of the establishment of the inter­
national trade organisation, (ITO).
The fact, however, remains that the GATT agreement has in 
practice been treated as an international treaty having legally 
binding effects on the contracting parties. Although the GATT
agreement /
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agreement has never been ratified by the contracting parties it has 
been tacitly accepted by them and its rules have been put into 
practice for a number of years. In the light of this consideration 
we can conclude that the legal status of GATT is peculiar under the 
rules of international law. The customary law concept plays an 
important part in this issue. The fact that the GATT creates rights 
and obligations upon the contracting parties, rests upon customary 
law. Having regard to the fact that the GATT agreement has been 
tacitly accepted as the legal instrument to regulate tariffs and 
trade relations, and that it has been practiced continuously and 
generally without interruption, means that the process of creation 
of customary law has been accomplished. The GATT has therefore 
created law under the concept of customary international law. GATT
j can be considered as a law-making treaty; it established throughI\ the MTNs new rules, which regulate, and are to regulate,the future of
i international trade practices. It creates rights and obligations
upon the contracting parties and also has an important effect on
17non-parties as well.
Therefore, the GATT is not a legal instrument strictu 
sensu according to international law, but in practice it has been 
accepted as such by the international community. In fact, the GATT 
agreement itself constitutes a codification of some existing rules
iI of customary law. For example, it incorporates the MFN principle,
I which was an accepted principle of international law contained in 
' commercial agreements since the 12th century. Furthermore, it
establishes through its practice customary international law on trade
matters. This is in accordance with the rules of international
law, which provide that in certain circumstances practices of states 
acting under the auspices of international institutions might 
\ contribute to the development of customary law. State practice 
 ^ within GATT shows some evidence that states act in the belief that 
 ^ they are bound by its rules.
As will be shown in the body of this thesis, the main
weakness of GATT is that it does not provide for an effective
dispute settlement system, enabling a progressive clarification and 
applicability of normative terms such as NTBs, which are but vaguely 
defined in the main body of the GATT text. Without this deficiency 
the argument for the overwhelmingly legal nature of GATT would have 
been much stronger.
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The Institutional Structure of the GATT
As regards its institutional structure,GATT is a de facto 
if not a de jure international organisation dealing with commercial 
(tariff and trade) matters. It is named as an Agreement, particularly 
to meet the interests of the USA and comply with its domestic policy. 
The GATT has become the central international organisation governing 
trade and tariff relations, although it was to last "but for a few 
years time".
The CONTRACTING PARTIES as a body is the principal organ 
and is the decision and policy making body.
It may enter into consultation with any contracting parties concerned 
in a dispute, and if it finds any inconsistency with the G.A. it may 
ask for modifications. If damage to the trade of any contracting 
party has been caused, the CONTRACTING PARTIES make appropriate 
recommendations in order to secure conformity with the GATT provisions 
within a certain period of time.
The CONTRACTING PARTIES should act jointly on various matters. 
They have also the power to make interpretations of the G.A. that are 
binding on all members: e.g. according to Art. XXV:5 the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES "may waive an obligation imposed upon a contracting party by 
this Agreement", under certain conditions. A Council of Represent­
atives of all contracting parties is an auxiliary body to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES and helps the latter in performing its functions
20under the provisions of the GATT. The "Consultative Group of 18"
composed of representatives of eighteen members, established in 1975,
meets once every three months with the responsibility of reviewing21recent developments in trade policies and international trade.
Moreover, the establishment of Committees in GATT has been 
considered very important. In the 1960 Session of the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES, several committees were appointed, notably on Industrial 
Products, on Trade and Development, on Balance of Payments Measures, 
on Agriculture, on Anti-Dumping Practices, and others. Inter- 
sessional committees were also established in order to deal with 
matters arising between the CONTRACTING PARTIES’ sessions.
Finally, the GATT is furnished with a Secretariat, although in the 
text of the G  A. there is no relevant provision. Very weak at the 
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beginning, due to historical factors, it was strengthened and 
enlarged during the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds.
The GATT text is composed of thirty-eight (38) Articles, 
divided into four parts. Part One (I) incorporates the first two 
Articles relating to the MFN clause. Part Two (II) contains the 
Commercial Policy provisions, which constitute the GATT's substantive 
Code of Good Behaviour in Trade Policy. Part Three (III) contains the 
procedural provisions and some substantive provisions, including the 
troublesome Art. XXIV. Finally Part Four (IV)y added during the 1964 
GATT amendment, is related to "Trade and Development" of the LDCs.
One of the most striking elements in the GATT and one of the
most disputed areas in the conduct of world trade, is the incorporation
within the G.A.of the regulation of Regional Economic Arrangements,
provided for in Art. XXIV. In fact, when GATT was established in
1948, no regional arrangements were in existence apart from the
24customs regime between Germany and Austria, the Benelux (Belgium,
The Netherlands and Luxembourg) Customs Union, and a preferential arrange­ment between India and Pakistan.
Although no other regional arrangements had appeared in the
interwar period, the idea of establishing such arrangements seems to 
have been cultivated in the minds of economists and politicians of that 
time. RAs, creating large markets, had been seen as steps towards 
free and non-discriminatory trade. The theory of comparative advantage 
and specialisation which implies closer collaboration among nations 
and unrestricted trade in larger markets, had been the seed for the 
later established regional arrangements. It was envisaged that free 
world trade could be better achieved not at international level at 
once, but through smaller economic groupings. The experience of the 
customs regime between Germany and Austria and the Benelux Customs 
Union, indicates that their trade creating effects would be deployed 
further. Specifically in the protocol signed in Vienna on March 
19th, 1931, Austria and Germany agreed to enter into negotiations for 
a treaty to assimilate the tariff and economic policies of their 
respective countries. GATT Art. XXIV emerged from this background 
and had been seen by the GATT founders as an attempt to enhance the 
world trading system.
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THE GATT MAIN PRINCIPLES
In the GATT legal system we can distinguish three important 
principles which underlie the whole structure of the Agreement:
1. The MFN clause, the most important non-discriminatory 
principle in the GATT,
2. The principle of reciprocity, and
3. The principle of universality.
The Most Favoured Nation (MFN) Principle
The concept of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment is not 
a new one. Its development goes back to the i2th century and 
appears often since then in bilateral trade agreements. There­
inafter it has become a rule in world trade agreements and almost
a necessary element contained in most world trade agreements of 
25the 20th century.
As bilateral trade agreements passed to a wider multilateral
concept, particularly after the Second World War, the MFN principle
became even more significant. Its importance was recognised during
the ITO preparatory negotiations, when it was proposed that the
MFN clause be included in the charter as well as in the GATT 
26Agreement. Art. I of the GATT Agreement contains the major MFN
commitment in GATT and it is considered to be the most important 
provision on which the GATT is based; the Most Favoured Nation 
clause constitutes the central principle of non-discrimination in 
GATT.
Art. I of the GA. describes the MFN principle as "... any
advantage, favour, principle or immunity granted by any contracting
party to any product originating in or destined for any other
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the
like product originating in or destined for the territories of all
other contracting parties". Under this clause "each member
of the GATT is obliged to treat the other GATT members at least as
well as it treats that country which receives its most favourable
27treatment with regard to imports or exports". When, according 
to the MFN principle, the contracting parties decide to apply this 
standard to each other, they become at the same time granting and 
beneficiary /
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beneficiary states. The MFN treatment by a GATT contracting party 
to any country must be granted to all GATT members and if granted 
in the context of MTNs to all participating countries, even to non- 
GATT contracting parties.
Several exceptions to the MFN clause are, however, provided
and it can be said that the MFN principle is riddled with exceptions,
the most important of which is found in the provisions of Art. XXIV
relating to the formation of customs unions and free trade areas,
which is considered the most troublesome exception to the
GATT rules. Problems have arisen, for example, when the EEC was
formed, based on a customs union and in the course of negotiations
of the EEC's agreements with third countries. Also, preferences
existing prior to the establishment of GATT between two or more
28territories are allowed under Art. 1:2 to continue. Thus
preferential treatment is accorded to a certain category of 
countries, including the former dependent territories in their 
relations with their former colonial powers. The developed 
countries, in fact, wanted to preserve their preferences with their 
former dependent territories over which they exercised economic 
and political control. Some, other exceptions are provided: e.g. 
in Art. XIV which allows discrimination in the application of QRs 
imposed for balance of payments reasons. Art. VI which permits the 
imposition of countermanding duties and Art. XXIII:2 which permits 
retaliation against a country which has nullified or impaired 
benefits under the G.A. As far as LDCs are concerned, they have 
obtained on several occasions exceptions from the MFN obligations.
The MFN clause does not apply to most trade relations between 
developed and developing countries. In the GA.in 1948 no special 
mention of differential and more favourable treatment to LDCs was 
made, but shortly after, need for such a treatment became inevitable. 
Thereby, Part IV of the G.A.was added in 1964 entitled 'Trade and 
Development* of the LDCs. It provided for differential treatment 
to be granted to LDCs and it envisaged that the MFN principle should 
not apply to certain types of international trade relations for a 
certain period of time. The particular problems of LDCs, i.e. lack 
of technology, skilled labour, export opportunity difficulties, were 
recognised,as well as the need for expanding their trade and 
accomplishing their development needs.
Apart /
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Apart from exceptions provided for in the G A  several others 
have been made possible during the Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
The LDCs under various schemes have achieved exceptions from the 
MFN application, e.g. the 1971 GBP's waiver, permitting LDCs to 
deviate from MFN obligations in GATT and recently in 1980, the 
establishment of the GATT Enabling Clause, which entitles LDCs to 
differential and more favourable treatment. In fact, the MFN 
principle is weakened by an attempt in GATT to accommodate the 
interests of developed and developing countries alike. Nevertheless, 
in the context of MTNs major trading nations like the USA and the 
EEC have demanded a kind of reciprocity to be assumed by some LDCs, 
notably the NICs, whose level of economic development is advanced.
However, except for the MFN principle of non-discrimination
among the GATT members, there are some other equivalent provisions
envisaged in the G.A, notably Art. XVII;2, referring to state-
trading enterprises. It states that "each contracting party shall
accord to the trade of other contracting parties fair and equitable
treatment", and Art. XIII, entitled 'Non-discriminatory administration
of QRs', requires the application of the principle of non-discrimin- 
29atory treatment. But, according to those provisions, promising
non-discrimination to the trade of the contracting parties is not 
meant to include necessarily all the advantages of the MFN clause.
The MFN clause's purpose is to establish equality among all 
the GATT parties. The ICJ, considering the principle of non­
discrimination, held that "the intention of MFN clauses is to 
establish and to maintain at all times fundamental equality without 
discrimination among all countries concerned'*.
Comparing the MFN clause and the general principle of non­
discrimination we can observe that the latter is much more 
general in character and governs the political, economic, cultural 
and other relations of states, whereas the MFN clause is attached 
solely to economic relations involving a contractual relationship.
This means that states may grant and expect equal treatment in their 
international economic relations to and from their partners within 
a general non-discriminatory system. In the concept of MFN clause, 
because of its conventional character, more advantageous conditions
can be claimed through bilateral, or more frequently now, multi-
31lateral trade negotiations.
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The MFN clause is of special character and its significance and 
Importance has been recognised as the fundamental basis on which 
international trade should be conducted. In some agreements 
there has been included a 'general clause' which stipulates MFN 
treatment in all matters relating to trade, navigation and all 
other economic relations. However, the MFN principle has 
currently been weakened,to. a great extent. It is designed to 
establish equality among the nations, but its application today, to 
Statee at differing levels of economic development, is an 
extremely complicated matter.
The Principle of Reciprocity
Reciprocity is the second most important principle envisaged 
in the G.A, It implies mutuality of gains in MTNs by providing 
equivalent concessions to the parties involved and, in fact, 
complements the MFN clause. It is nowhere explicitly defined in 
the G.A, although reference is made inter alia to 'compensatory 
adjustment or/to substantial equivalent concessions'.
Reciprocity was a necessary element of USA bilateral trade policy 
during the 1930s. From this bilateral level and on the USA 
initiative it was introduced on a multilateral level in the G.A,» and 
tariff negotiations were conducted on this basis in spite of 
difficulties in valuing and comparing tariff concessions.
As provided in Art, XXVIII (bis) 1 of the GATT, MTNs
conducted "on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis are of
great importance to the expansion of international trade". During
the Dillon Round, however, the USA claimed to have succeeded in
getting concessions from the EEC. In that these concessions
exceeded those made by the USA to the tune of $200m., in turn the
32EEC claimed that reciprocal concessions were almost equivalent.
The USA administration uses reciprocity as an instrument to invoke
the national interest when complaints from particular sectors are 
33raised. In the Kennedy Round when the system of linear-tariff
cuts was introduced, reciprocity became even more important in the 
bargaining process.
In theory, reciprocity applies only to tariffs but not to 
QRs. QRs in general are prohibited by the GLA. save as otherwise 
provided /
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provided - e.g. Art. XI for BOP reasons. In the GAh nevertheless, 
QRs are allowed in exceptional circumstances with the view to their 
elimination in a short period of time without reciprocal 
concessions. But, in practice, a decision has been taken that
QRs and other NTBs be included in the reciprocal negotiations.
The MFN is, however, the standard which is applied in negotiations 
on QRs.
Indeed, within the multilateral system, the request for
reciprocity caused difficulties for the LDCs who wanted to protect
their infant industries. A resolution,adopted at the GATT
Committee III of May 6, 1964. meeting,made recommendations to the
34DCs not to expect reciprocity from the LDCs. During the
Kennedy Round the Ministers also agreed that in trade negotiations
every effort shall be made to reduce barriers to exports of LDCs,
but that DCs cannot expect reciprocity from the LDCs. To this end
Part IV of the GA-, added in the 1964 Amendment, provides for in
Art. XXXVI:8 that "the developed contracting parties do not expect
reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to
reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade by less
35developed contracting parties".
Therefore, the principle of non-reciprocity was established
in GATT for the LDCs, although the attitude of the DCs has not been
favourable. During the Tokyo Round Negotiations, the principle
of non-reciprocity for the LDCs was reiterated, but DCs started
to press the more advanced of the LDCs, notably the NICs to assume
some kind of reciprocity. The former argued that the latter*s
economic position had improved and therefore negotiations should be
conducted to some extent on a reciprocal basis. For example, the
USA, as far as tropical products are concerned, made offers provided
that the LDCs should make reciprocal concessions. However, Brazil
and Argentina have already undertaken concrete steps in that
direction. In contrast, the EEC had not immediately demanded
36reciprocal concessions. According to the Tokyo Round Declaration,
however, LDCs are not expected to make reciprocal concessions Which 
are inconsistent with their development, financial and trade needs.
In theory, the same principle of non-reciprocity for the LDCs was 
reiterated /
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reiterated in the recent GATT Ministerial declaration, according
to which the CONTRACTING PARTIES '... urge contracting parties to
implement more effectively Part IV and the decision of 28 November
1979 (Tokyo Round) regarding "differential and more favourable
treatment, reciprocity and fuller participation of developing 
37
This insistence of the NICs on non-reciprocity is, never­
theless, under question. There have been arguments that their 
refusal to accept reciprocity has led to increased protectionism in 
DCs and therefore it turns out to be more detrimental to the LDCs* 
economies, in particular to least developed countries. Certain 
NICs, like Hong Kong, S.Korea ei should therefore make some 
reciprocal concessions with the view to a substantial liberalisation 
of LDCs* trade within the GATT framework.
The Principle of Universality
The GATT Agreement in principle accommodates the interests 
of both developed and less developed countries. It is addressed 
to all countries wishing to apply for membership, and it does not 
distinguish between the different groups of countries.
When the GA,was drawn up in 19^7 it was adopted by DCs and 
it has mainly been addressed to the DCs* trade problems. But, as 
the LDCs emerged gradually as competitors on the international trade 
scene, it was made necessary for their interests to be accommodated 
into the GATT. Therefore, the 1964 amendment was mainly included 
to meet this problem and Part IV of the G.A. was .added 
entitled "Trade and Development" and designed to meet the trade and 
development needs of the LDCs,
Accession to GATT, therefore, is open to all countries wishing 
to join it. Accession can be effected :
1. by signing the original GATT Agreement in Geneva in 
Geneva in 1947, or
2. by following the procedure of Art. XXXIII. In this 
respect an application to the GATT Secretariat is enough 
to enable the interested party to join under certain 
conditions /
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conditions provided for in this Article, or
3. by following the procedure of Art. XXVI:5 concerning
the accession of the newly independent countries being 
under sponsorship for a certain period of time and being 
on a de facto basis parties to the agreement.
To date, the GATT Agreement has become almost universal. 
Parties to it include almost all the industrialised countries and 
most of the LDCs. It also incorporates most Socialist countries. 
Prom the Eastern European Bloc all countries, apart from the USSR, 
have joined. Czechoslovakia was the first to join and retained 
its membership since 1955. Bulgaria is the only one having an 
observer status. Cuba also is a GATT contracting party, while 
China remains still out of this framework.
28
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NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE
As the GATT Agreement was to be a Chapter of the ITO Charter 
(Chapter IV), it was designed to liberalise only commercial policy 
matters and in particular tariffs. In this respect, however, its 
operation has been quite successful. It is worth mentioning that 
after the Tokyo Round only textiles had tariffs which amounted to 
more than 10%, but other NTBs, such as quotas and several other 
devices designed to protect domestic industries, have increasingly 
taken the place of tariffs and constitute at the present the most 
serious obstacle to trade liberalisation. Therefore, NTBs as such 
should be considered in this study.
Quantitative Restrictions
Quantitative Restrictions (QRs) or quotas, are administrative
measures which restrict primarily the importation of goods beyond
some specified amount permitted, in respect of quantity or value,
that is less than the free-trade quantity. QRs in contrast to
tariffs have no long history. The problem of QRs came up in
particular after the Second World War, when the post war economies
felt the need to protect their domestic industries, to keep up
employment, and to improve their balance of payments situation.
The USA in general preferred tariffs to quotas for controlling
imports. Its policy until the late 1970a was against the use of
QRs . During the ITO preparatory negotiations and the early days of
GATT, the USA opposed the application of QRs and any other measure
having equivalent effect. Finally, it was accepted in the text of
the GA., that QRs may continue to be used as long as they could be
justified by balance of payments reasons. Japan maintained QRs
on balance of payments grounds which were partially removed in 1963,
after extensive consultations with the IMF. The Japanese still
maintain under various devices many NTBs for controlling their 
39imports. Japan is the only industrialised country which has
imposed until now import restrictions on industrial products.
Residual import restrictions imposed by other industrialised
countries had ultimately been reduced by 1968 to a relatively small
40list of products, mostly agricultural.
It is regrettable, however, that after the USA monetary
crisis /
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crisis of 1971 and the oil embargo of 1973, NTBs and, in particular, 
QRs have increasingly been used by industrialised countries. A 
revival of various NTBs devices (eg. quotas) has greatly damaged free- 
world trade. An example of quotas is the establishment of VER 
Agreements, i.e. textiles, electronics, ejt whose proliferation
creates serious obstacles to the free movement of goods. Quotas are 
applied by the EEC in its relations with both sets of countries - 
industrial and third world countries alike. (See Chapter 9, p.272)
VER Agreements are considered in the context of the GATT, 
as regards their contribution to the development of the EEC's trade 
relations with third countries. The legal aspects of NTBs are 
therefore discussed in this section as a necessary prerequisite for 
evaluation and better understanding of current world trade problems.
The GATT Approach to QRs.
The GATT Agreement in general prohibits the use of QRs as a 
barrier to free trade, with a few exceptions under special circumstances. 
This prohibition is indeed one of the GATT's greatest achievements.
Arts. XI - XIV of the GATT are related to QRs. (See Appendix I. ).
Those four (4) Articles took up a very great part of the GATT
negotiations and are the longest and more detailed set of GATT rules.
Extensive discussions held especially during the London preparatory
negotiations and the drafting of the Articles, led to the "London 
41Compromise".
Article XI, entitled "General elimination of QRs" is very 
broad, applying to all kinds of NTBs, including all kinds of industrial 
and agricultural products. It prohibits the use of quotas or any 
other measures having equivalent effect on the importation or export­
ation of goods. It however provides for a number of exceptions to 
the general requirement to eliminate QRs, with particular reference to 
paragraph 2 (c) relating to agricultural and fisheries products.
This exception is of particular importance since trade in agricultural 
products is the most problematic area in international trade relations. 
Indeed, most of the QRs maintained by the DCs today are to be found 
in the agricultural sector, where the GATT rules are not very 
influential /
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influential and its efforts to promote liberalisation have not been
very successful. Another important exception relates to LDCs, who
insisted on the maintenance of QRs for industrialisation purposes,
and no serious attempt has been made to push them towards the 42abolition of QRs.
Nevertheless, Art. XII entitled "Restrictions to safeguard 
the balance of payments" is the most significant exception to 
Art. XI. It was especially designed and incorporated into GATT in 
order to help the post-war economies for a limited period of time 
to overcome their difficulties, and therefore it was not to be used 
after the Balance of Payments (BOP) crisis had passed. Recourse 
to Art. XII in the 1960s was not as frequent as in the 1950s. There­
after, Japan was the only developed country which invoked Art. XII.
This Article, however, could have been invoked in 1962 by Canada, in 
1964 by the UK, in 1968 by Prance, in 1971 by the USA, but all these 
countries had found another solution by the imposition of surcharges 
rather than QRs.^^ The exception to the use of quotas is made quite 
clear in Art. XII:2(a)(i) and (ii), where "QRs are permitted if 
they are necessary to forestall a threat of or to stop a serious 
decline in its monetary reserves, and in the case of a contracting 
party with very low monetary reserves, to achieve a reasonable rate 
of increase in its reserves". In theory it should be "an imminent 
threat" or "a serious decline to a country's monetary reserves" so that 
a contracting party may institute or maintain QRs and even in that 
case they "shall not exceed those necessary" and once imposed "shall 
be progressively relaxed as the conditions improve and be maintained 
only to the extent that the conditions ... still justify their 
application". (Art. XXI:(2)(a)(b)). QRs are also justified in order 
to help contracting parties to maintain or restore "equilibrium 
in their balance of payments". (Art. XII:(3)).
In fact, Art. XII reintroduces quotas for BOP reasons which
are forbidden in general under Art. XI. Art. XII is an escape clause
not only to Art. XI but also to Art. XIX. QRs on balance of payments
grounds, as provided for in Articles XI - XIV may be imposed as long
as the economic position of the country concerned justifies them, and
as long as other international economic institutions, in particular
44the IMF, in relation to the GATT rules, allows their use.
As /
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As far as the LDCs are concerned, there is a special provision. 
Art. XVIII relating to governmental assistance for economic development, 
is equivalent and corresponding to Art. XII:2(a).
Art. XIII in connection with Art. XII permits the use of QRs, 
but it tries to ensure that those quotas must not be used in a dis­
criminatory manner. It is related to global quotas which should be 
applied uniformly to all third countries and is one of the most important 
non-discriminatory principles embodied in the GATT. The MFN clause does 
not seem to cover adequately the problem of application of global quotas, 
and hence Art. XIII was especially drafted to deal exclusively with QRs,
The problem of QRs in GATT has recently led to talks on
"negotiating QRs". Particular reference was made during the Dillon
MTNs, to NTBs and more explicitly to the quotas provided for in Art.
XI:2(c) relating to agricultural products. During the Kennedy Round
some progress was made in this sector, but during the Tokyo Round MTNs
a significant achievement towards the abolition of all NTBs, including
quotas, was made. A number of Codes on NTBs were established, including
industrial and agricultural p r o d u c t s . M o r e o v e r ,  during the GATT
Ministerial Meeting in November, 1982, the CONTRACTING PARTIES decided
on the establishment of a group in order to review existing QRs and other
NTBs, to consider their conformity with the G.A., with a view to achieve
elimination of QRs which are not in conformity with the G.A., or bring
them into conformity. Also, to achieve progress in liberalising
other QRs and NTBs, it was provided that special attention should be
46paid to the particular export interests of the LDCs. As regards
the latter the elimination of quotas would be a contributory factor to 
their development trade needs, although it is not the only way towards 
industrialisation and development.
32
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OTHER NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
The substantial reduction of tariffs in international trade
resulted in the increase of imports and, therefore to a large extent
in the fulfillment of the aims and objectives of the G.A. Unfortunately
as soon as that beneficial effect took place, various other measures
in the form of non-tariff barriers emerged. During the Dillon Round
particular reference was made to NTBs and since then NTBs have become
the most controversial issue. As was the case with QRs during the
Kennedy Round Negotiations some progress was made on this aspect: the
47Anti-Dumping Code was established. During the Tokyo Round substantial
progress towards the elimination of existing NTBs was achieved. A 
number of codes on NTBs were established dealing with Subsidies and 
Countervailing Duties, Customs Valuationf^Import Licensing,Technical 
Barriers to Trade and Government Procurement aiming to supplement 
and clarify the operation of existing GATT provisions with the ultimate 
view to the elimination of barriers of international commerce. In
the external trade relations of the European Community their subject 
matter has not given rise to controversies and their implementation has 
not been problematic.
These Codes/agreements and some other codes/agreements or 
arrangements are the product of the Tokyo Round multilateral trade 
consultations and negotiations, the only exception being the Anti- 
Dumping Code^which is the result of the Kennedy Round. They have been 
brought within the GATT framework. They are considered as constituting, 
an extension and improvement of the system and they aim at strengthening 
the GATT. These Codes are rather an attempt to implement the GATT and 
the contracting parties accepting or acceding to them are subject to their 
provisions. According to the decision of 28th November 1979 (Tokyo 
Round) the contracting parties to GATT which have not accepted nor 
acceded to those agreements are not affected by their provisions. It 
was agreed that parties which have not signed the Codes would be able 
to participate in the Code Committees as observers.
It is important to note that the legal status of the Codes is 
not very clear. Do they have the same legal status as GATT? Do they 
have legally binding effects on the contracting parties? The Codes 
contain rules which rather indicate acceptance by signature or later 
accession /
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accession, or at least by practice, i.e. the parties which have signed 
or acceded to the Codes act in a way as if they were bound by their 
provisions. These Codes are negotiated under the auspices of GATT 
and it would indicate that they represent an expression of a creation 
of customary law because the two criteria of practice would have been 
met, and that they create rights and obligations on the contracting 
parties which have accepted or acceded to them.
If they do not constitute legal rules in a strict sense, what 
are they? What is their legal content? One interpretation is that 
they fulfill an important function by pointing towards future meaningful 
developments, which may transform these codes into clear legal standards. 
At the present stage they induce (based on the consent of the interested 
parties) voluntary adherence to them, and therewith usefully serve the 
interests of international trade. Another interpretation may be sought 
in the explanation that these Codes constitute agreements by virtue of 
the signatures attached thereto independently of the classical or con­
ventional requirement of ratification. Be that as it may, it should 
be added, however, that as long as they do not involve a binding pro­
cedure for the settlement of possible disputes they may be compared with 
the concept of lex imperfecta in civil law.
Special reference is only made to the Subsidies and Counter­
vailing Duties Code because subsidies in exported products, especially 
in agricultural products, are held as having an adverse effect on the 
liberalisation of international trade.
Codes on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties
Although not in themselves illegal under the GATT rules subsidies 
on agricultural products cause distortion in international trade and 
contribute to the depression of world markets. Subsidised agricultural 
exports by the EEC have become a major area of friction between the 
EEC and third countries, in particular the USA.
Subsidies are an economic advantage granted to an industry by 
a government in the form of money, goods, services, relief from taxation 
or other charges, such as social security contributions in a way which 
go beyond a simple support for production or export, and therefore dis­
criminate and distort trade.
No /
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No comprehensive definition is possible. However, several 
attempts have been made to determine what measures constitute subsidies, 
particularly export subsidies. In Chapter IV of the ITO Charter 
(Commercial Policy) subsidies were regulated, although in the 1940s they 
were not seen as a major obstacle to trade and therefore the ITO provisions 
on subsidies are not very strict. The element of serious prejudice 
was considered. Export and production subsidies were distinguished 
and Art. 27 envisaged special treatment for primary products. Art. 28 
provided that "no form of subsidy was to be applied which operated so 
as to maintain and acquire more than an equitable share of world trade 
in any commodity". Arts. 27 and 28 were actually transferred to the 
GATT Subsidies Art. XVI in 1948 and during the Review Session in 
1955.^ ^
A panel in 1948 considered the matter. In 1960 also, a GATT 
Working Party drew up a list of practices considered to be export sub­
sidies, but this list cannot be considered as e x h a u s t i v e . D u r i n g  the 
Kennedy Round the issue of subsidies and countervailing duties became 
more precise. A Working Party, established in 1967, continued to 
study subsidies and countervailing duties and this resulted during the 
Tokyo Round in the adoption of an agreement on interpretation and appli­
cation of Arts. VI, XVI and XXII of the G.A., known as the Subsidies 
and Countervailing Duties Code, which entered into force on 1st January
1980.
Subsidy is a very complex issue and the subject of one of the
most constant tensions in international trade relations. Subsidies
are widely used by almost all countries, either to support production,
or promote exports, especially in the present economic climate of
57slackening demand and high unemployment.
The consideration of what constitutes a subsidy and the 
criteria of a calculation of a subsidy and the determination of which 
subsidies distort trade is a very sensitive issue.
The question of what exactly constitutes a subsidy was one of
the most crucial issues in the DISC (Domestic International Sales Cor- 
58poration) case. In this case, the EEC filed a complaint under Art.
XXIII:2 of the GATT against the USA DISC tax practices, arguing that 
these tax practices were inconsistent with Art. XVI:4, 
prohibiting the grant of export subsidies and therefore that they 
constituted /
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constituted export subsidies. The most controversial issue was
whether this tax measure is a subsidy within the meaning of Art. XV I ' 4.
of the G.A. The Panel which was established, based its findings on
the 1960 GATT Working Parties' list of practices that were accordingly
defined as subsidies, but in its Report it did not come to any clear
conclusion about the issue concerned. Professor Jackson in an analysis 
59of this case, expresses the view that the "question of DISC tax 
practices being a subsidy is a very close one" and he further commented 
that "The Panel somewhat inconsistently and necessarily used some extra­
ordinary broad language which, if utilised in future disputes, could 
carry the interpretation of 'subsidy' very far indeed".
At the same time parallel USA complaints against tax practices 
of France, Belgium and the Netherlands were brought before the GATT 
Panels, which found that the practices concerned were inconsistent 
with the prohibition on the use of export s u b s i d i e s . D i s a g r e e m e n t s  
on this matter between the EEC and the USA have not been resolved, 
despite the establishment of the Subsidies Code which deals with some 
of these fundamental issues.
It seems, however, that indecisiveness and inconclusiveness of 
the Panels is due to political influence rather than to jurisprudence 
or other reasons. Broad interpretation, as it is found in Panel 
Reports, appears to be damaging to the whole GATT System. Such a 
broad interpretation is an expression of the non-application of the 
law mixed up with a degree of political interference.
(a) Subsidies as provided in the GATT.
Art. XVI of the GA.regulates the operation of subsidies.
Section A,Subsidies in general, provides no general prohibition of 
production subsidies, but an obligation to limit subsidies when there
has been a serious prejudice to another party. Accordingly, if a
contracting party maintains " any form of income or price support which 
operates directly or indirectly as to increase exports ... or reduce 
imports ____ it shall notify (it) to the CONTRACTING PARTIES". More­
over, "in any case in which it is determined that serious prejudice to 
the interests of any contracting party is caused or threatened by any 
such subsidisation, the contracting party .... shall discuss with the 
other contracting party or parties or with the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the 
possibility of limiting the subsidisation".
Therefore /
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Therefore, production subsidies in general are not prohibited 
while, on the other hand, they must not be used to cause injury to 
other countries and distort world trade. In 1978 during the Tokyo 
Round a compromise formula regarding production subsidies was reached, 
and it was recognised that certain practices may have adverse effects.
Section B of Art. XVI of the G.A. added in the 1955 Review 
Session, exclusively deals with export subsidies. It absolutely 
prohibits the grant of export subsidies in industrial products.
Primary products, e.g. farm, forest and fishery products, are differ­
entiated and export subsidies on those goods are permitted. Paragraph 
3 provides that "contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of 
subsidies on the export of primary products" and in any case "such 
subsidy shall not be applied in a manner which results in ... having 
more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product 
account being taken of the shares of the contracting parties, during 
the previous representative period
The definition of a primary product is a crucial question.
Primary products are considered those of farm, forest, fishery (minerals
and now excluded). But what about processed primary products? Are
cotton textiles a primary or an industrial product? A primary product
is understood to undergo only "such a processing as is customarily
required to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in inter- 
62national trade". Is therefore, wheat flour according to this defin­
ition a primary product? A very recent dispute between EEC and the 
USA over USA subsidised sales of wheat flour to Egypt raised this 
question. (This case is later discussed in Chapter 6, p.191).
However, according to Art. XVI, paragraph 3, export subsidies 
on primary products are permitted as long as they do not take more than 
an equitable share of the world export trade in that product based on 
the previous representative period, which is deemed to be the last three 
years. The phrase "more than an equitable share" raises a most 
crucial interpretative problem. What is equitable? Can it be consid­
ered as equivalent to fair? Who has the authority to determine that 
question?
A Working Party in the 1955 Review Session produced some 
recommendations adopted in the form of interpretative notes to Art.
XVI;3, Several Panels have studied the problem to discover and
evaluate /
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evaluate these difficulties. Their Reports are the only source for 
guidance in answering this question. In 1958 a Panel on Subsidies 
commenting on Art. XVI as a whole, referred in particular to the 
difficulty of assessing and measuring the effect of subsidies. This 
Panel noted that statistical measures are insufficient to define the 
concept "equitable share in world markets", although shortly after in 
1960 a Panel suggested that statistics "may assist in determining the 
effects of a subsidy and make one element in determining the 'equitable 
s h a r e * T h e  1958 Panel considered an Australian complaint against 
French subsidised wheat and wheat flour sales under Art. XVI:3 of 
GATT, according to which France had displaced Australia from its 
traditional markets in South East Asia and impaired its benefits under 
the terms of the G.A. The crucial question was whether the French 
assistance on exports involved a subsidy within the meaning of Art.
XVIÎ3. France drew attention to an interpretative note incorporated 
in Art. XVI:3 which recognises that in certain circumstances a system 
for stabilisation of domestic prices would not be considered as a 
subsidy on exports and went on to argue that the assistance to its 
exports fell within this meaning. The Panel concluded that although 
the French system had contributed to a large extent to the increase in 
France's exports and the present share was more than equitable, and 
that it had caused injury to Australia’s interest, yet it could not 
define that system as representing export subsidies within the meaning 
of Art. XVIt3 of the G^A. At the same time, however, the Panel pointed 
out the need for intergovernmental consultation and the necessity for 
some arrangements so as to take into account the interests of tradit­
ional suppliers.
Other Panels on Australian and Brazilian complaints against the 
European Community Sugar Refunds under Art. XVI:3, found that they were 
"not in a position to reach a definite conclusion" about the criterion 
of "more than equitable share in world export markets", although the 
European Community's Sugar Export Share had considerably increased. 
Particularly in 1978 and 1979 compared with the previous repre­
sentative period Australia's share, and even more that of Brazil, had
^  66 decreased.
From the above discussion on the definition of subsidies and 
the consideration of the concept "more than equitable share in world 
markets /
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markets" it is clear that there have not been developed so far 
uniform acceptable solutions and interpretative problems exist in 
almost every case. The Panels considering the particular cases 
have not reached any definite conclusions. Although Art, XVI ; 3 
explicitly allows the use of subsidies on primary products, the 
following paragraph 4 of this Article absolutely prohibits export 
subsidies on other than primary products from 1st January, 1958.
It is explicitly provided that ** contracting parties shall cease to 
grant .... any form of subsidy on the export of any product other 
than a primary product which subsidy results .... for export at a 
price lower than the comparable price charged .... in the domestic 
market ".
Therefore, according to Art. XVI:4 relating to non-primary
products barriers to trade should be eliminated. It was agreed
by the contracting parties not to introduce new export subsidies
in parallel with an effort to eliminate eventually all existing
export subsidies. Until 31st December 1957 a standstill was agreed
on the 'introduction of new or the extension of existing subsidies'.
This effort was not successful, however, but no further action was
necessary as the O.E.E.C. succeeded in abolishing export subsidies
67among its members under its liberalisation programme.
Under this programme and after the European currencies had 
improved their position, export subsidies on non-primary products 
were gradually eliminated. As the O.E.E.C. became O.E.C.D. and 
the development function was added to its tasks in addition to co­
operation, the GATT took on new importance. A Review of the use 
of subsidies was held in 1960 and a form of declaration was drawn up 
by the contracting parties. Thereafter only DCs accepted the
declaration, which had binding effects on their future conduct. The 
LDCs were not signatories to the declaration and therefore were free 
to use export subsidies on industrial products. It was the first 
time that LDCs were treated differently,. The LDCs are free to sub­
sidise their exports and they are unlikely voluntarily to change 
their practices, unless there are special provisions for their econ­
omic and development needs. With respect to primary products LDCs
should comply with the obligation expressed in paragraph 3 of GATT 
70Art. XVI.
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Where, however, an export subsidy on industrial products 
causes serious prejudice to the trade of another signatory, the 
matter shall be referred to the Committee. This procedure can be 
avoided if an LDC enters into commitment to reduce or eliminate
export subsidies when they are inconsistent with its competitive
71or development needs, (Special reference
LDCs' problems is later made in this chapter, p. 54.).
(b) Subsidies as provided in the Subsidies Code.
Two important questions can be put under the Subsidies Code.
1) Does it represent an improvement of Art. XVI of the GA., and 2)
Does it provide an adequate mechanism to deal with subsidies to 
relieve real economic consequences of unfair export subsidies?
Art. 10:1 of the Subsidies Code reproduces Art. XVI:3 of the 
G.A. retaining the concept of 'more than equitable share in world 
export markets' as a measure of obligation, but this concept is given 
greater precision. According to the Code Art. 10:1 "(equitable share) 
includes any case in which the effect of an export subsidy is to dis­
place the exports of another signatory bearing in mind the developments 
in world markets ", (Art. 10:2a) (Reference to Australian/Brazilian 
case is made later in Chapter 6, p.188). Art. 10:3 continues with the 
addition that signatories to a particular code shall not grant any form 
of subsidy which operates to increase the export of any primary product 
in a manner which results in prices 'materially' below those of other 
suppliers in the same market. This is an innovation and an attempt to 
improve Art. XVI:3. Subsidies on primary products under these circum­
stances are therefore prohibited. Production subsidies for promoting 
social and economic policies are permissible and export subsidies are
generally prohibited according to the above-mentioned provisions for 
72primary products.
The Code represents a slight improvement on earlier GATT defin­
itions. It clarifies general subsidies and there is, in addition, a 
list of governmental actions which are deemed to be export subsidies, 
but it has not removed the difficulties in the interpretation of 
"equitable share". It recognises the need for special and differential 
treatment to LDCs and the possibility for LDCs to use export subsidies 
for both industrial and primary products. Despite this, LDCs have 
criticised /
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criticised the Code as falling short on many of the important issues,
especially because it fails to impose an obligation on DCs to refrain
from subsidising exports when directed to LDCs' markets. Moreover,
LDCs argue that the Code fails to discipline DCs by allowing subsidies
to those agricultural products which are also produced in LDCs, and
which products provide LDCs with substantial export earnings. From
the LDCs' point of view, therefore, the Code provides no substantial 73improvement.
As a consequence of intense negotiations between the EEC and 
the USA, the latter has now accepted for the first time an internation­
ally agreed discipline on subsidies, that is the concept of injury.
The USA has to comply with the requirement of injury before imposing
countervailing duties, whereas before, under the USA law, the criterion
74of injury was not a prerequisite.
How effective the Code could be is an open question. It is 
not as detailed as necessary to deal with domestic aids which are 
directed to increasing exports. Subsidies are now used in the same way 
as tariffs and other restrictive practices which the GATT was establish­
ed to reduce. If the Subsidies Code does not prove able to reduce the
use of public subsidies, other means will be needed to achieve that 
75objective.
As far as the EEC is concerned, intra-community b«.rrtVrs should
76have been eliminated according to EEC Arts. 30-36. In the external
sphere the provisions of the G.A. in relation to the EEC Common Commercial
Policy are applied. (The direct effects of the latter provisions are
discussed in detail in the next chapter, p.86.). The Code on Subsidies
and Countervailing Duties and the Anti-Dumping Code are implemented in
the EEC by Council Regulation 3017/79, as amended by Regulation 1580/82
and in the ECSC by Commission Recommendation 3018/79 as amended by
77Recommendation 1955/82. Both these legal instruments, concerning
protection against dumped or subsidised imports from countries not members 
of the EEC, came into force on 1st January 1980. They contain similar 
provisions and are directly applicable in the member states which shall 
inform the Commission about dumped or subsidised imports. The Commission 
in turn shall communicate such information to the other member states.
The Commission of the European Communities is responsible for the 
application /
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application of the anti-dumping and countervailing duty law. It 
receives all subsidy and anti-dumping duty complaints, and investigates 
them in assistance with an anti-dumping unit whenever necessary. Under 
the Rome Treaty, the Commission undertakes all countervailing and anti­
dumping duty negotiation, but it has no legislative power. It is the 
Council of Ministers which has such authority. Under the Paris Treaty 
establishing the E C S C  , the Commission receives complaints, proceeds 
with investigation and has the decision-making power. Assisted by an 
Advisory Committee, the Commission makes recommendations for action to 
be taken.
Apart from export subsidies which are largely treated, pro­
duction subsidies are not correspondingly discussed, for it is believed 
that they are not distortive of trade. Most discussions in the inter­
national fora are devoted to export subsidies, with reference to their 
effects in causing distortion in world trade relations. As regards 
production subsidies, there is no general prohibition, provided either 
in Art. XVI of the G.A. or in the Subsidies and Countervailing Duties 
Code. The Rome Treaty as well does not explicitly treat this issue with 
regard to its external relations. Nevertheless, production subsidies 
should be given greater attention to the extent that, although granted 
for social and economic policy objectives, they usually result in over­
production and, consequently, can lead to distortive effects on trade. 
Production subsidies amount to the same results as export subsidies.
They can have, indirectly, equivalent effects to export subsidies and 
therefore the issue of the former appears to be very sensitive and some 
kind of control over production subsidies should be carefully considered. 
As far as the countervailing duties are concerned, they are a counter­
part to the anti-dumping duties which are levied in respect to low- 
priced goods. Countervailing duties can be levied when subsidies result 
in material injury in the importing country. That country can only 
impose countervailing duties when the material injury has occurred in a 
particular sector of the economy
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THE CONSULTATION PROCEDURE
The Consultation procedure provided for in Arts. XXII and 
XXIII;1 is an important élément of the GATT Agreement and the first 
step for the resolution of disputes. Arts. XXII and XXIII:1 consti­
tute basic GATT procedures and should therefore be analysed with the 
ultimate objective of the evaluation and better understanding of 
problems concerning the settlement of disputes in international trade 
relations.
Despite the fact that in the Geneva draft of the ITO, four
Articles were incorporated, one concerning the consultation procedure
and the remaining three the nullification and dispute resolution, only
79the first Article was incorporated into the G.A. Then over the
years the Western nations felt a growing need to co-operate and con­
sult each other in international economic problems. The habit of 
international consultation was indeed very well established by the 
early 1960s, especially in emergency situations. Consultation over a 
large number of economic problems became necessary. In fact, consult- 
tations should take place as frequently as possible and as a necessary 
prerequisite for the settlement of disputes.
Within the GATT framework and during the MTNs, where customs 
duties have been eliminated in world trade, the principal accomplish­
ment has been the establishment of a forum for continuing consultation.
Even hard disputes have been resolved after consultations have taken 
80place.
Art. XXII:1 states that "each contracting party shall accord
sympathetic consideration to and shall afford adequate opportunity for
consultation .... with respect to any matter affecting the operation
of this agreement" and, in paragraph 2, "..the CONTRACTING PARTIES may
... consult with any contracting party or contracting parties in respect
of any matter for which it has not been possible to find a satisfactory
solution through consultation ...", This procedure is of particular
importance to the small countries because they can ask to consult and
81they can be consulted as well.
Therefore, when a dispute between two contracting parties to 
GATT arises, the first thing the disputants are obliged to do is to 
conduct bilateral consultations. If the matter is not settled after
the bilateral consultations have been exhaused, the matter is brought 
before /
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before the CONTRACTING PARTIES acting jointly to settle the case by
83multilateral consultations. The procedure adopted by the CONTRACT-
84ING PARTIES on 10th November 1958 for the resolution of disputes by 
consultations is described in the GATT Basic Instruments and Selected 
Documents. (7 Supplement p. 24)
However, apart from Arts. XXII and XXIII:1 (Consultations under
the latter - see hereinafter in the Disputes Procedure Section), there
85are several other clauses in the GATT relating to this procedure.
In the case of the EEC, consultations are conducted by the 
EEC Commission, which has in fact replaced the member states and repre­
sents them in international trade negotiations in particular within the 
GATT framework. Although the member states are also present in the 
negotiations, exercising voting power, the EEC Commission has been 
tacitly accepted since the Dillon Round as the legitimate representative 
of the member states in GATT. (Further details about the EEC'p power to 
enter into international agreements are discussed hereinafter in chapter 
3) .
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THE DISPUTES PROCEDURE
Nowhere in the G.A. has there been laid down explicit and detailed 
rules concerning the settlement of disputes except for Arts. XXII
and XXIII copied from the ITO Charter. A proposal for submission of 
disputes to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) was not accepted. Likewise there is no mention of any equiv: 
aient provision establishing a GATT Court for resolving disputes or 
interpreting relevant questions. The CONTRACTING PARTIES acting 
jointly is the main GATT Institution from a juridical point of view.
Arts. XXII and XXIII, therefore, comprise the main dispute 
clauses in the G.A. These two Articles are the principal ones for the 
settlement of disputes and they provide the procedure which is to be 
followed whenever a dispute arises. Inter-related provisions
concerning retaliation are found in Arts. XII:4(c) and XVIII:2(c).
The procedure of the dispute settlement is as follows :
The first step is bilateral private consultations between the parties 
concerned. If they have been unsuccessful then multilateral consult: 
ation procedure within the GATT framework is used, under Art. XXII, or 
under Art. XXIII:1, when there is nullification or impairment of 
benefits. Subsequently, if the multilateral consultation has failed 
to bring a dispute to an end, a Panel or a Working Party is set up to 
consider the matter. Throughout the Panel or the Working Party
procedure, an attempt is made to resolve the dispute by conciliation and 
where there is a clear violation of the GATT rules to obtain a withdrawal 
of the disputed actions; then the Panel or the Working Party Reports are 
submitted to the CONTRACTING PARTIES acting jointly. Before the case 
is referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the Director General of the GATT 
is often asked to act as a mediator or conciliator in the disputes after 
consultations have not been successful. The CONTRACTING PARTIES have 
jurisdiction 'over the final disposition of the dispute procedure',
The CONTRACTING PARTIES acting jointly in the first instance may make 
recommendations or give a ruling. If these measures are not followed 
they "may authorise a contracting party or parties to suspend the 
application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions 
or other obligations under this agreement as they determine to be 
appropriate in the circumstances". (Art. XXIII:2)
It is evident, however, that the suspension is ineffective when
it is applied by a small nation against a large nation whose volume of 
exports 1 
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threat is often ignored by a large nation and as a sanction does not
really work. Finally, Art. XXIII:2 authorises official retaliation
and withdrawal from the G.A. as the ultimate sanctions. Under this
clause if the application of any concession or other obligation is, in
fact, suspended the contracting party shall be free to withdraw exclus-
91ively from the G.A. after written notice to the Executive Secretary.
Art. XXIII does not move, however, towards a more powerful sanction.
The measure which the CONTRACTING PARTIES should take is to authorise
a large number of contracting parties to suspend concession towards an
offending party, but this sanction is very weak. As Dam says "The
CONTRACTING PARTIES have manifested a great reluctance to authorise the
92retaliation that constitutes the heart of the GATT enforcement".
However, no other sanction is imposed on a contracting party
violating the GATT rules or acting inconsistently with those rules.
In order to invoke Art. XXIII there is no need for any breach of the
G.A. It is enough if the benefits of any contracting party are being
nullified or impaired as a result of the application of any contracting
party's measure when certain conditions are met, even though no other
party is responsible for this injury. Moreover, if a contracting party
violates its obligations under the GATT rules, and this results in the
nullification or impairment of benefits of another contracting party,
this is called "prima facie nullification or impairment" of benefits
93requiring counter-evidence.
Presently there is no direct appeal according to Art. XXIII by 
individuals. A private person can usually only make a complaint to 
GATT through his government.
Nevertheless, the waiver exception provided for in Art. XXV:5
constitutes a very important mechanism in GATT for the settlement of 
94disputes. Waivers are measures which constitute exceptions to the
GATT obligations granted by two-thirds of the contracting parties. They
legalise particular restrictions which otherwise would be illegal.
Waivers are mechanisms which not only help avoid disputes, but also
help settle existing ones and prevent them from being raised in the 
95future. Moreover, it is worth mentioning here some of the most
important disputes which have been raised in GATT throughout its exist­
ence. In the first two decades (1948-1968) about sixty (60) cases were 
brought against contracting parties to GATT with reference to Arts.XXII 
and /
46
■ ■ ■■ - V ' I;-
and XXIII. The majority of them are complaints alleging some violât-
96ions of the GATT obligations and on various matters. Clearly the
1952-58 period provided the highest number of disputes. After that
there was a decline in the volume of disputes, partly due to an improve­
ment in world trading conditions. During the interim period between 
the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds four cases were brought by the USA and
one by Uruguay which actually constituted fifteen (15) separate com-
97plaints against fifteen developed countries. Half of the complaints
brought before the GATT during this period, resulted in the settlement
of disputes by agreement. Only one, the Netherlands' complaint against
98the USA resulted in retaliation by suspending concessions.
The decline of disputes between the contracting parties to
GATT in the 1960s gave the hope that the disputes would be resolved
99between the disputants through conciliation. But this was not proved
true. The 1970-1975 period was characterised by a revival of disputes. 
Thirteen (13) complaints were initiated. Eleven of them were brought ' 
by the USA which seems to have at that time lost some of its power.
The USA threatened to withdraw from the GATT entirely and declared to 
some extent a 'trade war* against the other GATT parties, particularly 
against the EEC member states. ’ It became evident meanwhile that the 
GATT's legal system was unable to cope with major world trade problems.
During the 1975-1980 period not many disputes were brought to
GATT. The characteristic feature of this period is that most
complaints have been raised against the EEC's agricultural policies.
Most of them (six out of ten) after consultation between the disputants
arrived at a bilateral solution and terminated any procedure being
raised under Art. XXIII of the G.A. Nevertheless, four out of the six101can be defined as complaints brought against the EEC's policies.
Finally, during the 1980-present period there is a revival of 
complaints brought to GATT. The EEC's CAP is again the centre of the 
complaints, mainly brought by the USA against the EEC Agricultural 
Policy.
An examination of these last two periods of the evolution of 
the GATT dispute settlement procedure, and generally of the GATT system 
overall make it quite obvious that the EEC and the USA are the principal 
nations dominating GATT affairs. Their movements greatly influence 
the world trading system. (The particular disputes are examined in 
depth later in Chapter 6, pp. 183, 187).
The /
The EEC's existence, however, has had an impact on the GATT 
legal system, and especially on that of the settlement of disputes.
Even its establishment as a customs union had raised legal problems aid its 
compatibility with the GATT System is not yet definitely settled. 
Subsequently the EEC and the USA have become the central partners in 
disputes. It is not absolutely clear if the individual EEC member 
states would have been involved in so many disputes within the GATT 
system, but it is rather easier to conclude that the EEC as a bloc 
has had an impact on the increased number of disputes within the GATT. 
In particular its protectionist measures for the controversial CAP 
has led to a largely increased number of disputes involving the EEC 
and third countries, mainly the industrialised countries.
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CRITIQUE AND EVALUATION OF THE GATT DISPUTES PROCEDURE :
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM.
It is increasingly evident that the GATT does not work 
satisfactorily. In the current economic climate constraints in 
trade relations have developed and disputes have arisen between DCs 
on the one hand and DCs and LDCs on the other. Above all between the
USA and the EEC serious frictions are now more frequent than ever.
They concern in particular trade in agricultural products which are not 
treated in the G.A. in the same way as industrial products.
The GATT has not proved successful in accommodating the inter­
ests of the DCs and especially the interests of the developing world.
Its rules, obsolescent and increasingly ineffective, need some kind of 
reform. An overall reform would be greatly desirable: however, this
is not feasible at the present. Therefore improvements to the GATT 
system should be done on a small scale. Several areas in the GATT 
legal system need attention - e.g. institutional weaknesses, QRs, but 
above all special attention should be paid to the GATT dispute settle­
ment procedure. There is no doubt that there has been widespread con­
sideration for the need for the reform of the latter.
Historically, the dispute settlement procedure was based on 
the idea that the GATT might discUss trade problems in their early 
stages and thereafter, these problems would be dealt under the proced­
ure which was envisaged in the ITO charter. Due to these reasons Arts. 
XXII and XXIII appear to be weak and unable to deal with the current 
world trade problems. Over the first two decades of the GATT's exist­
ence, economic problems were not so pressing and enabled governments to 
co-operate at a satisfactory level. However, under the current econom­
ic circumstances, and the tendency towards protectionist measures, the 
institutional weakness of the GATT System, and especially the dispute 
settlement machinery, has become evident. The parties to the GATT 
seem reluctant to co-operate and they devise techniques in order to pro­
tect their domestic markets from foreign competition. Departures from 
the rules then is not an exception.
Therefore, there has been growing criticism of the ineffective­
ness of the GATT System and the inadequacy of its dispute settlement 
machinery, in particular that of the Panels or Working Parties. Severe 
criticism /
49
criticism has come from the USA, especially during the adoption of 
legislation and, in particular, of the Trade Act of 1974, when crit­
icism was expressed in Congress over the GATT law and its procedures.
It proposed revision of the overall System of GATT with particular 
reference to the dispute settlement mechanism. The criticism sought 
revision of the GATT System in order to bring it into line with present 
economic circumstances.
However, there are many obstacles in the reform of the dispute 
settlement system. The world-wide membership of GATT is one of them, 
thereby the required unanimity is impossible to achieve. Furthermore, 
the USA believes, as Professor Jackson says, that^the EEC has been 
among the more difficult obstacles to the potentiality of reform of the 
GATT Institutional System*. In fact, the EEC combined with the
Associated Countries is a strong force against USA interests in trade 
negotiations.
A great difficulty in resolving disputes rests also with the 
Panels which have not sufficiently developed. That is, the machinery 
for resolving disputes is rather ineffective. The Panel members are 
in principle independent of their governments and are supposed to be 
impartial, but in practice, they cannot act independently from their 
government’s policy. They are persons residing in Geneva and there­
fore known to each other. Diplomatic pressure and influence is always 
present. As Jackson says, when considering the DISC case "the polit­
ical forces (involved) are inappropriate as an adjudicatory procedure
103that needs to develop confidence and trust". Panels have been
proved inadequate to bring a dispute to an end. They mostly play the 
role of conciliators and frequently refer the case to the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES for further consideration. Lack of confidence in the Panels 
and the inadequacy of enforcement of their recommendations or findings 
is customary. There is no doubt that the GATT System needs improvement 
which can be achieved by reference to the rules of law rather than to 
political or economic factors. Professor Jackson supports the view 
that the most important of all is trust and confidence in the System.
He believes that sanctions are inappropriate at this stage and not 
welcome by the contracting parties. He acknowledges the inadequacy of 
the Panels and further argues that the establishment of a permanent 
"cadre of international civil servants" would help the System improve 
as a system of conciliation or adjudication. He proposes settlement 
of disputes by negotiation and agreement. He makes a concrete pro­
posal for resolution of trade and economic disputes, and suggests that 
if /
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if consultations have been unsuccessful, any member feeling unsatis­
fied may address a request for mediation assistance to the Director 
General of GATT who may offer mediation services if he deems it 
appropriate. He would make concrete proposals for improvement of 
the system even before a Panel or a Working Party is initiated. 
Professor Dam, too, expresses a more or less similar point of view 
as regards the role which the Director General can play. He argues 
that information should be provided to Panels or Working Parties 
either by certain contracting parties or by the Director General him­
self, who may be in charge of preparing a Report and who can require 
the contracting parties to provide him with relevant information.
The role which the Director General is called on to play is very 
important indeed in the improvement of the dispute settlement system. 
Therefore, advantage of this opportunity should be taken, given that 
he is in a more privileged position than Panels or Working Parties.
He has trained personnel, staff and so on, at his disposal and can
properly investigate the matter and reach a quick and concrete con-
, . 105elusion.
The role of the Director General as a mediator or conciliator
is favoured by many contracting parties and has been put forward on 
106several occasions.
In this context proposals for improvement and amendment have 
been made during the Tokyo Round. A Canadian proposal stresses the 
importance of Panels as being the most appropriate and major dispute 
settlement body. The EEC proposed that disputes should be settled 
by diplomatic arrangement rather than quasi-judicial determination.
The GATT Secretariat proposed that customary practice and an under­
standing on dispute settlement elaborated upon the customary practice 
should not be negligible in the dispute settlement procedure. Within
the 'Framework Group’ proposals have also been made, stressing compul-
107sory consultations.
A Brazilian proposal pointed out the inadequacy of the GATT 
system to accommodate the interests of the LDCs and the ineffectiveness 
of Part IV of the G.A, In the context of differential and non-recip­
rocal treatment of the LDCs’ trade, discussed during the Tokyo Round, 
the Brazilian Government considered that certain very specific except­
ions should be added to those already existing, in favour of the LDCs, 
e.g., a provision of a standing legal basis with greater security for 
the /
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the GSP while it could maintain its present non-discriminatory and 
ncn-rectprocal nature and a provision in the GATT to enable a DC to 
negotiate a "preferential" concession with the LDCs in the same way 
as they are negotiated under MFN rules. It generally points out that
the power-orientated GATT system might be changed to a more rule- 
orientated system for the benefit of the weak.^^^ The need for an 
effective dispute settlement and enforcement (binding) mechanism is 
everywhere recognised, but none of these proposals have been accepted. 
There should be no illusions whatsoever, that a unanimous acceptance 
is possible. In this respect it has been proposed that a separate 
protocol of the dispute procedure should be established and applied to 
the signatories, with the hope that a great number of countries would 
subscribe. Radical changes are unacceptable. Small-scale reform, 
as most authors s u g g e s t , i n  the improvement of the system, is the 
most appropriate.
There is no doubt that considerable improvement of the GATT 
legal system has been achieved by the negotiation and adoption of 
codes in the course of MTNs. As far as the dispute settlement pro­
cedure itself is concerned, no corresponding code has been established, 
but several norms and techniques for resolving disputes have been 
developing over the major tariff and trade liberalisation rounds. 
Nevertheless, there has been growing support for the establishment of 
a dispute settlement code. A panel of the American Society of Inter­
national Law, contemplating the adoption of several codes, suggests 
that a uniform procedure be established in resolving disputes. Also, 
it has been suggested that there be established a separate and independ­
ent dispute settlement mechanism for each Of the various agreements 
(Codes). Already in the Subsidies Code, and in the Code on Government 
Procurement, separate dispute settlement machinery has been established. 
This has been a decisive step towards the improvement of the settlement 
of disputes.
Therefore, a permanent body, constituted of independent experts 
known for their abilities and experience In international trade relations 
assisted by Panels or Working Parties, should be established for resolv­
ing disputes. That is, a decision-making body should be established, 
whose decision should have legally binding effects as well as an adequate 
machinery for enforcement of the findings or recommendations, or prefer­
ably decisions,of the appropriate bodies. It is believed that 
sanctions /
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sanctions at international level are not appropriate, but neverthe­
less, at international economic level some strong kind of enforcement 
should be established so as to strengthen and improve the system and 
so as not to leave it to the discretion of the contracting parties. 
The practice so far has demonstrated that retaliation is absolutely 
ineffective and therefore another stronger form of sanctions is 
required. Retaliation is useless if taken by small contracting 
parties. In that respect LDCs should be given special attention. 
They should subscribe to the codes and participate fully and effect­
ively in the dispute settlement and surveillance procedures.
In the GATT Ministerial Declaration of November 1982, a 
little progress was made in the improvement of the system. Although 
in principle, willingness of the contracting parties for amendment is 
apparent, in practice no effective measures have been taken for 
resolution of disputes. It is encouraging, however, that the good 
offices of the Director General are recognised although no formal 
agreement for consultation has been reached.
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■DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE GATT
The GATT system in principle accommodates both developed and 
developing countries’ trade, primarily that relating to industrial 
products. Agricultural products are included in this system, but 
they are not actually regulated the same way as industrial products.
The liberalisation process, however, is, in practice, almost exclusiv­
ely limited to DCs' trade which export the bulk of the industrial 
products.
The legal position of LDCs in the GATT is very important, and110many legal issues are raised. Does the MFN clause of equal treat­
ment apply or are different levels of economic development to be taken 
into account? Does the GATT sufficiently accommodate the interests and 
needs of the LDCs? Is the GATT able to offer a greater number of bene­
fits to LDCs?
The existing legal and economic order based on the principles 
of equality, non-discriminatory treatment and reciprocity, has become 
insufficient to accommodate the interests of the LDCs. As a result 
of the original system the gap in economic development between DCs 
and LDCs has widened. LDCs felt that they are exposed to discrimin­
ation within the existing economic system and the rules governing 
international trade. The legal framework centred around GATT has not 
been on the whole beneficial to LDCs. The liberalisation process was 
especially directed to industrial products of interest to DCs.
Products on which the LDCs had a comparative advantage have not been 
liberalised or have been later subjected to several restrictions, i.e. 
textiles subject to quotas. Also, the existing protectionism in 
agricultural products is harmful to LDCs’ export opportunities.
In fact, since the establishment of the GATT, efforts have 
been made so that more favourable treatment be accorded to LDCs. Art. 
XVIII relating to trade problems in LDCs provides them with rights and 
privileges. The Heberler Report in 1958 entitled "Trends in Inter­
national Trade" pointed out the need for export growth in LDCs and
that tariffs and other barriers raised by DCs were detrimental to
11.1trade in which LDCs had a special interest.
The culmination of these efforts was the creation of the United112Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, 
because LDCs felt that GATT was not the appropriate forum for them to 
get the desired modifications in the international trade system. In 
some /
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some ways departure from the MFN principle was the only answer to 
the development needs of the LDCs. With the addition of part IV 
in 1964, the MFN principle and the principle of reciprocity gave way 
to the differential treatment in favour of the LDCs. Part IV pro­
vides for an exceptional and more favourable treatment for LDCs, but 
this seems rather temporary and there is no provision for establish­
ing the legal basis for permanent preferential treatment in favour 
of LDCs.
The LDCs therefore have demanded further changes in the existing inter­
national legal order. Efforts concentrated in UNCTAD led to the 
adoption of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, the 
so-called New International Economic Order (NIEO) on 12th December,
1974, concerning, among other aspects of international trade, promot­
ion of development of LDCs, preferential treatment of LDCs and non­
reciprocal concessions. Meanwhile the North-South Dialogue was begun 
in Paris in 1975 covering raw materials, development and financing. 
Within this framework two reports, the Brandt Reports, have been pub­
lished relating to the development needs of the LDCs urging the transfer 
of capital and technology to the third world and the elimination of 
disparity among the nations. The Brandt Report I or 'Programme for
Survival* met with an unwillingness on the part of the DCs to implement 
114its proposals. The Brandt Report II or 'Common Crisis' published
in February 1983, is more concrete in its proposals, but its implement­
ation is still uncertain because the DCs are very much concerned with
115their economic problems at home.
Nevertheless, the need for a New International^oïviamicOrder is 
universally recognised. Proposals for modification of GATT have on 
several occasions been made. The modification of the existing legal 
system depends on a more active participation of LDCs. In the course 
of MTNs only a limited number of LDCs take part, although formally a 
great number of them participate in the GATT. Their bargaining power, 
therefore, so essential to this end, is rather limited. Consequently, 
products of particular interest to LDCs are excluded.
Nevertheless, there is a change in the Old International 
Economic Order today as far as the advanced LDCs, the so-called NICs,
117are concerned, and a great deal of economic power has passed to them. 
Subsequently /
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Subsequently the rules governing economic and trade relations should 
be changed to accommodate the new pattern of economic development.
The U.N. Commission of International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has already 
taken the first steps and in 1978 a Working Group on the NIEO was 
established to deal with questions of l a w . I n  fact, the existing 
legal rules and principles governing international trade have largely
become ineffective and obsolete and are in need of review, revision
-or extension. The GATT agreement is now required to take into more
3
I
•Ï.:'
serious consideration the development needs of the Third World. The 
only solution to the modification of the existing system which should 
be to the benefit of the LDCs, is that they must participate more 
effectively in the international decision-making process.
Deviation from the MFN principle and that of reciprocity has 
frequently taken place in favour of the LDCs. Arts. XVIII and XXIV 
and the Generalised System of Preferences are the most important appli­
cation of the principle of differential treatment in international 
trade relations. Nevertheless, this treatment in favour of the LDCs 
is on an exceptional and temporary basis. It was only at the con­
clusion of the Tokyo Round MTNs that the CONTRACTING PARTIES decided 
to initiate a differential and more favourable treatment to LDCs on a 
permanent basis, although the developed countries insisted on some 
kind of reciprocal concessions by the most advanced LDCs. The LDCs 
had strongly urged the permanent establishment of this principle during 
the Tokyo Round, since their initial objective of modification of the 
MFN principle was impossible, given that this would require unanimity.
The differential and more favourable treatment, or the so-called
■
‘Enabling Clause' negotiated within the 'Framework Group' in the course 
of the Tokyo Round MTNs, is the result of tremendous efforts made by 
LDCs to establish a permanent deviation from the MFN in favour of their 
trade, but it falls short of their demands to modify the GATT legal 
structure, which remains their long-term objective. Of course this
treatment designed to liberalise LDCs* trade must not create obstacles .1to other countries* trade, nor prevent further liberalisation at MFN
r a t e s . T h e  Enabling Clause, nevertheless, is a step forward. It 
provides the legal basis which sets up a permanent legal framework for 
differential and more favourable treatment of LDCs in international 
trade relations notwithstanding the provisions of Art. I of the G.A., 
despite the criticism that its provisions remain rather vague.
■
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Moreover, the establishment of the Agreements or Codes at the
conclusion of the Tokyo Round emphasises the need for special treatment
to third world countries, particularly for improving their position in
120the international framework of the conduct of world trade.
The Tokyo Round was called to eliminate not only tariffs but 
more important^ NTBs. The charter of the NIEO explicitly demands their 
elimination, but the perplexity of the NTBs' issue gives no hope for 
greater trade liberalisation. In particular, products of special 
importance to LDCs are not sufficiently liberalised. Agricultural 
products with the only exception of tropical products, which are of 
great significance to developing countries, are not sufficiently 
treated within the framework of MTNs. LDCs demanded that special con­
sideration should be accorded to their exports and, in particular, to 
least developed countries' (LLDCs) exports, in the application of NTBs. 
All the Codes contain, however, some important elements of LDCs' trade 
liberalisation but a lot of criticism has been directed against them 
as they are designed to protect NOrth-North trade from new barriers. 
Under the Subsidies Code, which is of particular importance to LDCs,
LDCs are permitted to use subsidies on both industrial and primary 
products. Art. 14 of this Code, specifically recognises that subsidies 
are an integral part of the economic development of LDCsj provided that 
they shall not prejudice the trade interests of another signatory. The 
Customs Valuation Code provides for technical assistance to LDCs. The 
Code on Technical Barriers to Trade, provides that LDCs "should not be 
expected to use international standards including test methods which 
are inappropriate to their development, financial and trade needs".
The Code on Government Procurement includes the LLDCs among its benefic­
iaries, even if they do not subscribe to the Code. The Code of ConductL2Lpromises a change in the rules of the behaviour of the DCs as well.
After the Tokyo Round a very important question to be considered 
is the implementation of the Codes concerned. DCs seem reluctant to 
recognise the need for permanent differential treatment of LDCs and are 
constantly demanding concessions from the NICs. The LDCs on the other 
hand, are not satisfied with the results of the Tokyo Round. They 
point out that benefits to LDCs are limited, because products of great 
importance to them are excluded from the liberalisation process, such 
as textiles, footwear, etc.; VERs and OMAs (Orderly Marketing Arrange­
ments) have dangerously proliferated; existing QRs are not negotiable 
and /
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and Safeguard Measures have not been agreed. The Codes could have 
been more favourable to third world countries if the LDCs had more 
effectively participated in the negotiations. Few LDCs, however, 
have subscribed to the Codes. Needless to say that it is in their 
interest to subscribe to them and more actively press towards their 
implementation, in particular, to the implementation of the provisions 
which are of interest to them.
The same treatment towards the LDCs is re-emphasised also in 
the GATT Ministerial Declaration of November 1982. The contracting 
parties are urged, a^.to implement more effectively part IV of the 
GATT and the decision of 28th November 1979 regarding "differential 
and more favourable treatment, reciprocity and fuller participation 
of LDCs", to improve the GSP, to reduce or eliminate NTBs, to strengthen 
the technical co-operation programme of GATT and to examine the pros­
pects for increasing trade between DCs and LDCs and the possibilities
123under GATT for facilitating this objective.
In conclusion, the LDCs have not greatly benefited from their 
participation in the GATT and in the MTNs, conducted under its auspices. 
This is particularly true for the LLDCs, for which no special reference 
is made in the GATT, even in part IV. The LDCs could have benefited 
further if they had been better organised within the Committee on'Trade 
and Development"in the GATT and more active in the UNCTAD. Subsequently, 
they could have made any necessary efforts to improve their position 
under the GATT system. Through UNCTAD they could successfully press 
for greater trade liberalisation in products of special importance to 
them. UNCTAD is indeed an important forum for international negotiat­
ions concerning changes in the world trading system. As an example, 
the GSP negotiated in UNCTAD in 1968 was later incorporated into 
GATT.
Likewise some concessions from the NICs may be beneficial as 
long as they are able to improve their situation and participate more 
fully in the G.A. In fact, during the Tokyo Round, the LDCs have 
affirmed that as their development proceeds they are willing to assume 
more obligations. Their attention, therefore, should be directed 
not only towards exceptions or preferences but also towards increasing 
their voice and also their responsibilities in international organisat­
ions, It is important for LDCs to be united and it is encouraging that 
they /
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they do so on a large number of questions. It is of great sig­
nificance that the pattern of world trade law has already changed 
from the MFN principle and that of reciprocity to the principle of 
non-reciprocity and differential treatment for LDCs, but there 
remains of even more fundamental importance the implementation of 
this achievement towards which increased efforts are required.
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CHAPTER 3.
THE EXTERNAL TRADE LAW AND POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
This chapter aims to deal with the legal aspects of the external 
trade of the European Community, with particular reference to commercial 
agreements, to association agreements, to the contribution of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the evolution of external trade law, 
and to the position of the Community within the international legal 
system. Explicit rules governing these aspects are provided for in 
the Rome Treaty, e.g. Arts. 110-116, 131-136, 228, 238 and furthermore. 
Acts of the Community Institutions have been enacted so as to regulate 
their development. These aspects will be discussed and analysed, 
however, as an important and fundamental pre-requisite for the present 
study.
International Legal Personality of the European 
Community.
The legal personality of the EEC is provided for in Art. 210 
which states: "The Community shall have legal personality".^
This implies that the Community, within the limits of its law, has 
the power to represent its member states in international fora, accept 
international responsibility and conclude international agreements with 
third countries. The Treaty, as the 'Constitution' of the European 
Community provides, therefore, the Community with the legal basis for 
its external relations.
The Community's power to enter into agreements in the external 
sphere and to replace its member states at international level is not 
only an external phenomenon, or otherwise a phenomenon of legal recog­
nition by third states, but also has its internal implications. It 
assumes the existence of a common agreement in the internal sphere 
which would entitle the Community institutions to represent the Commun­
ity and the relevant interests of the member states externally. The 
member states have transferred to the Community all the necessary power 
to conclude commercial, (tariff and trade) agreements under EEC Arts. 
110-116, but they have been reluctant to do so when agreements include 
more than commercial aspects, e.g. the association agreements incor­
porate not only commercial but also other aspects for which the member 
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states still retain negotiating power and therefore, they are not
included in the common Community policies such as aid, transfer of
technology. In this case the Community institutions act together
with the member states in the so-called 'mixed procedure'. Over
this issue, however, controversies between the Community and its
member states involving political issues, in particular that of the2surrender of sovereignty, have often arisen.
The Community's legal personality, however, in entering into 
international agreements has been largely recognised by third states. 
Most of these states have entered into agreements with the Community 
and have accredited diplomatic representation to it. Therefore, by 
doing so they have recognised the Community as an entity of inter­
national law. Some COÎÆECON countries and, in particular the USSR, 
have not yet recognised the Community, although in the early 1970s 
the Soviet leaders had expressed an interest to negotiate with the 
Community as such. But the Community had turned down the proposal 
obviously because it did not want to facilitate integration among the 
COMECON countries. Romania is the only CMEA country today which has3negotiated an agreement with the Community. The USSR has entered
into negotiations with the Community over fishing rights,but no4agreement has been reached. No other country has at least directly 
denied the existence of the EEC under international law. With part­
icular reference to the GATT, where the EEC represents its member 
states in multilateral trade talks, no participating country has ever 
raised this question.
The capacity of the Community to enter into international agree­
ments, either explicity provided for by the Treaty or conferred on it 
by Community Acts, is in fact a demonstration of its legal personality. 
The Community, in order to support its legal personality, may rely 
on the case law of the International Court of Justice which in an 
advisory opinion of 11 April 1949, acknowledged that "the U.N, had the 
legal capacity to make all international claims for the reparation of 
injuries even against a defendant state which was not a member of theL àU . N . T h e  Community can invoke this provision especially when a 
claim against her is made. However, the ECJ has lately extended its 
jurisdiction over the external powers of the Community and has 
strengthened and confirmed the Community's legal personality in its 
external relations. The EEC, in its concrete practice, has largely 
extended its external powers and has concluded a great number of Treaties 
with third countries, concerning mainly commercial issues.^
The /
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The Role of the European Court of Justice in the External 
Relations of the European Community.
The ECJ has since 1970 increasingly expanded the international 
legal capacity of the European Community. In the historic case of 
the European Road Transport Agreement (ERTA), the EEC member states 
themselves entered, in 1962, into an agreement with certain other 
European states over a common transport policy of the Community.
However, as this first ERTA never came into existence, a second ERTA 
was negotiated in 1967 and concluded, also by the EEC member states, 
in 1970. The ERTA case is extremely important for defining the 
external legal capacity of the Community, because it deals with the 
question of the Community's competence over external relations, 
especially where there is no express Treaty provision. The negotiation 
and conclusion of the ERTA by the member states provoked objections by 
the Commission of the European Community. A controversy between the 
Commission and the Council of the European Community had arisen over 
the extent of the Community’s treaty-making power deduced from explicit 
treaty provisions or from Acts of the Community Institutions. The 
Commission filed a complaint against the Council arguing that it, the 
Commission, should have carried out the relevant negotiations and 
asked for nullification of a Council Communique (of 20-21 March 1970 
Session) approving a "mandate to allow the member states to continue7negotiations for the conclusion of the ERTA".
The ECJ had to decide whether the member states were capable of 
entering into international agreements concerning Community competences. 
This depended on whether the Community has the capacity to enter into 
international agreements beyond the powers conferred on it by the 
Treaty, or deduced from Acts of Community Institutions. Meanwhile, 
Council Regulation 543/1969 providing for common rules had been enacted 
on transport policy. The Commission contended that it, and not the 
member states, had the power to represent the Community in the external 
field.
The ECJ in its judgement ^ held that when the Community enacts 
common rules in order to implement common policies "the member states 
no longer have the right, acting individually or even collectively, to 
undertake obligations with third countries which affect those rules" 
and when "such common rules come into being the Community alone is in 
a position to assume and carry out contractual obligations towards 
third /
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third countries affecting the whole sphere of application of the 
Community legal system", and it reaffirmed the doctrine of parall­
elism by stating that "with regard to the implementation of the pro­
vision of the Treaty the system of internal measures may not therefore 
be separated from that of external relations".
The Court relied on Council Regulation 543/69 and recognised 
the Commission's competence to negotiate international agreements, 
not only when such a power is derived from explicit treaty provision, 
but also from Acts of Community Institutions. Nevertheless, the ECJ 
did not go thus far to declare the ERTA as violating Treaty rules 
because pragmatic considerations had to be taken into account. The 
position of the non-European Community states was considered. Re­
negotiation of the ERTA by the Commission would have harmed Community 
interests in the outside world, in particular because negotiation for 
the ERTA had started by the member states before Regulation 543/69 had 
come into force. Another policy reason why the European Court of 
Justice did not find the case as inconsistent with the EEC provisions 
and did not order re-negotiation, was that the Eastern European 
countries would have as negotiator in
the Agreement.
In the next case, the Local Cost Standard Case ^ the European 
Court of Justice was requested by the Commission to give an opinion 
in accordance with the provisions of Art. 228(1),(EEC), as to whether 
the Community had the power to conclude an agreement (an understanding 
on a Local Cost Standard which would be established for export trans­
action within the OECD), or whether the member states had concurrent 
power in the field. _ The European Court of Justice at first considered 
that the understanding constituted an agreement within the meaning of 
Community agreements concluded with third states, and then went on to 
examine whether or not,the Community had the power to enter into this 
particular agreement; it also examined the nature of the understanding, 
and concluded that this understanding falls within the CCP provision of 
the Rome Treaty - i.e. Art.113. Accordingly, when a common policy is 
established, it is intended to serve the interest of the member states, 
and, therefore, it would be inconsistent if the member states had con­
current power in this field.
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The European Court of Justice in this case went further than / 
in the ERTA -case and confirmed the exclusive competence of the 
Community in the external trade field. This case, therefore, has 
particular importance for the discussion of our topic.
Another important case concerning the Community's capacity in
11the external field is opinion 1/76 of the European Court of Justice, 
on the Draft Agreement on a European Laying-up Fund for Inland Water­
way Vessels, The aim of this Agreement was to set up a fund in order 
to alleviate the economic problems resulting from over-capacity and 
fierce competition between inland waterway vessels on the Rhine and 
related waterways. Parties to the agreement would be the European 
Community (with the express participation of six member states - i.e. 
the Benelux Countries, Germany, France and the UK.) and Switzerland 
(because the Rhine-Moselle waterway has been largely utilised by the 
Swiss). There was in the European Community agreement as to the 
representation of the Community by the Commission and the participat­
ion of the above six member states in their own capacity. This was 
justified for historic grounds. This agreement was linked with the 
Mannheim Convention of 1868 and the Convention of 1956 on navigation 
of the Moselle, to which the six EEC member states were parties.
The Commission asked the European Court of Justice whether the
Community and Switzerland were entitled to delegate decision-making
12and judicial powers to the Fund. This case, however, has to be
seen from the point of the Community's competence to enter into inter­
national agreements. Arts. 74 and 75 of the Rome Treaty lay down 
proviens for the establishment of a common transport policy; but, no 
measures of implementation of this policy had been taken. In view 
of this and in accordance with earlier judgements of the ECJ, the 
question was whether the member states had the competence to represent 
the Community externally, or whether the internal powers of the Com­
munity would be extended to the external field. In its opinion, the 
European Court of Justice held that it did not matter that the common 
transport policy had not yet been implemented, and repeated the doctrine 
of parallelism according to which internal powers of the Community can 
be extended to external relations, and furthermore said that the Treaty 
making power of the Community flows from provisions of the Treaty 
creating the internal powers. This constituted a development of the 
principles /
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principles laid down in earlier cases. In this opinion the European 
Court of Justice recognised the Community's competence to enter into 
international agreements, even though no common rules for a common 
transport policy had been laid down. On the other hand, it did not 
reject the member states' participation in the agreement, reasoning 
that their involvement was necessary for the attainment of the pro­
posed amendments to the earlier conventions. The ECJ thus re­
affirmed its willingness to strengthen the Community's treaty-making
13power in the area of external relations. As Hardy puts it, 
commenting on the opinion: "This is one illustration of the Court's
pre-occupation with the need that the unitary nature of the Community 
should be reflected in its external relations - that is, it is the 
Community as such which should take its place on the international 
scene .... "
Another important case concerning the representation of the
Community to the outside world is the international agreement on 
14Natural Rubber, conducted within the UNCTAD framework. At the 
beginning negotiations were conducted by the Community and its member 
states, but shortly after, the Commission felt that it should exclus­
ively participate in the negotiation of this agreement and brought a 
case before the European Court of Justice under the procedure of Art. 
228 (EEC) and asked if the member states are capable of participating 
as well. The ECJ had to consider if the agreement fell within the 
context of the CCP and, if so, whether the member states could effect­
ively participate. On the first question the Court held that the 
matter fell within the CCP and the Commission therefore had exclusive 
competence to participate in the Draft Agreement, But in this spec­
ific case it went on to say that since the member states were to bear, 
together with the Community, the financing of the scheme (commodity), 
they too should participate in such negotiations. However, the Court 
held that until the matter of financing was definitively resolved 
internally within the Community, both the member states and the 
Community should participate in the relevant negotiations.
From the above surveyed cases, we can conclude that the inter­
national legal capacity of the Community has been gradually enhanced. 
The European Court of Justice has greatly contributed to this develop­
ment with the result that the Commission's views in all the cases
15since ERTA have prevailed before the Court (ECJ).
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The powers of the EEC in the external sphere, although limited at 
the time of its establishment, have, in the course of the time, been 
extended, with the consequence of a relative reduction of the member 
states* powers. The doctrine of parallelism as Hax’tLey says "has 
triumphed", and we can, moreover, observe that the ECJ has even gone 
further than parallelism to state that the EEC can exercise in its 
external relations more competences than that of the internal sphere, 
supporting thus the Commission's views.
Commercial Agreements
The commercial provisions of the EEC Treaty are the most impor­
tant and detailed aspect of the external relations of the Community. 
They are mainly contained in EEC Art. 110-116 relating to CCP, but 
they can also be found in other provisions, such as EEC Arts. 18, 19, 
27, 28, and 29 relating to CET. Under Arts. 110-116 the Rome Treaty 
empowers the Community to enter into agreements involving tariffs and 
trade with a great number of countries or group of countries. These 
are, in the following chapters below, distinguished as associated 
countries, industrialised countries, non-associated countries and 
state-trading countries, according to their geographical position or 
stage of economic development. These agreements cover a wide field 
including amongst other things, movement of goods and transfer of 
payments.
Arts, 110-116 lay down a common approach to trade in the exter­
nal field, which may involve, to a great extent, both economic and 
political aspects. Judge Pescatore has defined "the commercial policy
(as meaning) all measures intended to regulate economic relations with
17the outside world," The extent, however, to which a common commer­
cial approach to the outside world has been achieved is discussed 
below. The establishment of the CCP is indeed of fundamental import­
ance for the Community to the extent that it strengthens its unity and 
its future existence.^®
Art. 110, EEC, together with Arts. 18, 19 define the CCP 
objectives. This Article, also read together with the preamble to 
the EEC Treaty, emphasises that the object of the Community is to con­
tribute to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive 
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abolition of restrictions on international trade, and the lowering 
of customs barriers. This committment is further emphasised in EEC 
Art. 29 as far as tariff liberalisation is concerned.
During the transitional period (Arts. Ill and 113 (EEC)) and
19according to Council Decision 1273/61 (9th October 1961) , the
member states were to co-ordinate their policies and progressively 
standardise commercial agreements concluded with third countries.
These agreements were not extended beyond 1st January 1970. The Com­
munity would then undertake the application of a common policy and con­
clude trade agreements with third countries. Nevertheless, individual 
member states were left free to derogate from the Council Decision 
1273/61, and to take some measures of commercial policy until the end of 
the transitional period, provided that these measures did not constitute
an obstacle to the establishment of the CCP. However, according to20Council Decision of 16th December 1969 some national measures which 
did not present great difficulties in the establishment of the Common 
Commercial Policy could be prolonged for one year and in no case later 
than 31st December 1972. That would happen when particular difficul­
ties - economic, political and technical - were involved, which would 
make the Community’s involvement impossible. An example concerns the
COMECON countries, apart from Romania, with which still no Community21agreement has been achieved, for obvious political reasons.
With respect to tariff agreements, Art.Ill EEC gave the Com­
munity the task of negotiating on the basis of common customs duties, 
whereas the other aspects of CCP were to come under full Community 
competence when the CCP would be implemented.
Art.113 is the principal provision of the CCP, for it aims to 
regulate commercial policy measures after the transitional period.
It provides that "The CCP shall be based on uniform principles parti­
cularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff 
and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of 
liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as 
those to be taken in case of dumping or subsidies". Therefore, common 
principles were to have been adopted by the end of the transitional 
period and it is the Council which would proceed with the implementation 
of those principles. It is not absolutely clear under this provision 
whether after the transitional period the Community would be responsible 
for the conduct of negotiations and the conclusion of commercial agree­
ments. As regards the procedure, negotiations are conducted in accord­
ance with Art.113;3 by the Commission in consultation with a special 
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Committee (The Article 113 Committee) appointed by the Council and 
composed of representatives of member states. The power to conclude 
such agreements is vested with the Council (Art.114). A necessary 
pre-requisite for the negotiations is that internal agreement should 
be reached within the Community. In that respect, however, 
s o m e  controversy had arisen as to the method of implementing a 
common policy and the range and manner of exercise of the Community's 
external responsibilities. The Commission's view is that a related survey should 
be carried out. When for legal and other reasons, the Community's
negotiating capacity is limited, member states can conclude agreements 
with third states, as in the case of agreements with CO&ÎËOON countries.
Art. 113 (EEC) refers to the measures that can be taken in the context 
of the implementation of the CCP. Besides tariffs, QRs are also in­
cluded as regards unification of liberalisation measures. The EEC 
Treaty provides for abolition of QRs in the internal sphere but measures 
of export policy are left to be regulated by the CCP. Furthermore,
Art.113 is restricted to trade issues and it does not embrace measures 
such as transportation, exchange restrictions, ^  * Of course,
tariffs and to some extent QRs are measures that have been subjected 
to treatment under the GATT rules. In this context liberalisation in 
tariffs has been remarkable, but the use of QRs as protective measures 
of internal markets has been dangerously increasing to the detriment of 
world trade.
Art. 113 along with 116 is the most important in practice today.
Accordingly, it is the Community that conducts negotiations based on
uniform principles with third countries and organisations of an economic
character. The European Court of Justice has recently examined its
jurisdiction and the Community's competence over commercial policy in
the external field. Examples of such cases are the opinions 1/75
and 1/78. In these cases the Court has confirmed the Community's
competence and has decided that Art. 113 should be widely interpreted
25for the attainment of the objectives set out in the CCP orovisions.
The Court held that the Community is empowered to enter into negotiat­
ions in respect of CCP provisions without excluding altogether the 
member states. However, in every case particular circumstances have 
to be taken into account. In view of the Court's decisions, the 
Community’s capacity has been improved and strengthened. The member 
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states' involvement has had to be limited to matters belonging to 
their jurisdiction. The ECJ has tried to exercise a kind of control 
over external trade and has contributed to some extent to the devel­
opment of the CCP, although the member states still have a role to play. 
It is clear that, where no common Community measures have been taken, 
member states are left free to take any measure of commercial policy 
provided, of course, that they do not infringe Treaty provisions.
Art.115 EEC, provides for a procedure which enables member states 
after authorisation from the Commission to take protective measures.
This is, in fact, a derogation from Arts. 9 and 30-36 (EEC) which pro­
vide for free-movement of goods in any member state. It would be 
greatly desirable if member states would not apply Art.115 but the fact 
is that it is being increasingly used, although the member states re­
quire the authorisation of the Commission for any such measures,usually 
in the form of import licenses. The fear has been expressed that non­
application of Art,115 "would frustrate rather than enhance intro- 
26Community trade". In practice the Commission, following the lead
given by the Court, has been exercising close supervision of all actions 
of member states.
Having examined the legal aspects of the CCP as provided for in 
the Treaty, and considered the development of the commercial policy of 
the Community, we can finally ponder whether the Community has succeed­
ed in establishing a CCP in accordance with the Treaty provisions, and, 
if not, how far it has gone. Art.113 EEC provides that in the adoption 
of a CCP uniform principles should be applied. It does not expressly 
provide for the establishment of a common policy as such; only in the 
transitional rules (Art.Ill) is mention made of a common policy. There 
is no doubt, however, that common policy should be based on uniform 
principles but ihe provisions of Art.113 are not absolutely clear, and 
no details are given for the adoption of these principles. Different 
opinions have been expressed. One of them supports the view that the 
CCP is not intended to be really a common one in the sense of being 
carried out by the Community in the way the CAP is, but rather a co-
27ordination by member states of a policy based on uniform principles.
The concept of co-ordination, certainly, is less than common policy.
The procedure for the establishment of a CCP whether carried out by 
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co-ordinated action of member states based on uniform principles or 
by concerted action of member states is ambiguous. Furthermore, a 
comparison of Arts.110-116 with Arts,38-47 relating to CAP or with 
Arts,74, 75 with reference to the common transport policy, leave the 
reader with the impression that the founders of the Treaty were not 
exactly agreed as to the concept and application of the CCP or that 
they had realised the difficulties arising from the implementation 
of a CCP. However, if one analyses the concept of the CCP in the 
context of Community objectives and the technical necessities of 
international commerce and commercial policy in our times, he can 
come to a comprehensive definition of this concept.
The Commission, although supported by the European Court of 
Justice, is not able by itself to formulate a CCP. Of course, we 
must not underestimate its efforts towards the creation of a CCP. 
Nevertheless, the real power rests with the Council, which is com­
posed of representatives of the member states, and it depends on them 
to proceed to the implementation of a common policy. The approach 
taken by the Council is similar to that taken by the member states.
As P. Leopold says "The Council keeps balance between the development 
of the Community and the desires of the member states". The Council
seems to have no real intention to interpret these provisions and 
widely clarify them. Indefinite and unclear interpretations prevent 
the CCP from being fully implemented. Therefore, it is evident that 
there is no political willingness on the part of the Council to deter­
mine the application of the CCP. In fact, it is a matter of surrender
29of sovereignty which the member states have so jealously safeguarded. 
However, apart from this, implementation of a CCP is not only a Community 
matter. The CCP is addressed to the outside world and therefore exter­
nal influences and different economic, legal, political and social de­
velopments need to be taken into account.
There is no doubt that many commercial agreements have been con- 
30eluded by the Community, but not all areas of commercial activities 
have been covered under CCP, As an example tariffs have been regulated 
by common measures, but although highly relevant to commercial policy, 
they do not constitute the main part of commercial agreements. Whether 
all trade agreements should be concluded by the Community is open to 
doubt. This, of course, requires reciprocal effort on the part of 
third /
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third countries, parties to the agreements. For example, in the 
case of Eatern European countries, it has for purely political pur­
poses been accepted that member states can still have individual
co-operation agreements, but an obligation to consult the Commission
31fully on the terms has been introduced in 1975.
Numerous efforts, political activities, programmes and proposals 
from the Commission, have been made towards a CCP. As a result many 
trade agreements have been concluded, but despite this we are not in 
a position to conclude that CCP has been fully implemented. The 
increasingly depressing economic circumstances, the uncertainty over 
the legal issues and the involvement of political issues have made and 
will make the full implementation of a CCP very difficult.
Association Agreements
~  1  Although the concept of association is nowhere defined in the
Rome Treaty, Arts. 238 and 228 lay down the rules for its consideration; 
particularly, Art. 238 provides that "the Community may conclude with 
third countries a union of states or an international organisation, 1-
agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and 
obligations, common action and special procedures". Association agree­
ments do not only include provisions concerning tariff and trade matters,
■ii::but also development assistance, transfer of technology, capital flows, 
etc. The concept of association is much wider than that of commercial 
agreements and, therefore, the procedure of an association agreement is jp
more complex and stricter than for a merely commercial agreement.
Normally they constitute preferential agreements and, as such, they 
raise the question whether they conflict with the GATT law. The 
association agreements with the overseas countries and territories 
aiming at their economic and social development (131-133 EEC) had been 
sought to be included in the EEC Treaty as a condition of its establish­
ment (Haberler Report). Later, in 1973, when the UK joined the community 
she wanted her dependencies to have special links with the Community and
r g'g#she became partly responsible for the negotiation of the Lome I Cbnvention.LS
An association arrangement consists of two or more countries or 
groups of countries which grant each other, unilaterally or reciprocally, 
duty-free access to their markets of their domestic products or groups 
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of products, or access at lower than normal rates of duties. It 
is doubtful, however, if they constitute a free-trade area within Ithe GATT framework, although the EEC wants to define them as FTAs or
33 ' #at least one-way FTAs aiming at liberalising trade.
Three types of association have been defined:
(1) Association as a preliminary to membership of the European Community;
(2) Association as a special form of development assistance, and (3) 
Association as a substitute for EEC membership, (Further details in
Chap.5, p.140). For the conclusion of an association agreement, the 
Commission of the European Communities negotiates and the Council con­
cludes the agreement (Art.228, EEC) on behalf of the EEC, acting unan­
imously after consulting the European Parliament. The ECJ may be 
consulted, especially as regards the compatibility of the proposed 
agreement with the EEC and particularly if an amendment is required 
(Art. 236 EEC). Representatives of the member states, too, participate 
in the negotiations as observers to follow the Commission's work. The 
principal organ of negotiations is the Council of Association, composed 
of members of the Council and the Commission of the EEC on the one hand, 
and the representatives of the Associated States on the other. When 
association agreements include development aid provisions, e.g.
association agreements with the overseas countries, the ’mixed procedure'
36is used. In those cases, the Community and the member states can act
together in order to negotiate international agreements. These agree­
ments are called "mixed agreements” . Such agreements are ratified by 
the individual member states and also approved by the Council on behalf 
of the Community. A mixed agreement with particular importance to 
the Community is the Lome II Convention, negotiated by both the member 
states and the Council. (Further details are discussed later in 
Chap.5, p . 147). In the negotiation of association agreements with 
Turkey and Greece, member states were also involved. If an association 
agreement is a preferential agreement, and usually it is, in order to 
work legally within the GATT framework and in accordance with its 
rules, it must provide for the establishment of a customs union or a 
free trade area. The association agreements, especially those including 
development assistance, do not appear to be free trade areas, although 
the EEC argues in favour of this designation, (Further details are 
discussed in Chap.5, p .144 )
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International Agreements and Community Law
As has been discussed above, the Community has the legal
capacity to enter into commercial agreements with third countries
(Art. 113 EEC) or with international organisations of an economic
character (Art. 116 EEC). As far as commercial - tariff and trade -
agreements are concerned, the Community has replaced the member
states, since the date of commencement of the application of the CCP,
i.e. 1st January 1970, and has assumed jurisdiction in this area in
the sense that all rights and obligations of member states have been
transferred to the Community, However, when special circumstances
are involved (see e.g. Opinion 1/78) or for political purposes (see
e.g. Co-operation agreements with COMECON countries), member states
37can act together with the Community. The Community, therefore,
has exclusive jurisdiction in commercial policy matters and as such
represents the member states in GATT and conducts all negotiations,
participating as a contracting party, although voting power is still
exercised by the member states. The other contracting parties to
GATT have accepted this situation and thus far no contracting party
has raised the question of the legality of the participation of the
38Community in the negotiations.
The commercial agreements bind both the Community and its 
member states, according to Art. 228 EEC, which provides that Com­
munity agreements "are binding on the Community and on member states". 
Within the GATT legal system, therefore, which deals with tariff and 
trade matters, both the Community and its member states are bound by 
its rules.
39In the Polydor case the ECJ held that "by virtue of Art.228 
of the Treaty, the effect of the agreement is to bind equally the 
Community and its member states".
Concerning association agreements, which are wider than mere 
commercial agreements, member states can be parties to the agreements 
together with the Community in the so-called "mixed agreements". In 
fact, there is controversy as to what extent the mixed agreements bind 
the Community. They are certainly binding on the member states, but 
it is not clear if the Community is bound by the whole agreement or 
only by the parts which fall within its jurisdiction. The International 
Fruit Company case is rather favourable to the second solution, although 
disadvantages /
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40disadvantages are recognised.
It is believed that agreements concluded by the member states
prior to the establishment of the Community bind not only the member
states but the Community too. It is Art. 234 EEC, which provides
that "the rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded
before the entry into force of this Treaty between one or more member
states on the one hand and one or more third states on the other shall
not be affected by the provisions of this Treaty". This has proved
to be particularly true in the International Fruit Company case.
When the GATT was established in 1947, the individual (later EEC)
member states became parties to it and subsequently the Community
succeeded the member states to their rights and obligations, and
since the Dillon Round it has participated in GATT negotiations. The
Community has become if not de jure certainly a ^  facto contracting
party to GATT and it is bound in the same way as agreements concluded
under Art. 228 EEC. The European Court of Justice has, in a number
of cases, ruled that the Community is bound by GATT in accordance with
41international legal principles.
In the above context, the question of a relationship between 
Community law and international law is apparent. The question of 
primacy or non-primacy of international law over Community law has 
been discussed and that of direct effect has been upheld by the ECJ in 
several judgements. According to the constitutional provisions of 
a number of countries, rules of general international law have been 
in principle accepted (Italy, USA) as having binding effects, although 
a distinction between general international law and international agree­
ments should be drawn. ^ In the (Commission v. the UK) Fisheries case^^ 
the ECJ held that the Community should respect all rules of general 
international law. Of course, the formation of the EEC is a new pheno­
menon in the international trade scene, and the relationship between 
international law and Community law assumes a peculiar and rather diffi­
cult character. One could say that the Community, in respect of GATT» 
has succeeded the member states according to the rules of international 
law. According to this interpretation, the Community has become sub­
ject to the rights and obligations previously possessed by its member 
states and even by one of them as explicitly referred in Art. 234 EEC. 
Based on this reasoning, the ECJ held in the International Fruit Company 
case that the Community is bound by the GATT. In that case, the 
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the Community had, in the context of the implementation of its CAP, 
imposed QRs on imports of apples from third countries to the 
Community. The International Fruit Company, as the importer of 
apples into the Netherlands, argued that QRs imposed by the Community 
were illegal and brought the case before the Dutch Courts. The Dutch 
Court held that QRs were contrary to Art. XI of the G.A. and, therefore, 
according to Art. 177 EEC referred the case to the ECJ for a prelimin­
ary ruling. QRs are aspects covered by the Community CCP, and in that 
respect the Community has explicit treaty-making power.
The ECJ examined in the first place whether or not it had 
Jurisdiction in the case, and upheld its own Jurisdiction on the grounds 
that its function is to ensure the uniform interpretation and applicat­
ion of community agreements and that these agreements to which the 
Community is a party constitute Community law. Therefore, the ECJ 
has Jurisdiction in commercial agreements (in respect of which the
Community has exclusive treaty-making power) and the power to interpret 
44them.
45In the International Fruit Company Case the ECJ accepted
the binding effects of the GATT agreement on the Community. In the
ERTA case there was no explicit reference to the binding effects of
the ERTA agreement on the Community, although it could be implied that
the Community was bound by the agreement even though it was not a party
47to it. In the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention case, it 
is probable that the Community would be bound by the Agreement as soon 
as it was concluded. However, this particular issue, i.e. the direct 
effects of the GATT has no longer raised difficulties as it is widely 
recognised that international agreements have binding effects on the 
Community.
On the other hand, the issue of direct effect of international
agreements within the Community legal system, that is, the right of
individuals to invoke them before their national courts, has not yet
48been absolutely settled. Within the Community legal system, the
issue has been well settled. In the historic case of Van Gend en
Loos, the ECJ recognised the direct effects of Community rules in
49the national legal systems. This issue was further developed by
the subsequent case-law of the ECJ. The concept of direct effects 
of international agreements involves, however, three legal systems - 
International, Community and National legal systems In several
countries international agreements have been recognised as having 
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binding effects; e.g. Italy has declared certain international 
agreements directly applicable. The ECJ has dealt with this concept 
of direct effects of international agreements concluded by the Com­
munity exclusively or the Community and its member states in a number 
of cases, but its case-law is not conclusive.
In the International Fruit Company and in Schlutter cases,
concerning the compatibility of certain Community Acts with Arts, XI
and II of the GATT respectively, the ECJ in these early judgements
was much concerned with the direct effect of GATT provisions in the
Community legal system. Likewise, in Haegeraann and Schroeder
concerning infringement of a provision of the association agreement
with Greece by a Community Regulation, the issue of direct effects53was raised. Bresciani dealt with a provision of a Yaounde Con­
vention of 1963 and it is examined from the point of view of its 
direct effects into the Community legal system.
In the International Fruit Company and Schlutter cases, the
issue in question was whether individuals could invoke Arts.XI and II
of the GATT before national courts. The International Fruit Company
could only succeed if Art,XI had direct effects in the Netherlands
legal system. The Court recognised that the GATT provisions were
very flexible and also that the G.A. provided (Arts.XXII and XXIII)
for consultations and settlement of disputes. It has traditionally
been accepted that if the Treaty provides for settlement of disputes,
it is unlikely that the Treaty is directly applicable, since its
applicability before national courts would provide for another more
54effective system of enforcement. The ECJ stated that GATT re­
sembled other international agreements usually characterised by flex­
ibility; it therefore concluded that ''GATT was not capable of con­
ferring rights on citizens which could be invoked before the Courts". 
The view has been expressed that since GATT is an international agree­
ment, concluded under the rules of international law, it is consequent 
that international rules and principles should apply to determine its 
applicability, not only at Community but also at national level.
The ECJ appears to favour the view thAt international law could deter­
mine the direct applicability of international agreements.
In the International Fruit Company and Schluter cases, the ECJ 
was very concerned about the direct applicability of GATT rules, and 
in both cases it denied the possibility of direct effects of the GATT 
provisions /
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provisions in the Community legal system. In both cases the 
reasoning of the Court was quite broad and might apply to other GATT
57provisions as well. Commenting on these particular cases M.Waelbroeck 
expressed the view that the ECJ should abandon its strict criteria as 
to determine the direct applicability of international agreements, and 
also stressed that the ECJ should reconsider its stance in the Inter­
national Fruit Company and Schluter cases with the ultimate objective 
of accepting the direct applicability concept, and not of distinguish­
ing between the internationally binding character of GATT and its lack 
of direct effects. The Court denied the direct applicability of the 
relevant GATT provisions, taking into consideration the flexibility 
of the GATT Agreement and its dispute settlement mechanism.
In later cases the ECJ was not so much concerned about direct
58effects. In the Schroeder case, concerning the compatibility of
certain provisions of the association agreement with Greece with the
Community law, the Court did not examine the direct effects of the
59agreement. In The Nederlandse Spoorwegen case, the ECJ proceeded 
to its judgement without examining the question of direct effects of 
Provision II of the G.A. In this case, the applicant had imported, 
into the Netherlands from a third country, a zerographic duplicator 
for the reproduction of documents. The Dutch custom authorities had 
classified the apparatus under the heading 'photographic cameras' 
instead of 'other office machines' as the applicant contended, and 
had charged higher customs duties. According to the applicant, the 
Dutch authorities had contravened Act II of GATT. In turn, the Dutch 
court (The Tariefcommissie) asked the ECJ whether the Dutch court is 
bound to consider and apply Community Acts which contravene GATT pro­
visions.
In the Bresciani case the issue concerned the direct effect 
of a provision of the Yaounde Convention of 1963 concluded by the 
Community and its member states with 19 African and Madagascar states.
The question was whether Art. 2:1 of the Convention, prohibiting 
member states from imposing custom duties and charges having equiva­
lent effect on imports from associated countries, had direct 
effect and could be invoked in national courts - in this case in Italy 
The ECJ recognised that this specific provision had direct effects. It 
based its findings on the special nature of the objectives of the 
Convention / :|
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Convention and paid particular attention to the special economic and 
political links of the Community with the associated countries. This 
was the first case in which the Community recognised direct effects 
of a provision of a Community agreement, and as such this case stands 
as one of particular importance.
In the Polydor case the Community had concluded an agreement 
with Portugal. It concerned the production and distribution of records 
in Portugal. In Britain the owner of an English copyright of the records 
wanted to prevent the records in question from coming into Britain and 
insisted that his copyright had been infringed. The defendant, who had 
legally produced and marketed the products in Portugal, argued that 
such a measure was equivalent to QRs. He invoked before the Portuguese 
Court Arts.1 and 23 of the Agreement with Portugal, which prohibited 
Quantitative Restrictions, arguing furthermore that this agreement pro­
duced direct effects and therefore it was applicable in the national 
legal system.
The ECJ, considering these questions, held that the objectives 
of the agreement were to eliminate customs duties and charges having 
equivalent effect, including quantitative restrictions, and that the 
provisions of Arts.14 and 23 of the agreement were similar to Articles 
30-36 EEC, relating to the free movement of goods. The ECJ considered 
the nature, the objectives of the agreement, and moreover, compared the 
differences between the EEC Treaty and Arts,14 and 23 of the agreement 
concerned. As far as the direct effect of the agreement is concerned, 
the Court stated that Art.23 did not constitute a measure having equiva­
lent effect to QRs and there was, the:^eforë, no need to consider its 
direct effect. As regards Art.14, the Court did not examine its direct 
effect at all. Finally, the ECJ concluded that the agreement had 
binding effects on the Community and on the member states, but did not 
go further to examine the issue of direct effects, although one of the 
parties expressed the view that the agreement should be interpreted 
according to the rules of international treaties and agreements.
62In the Pabst case an individual brought an action against the 
German state monopoly in spirits for infringing a provision of the 
association agreement with Greece, concerning fiscal discrimination.
A temporary tax relief was granted to producers and importers of spirits 
in Germany in the course of adjustment to the new tax situation; the 
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tax relief measure favoured domestic spirits. The referring German
Court (The Finanzgericht) asked inter alia whether Art.53 of the
association agreement with Greece, which was similar to Art.95 EEC,
could confer rights on individuals to claim the same treatment as
that granted to domestic spirits. The ECJ concluded that Art.53
of the relevant agreement had exactly the same effect as Art.95 and
therefore declared it directly applicable. The ECJ took this
decision relying on the nature and the objectives of the agreement;
mainly on the fact that this agreement was of temporary nature being
63preparatory for Greece's accession into the European Community.
64On the other hand in Haegemann, which also concerns the
association agreement with Greece, but from a different perspective 
(countervailing duties imposed on Greek wines, involving interpretation 
of Protocol No.14, annexed to the association agreement), the concept 
of direct effect was not even raised.
In Kupferberg which more or less concerns similar questions 
as in the Pabst case, i.e. the rate of monopoly equalisation duty 
imposed on imports of port wine from Portugal, the ECJ inquired whether 
this provision, which prohibits discrimination of imported products, 
had direct effect and if so whether it had the same meaning as Art.95:1 
of the EEC Treaty. In this case a free-trade agreement between the 
Community and Portugal had been concluded. The Court^putting particular 
emphasis on the fact that a free-trade agreement was involved, considered 
the principle of reciprocity, but it rejected the view put forward that 
an agreement may have direct effect in the legal order of any contracting 
party only when the other party recognises such an effect. Although the 
Court stated that a single free-trade agreement does not in itself justify 
direct effects, and furthermore, that neither the nature nor the objectives 
of the agreement justify direct effects, nor special links with the 
Community are established as in Bresciani, nor future membership is 
envisaged as in Pabst, it nevertheless went on to favour the direct 
effects of the agreement. In the last cases and, in particular, in 
Kupferberg, the tendency of the Court now has been to uphold the direct 
effect of international agreements.
In the Société Italiana v. Ministero delle Finanze and delle 
Marina Mercantile case concerning fiscal arrangements of goods in 
transit between Italy and Austria, the referring Italian Court inquired 
of the ECJ inter alia what was the effect within the Community, of the 
GATT /
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GATT and the interpretation of Art.V of GATT relating to freedom on 
transit. The ECJ, as regards the direct effects of Art.V of GATT 
within the Community legal system, based its findings on previous 
cases relating to similar questions (e.g. joined cases 21-24/1972, 
International Fruit Company cases) and concluded that "(Art.V) can­
not have direct effect under Community Law" and therefore "individuals 
may not rely upon it ...."
Having in this section considered the relationship between 
international agreements and Community law, we may distinguish 
between the effect of international agreements on the Community legal 
system and their direct effect on the national legal systems. Con­
cerning the first question, i.e. the primacy of international law, it 
has widely been accepted that international agreements have binding 
effect on the Community legal system. In particular, as far as the 
GATT is concerned, the International Fruit Company case has clearly 
established this principle. In the ERTA case, and in respect of the 
North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention, the same principle is in­
directly recognised. In the Schluter and in the Nederlandse Spooiwegen
67cases referred above, as well as in some other recent cases the
binding effect of the GATT law over the Community law has also been 
accepted as a rule.
As regards the second question, i.e. the direct effect of 
international agreements on national legal systems, we may say that 
the Court's decisions lead to no definite conclusions. Firm rules 
have not been established through the case-law. In Bresciani, Pabst, 
Kupferberg cases, although the nature and the objectives of the agree­
ments are different, they have all been declared directly applicable.
It seems that the overall objectives of the agreements play a decisive 
role. As Bebr rightly observes "(the ECJ's) case law hardly 
reveals whether the Court applies the same standards for direct effect 
to agreements as it does to the Treaty provisions, or whether it differ­
entiates between them for which there would be good grounds". It is 
remarkable, however, that although the Court has denied direct effects 
to international agreements in the first cases, e.g. International 
Fruit Company case, Schluter case, in the later cases it seems to have 
upheld the tendency to favour the direct effect of international agree­
ments. Such a tendency, which is favoured by most writers, would be 
in line with national treatment, which through constitutional changes, 
has /
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has accepted the supremacy of international agreements on national
legal orders. This demonstrates the fact that international trade
law with due regard to the GATT law is increasingly directly effective
on the Community legal order. When the notion of direct effects is
well established it will give the individual the right to invoke certain
rules of international trade law before its national courts. For
example, as we have seen in the International Fruit Company case, it,
the company, would only have succeeded if Art. XI of the GATT had direct The. ot«a.s>'tfc?n of q iV ec t e6Fec6s oP effects, i\ international agreements concerning trade relations of the
EEC is an important legal issue with which the ECJ has dealt. The ECJ
in order to justify its concerns has had to take into account specific
situations in different circumstances_and this explains why, for the
tijne ^eing, no firm rules have been established in this developing area
of international law. The tendency of the Court, however, to uphold
the direct effects of international agreements is certain to increase
confidence in the international trading system by giving the right to
individuals to invoke the rules of international trade law before their
national courts. Furthermore, it (tendency) would facilitate uniform
interpretation and application of the GATT rules within the Community
legal order, it would safeguard the application of the CCP, with the
consequence of avoiding distortions of international trade. When the
notion of direct effects is well established by the ECJ, (which seems
to be only a matter of time), the individual will generally be given
this right. However, there is no doubt that this is a new area of
law where a constructive relationship between domestic, Community and
international law is progressively developing.
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PART II
CHAPTER 4,
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN THE GATT: THE EXAMPLE OF THE EEC.
Regional Arrangements and GATT Article XXIV.
The MFN principle provided for in Art.I of the G.A. is the most
important non-discrimination clause of the agreement. (For further
information see above chapt. 2, p.22 ). Although uniform application
of this principle is urged, a number of exceptions to MFN obligations
to GATT are provided for, the most significant of which are laid down
in Art. X par.2 and Art.XXIV of the G.A.; both relate to preferential
trade agreements. Art. 1:2 of the GATT agreement provides for the
continued operation of preferences established prior to the coming1into force of the G.A. Art. XXIV, which is arguably the most contro­
versial, disputed and abused provision of the G.A. permits regional 
economic arrangements, such as customs unions, free-trade areas and 
interim agreements leading to either of them, to operate lawfully 
under the agreement.
The spirit and basic tenets of the MFN principle, is also found 
in the Community legal system as a pillar underlying it. The most 
significant application of this spirit in the EEC is Incorporated in 
Art.7 which prohibits any discrimination between Community nationals 
Art. 40:3 EEC, prohibits discrimination between producers and con­
sumers in relation to agriculture. Art.86 EEC, relating to the 
competition policy of the Community, prohibits discrimination between 
consumers, where a supplier in a dominant position may discriminate 
against consumers in terms of different prices, different conditions 
of delivery, payments, etc. Art. 119 EEC, establishes the principle3of equality of payment for equal work regardless of sex. Likewise, 
Art, 95 EEC, relating to internal taxation, provides that "No member 
state shall impose directly or indirectly on the products of other 
member states any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that 
imposed directly or indirectly on similar domestic products". This 
article aims to eliminate internal discrimination on taxation and 
facilitate the free flow of goods within the Community. A series of 
cases /
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cases have been brought before the ECJ against certain member states
4because of the way they taxed alcoholic beverages.
/The ECJ has on several judgements based its decisions on the 
principle of equality when considering various matters. In the 
Frilli V. Belgium case, it held that there is a general principle of 
non-discrimination in Community law.^ In the skiramed-milk powder .mcase, the question of discriminatory treatment in regard to Art.40:3 
was considered.^ The question of discrimination on the grounds of 
sex, nationality, religious faith, has, on several caseg,been con-7sidered by the ECJ.
Therefore, the EEC Treaty incorporates the general principle of 
non-discrimination as a fundamental foundation of its legal system. 
This principle has, subsequently, been implemented and strengthened 
by the ECJ in the course of its case law with the ultimate objective 
of developing it even further and providing the necessary framework 
for the full protection of individuals.
Regional arrangements are not a new phenomenon. International 
and regional integration as is referred earlier in Chapter 2 (p.9 
and following, and in particular at p.13 ) has its foundations in 
international trade theories, in particular in the classical theory 
of comparative advantage and specialisation. Specifically, in the 
commercial treaties of the last centuries, there had been provisions 
relating to regional arrangements that had long been considered as an 
exception to the idea of the MFN principle. In the ITO/GATT pre­
paratory negotiations the issue of regional arrangements was long 
discussed. The first ITO draft contained only provisions relating
to customs unions, but the Havana charter included provisions relating8to free-trade areas as well. After the Havana Conference, the ITO
Article on regional integration was carried into GATT.^ The USA
favoured the formation of customs unions and free-trade areas for
political reasons and it saw them as a means of exercising political
influence on other states, even though regional arrangements might
10not be advantageous to its own economy. The LDCs pressed also
for the exception of regional arrangements, to which they were parties 
from MFN obligations, so that they would benefit by entering into 
regional arrangements, broaden their markets and expand their develop­
ment programs.
Since /
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Since the establishment of GATT and, most particularly, since 
the formation of the EEC in 1958, numerous regional arrangements, 
such as customs unions, free-trade areas and interim agreements have 
proliferated, and several preferential agreements have been negotiated 
between them (regional arrangements) and third countries. The EEC 
has negotiated a chain of preferential agreements with almost all 
Mediterranean and most of the African countries. (See next chapter 
for further details). At present most countries form part of regional 
arrangements and thereby or through other means most countries belong 
to one or another regional economic group. Today more than two- 
thirds of the GATT parties belong to some regional economic arrange-
4 . 11ments.
The creation of regional arrangements is not ruled out by the 
GATT rules as Art.XXIV states: "The provisions of this agreement shall
not prevent .... the formation of a customs union or a free-trade area." 
From one respect such a formation shall be rather encouraged so that 
regional arrangements encompass the whole world and facilitate trade 
between them, with due observance to the GATT norms. It is worth 
defining regional arrangements in order to evaluate the development and 
significance towards the establishment of free-world trade.
1• Customs Unions
A customs union is an arrangement "whereby tariffs and quotas 
on trade between members are removed, but members agree to apply
"12a common level of tariff on goods entering the union from without. 
According to GATT Article XXIV:8(a) "duties and other restrictive 
regulations of commerce (except where necessary those permitted 
under GATT Arts. XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated 
with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent 
territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially 
all the trade in products originating in such territories" and 
"the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by 
each of the members of the union to the trade of territories not 
included in the union".
Therefore, a) all internal trade barriers shall be eliminated 
on substantially all the trade, b) a uniform CET shall be applied 
to non-union members, and c) a third requirement is found in 
Art. XXIV:5 /
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Art. XXIV:5 (a) with respect to customs unions and interim agree­
ments leading to customs unions. Accordingly "duties and other 
regulations of commerce (imposed) on contracting parties not 
parties to such a union shall not on the whole be higher or more 
restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and regulat­
ions of commerce ... prior to the formation of such a union".
As regards the first of the above criteria, "the substantially
all the trade" aspect is very important and it should be considered
with respect to customs union arrangements. It can be interpreted
in the sense that the bulk of trade, i.e. 80% of the trade should
be liberalised. The EEC before the GATT Committees at the time of
its establishment claimed that 98.6% of intra-Community trade would
be liberalised, although this percentage was considered to be very
high. The question of substantially all issue was also raised in
the EFTA arrangement which excluded agricultural trade from the
provisions of the free-trade areas. Within the GATT framework,
the CONTRACTING PARTIES with regard to the question of whether the
regional arrangements liberalised substantially all the trade
"never made any serious attempt to define this terra nor to indicate
13any agreement as not meeting this standard". With respect to
the common external tariff of the customs unions when relating to 
the third requirement of Art. XXIV:5(a) mentioned above, problems 
arise.
In this context it is worth mentioning that so far the only 
complete customs union which has reached the level of the applicat­
ion of a CET is the EEC. All the other customs union arrange­
ments are interim agreements which are supposed to lead to the 
formation of customs u n i o n s . I t  is also with reference to the 
EEC that the GATT agreement has had the only opportunity to scrut­
inise the CET. In considering the CET in its application to both 
high tariff and low tariff countries, several interpretative 
problems have arisen. The quantitive concrétisation of the CET 
is quite difficult. With respect to par,5 of Art.XXIV which 
states that "duties and other regulations of commerce ... shall 
not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general 
incidence of the duties ...", the question which had to be deter­
mined was whether the concepts "on the whole" and "general incidence" 
refer /
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refer to each item in the CET or to the GET as a whole.
This question is highly problematic. The GATT agreement does
not include any official interpretation of this concept. The
Havana Reports indicate that the intention was that the article
on regional arrangements "should not require a mathematical
average of customs duties, but should permit greater flexibility,
15so that the volume of trade may be taken into account".
In 1957 during the negotiations leading to the establishment of 
the EEC, the term "general incidence of the duties" had been used 
with the intention that it should not require mathematical cal­
culation of d u t i e s I t  is submitted that the intention at the 
beginning of negotiations for the establishment of the EEC was 
that the method of calculation of the CET should not relate to 
each item, but look in general at the CET schedule as a whole.
The schedule as a whole should not be higher and more restrictive 
than the general incidence of the duties existing prior to the 
formation of such a union. Long discussions took place to de­
termine the CET. It was decided that the arithmetical average 
method should be applied as provided for in Art.19 of the Rome
:sTreaty which reads "that CCT shall be at the level of the arith­
metical average of the duties applied in the four customs territ­
ories comprised in the Community (at the time of its establishment)".
The common sense interpretation of Art.XXIV is to the effect
that as long as the CET is not higher or more restrictive than the
members' tariffs collectively, one may conclude that the creation
17of the CET has not been restrictive.
The interpretation and application of the CET of customs unions 
is very significant, given that it plays a major role in the liber­
alisation of trade as applied towards the non-union states. The 
most important aspect of the CET, however, is its uniform applic­
ation to all foreign suppliers. In customs unions once goods are 
imported into one member state and submitted to the CET, they 
cannot be subjected to additional duties, but they circulate freely 
within the union. When a customs union adopts its CET it may 
raise a member's tariffs (XXIV:6) as in the case of the EEC which 
raised the Benelux tariffs; these were much lower than those of 
the other members. The creation of a customs union may entail, 
however, (1) an increase in all duties, (2) an increase in some 
and decrease in other duties,(3) a decrease in all duties. Under 
the GATT rules only category (3) qualifies for an exception.
Art. /
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Art. XXIV:8(a) refers to the elimination within the customs 
unions' territory of all internal barriers, that is, duties 
and other regulations of commerce which mainly include QRs (except 
for those provided as necessary and permitted under Art. XI-XV 
and XX). This paragraph (XXIV:8(a)) treats QRs as equivalent to 
tariffs. Both are to be eliminated with respect to substantially 
all trade. Therefore QRs as well as tariffs are eliminated in
the internal sphere, but may still be imposed as against third 
parties. In particular QRs are very problematic. In the case 
of the EEC they would have to be applied jointly or with the 
approval of the Commission. (For further details see earlier. 
Chapter 2 p.29. , and later in this Chapter, p.118 ).
Free-Trade Areas
Free-trade areas are much simpler regional economic arrangements 
than customs unions. In free-trade areas all internal barriers 
are substantially eliminated, but the members retain their own 
individual external barriers against third countries. For the 
creation of a free-trade area, two requirements must be met.
(a) According to Art. XXIV:8(b) between constituent territories 
duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce are required 
to be eliminated on substantially all the trade in products origin­
ating in such territories. Towards third countries the free-trade 
area members retain their own duties, that is, no CET is applied, 
and (b) according to Art,XXIV:5(b) for the establishment of a free- 
trade area "each member's duties and regulations of commerce shall 
not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding ones prior 
to the formation of the free-trade area or the interim agreement 
leading to a free-trade area".
In a free-trade area no common external tariff is required, 
but each member can adopt its own system of duties, e^ £l, which 
should not be higher or more restrictive than those existing prior 
to the formation of the free-trade area. Goods originating from 
outside the area are submitted to the importing country's duties, 
but, contrary to what happens in customs unions, when re-exported 
to another higher tariff member of the area, may be subsequently, 
submitted to some additional higher duties, which the second 
country may apply.
Thus /
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Thus, the origin of goods is the most essential and com­
plicated question in a free-trade area. How to determine the 
origin of goods and how to cope with the practical difficulties 
raised in trade with third countries are very difficult questions
Interim Agreements
Interim agreements are regional economic arrangements which 
are assumed to lead to customs unions or free-trade areas within 
a reasonable length of time contemplated by the parties. Art. 
XXIV:5(c) states that "Any interim agreement shall include a plan 
and schedule for the formation of such a customs union or free- 
trade area within a reasonable length of time".
Interim agreements are the first step towards the establish­
ment of customs unions or free-trade areas. They are subject to 
the same procedures and are required to comply with the same 
obligations under the GATT rules as customs unions or free-trade 
areas in accordance with par.5(a) and (b) of Art. XXIV. This 
Article applies in the same way and has the same effects with 
respect to interim agreements. All regional arrangements, with 
the possible exception of the EEC, brought to GATT for approval 
have been interim agreements needing a transitional period on the 
way to becoming customs unions or free-trade areas.
Preferential Agreements
Preferential agreements are arrangements negotiated between 
two or more countries or groups of countries, in this case between 
the EEC and third world countries. They involve preferential 
treatment granted by the EEC to the latter, in order to promote, 
through financial and technical aid, their economic development and 
expand their trade. They can be a step towards the establishment 
of a free-trade area between the Community and third countries.
Preferential agreements are absolutely forbidden by the G.A., 
except those previously in existence, in accordance with Art.1:2 
MFN principle and according to par.9 of Art. XXIV, which states 
that "preferences referred to in Art. 1:2 shall not be affected by 
the formation of a customs union or a free-trade area, but may be 
eliminated /
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eliminated or adjusted by means of negotiations with contracting 
parties affected".
Preferential agreements are, as such, inconsistent with the 
MFN principle of GATT, and several questions have been raised as 
regards their application and their subjection to the concept of 
regional economic arrangements. In fact, tariffs applied be­
tween the constituent territories are reduced, whereas in customs
unions or free-trade areas they are elininated on substantially all 
20the trade. But despite this, several preferential agreements
have been negotiated. In particular, the EEC which is the most 
important of the regional economic arrangements, has negotiated 
several preferential agreements. Its preferential network en­
compasses almost all Mediterranean and most of the African countries 
(Further details are discussed in next chapter, in particular as 
regards the impact of preferential agreements on the GATT system.)
The GATT agreement, as has been pointed out earlier, does 
not allow preferential agreements to operate under its provisions. 
It nevertheless, provides for the system of waivers applicable 
instead of preferential agreements. A waiver can be granted to 
any country and, having obtained it, such a country can act law­
fully under the G.A. For example, Australia obtained a waiver
21from GATT in 1966 to allow it to grant preferences to LDCs.
Also, the GSPs granted in 1971 by several DCs to LDCs can be de-
22fined as a waiver of the GATT obligations.
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EVALUATION OF REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Regional arrangements, such as customs unions or free-trade
areas, establish a preferential and privileged regime among the
countries involved. They may tend more towards free trade in the
internal sphere, at least to the extent that tariffs are lowered and
to the extent that the shift from high-cost producers to low-cost
23member supplier may be beneficial leading to trade creation. They 
involve a departure from the MFN obligations and may discriminate 
against the rest of the world by moving away from the global free- 
trade approach.
Within the multilateral trading framework, in particular in 
GATT, regional arrangements are permitted in order to increase free­
dom of trade, facilitate integration between the economies, accelerate 
their development process without formal action or retaliation from 
GATT members, and promote rational allocation of world resources. 
Although at the time of the establishment of GATT, regional economic 
arrangements were not as advanced as in the 1970s (as has been discussed 
above in Chapt.2 p. 14); they had been seen as gradual steps for freer,
non-discriminatory world trade and therefore Art. XXIV. was included in 
24the GATT. The USA had been sympathetic to the idea of incorporating
the regulation of regional arrangements within the GATT. The first ITO 
draft included clauses exempting such arrangements from MFN obligations. 
During the ITO negotiations the USA representative pointed out that 
customs unions "are desirable provided that they do not cause any dis­
advantage to outside countries in comparison with their trade before
the establishment of a customs union".
GATT Article XXIV regulates regional arrangements and sets out
the conditions under which contracting parties may become members of
customs unions or free-trade areas. It is, however, considered to be
the most troublesome provision of the G.A. and, as such, it has been
discussed in the legal literature more extensively than any other 
26GATT provision. Certainly, regional arrangements promote internal 
trade but they may be discriminatory and conflict with free world 
trade. For the assessment and impact of regional arrangements on the 
world trading system we should look at the Article as a whole. Para­
graphs 4 and 5 of this Article point out in particular its major sig­
nificance. Paragraph 4 states that regional arrangements "can 
increase /
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increase freedom of trade" through "closer integration between economies" , 
but the danger of moving away from free trade as regards external trade 
has also been recognised. Para.5 requires, with reference to customs 
unions that external tariff and trade barriers "shall not on the whole 
be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties 
and regulations of commerce applicable in the territories prior to the 
formation of such union".
Art. XXIV of the G.A, puts the system of regional arrangements 
under the control of a multilateral mechanism and therefore plays a 
very significant role in trying to keep a balance between the world 
trading system and regional economic groupings, permitting regional 
arrangements to function without causing any disturbance in the multi­
lateral system and therefore political conflicts.
In the case of regional economic arrangements the most important 
questions which can be asked in respect of their effects on world trade 
are: What is the impact of the creation of regional arrangements? Are
they beneficial to world trade or not? Is the GATT's role positive to­
wards the establishment of regional arrangements? It has been recog­
nised that there can be favourable effects on trade creation; i.e. when 
there is a shift from high-cost local suppliers to low-cost union suppliers, 
or there can be unfavourable effects on trade diversion; i.e.when there 
is a shift from low-cost suppliers from outside the regional arrangements 
to high-cost suppliers within the regional arrangements.^^ The latter
case can, moreover, lead to disturbances in international economic flows
and, furthermore,to political tension, and also it may cut ties with 
third countries. On the other hand as U.Everling suggests this may Ï
Î
stimulate economic activities and thus help to develop relations with 
other countries. Which of the two conflicting effects is the stronger 
is an extremely difficult question, even for economists. It rather 
depends on the policies of the regional economic arrangements. If they 
pursue liberal economic policies, the creation of the regional arrange- 
ment can be beneficial on world trade, but if on the contrary they 
pursue protectionist policies the effects on trade can hardly be bene­
ficial .
Whatever the circumstances are, regional arrangements are sub­
mitted to a multilateral surveillance mechanism in order to examine 
whether /
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whether they are in conformity with the GATT rules and procedures, and 
especially with Art. XXIV requirements.
When two or more constituent territories decide to enter into a
customs union or free-trade area arrangement they have to present the
CONTRACTING PARTIES with the proposed Treaty and provide information to
facilitate GATT review. The proposed union or area is examined
for its conformity with the GATT rules. So far the GATT has approved
all regional arrangements submitted to it, although none of them notified
29to GATT fully complied with its requirements. For example, the EEC,
which is considered to be the only complete customs union, has been sub­
jected to a great deal of criticism, particularly as regards its assoc­
iation agreements with third countries which, however, have been approved
and have been legally functioning under the G.A. despite their apparent
30discriminatory nature.
In fact, to date, regional arrangements have proliferated to such 
an extent that most countries have been parties to one or other regional 
arrangement, according to their geographical position or stage of economic 
development. Regional arrangements have been the rule and their estab­
lishment no longer raises particular problems when submitted to GATT for 
approval. The pattern of world trade has shifted from the MFN principle 
and principle of reciprocity to differential treatment and to the accept­
ance of the principle of non-reciprocity. Art. XXIV, of course, allows 
the latter treatment for customs unions and free-trade areas, but prefer­
ential agreements are not allowed to operate within the GATT framework.
In practice Art. XXIV is very flexible and, therefore, it cannot be 
expected to be strictly applied. Its broad interpretation aims to 
facilitate trade among GATT contracting parties and not to raise, trade 
barriers.. Preferential agreements, although in law inconsistent, have 
tacitly been accepted as equivalent to customs unions and free-trade 
areas, and therefore in practice no particular problems have arisen.
Most countries are parties to preferential agreements; e.g. the
EEC in particular has negotiated a large number of preferential agree- 
31ments. Although preferential agreements are contrary to MFN obligat­
ions and to the free world trade approach of the GATT, in practice they 
have become the rule. In other words, the practice is contrary to the 
legal /
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32legal rules. DAM has expressed the view that preferential agree­
ments should be included in the GATT system and submitted to the same 
treatment as customs unions or free-trade areas. In that way some kind 
of reconciliation of preferential agreements with GATT Art. XXIV and 
Art.I could possibly be achieved. As GATT Art. XXIV stands now, however, 
it has not proved sufficiently capable of coping with existing economic 
and legal issues and, therefore, it is submitted that it should be 
revised and updated so as to have more control than is presently possible.
At the present point of the discussion, having regard to the 
proliferation of regional arrangements, it is also submitted that 
regional arrangements should be strengthened in such a way so as to 
constitute individual entities within the GATT legal system. Such 
entities could be parties to the G.A. Thus having a certain number of 
regional arrangements functioning within a superior multilateral trade 
organisation, we would have a limited number of contracting parties and 
consequently we would be in a position to strengthen the world trading 
system. This could be best achieved if all regional arrangements apply 
common rules and set out the conditions for improvements of world trade 
rules and in order to provide for a better allocation of world resources. 
Nevertheless, such a submission'of the regional arrangements to a multi­
lateral trade system could cause some conflicts. At this stage, the 
multilateral trading system shouH be called on to solve existing problems 
and try to reconcile conflicts. Such a development which would establish 
uniform principles, would facilitate and strengthen inter-bloc relations, 
promote efficiency and ultimately improve the standards of living of the 
international community of states. In this framework, however, parti­
cular attention should be given to LDCs * regional arrangements as a means
33towards development and industrialisation. The question as Huber 
puts it, is whether the GATT should give these regional arrangements 
between LDCs more lenient treatment than to arrangements among DCs.
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EEC and GATT: The external trade relations provisions of
the EEC and their compatibility with the General Agreement.
34The history of the EEC is well known. The treaty estab­
lishing the EEC was signed in Rome on 25th March 1957 by the six ECSC 
countries (France, Fed. Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg.) The new organisation took the form of a 
customs union and it is considered to be the only complete customs union 
so far. Accordingly, Arts. 9-29 EEC, provide the details for its 
foundation.
Art. 9 of the EEC provides that the Community "is based upon a 
customs unions which covers all trade in goods". The EEC is, moreover, 
much more than a mere customs union. It is a Common Market in which 
the factors of production, labour, capital and enterprise are to move 
freely. It is also governed by Community law, by harmonised national 
policies and common Community policies. Eventually, the establishment 
of an Economic and Monetary Union is envisaged, although not explicitly 
provided for in the EEC Treaty.
As was pointed out earlier in this chapter (p.100) customs unions 
can contribute indeed to the expansion and promotion of trade within the 
bloc, but it involves possible discrimination against the rest of the
world (GATT Art. XXIV 4-9). Some economists believe that the benefits 
of the Western European Customs Union are not very g r e a t . A l t h o u g h  
some of them believe that the gains of the creation of a customs union
36are not great, much support is given to the creation of customs unions.
However, it is believed that the impetus for the creation of a customs
union are more political than economic. That is, because political
integration is difficult to be directly achieved, integration of the
economies is considered to be the necessary prerequisite and the first 
37step to this end. The failure to establish the European
Political Community not founded on an economic background is an explan­
atory justification of this argument.
The EEC Treaty provides in Arts. 9-29 for the creation of a 
customs union. It provides for the harmonisation of customs legis­
lation, leading eventually to the establishment of common customs 
legislation, which would constitute the basis for the progressive 
economic integration of the EEC.
A /
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A schedule for the elimination of internal barriers and other 
relevant restrictions between the original six member states is con­
tained in the Treaty and was to be accomplished by 31st December 1969.
The Community complied with the obligations contained therein eighteen
38months ahead of schedule, on 1st July 1968. The three new member
states later, on 1st July 1977, brought their customs legislation into 
line with the Community. Greece, being the tenth full member state 
of the EEC will apply the customs union's provisions by the end of the 
transitional period, that is on 31st December 1985 in accordance with 
the Treaty of Accession and the rules laid down in the association 
agreemeht, applicable since November, 1962. Furthermore, quotas were 
abolished. This was achieved relatively easier by virtue of measures 
of liberalisation taken within the framework of IMF, GATT, UNCTAD 
and OECD.
In addition, customs unions' provisions of the EEC Treaty 
together with the preamble to the Treaty and Arts. 110-116, relating 
to the CCP, aim at the harmonious development of international trade, 
the abolition of restrictions and the lowering of customs barriers.
Arts. 110-116 of the EEC provide for a CCP as well as for 
negotiations with third countries on the common external tariff and 
on the CCP. Beside the CCP provisions of the EEC Treaty, there are 
some other scattered provisions relating to external relations; notably 
Arts. 18, 19, 27, 28 and 29 relating to the CET. Already in the 
Preamble to the EEC Treaty the establishment of common policies is 
emphasised. The Community shall apply liberal principles of commer­
cial policy to third countries. It shall apply liberal measures 
towards third countries and at the same time take measures to protect 
its internal market from imports coming from third countries.
Art. 110 EEC Treaty, in connection with the general principles set out 
in the Preamble, states that the object of the Community is to contri­
bute to the harmonious development of world trade and the lowering of 
customs barriers. Art. Ill refers to the task of the EEC of negot­
iating on the basis of common customs duties, whereas the other aspects 
of the CCP were (Art.113) to come under full Community competence only 
in 1970, Individual member states were left free to take some measures 
of commercial policy until the end of the transitional period; common 
measures in the field of the CCP may be taken on certain points after 
that. /
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39that. Art, 113 provides that "member states shall co-ordinate their
trade relations with third countries so as to bring about by the end
of the transitional period the conditions needed for implementing a
common policy in the field of external trade". Art. 116 of the EEC
provides that the member states must act in common after the transitional
period has expired when matters of particular interest for the common
40market arise in international economic organisations.
The best example of negotiations concluded in common by the 
member states represents the participation of the EEC in multilateral 
trade talks conducted within the GATT framework. Before the EEC 
Treaty was ratified, the member states individually had to conduct 
negotiations within the framework of the GATT. Currently the Commission 
represents the member states in such negotiations while representatives 
of the member states still formally take part and, in fact, they have 
the voting power. The latter are represented by the Commission, which 
is responsible for conducting tariff negotiations with third countries. 
(For a full discussion on this matter see Chapter 3).
Thus the European Community has, in practice, replaced the 
member states in international trade talks and facilitated the dis­
mantling of barriers. In the Kennedy Round trade talks, which coincided 
with the merger treaty in 1967, the EEC has also had the
opportunity to participate successfully in multilateral trade negotiations 
within the GATT framework and thus strengthen its position in inter­
national fora.
Concerning the relationship of the EEC with the G.A., the status
of the EEC as a customs union needs to be analysed with regard to Art.
XXIV. The EEC's establishment in 1957 had an impact on the GATT agree­
ment and it established a precedent for the formation of other customs 
unions or free-trade areas within the GATT framework. However, the 
question of compatibility of the EEC, founded on a customs union, with 
the GATT, occupied a central place in deliberations within the GATT for 
a long time. Even before the EEC Treaty was signed, deliberations and 
extensive discussions took place. Most of the time the legal issue in
question concerned the validity of the EEC Treaty itself under the GATT
42rules relating to customs unions.
As far as tariffs and other restrictive regulations of commerce
between the EEC member states are concerned, they had been removed 
partially /
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partially within the GATT framework, even before the EEC's establish­
ment. This partial reduction of duties and other restrictive measures 
such as QRs, facilitated the further elimination of all barriers in 
the internal sphere and the establishment of a CET in the external 
sphere.
On the other side of the Atlantic the USA, even before the EEC 
Treaty was drawn up, indicated its willingness to support and even it 
helped, with the Marshall Plan, the establishment of the new power­
ful Community in the form of a customs union. The Americans, mostly 
for political reasons wanted to h e l P  Europe to re-establish its 
balance of payments position. After the EEC Treaty was signed, the 
Americans supported the EEC, although they recognised that there was 
some inconsistency between the new treaty and the GATT rules, especially 
Art. X X I V . I n  the light of the USA support, other countries felt 
that "it was meaningless to insist on pursuing the legal technicality44of possible EEC violation of GATT obligations any further". What the
Europeans wanted most was to facilitate and restore intra-European trade.
In fact, the EEC Treaty was drawn up so that its provisions would be
45flexible and would not conflict with the GATT rules.
However, in accordance with Art. XXIV.para.7 thetEEC Treaty 
had to be notified, as all regional arrangements,to the GATT for approval. 
For this reason all the information concerning the proposed customs 
union had to be made available to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, Subsequently, 
when the new treaty was notified to GATT, laborious negotiations and 
consultations took place. A working party was appointed to examine the 
compatibility of this new customs union with the GATT agreement and 
particularly Art. XXIV.
During the negotiations, "in several instances; reconciliat­
ion of interests was brought about by adopting measures that were in 
violation of the GATT rules or at least were close to the line. Con­
sequently, the Rome Treaty and its commercial understanding had to be 
accepted as they were or not at all". However, with the formation 
of the EEC, the GATT agreement for the first time had the opportunity 
to test its legal character. As Jackson says "the approval of the EEC
by the GATT in fact has changed the GATT law concerning regional arrange­
ments" . 
adapt /
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adapt to the new requirements of the times, especially the require­
ments brought up by the formation of regional arrangements.
However, in accordance with Art. XXIV:7, the EEC Treaty was 
submitted to the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES at the eleventh session 
late in 1956, when the creation of the EEC was the subject of negotiat­
ions, Between the eleventh and twelfth sessions an inter-sessional 
Committee was appointed with the express purpose of studying the new 
treaty and of examining its compliance with the G.A. The Committee had
to examine particularly "the commercial aspects of the Rome Treaty
48following from the rules on customs unions in the Agreement".
During the twelfth session, extensive discussions took place 
relating in detail to the EEC Treaty. "Most of the members of the 
GATT felt that as regards the internal trade barriers the Rome Treaty 
was fairly detailed and complete. On the other hand, the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES were not in a position to judge the consistency of the EEC ex­
ternal tariff with the G.A. because the common level of duties had not 
ÎI 49yet been published.
The basic problems which occupied the discussions throughout 
the twelfth session concerned four main legal issues: (1) the process
of calculating the CET of the European Community. The method of cal­
culating it, that is, the mathematical averaging of some sort, was ex­
tensively discussed. (2) the imposition of QRs for balance of payments 
difficulties by the member states against the rest of the world, whereas 
no restrictions of any kind would have to be imposed against member 
countries. (3) As regards agriculture, the Community representatives 
pointed out that the Community’s price support system in agriculture 
needed some protection as the system itself was in its infancy. (4) The 
"loudest guns" were directed against the EEC's association agreements. 
The GATT agreement holds the existence of preferential agreements to be 
illegal under its rules. (Detailed reference to preferential agreements 
is later made in Chapt.5) A very detailed study was made relating to 
trade impact of the association agreements on twelve commodities.^^
The EEC member states responded to severe criticism made by the 
other GATT parties and offered to work out whatever actual problems 
might arise.
After the twelfth GATT session completed its work, an inter- 
sessional Committee was appointed for further study of the legal issue 
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of compatibility of the Rome Treaty with the G.A. It is worth 
noting that the relevant committee reported to the thirteenth GATT 
session and explicitly stated ; "It would be more fruitful if atten­
tion could be directed to specific and practical problems leaving
aside for the time being questions of law and debates about the com-
51patibility of the Rome Treaty with Art. XXIV of the G.A. It was
felt that the legalistic examination of compatibility was fruitless.
It was more important for the Committee to study the Rome Treaty in 
general and to examine its application to the practical problems. 
Therefore, the CONTRACTING PARTIES agreed that more attention should 
be directed to the practical issues and leave aside the theoretical 
approach of the EEC’s consistency with the GATT rules.
Therefore, the EEC has been tacitly accepted by the Working 
Party as legally operating, under Art. XXIV of the G.A. despite the 
controversies and the various views expressed, particularly as regards 
its preferential network. The acceptance of the EEC and the following 
proliferation of preferential agreements, has led to the weakening of 
the GATT Articles I and XXIV and, in general of the GATT system as a 
whole. Thus an amendment of Art. XXIV, so as to embrace all kinds of 
regional arrangements including preferential agreements, recommends 
itself. This particular legal issue of compatibility of the EEC 
itself and hereinafter of the EEC agreements with the G.A. is further 
analysed in the conclusions, because this issue is taken up time after 
time and in the following chapters, when a preferential agreement is 
negotiated by the EEC with third countries.
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THE FOUR MAIN LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE GATT WORKING PARTY.
(a) The common external tariff
The Working Party appointed four sub-groups to deal with 
four main legal issues raised on the compatibility of the EEC 
Treaty with the General Agreement. Sub-group A was appointed to 
examine the EEC common external tariff (CET) and to consider if 
it was in conformity with the provisions of the GATT agreement 
and especially of Art. XXIV Par.5(a) and par,8(a). The issue 
raised many questions during the negotiations, the most important 
of which was the method of its calculation.
According to Art.19 of the EEC Treaty the member states
decided to use the method of the "arithmetical average of the
duties applied in the four customs territories comprised in the 
53Community" which in their view was in conformity with the GATT 
agreement and especially Art. XXlV:5(a). The method of calcul­
ation of the CET had occupied a very great part of the EEC's de­
liberations. The EEC representatives argued that the arithmetical 
method was in conformity or at least was not in contradiction with 
the GATT rules. They further argued that they could use any 
method of calculation since "Art. XXIV does not exclude any method 
of calculation provided that the duty rates are not on the whole
higher than the general incidence of the duties which they re-
54place".
The Working Party requested, however, the EEC to supply not 
later than 1st July 1959, the sub-group with all data concerning 
the CET. The data finally presented by the EEC member states in 
mid-1960, regardless of the controversy over the date of its sub­
mission, was inadequate according to the sub-group's opinion. The 
sub-group said that "the EEC refused to supply data by which to 
compare the general incidence of the common tariff duties actually 
applied by exporters to the EEC from third countries on 1st 
January 1957".^^ Subsequently, the sub-group asked the other 
GATT contracting parties to supply any available information 
concerning this matter. On the data supplied, however, the sub­
group felt that the common customs tariff seemed to be higher than 
that actually applied before and on 1st January 1957,
On /
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On the other hand, the EEC representatives noted that
"they had gone further than the requirements of Art. XXIV:5(a)
which derived the common external tariff (CET) by arithmetical
average of the tariff rates actually being applied by the member
states on 1st January 1957", They argued that they had observed
56the rules and exceptions laid down in Art. 19 EEC.
In general the arithmetical average method envisaged in 
Art.19 of the EEC Treaty and adopted by the EEC member states was 
not welcomed by the other contracting parties. The latter 
argued that "an automatic application of the formula whether arith­
metic average or otherwise could not be accepted ... The matter
should be approached by examining individual commodities on a
57country by country basis".
Meanwhile, when the EEC member states were negotiating the
CET, the Dillon Round Multilateral Trade Negotiations were being
c o n d u c t e d . T h e  item to item approach, which was adopted during
these negotiations, was abandoned during the next round of MTNs.
The Kennedy Round concluded in favour of the "linear approach” of
59tariff schedule negotiations. Some writers, including J.Allen,
thought that a product by product approach was the proper one in 
evaluating the impact of the new common customs tariff.(CCT).^^
He concluded that the common rates of duty on each product must 
be examined to see if there is overall compatibility with the 
GATT Art. X X I V : 5 ( a ) . I n  general, the contracting parties con­
sidered that the arithmetical average method did not comply with 
the G.A. especially as far as the increase of the Benelux exter­
nal duty rates were concerned. These were less than 3% at the 
time of the EEC establishment and they had to raise it to 12% 
in order to reach the level of the common customs tariff.
Furthermore, some of the common customs duties had to be gradually
 ^ 62 increased.
Meanwhile, as the question of the compatibility of the 
method of calculation of the CET with Art. XXIV of the G.A. had 
not reached any definite conclusion, the controversy turned upon 
the word "applicable" provided for in Art.XXIV:5(a) and in re­
lation to par.4 and par.8(a). That is a comparison of the duties 
applied in the constituent territories prior to the formation of 
the /
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the customs union with the common duties applied thereafter, which
had to be made. The question was whether the calculation was made
6 3on those duties actually applied or those authorised by GATT law.
Finally, the members of the sub-group felt that they were 
not in a position to consider whether the EEC CET was in conformity 
with the General Agreement, because "the common level of duties had 
not yet been published", They further noted that they should be 
given more time and be supplied with additional data in order to be 
able to make a thorough and detailed analysis of the proposed customs 
tariff.
(b) Quantitative Restrictions
As far as the Rome Treaty provisions on QRs are concerned, 
Arts. 30-37 provide for the elimination of QRs between member states 
and lay down the rules for this purpose.
Accordingly, QRs and other equivalent measures were to be 
eliminated between the six original EEC member states by 31st December 
1969, but, in fact, they were eliminated even earlier. As far as 
the new Acceding states are concerned, the 1972 Accession Act con­
cerning the accession of the U.K, Ireland and Denmark into the 
Community, provides for the abolition of QRs on imports and exports
of industrial products between the six original and the new member
67states from the accession date. As regards agricultural products
they were subject to a Common Agricultural Market Organisation at the 68date of accession. Likewise as regards Greece, under the
Accession Act of May, 1979 by which she was admitted into the
Community, it is provided (Arts. 25 and 35) that the abolition of
QRs on imports and exports between the Nine and Greece should take
place as from the date of accession, i.e. 1st January 1981 (save
70some exceptions provided for ) concerning both industrial and agri­
cultural products. The latter are covered by a common organisation 
of the market.
There is no doubt whatsoever that the problem of QRs applied 
by EEC member states is complex. What measures, taken by a member 
state, constitute quotas or which measures can be defined as QRs is 
a source of continuous argument between member states. In the Rome 
Treaty no corresponding definition is provided. Various rules 
enacted /
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enacted by member states may directly or indirectly amount to 
QRs. The ECJ in its endeavour to cope with the difficulty con­
cerned, has in several cases defined which actions taken by member 
states can constitute QRs or other measures having equivalent effect.71Thus a list of such measures has been developed by the ECJ. The
Commission of the European Community has also taken steps to speed 
the elimination of QRs. In particular, it has issued a communication 
according to which any product produced and marketed in any member
72state must, in principle, circulate freely within the member states.
In general, the EEC in the context of harmonisation of national 
legislation, under Arts. 100-102 has adopted several measures in the 
form of directives which have binding effects on member states. In 
particular, emphasis is concentrated on the approximation of national 
laws concerning trade and industry. The European Community has 
attempted to eliminate technical barriers to trade, taking also into 
account international standards - e.g. within GATT the development 
of international standards. In fact, the EEC has actively parti­
cipated in the establishment of the Code of Technical Barriers to
73Trade, or Standards Code. Furthermore, in this context the EEC
has still to proceed with a programme of harmonisation of all measures 
which can constitute obstacles to the free movement of g o o d s . T h e  
harmonisation process should particularly cover laws concerning 
national health and safety standards and generally all concept pro­
vided for in Art.36 (EEC) under which derogation from the rules 
becomes easier.
The elimination of QRs while it is equivalent to the 
elimination of tariffs in the internal sphere, does not tackle the 
question on the external sphere; the treatment of QRs against non­
members is different from the treatment of external tariffs. Despite 
the establishment of a CET, there has as yet been no equivalent 
common policy concerning the abolition of QRs against third countries. 
In the CCP chapter of the Rome Treaty, Art. 110 EEC provides for 
"... the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive 
abolition of restrictions on international trade, and the lowering 
of customs barriers". Also the subsequent Article 111:5 provides 
for "trade liberalisation lists regarding third countries, or groups 
of third countries". As regards this obligation the Commission 
makes appropriate recommendations to the member states. Then if 
member /
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member states abolish or reduce QRs in relation to third countries, 
"they shall accord the same treatment to other member states".
The EEC Treaty provisions must be examined in relation to 
the GATT provisions concerning QRs and with the customs unions pro­
visions of the GATT. As QRs between the EEC member states have been 
abolished, like tariffs, under the GATT rules and particularly Art. 
1:1 of the MEN clause, the same treatment should be expected to be 
applied to all parties to this Agreement; but the EEC as a customs 
union can deviate from this provision. Art. XXIV authorises customs 
unions to qualify for exceptions to these rules.
On the other hand, the G.A. treats QRs as equivalent to 
tariffs. In Art.XXIV:8(a) it is provided that both are to be 
eliminated with respect to "substantially all the trade". It 
explicitly provides that "Duties and other restrictive regulations 
of commerce (except those permitted under Arts. XI-XV and XX), are 
eliminated ...... between the constituent territories of the union ..
and ... substantially the same duties and other regulations of 
commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the 
trade of territories not included in the union". Therefore this 
different treatment of the EEC approach on QRs on the external 
sphere and of the GATT Art. XXIV para.8(a) on QRs, should be examined. 
The EEC applies the CET applicable to tariffs but as regards QRs 
there is no common external approach. The EEC member states can 
apply their own quantitative measures, while the G.A. provides that 
all members of the customs union should apply the same tariffs as 
well as QRs to the non-union members.
Sub-Group B was appointed in GATT to examine this second legal
issue, concerning the QRs provisions of the Rome Treaty and their
compatibility with the G.A. The six member states of the EEC
argued that they were entitled to deviate from some provisions of the
75G.A. including Arts, XI and XIV (concerning QRs) provided that 
according to Art. XXIV para.5(a), "other regulations of commerce ... 
shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general 
incidence of ... those regulations applicable to the constituent 
territories prior to the formation of the union". They further 
argued that under the OEEC liberalisation code, they had liberalised 
in the external sphere at least 85% of their QRs. Indeed the EEC 
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countries have eliminated most of the quotas concerning products
coming from third countries, but they do not seem willing to
eliminate the rest against other contracting parties to GATT, nor
76do they resort to the waiver procedure under Art, XXV:5.
Certainly, if member states do not use the waiver procedure and 
their restrictions cannot be justified under balance of payments 
provisions or other legitimate provisions, they act in violation of 
the G.A.
Therefore, the original six member countries of the EEC,
as any other contracting party to GATT, are under the rules of
this agreement, not allowed to use QRs for protective purposes,
apart from those permitted in exceptional circumstances provided
77for in Arts. XI-XV and XX.
In its external phase the EEC has not established, however, 
a common level of QRs for BOP difficulties or for any other reason. 
Most members of the sub-group believed that "the imposition of 
common quotas by the six apart from being contrary to Art. XII of 
GATT, would be contrary to fundamental economic reasoning unless 
they held reserves in common".
The USA position towards QRs was not favourable. They 
still preferred tariffs to QRs in order to protect domestic pro­
ducers, although they used quotas for a number of products. In 
particular, for BOP reasons, they were in a difficult economic 
position in 1971 when they felt obliged to use import surcharges 
which are equivalent to quotas. In the past the USA commercial 
policy has always been opposed to the use of import quotas. In 
fact, Americans suffered from quotas imposed by other countries,
79especially during the period of economic depression in the 1930s.
During discussion on this matter, different opinions were 
expressed. The EEC representatives argued that Art. XXIV:5 provides 
exceptions to the MFN obligations, but also entitles them to de­
viate from other provisions of the G.A. including Arts. XI and XIV.
In their opinion "Art. XXIV imposed an obligation on the member 
states of the customs union to eliminate between themselves QRs 
without extending this measure to non-membersV. On the other
hand, the members of the sub-group pointed out that under the Rome 
Treaty a member state may impose QRs against third countries even if 
not justified for BOP reasons. The group did not share the EEC
members /
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members' view and could not accept the EEC interpretation. The 
group finally expressed the hope that the EEC would not take action 
that was inconsistent with GATT.
In the end, what was considered important for the harmon­
ious attainment of the objectives of the EEC and the G.A. was that 
a co-operation and consultation machinery should be established 
between the European Community and the contracting parties; and 
that, in relation to QRs for BOP reasons, further close collaboration 
with the IMF (Art.XV:!) was considered to be necessary.
In conclusion, the sub-group considered that there was no 
need for further examination of this issue, nor for the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES to take a formal decision to set up a special machinery to 
deal with the use of QRs by the six. It seems the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES were not willing to examine this issue further, despite the 
fact that quotas should have been treated more seriously than tariffs 
with respect to most crucial areas of products. Quantitative 
restrictions in juxtaposition to tariffs have been very complex 
measures in their application, since each contracting party to GATT 
and in particular each EEC member state applied its own quotas and 
as such has been considered by sub-group B. (More details about the 
GATT approach to QRs are provided earlier in Chapt.2 p.29 ).
(c) The Agricultural Provisions
Both the GATT agreement and the EEC Treaty provisions apply 
to all products, industrial and agricultural. The GATT agreement, 
however, makes no distinction at all between industrial and agricul­
tural products, whereas the EEC Treaty includes special provisions 
with reference to agriculture and trade in agricultural products, 
envisaged in Arts. 38-47 with the objective of establishing a CAP.
In the agricultural sector over-production and protectionism 
are the problems that have made trade one of the most controversial 
issues of recent times. In the European Community the member states 
have agreed that trade in agricultural products should be restricted 
even within the Common Market, They thought that trade in agricul­
tural products should be governed by a CAP that has been developed 
gradually /
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gradually and implemented through a common organisation for
83agricultural products.
Sub-group C was to examine a possible conflict between 
the GATT and the EEC with particular respect to agricultural pro­
visions and in particular, the system of minimum import prices, 
the development of long-term agreements of the EEC Treaty and the 
problems that might arise in the wake of their implementation.
EEC Art. 44 provides for a system of minimum import prices below 
which imports may be suspended or reduced. This system was to be 
applied during the transitional period. It was to promote the 
formation of such a customs union by facilitating the internal re­
duction of trade barriers (XXIV:8(a)(i))
The minimum import price system, however, operating during 
the transitional period does not seem to be incompatible with the 
G.A. Unquestionably, it restricts imports into the Community by 
imposing a minimum import price level below which products cannot 
be imported into the Community; it thus protects domestic producers 
from foreign competition; but continued beyond the transitional 
period, it might be incompatible with the G.A.^^
Secondly, EEC Art. 45 refers to the development of long­
term agreements or contracts, between importing and exporting 
countries during the process of replacing national organisation with 
a common organisation for agricultural products. This objective 
was designed to guarantee national producers a market for their 
products. These long-term agreements or contracts would be applied 
for a limited period and to a limited number of products and only 
until such time as the common organisation for agricultural products 
would be established.
The purpose of the long term contracts is to facilitate
the abolition of QRs and import duties when EEC Treaty provisions
conflict with national regulations. According to Art. 45 (1) EEC
and GATT Art. XXIV:8(a)(i), it appears doubtful whether such con-
86tracts are incompatible with the G.A. It was perhaps unfortunate
that the Community imposed other restrictions after the establishment 
of a common agricultural organisation, thus consequently raising new 
barriers against imports into the Community.
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Within the GATT framework and outside the Community, 
countries exporting agricultural products were concerned that the 
minimum import prices system and the long-term agreements or con­
tracts might affect their exports to the Community and that those 
two measures may be inconsistent with Art. XXIV:4. This Article 
states that the purpose of a customs union is to facilitate trade
between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to
87trade to other contracting parties with such territories.
The USA with its agricultural support system, similar to 
the EEC's CAP support mechanism, after having obtained a waiver 
for agricultural products in 1955, was not in a strong position to 
negotiate for free agricultural trade.
However, trade in the agricultural sector has continued to 
be the most sensitive area. Trade in agricultural products always 
poses problems - e.g. in the Benelux customs union, although customs 
duties and QRs were eliminated in the industrial sector, in the area 
of agriculture no significant achievement could be claimed; the
respective national organisations for agricultural trade remained in
•  ^ 89existence.
The GATT sub-group C, which was set up to examine the con­
sistency of the EEC agricultural provisions with the GATT, considered 
that "neither the EEC provisions as such, nor the Community institut­
ions had acted contrary to their international commitments".^^ 
Especially as regards the second of the above points, i.e. concerning 
long-term contracts, the six EEC member states gave before the sub­
group the assurance that they would be applied to a limited number of 
products and for a limited period until the national agricultural 
organizations were replaced by a common one.
The members of the sub-group pointed out that "the G.A. 
does not forbid long-term contracts but they felt they could hardly 
be reconciled with the provisions of Art. X X I V " . T h e y  expressed 
fears that these contracts may lead to more import barriers and 
restraints on international trade, particularly with reference to 
the export trade needs of the LDCs, where the national economies 
depended on the export of certain agricultural commodities. The 
six EEC member states said that "the main aim of the long-term 
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contracts was to make possible a development towards freeing trade
in certain products for which the provisions of the Rome Treaty
relating to the abolition of QRs and import duties were 'not adequate"
and they pointed out that no inconsistency of the European Community
provisions with Art. XXIV of the G.A. existed; should any problem
later arise, the institutions of the Community may apply for a 
92waiver.
Some members of the sub-group were of the opinion that 
"the agricultural provisions carried a strong presumption of in­
creased external barriers in place of existing tariffs and other 
93measures". Moreover, the majority of the members of the sub­
group considered that it was impossible to determine the compatib-
94ility of the agricultural provisions with the G.A.
Thus, during the first stage of the implementation of the 
measures concerned, relating to a minimum import price system and 
long-term contracts, there were no indications that an inconsistency 
between the G.A. and the emerging Community system existed. After 
the transitional period, problems might arise, but they would be 
solved by means of consultations under GATT Art. XXII.
(d) Association with Overseas Countries and Territories
The Association Agreements (AAs) of the EEC with the over­
seas countries and territories are one of the most debated issues 
and have received much criticism as being incompatible with the 
GATT provisions. Even before the EEC Treaty was signed,the GATT 
contracting parties were concerned with this issue and objected 
to the conclusion of Association Agreements by the EEC, but France, 
with overseas dependencies,wanted special arrangements to be made so 
as to establish links between these territories and the EEC.
The French particularly threatened not to participate in the 
Community if its overseas territories were excluded.
Articles 131-136 of the EEC Treaty entitle the member 
states to conclude association agreements with overseas countries 
and /
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and territories and even to extend existing ones for the 
purpose of economic and social development of such countries 
and territories. In particular EEC Art. 133:3 provides that 
"these countries and territories may levy duties (new ones) in 
order to meet their development and industrialisation ... and 
that the duties shall be progressively reduced to the level of 
those imposed on imports of products from member states with 
which each country or territory has special relations".
Obviously these Association Agreements establish a 
preferential regime and as such are contrary to the MFN treat­
ment of GATT Article I which, in para. 2 permits existing pre­
ferences to continue but precludes their extension, unless there 
has been established between the countries involved a customs 
union or a free-trade area arrangement, falling within the scope 
of Article XXIV.
The crucial question has been whether such arrangements 
between the Community and overseas countries and territories 
constitute a free-trade area. The members of Sub-Group D 
were of the opinion that these association agreements did not 
constitute a free-trade area since they did not meet the re­
quirements of Art. XXIV:8(b) of elimination of duties and other 
regulations of commerce on substantially all the trade. They 
went on to argue thàt not only was there no reduction of barriers 
in the trade, but also that the countries and territories con­
cerned could levy new duties, (133:3 EEC) and that the association 
agreements were an extension of the preferential system already 
in existence between the EEC member states and the overseas 
countries and territories.
On their side, the EEC representatives argued that the 
ultimate objective of these agreements, was the establishment of 
a free-trade area, and they held that they were Interim agreements 
envisaging ^
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envisaging the formation of a free-trade area; they insisted 
that the conditions laid down in Art. XXIV^8(b) were fulfilled, 
that is, that substantially all the trade was liberalised and 
duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce maintained, 
were not on the whole higher or more restrictive than those 
before the formation of the free-trade area; and even if this 
were not so, they argued further that the provisions of Art.
133:3 (EEC) together with Art. XVIII of the G.A, providing that 
duties could be justified for economic development and indust­
rialisation of the associated countries, should be taken into 
account. The volume of trade between the six EEC member states 
and the associated countries was negligible and the protective 
duties and measures taken were at about 1.4%. Such a small
percentage, it was said, did not violate the "substantially all"
. 95.criterion.
The members of the sub-group insisted, however, on their 
view that association agreements did not create a free-trade 
area and they pointed out that the Rome Treaty did not provide 
that association agreements create a free-trade area and that, 
additionally, the G;A.does-not provide for a simultaneous existence 
of customs unions and free-trade areas, nor can a customs union 
operate within a wider free-trade area framework and vice-versa. 
The association agreements were attacked not only by the contract­
ing parties to GATT but also by the other LDCs who were not 
linked with the European Community by any kind of agreement.
The latter (LDCs) particularly emphasised that the preferential 
treatment extended to the dependent countries and territories 
would do damage to their trade and development, and that the 
growth and economic expansion of the associated countries was to 
be achieved at their expense. A number of delegations wanted 
special consideration to be given to practical problems rather 
than to a legalistic analysis of association of the overseas 
territories with the EEC.
Undoubtedly, association agreements are preferential 
agreements and to many members of the sub-group they were a 
simple extension of the existing preferential arrangements and, 
as such, violated the MFN clause of GATT Art.I.^^
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Despite this general consideration, no ultimate decision was 
taken by the sub-group, although a majority within the sub-group 
strongly criticised the association agreements as being contrary 
to the G.A.
The CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT might find some aspects of 
the Rome Treaty or sources of action inconsistent but as 
Allen says "if the GATT was too juridical in its appraisal and 
too demanding in its requirements, the Community could find
97.it more profitable to withdraw from the Agreement altogether".
The EEC actually could apply for a waiver from its GATT 
obligations, but it felt there was no need to do so, since the 
sub-group decision was inconclusive; it preferred to wait 
until another contracting party would force the issue. The 
association agreements were finally tacitly accepted due to 
American s u p p o r t . I n  fact, the contracting parties to. GATT 
could make recommendations to the EEC relating to incompatib­
ility of the measures, but they never did.
At the thirteenth GATT session, the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
did not examine the legal issues, but it was suggested they 
should direct their attention to practical problems. They 
concluded, however, that negotiations and consultations should 
take place and at the end a compromise might be attempted if 
necessary, as had been the case with the EEC and the association
agreements within the Fifth Multilateral Tariff Negotiations 99Round. ■ Consultations and compromise were stressed by 
Steinberger^^^ He did not argue for recourse to any juridical 
process, nor considered recourse to the International Court of 
Justice to be effective. He argued that if a whole region is 
affected, it is doubtful that a judicial or legal instrument can 
solve the problem^^^'
As far as this question is currently concerned, some EC 
officials in Brussels argue that the association agreements 
between the EEC and the associated countries and territories 
constitute a one way free-trade area with regard to the fact that 
the associated countries (e.g. the Lome countries) can levy 
duties on imports of products from the member states on a non- 
reciprocal basis. Some others believe that there is no establ­
ishment of a free-trade area but the agreements concerned are102"something special".
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The compatibility issue has never been discussed again
since the first years of the EEC's existence, and although in
law we may say that there is some element of incompatibility, in
practical terras there is no need to discuss this issue again.
The EEC has been accepted if not as a de^  jure, certainly as a de
facto entity for the purpose of the GATT and, as such, enjoys 
103legal personality. The practice, as it has been developing
thus far, is that only trade agreements with preferential charact­
er concluded by the EEC should be submitted to GATT for approval 
and not mere commercial agreements. As is discussed in the next 
chapter preferential agreements, concluded by the Community and 
third countries or groups of countries, are submitted to GATT for 
consideration of the compatibility issue, but in no case have defi­
nite conclusions been reached. Discussions and consultations 
normally take place, but as regards this specific issue, no 
problem of at least legal nature has arisen. (This issue is 
taken up again in the conclusions for further consideration).
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PART III
EEC AGREEMENTS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 
GATT LEGAL SYSTEM.
The Community has the power to enter into bilateral or multi­
lateral agreements with third countries or organisations of an 
economic character. In this context it has, since its establish­
ment, replaced its member states in entering into a great number of 
agreements involving trade. These agreements can be distinguished 
as :
1. Association agreements under Art. 238 EEC, and
2. Commercial - tariff and trade - agreements under Art.113 EEC. 
However, when elements of a non-commercial character are also involved 
as in the case of association agreements, member states may also 
participate. In the case of the GATT, the Community has succeeded to 
the rights and obligations of the member states and has become if not
de jure certainly a ^  facto contracting party to GATT. The Community 
is also bound by agreements concluded by its member states, prior to its 
establishment.
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CHAPTER 5.
ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS
(a) Association Agreements leading to membership of the 
European Community.
All European countries in accordance with Art. 237 EEC are 
eligible to become members of the European Community, provided 
that they apply to the EEC Council which must unanimously accept 
their application, after having obtained the opinion of the 
Commission, To this effect, Denmark, Ireland, Norway and 
the United Kingdom applied in 1970 to enter into the Community. 
On 22nd January 1972, the Act of Accession was signed by the ten 
(10) governments and the Council of Ministers of the European 
Communities, subject to notification by the four applicant 
countries, applicable from 1st January 1973. Norway failed to 
accede into the European Communities due to negative results of 
a referendum, undertaken in the country, before the Norwegian 
Parliament was to ratify the Accession Act.
Greece is the tenth member state which acceded to the 
Community on 1.1.1981. For Greece, however, the first step 
to this movement was the conclusion of an Association Agreement 
which led eventually to membership of the European Communities. 
Turkey has also concluded an Association Agreement with the 
European Communities, which agreement may finally result in EEC 
membership. These two countries, while belonging from an 
economic point of view to the least developed regions of Europe, 
are, from a political point of view, worth special consideration. 
This consideration gains in weight with reference to their member­
ship of the NATO Alliance and their geographical and strategic 
importance.
The association agreement with Greece was an early major 
activity in the external relations of the European Community.
Much faith was invested in the successful conclusion of the agree­
ment. As such, it was considered to be quite favourable for the 
Greeks /
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Greeks, but it involved considerable difficulties for the
Community, when the Community was unable to grant similar treatment
to other countries, especially to the Mediterranean and near
Eastern areas. The Athens Association Agreement  ^ signed in 1961,
was submitted to the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES at the nineteenth
GATT session in the same year. In November 1962 Greece became
associated with the Community with the prospect of becoming a full
member, after a transitional period. This agreement was based on
a customs union, but in view of the weak economic position of the
country, Greece was granted a very long transitional period. Greek
products would enter duty free into the Community within a twelve-
year period, that is in 1974, while Community products would enter
Greece duty free after twenty-two years - i.e. in 1984, when Greek
tariffs were to be brought in line with the Community's CET. In
this way it was hoped that Greece would be helped in its economic
2and social development. Subsequently, owing to the political 
situation in Greece, the agreement was frozen between 1967 and 1974 
and re-activated in 1974 when Parliamentary democracy was restored 
to the country. Later, in June 1975, application for accession 
was submitted to the Community and finally the Treaty of Accession 
was signed in Athens on 29th May 1979, providing for full member-3ship from 1st January 1981. It includes a five year transitional 
period within which all duties and other restrictive measures were to be 
gradually abolished for almost all products^and a seven-year tran­
sitional period for some agricultural products, notably tomatoes 
and tobacco, and for the free movement of labour. When in October 
1981 the new Greek government came into power, it maintained that 
membership of the EEC would have negative effects on the Greek 
economy, with special reference to the more advanced level of
economic development in the EEC member states and the critical
4international economic situation.
Nevertheless, the Greek Government has been taking an active 
part in Community activities (from July to December 1983 it held 
the presidency of the Council of Ministers) in spite of its 
different stance on various aspects of the external political relations 
of the Community, e.g. the situation in Poland, the Middle East 
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crisis, the destruction of the Korean airliner by the Soviets.
On 19th March 1982, Greece submitted a memorandum to the
Community Institutions, pointing out that the special j^roblems
of her economy had not been taken into account by the Accession
Treaty and furthermore the Greek Government stressed the sensitive
nature of the Greek economy, its structural weaknesses, the
relatively important role of agriculture, the extremely difficult
competitive position of small and medium scale industries
the negative GNP growth rate, and the balance of payments deficit.
They asked for more help from Community funds so as to improve
agricultural infrastructure, develop tourism and protect small
industries and, also, exemption from the strict application of
Community rules on competition. In the first round of discussions
Greece’s special economic situation was recognised by the EEC, but
its overall response to the Memorandum does hot seem favourable
for Greece, although it is too early as yet to reach definite 
5conclusions. Within the GATT framework the association
agreement (of 1961) with Greece was pointed out by the GATT 
contracting parties to be a preferential agreement and, as such, 
in conflict with GATT law. The Community again pledged within 
the GATT that the association agreement in question granted no 
more than MEN treatment to Greece. During the formal review 
by GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES in 1962 at the nineteenth GATT 
session, the GATT failed to examine the legality of the assoc­
iation agreement and no consideration was given to whether or not 
it was a movement towards or away from free trade. This
Association Agreement was. contemplated in the form of a customs 
union arrangement, because the EEC wanted it to be in line with 
the GATT requirements and as such was permissible under the GATT 
Art. XXIV. It was the first association agreement concluded by 
the EEC and its conformity with the GATT rules had a special 
importance. Its legality or not came under consideration in 
accordance with the GATT rules and procedures. And in this 
case, as happened in the examination of the EEC's compatibil­
ity with GATT, (discussed in detail in the previous Chapter 4), 
the same pragmatic approach was followed by the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES to GATT, while the legal question was left open. (This 
legal /
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legal question has occupied the GATT deliberations as many times 
as association or preferential agreements have been concluded by 
the EEC. The questions is, in detail, analysed in the con-
elusions and it is not exaggeration to say that it is still left open.V
Turkey is the second country which has signed an association 
agreement with the Community with the prospect of becoming a full 
EEC member sometime in the future. The Ankara Association Agreement 
was signed in September 1963, and became operative in December 1964. 
This agreement aims at the progressive establishment of a customs 
union. It is different from the Athens Association Agreement 
in that its final objective was "the accession of Turkey to the 
Community when the operation of the agreement makes it possible 
to foresee the acceptance in full by Turkey of the obligations 
arising from the EEC Treaty .....
A preparatory period of five to ten or more years was needed 
for Turkey to strengthen its economy with assistance from the 
EEC and for increasing the EEC tariff quotas for Turkish products.
After that period a plan would be worked out within a twelve- 
year transitional period,-within which a customs union would be 
gradually established. The Working Party of GATT, examining the 
Ankara Association Agreement, was very concerned with the time 
limits set for the completion of the customs union and the uni­
lateral preferences granted to Turkey. Once again, no decision
was at the end taken as regards the compatibility of this agree-
7ment with the GATT. The same legal considerations were taken 
into account in the GATT appropriate committees, as in the case • 
of Greece's Association Agreement.
The Turkish authorities have continuously complained that the 
operation of the agreement has not really helped the country in 
its development as was foreseen, because the tariff preferences 
have been diluted through the granting of similar concessions to 
other Mediterranean countries. Turkey has argued that the aid 
given has been inadequate and the contemplated introduction of 
the free movement of labour between the two sides has not been 
fulfilled. Particularly,Turkey has argued that the Greek 
accession to the EEC was to the detriment of the Turkish economy.^
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Nevertheless, after political instability and the estab­
lishment of a military government in Turkey in 1980, it has been
argued by the EEC that the association agreement should be frozen
9until parliamentary democracy was restored. The European Trade 
Union Confederation has asked for the suspension of the agreement, 
as was done with the agreement with Greece during the seven years 
of Greek military dictatorship (1967-1974). Also, the Community 
has taken into account political developments in the country, 
every time it has come to consider Community aid to Turkey.
These two association agreements are on the one hand preliminary 
for an EEC membership according to Art. 237 EEC and, on the other 
hand, they both incorporate a preferential trade agreement which 
provides for free movement of goods, persons and services, 
dismantling of customs duties and QRs, harmonisation of laws in 
trade policy and co-ordination on economic policy matters. In 
particular, the Athens Association Agreement which was deemed to 
be very favourable for the Greek side, especially for agricultural 
products, has left narrow margins for further concessions made by 
the EEC to the other Mediterranean countries, which had sought to 
link themselves with the EEC.
(b) Association as a special form of development assistance.
(i) Association Agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries and territories.
The EEC Treaty envisaged two sets of provisions relating 
to the concept of association. The first envisaged in Part IV of 
the Treaty (Arts.131-136), establishes an association with the 
member states' overseas dependencies and territories and the 
second, provided for in Art. 238, authorises the Community to 
"conclude with a third country, a union of states or an inter­
national organisation, agreements establishing an association 
involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and 
special procedures".
The first form of association has its origins in the existing 
links between the EEC member states and their overseas countries 
and /
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1963, between the Community and eighteen African states 
colonies - and Madagascar.
and territories. Both groups of countries wanted their relation­
ship to be maintained and strengthened after the EECs establish­
ment. In particular, the overseas dependencies of France, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Italy, wanted their preferences with the 
Community member states to be extended over a much wider market.
The result was an association agreement signed in Cameroon in
former
This is the Yaounde I Convention, 
subsequently followed by a second one which entered into force 
in 1969 and expired on 31st January 1975. These conventions, 
however, did not cover commercial relations between the African 
States and Madagascar. Provision was made only for the pro­
gressive elimination of all duties and QRs. The principle of 
reciprocity was included in the Yaounde Convention, but certain 
duties were retained by the associated countries in order to 
protect their infant industries against imports from EEC.countries, 
especially for certain agricultural products. EEC development 
policy was an important element of the association. Financial 
and technical aid was provided in the form of grants through the 
EOF and, since 1964, in the form of loans from the EIB. Finan­
cial aid was provided not only by the Community but by the member 
states as well.
However, some other African countries (not former dependencies 
of the original six member states), felt that they might experience 
discrimination against their exports to the EEC and therefore 
sought a similar kind of relationship with the Community. Nigeria 
was the first country outside of this framework which signed an 
association agreement with the EEC, in 1966, while still a member 
of the Commonwealth preference system. This agreement which was 
based on reciprocal treatment, and included no development aid, 
never came into force. The example of Nigeria was followed in 
1969 by three Commonwealth countries of Eastern Africa, i.e.
Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. This association agreement, known
This assocation agreement never came
as the "Arusha Agreement", involved free trade, but not financial12and technical co-operation, 
into force either.
However, /
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However, with specific reference to the Yaounde Convention, S
the issue of compatibility of the convention with the GATT was 
considered. The EEC and the associated countries' represent­
atives pointed out to the GATT that the convention constituted 
nineteen separate free-trade areas fully consistent with Art.
XXIV:8(b) and that, therefore, they were under Art. XXIV:5, 
entitled to deviate from the provisions of the G.A. in order to 
establish the free-trade areas. Nevertheless, the argument 
put forward by the EEC was not accepted by the other contracting 
parties to GATT and therefore uncertainty about the existence of 
such free-trade areas existed in the light of great differences 
of views between member countries in.the consideration of the 
convention within GATT. In this case also, no decision
was reached, and the matter was referred to the twenty-fourth
13 'GATT session.
Attacks on the Convention were made by the other LDCs, and by the 
UK on behalf of her colonies. The LDCs outside the Convention 
did not really want the agreement to be declared illegal under 
the GATT rules, but wanted to be granted similar treatment by 
the EEC. Germany also strongly opposed the Convention during 
the GATT deliberations throughout the 1960s because it feared
that its trade with Latin America and Asia might suffer as a
result of the Yaounde preferential system. In the end, the 
Working Party of GATT adopted a Report on 9th November, 1971, 
concerning the compatibility of the association agreements with 
the G.A. but no definite conclusion was reached and the question
was left again open for future consideration.^^ Pragmatic :
considerations had again been taken into account, while any legal 
factors had been left aside.
After the U.K. entered the Community in 1973 (Accession 
Treaty of 22nd January 1972), and specifically in October 1973 
the nine EEC member states and forty-six African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) states began negotiations leading to the renewal 
and enlargement of the second Yaounde Convention. Thus, the 
first Lome Convention (Lome.I) was signed on 28th February 1975 
by /
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by the negotiating parties for a period of five vears, and 
expired on 1st March 1980. The Lome I Convention entered 
into force on 1st April 1976, but some trade arrangements 
included in the Lome I Convention were put into effect uni­
laterally by the Community earlier on 1st July 1975.^^ When 
it expired it was followed by the second Lome Convention (Lome 
II) signed by the Community and over sixty ACP countries (sixty-
one with Zimbabwe) at Lome on 1st October 1979; it became fully
17operational on 1st January 1981. Negotiations for Lome III
started in 1983.
Both Lome Conventions contain most of the provisions of the
Yaounde Conventions in an improved form and they include in
addition, the new policy of the Community concerning raw materials
and commercial and industrial co-operation.^^ They involve some
important innovations, particularly the principle of non-reciprocity
under which virtually all products originating in the ACP countries
can enter the Community duty-free, save some agricultural products,
whereas the Community products receive in the associated countries 
19MFN treatment. Apart from that, the ACP countries are free
to determine their trade policy. It is a great achievement,
however, that 99.5% of the total ACP exports to the Community are 
20duty-free.
The second and greatest innovation of the Lome Convention has 
been the introduction of the STABEX system for the stabilisation 
of export earnings of the ACP countries; it guarantees the 
earnings from certain exported commodities. Initially, the 
system covered twelve products (groundnut products, cocoa 
products, coffee products, cotton products, coconut products, 
palm and palm nut and kernel products, bananas, raw hides, skins 
and leather, wood products, tea, raw sisal and iron ore.) Under 
the second Lome Convention, the system has been expanded and 
covers forty-four products compared with thirty-four of Lome I.
When, under the STABEX system, export earnings from certain 
products fall below an agreed reference level, a compensation 
fund contributes the difference. The agreed aid under this 
scheme was set at 375 million European Units of Account (EUA) 
for the first five years (Lome I) and 550 million EUA under the 
second /
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second Lome Convention. It provides for protection not
only on the grounds of bad economic conditions, but also on the
grounds of fall in demand and of drop in production attributable
to natural disasters. Its purpose is to stabilise market price
fluctuations and to secure the regularity of supplies. It
assures the EEC of a reasonable stability of prices of certain
raw materials and foodstuffs and also secures access to suppliers
21in times of shortage.
The STABEX system under the first Lome Convention, succeeded
in meeting the demands of the ACP countries and , in fact, left an
undemanded balance of 6 million EUA when the Convention expired.
But as soon as the second Lome Convention came into existence,
STABEX ran into difficulties. In 1980 and 1981 it ran out of 
22funds. The reasons are various and complex. The Commission
acknowledged the need to reform the system and carried out an 
23investigation. This investigation revealed that many factors
were involved; increased demands of the ACP countries, world
recession, increased competition in world markets, protectionist
measures undertaken by DCs, improvement in the operation of the
system, sharp fall in world prices of a number of key products
covered by STABEX, natural disasters, lower demand in the
Community. It seems, however, that the most important factors
which led to the ineffectiveness of STABEX are found in the
point that the ACP countries started to effectively use the
system and also to the worsening competitive position of ACP
exports covered by STABEX on international markets.
In the face of such competition the ACP countries are unable
to develop their industries, increase production, expand their
exports and diversify their economies. The consequences of the
ineffectiveness of STABEX are very serious. The recoil of the
system illustrates the negative effects of protectionism on the
ACP countries and on the EEC as well. The situation has reached
alarming dimensions, especially because funds from the IMF may be 
24short. The system is also criticised by the non-ACP LDCs
which point out that it discriminates against their exports; 
but the EEC cannot, for the time being, extend the system to all
LDCs.
Nevertheless, /
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Nevertheless, whatever the shortcomings of the system, 
the ACP countries want the maintenance and improvement of 
STABEX, which remains one of the most important instruments of 
co-operation. In general, Community funds should be reimbursed 
when export earnings return to a satisfactory leve^ but this
obligation does not apply to the thirty-five least developed
. • 26 countries.
Moreover, another system similar to STABEX, the SYSMIN or 
MINEX ( a new innovation Included in Lome II, concerning mineral 
exploitation) has been introduced to protect ACP exports of 
minerals apart from iron-ore, against price fluctuations and 
other disturbances. For the operation of the schemes funds can 
be channelled through the European Development Fund (EDF) and also 
loans can be secured by the European Investment Bank (EIB). Not
27all countries, however, have equally benefited under these schemes.
Financial and technical co-operation: Financial and technical
co-operation is provided for the ACP states through the EDF and 
EIB, in favourable and long-term loans for financing in particular 
small scale basic development schemes in rural areas, and most 
particularly those in the least developed countries. The bene­
ficiary countries are responsible for administering and managing 
the aid, although the Community member states still play a role.
The second Lome Convention has contributed to a more equitable dis­
tribution of funds to all ACP states and particularly to those 
needing most help. Part of the aid is given for industrialisation , 
economic infra-structure and social development. The total 
financial aid given by the Community according to the terms 
agreed in the Lome II Convention is 5,692 million EUA, compared 
with 3,457 million EUA of the Lome I Convention,. For the ACP 
countries this kind of co-operation is vital given that they 
want co-operation and open European markets for their primary 
commodities.
Industrial Co-operation: For the development and diversification of
this crucial sector of the economy, numerous decisions have been 
made /
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made involving aid administered by the EIB and by the Commission 
of the EEC. The proposed areas of action are development of 
research and technology, information exchanges, studies, establish­
ment of conduct between firms, co-operation in the field of energy 
especially since 1973. Community firms have an important role 
to play in the industrialisation of the ACP countries who are calling 
for the transfer of technology to the third world. To this end 
the Centre for Industrial Development (CID) assisted by a Committee 
on Industrial Co-operation (CIC) was created to provide information 
opportunities for industrial co-operation and to facilitate the 
transfer of technology. Unfortunately, this centre has been a
disappointment despite the efforts on both sides to correct the 
29disadvantages. ' Since the application of the first Lome
Convention, over 140 million EUA have been transferred to the
ACP states for fifty-seven projects in studies in this field, with
special consideration given to the least developed countries (LLDCs).
Lome does not meet the aspirations of the LDCs as evidenced by
their demands made at the second UNIDO Conference held at Lima,31Peru, in March 1975,which adopted the Declaration of Lima.
This Declaration constitutes a series of demands in the field 
of development co-operation; it is much broader and ambitious 
than the Lome industrial co-operation provisions, especially as 
regards the operation of multinational companies and the super­
vision of foreign businessmen. The Lima Declaration urges the LDCs 
to co-operate and speed up their industrial development. The
USA voted against the Declaration but the EEC adopted a more
32conciliatory.attitude during the conference. ' In principle,the
EEC supports the development and industrialisation of the LDCs^but
it has no global programme for the industrialisation of the third
world. Moreover, it has a global aid target of 0.7% of the GNP.
So far only the Netherlands have reached the 0.7% aid target and
has written off some debts of the poorest countries.
The Community is the principal development aid donor to third
world countries and its contribution amounts to 35.5% of total 
33aid given to LDCs. ’ At first glance these figures are impressive 
but, in fact, the real aid is much lower. During the Lome I 
Convention only 6% of the EEC aid reached the ACP countries, due 
to the disbursement procedures which are very slow.^'^' Therefore, 
complaints /
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complaints raised by the ACP countries are justifiable. In fact, 
the LDCs call the Community for better understanding of their 
problems and seek more aid through the EDF or the EIB. However, 
under the present economic circumstances of reduced export opport­
unities and mounting debts for the developing countries, it is very 
depressing that some developed countries have spoken up for decrease 
of development aid; e.g. the USA has currently considered reducing 
its foreign aid commitments, even though the IMF may be dangerously 
short of funds, and also to reducing the share of funds it is supply­
ing to the World Bank's development programmes in the poorest
. 35countries-
What, however, remains as an important aspect in this study is 
the impact of the EEC-ACP associations agreements on world trade.
Is this beneficial or not? To what extent are the non-associated 
LDCs affected?
At first, and as regards the legality of the Lome I Convention
with the GATT rules, the text of the Convention was submitted to the
GATT in July 1975 and a Working Party was appointed.. Sympathy was
expressed in the Working Party with the view that the objectives of
the Convention were in line with the spirit of GATT and especially
Part IV, given that the Convention aims at the improvement of the
standards of living and economic development of a significant
number of LDCs, including a number of LLDCs as well. The parties to
the Convention and some members of the Working Party stated that "the
trade committments in the Convention were compatible with the relevant
36provisions of the G.A. taken as a whole and with its objectives". 
However, contrary opinions were expressed and finally no decision was 
taken, but the parties to the Convention agreed to supply information 
and notify any changes in the Convention. The second Lome 
Convention signed in 1979, is fundamentally an extension of the first 
one for five more years. It does not include new provisions requiring 
its submission to the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES for approval. Only 
when it is deemed necessary, the parties can supply any additional 
information, concerning the operation of the Convention. The Lome 
Conventions as such do not include any separate provisions concerning 
preferential /
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preferential treatment, but it is generally accepted that the EEC 
has, through the Lome Conventions, granted preferences to the ACP 
countries in comparison with what it has granted to other LDCs,
Whether and to what extent the Lome Conventions infringe the GATT 
law is left an open question. As it happened with the EEC 
association agreements with Greece and Turkey and in this case, no 
definite decisions have been taken in GATT as regards this 
sensitive legal issue.
However, the aim of the EEC-ACP association agreements, re­
lating primarily to the economic and social development of the 
overseas countries and territories, and the raising of their standards 
of living, through the expansion of their trade, appears to co­
incide with the aims and the objectives of the G.A. set out in the 
preamble and Part IV relating to the developing countries. In 
broader terms, these agreements do not appear incompatible therefore 
with the spirit of GATT in respect to preferences not accorded to 
other contracting parties,
This consideration is justified on the grounds that the GATT 
and the EEC have both the same objectives as far as LDCs are con­
cerned, that is the industrialisation and development of the LDCs.
A favourable treatment granted by the EEC to the associated countries 
consequently could not be incompatible with the spirit of the GATT, 
although the position of the LLDCs raises several questions.
Due to political and historical reasons, the EEC and ACP 
countries have developed mutually close relations. The ACP countries 
have chosen closer relations with Europe, aiming at their social and 
economic development and expansion of their trade. In fact, the 
EEC association agreements with the ACP countries are considered to 
be more privileged than others concluded by the Community. These 
arrangements are beyond any doubt favourable to the countries in­
volved. Even the hardest critics cannot deny their favourable 
effects at least for a short time. Nevertheless, the ACP countries 
complain that their exports to the Community stagnate, while
European exports to their markets have continued to grow under the 
37Lome Conventions. In absolute terms there has been an increase
of ACP exports to the Community, but considering inflation 
rates /
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38rates the actual increase is much reduced. They also complain
of the EEC sugar policy and of the limited effects of the STABEX 
system which in their opinion covers too small a range of*, products 39
However, in this context the case of non-associated LDCs 
raises certain questions. The non-ACP developing countries are 
those who are particularly unhappy about the EEC-ACP association 
arrangements, arguing that they have worked to their detriment.
These countries have repeatedly demanded a halt to the proliferation 
of EEC preferential agreements. Even the LDCs who are associated 
with the Community but outside the Lome Convention complain about 
the EEC association network.
Whether or not the EEC-ACP agreements are favourable or 
not to world trade as a whole is a very difficult question.
Developing an EEC global approach towards the third world should be 
one of the major tasks ahead.. Unfortunately, to date the Community 
has not developed a common policy towards the LDCs within the frame­
work of the North-South dialogue.
In general, the LDCs' demand for global negotiations must be
taken into account; the LDCs should be recognised as equal partners
and particularly the position of the LLDCs, the LDCs and the Newly
Industrialised Countries (NIC) should be carefully distinguished.
Some ACP countries have supported the view that they should work
within the group of 77 within the UN instead of being limited by
40association with EEC. They maintained that association with
Europe does not provide them with long-term advantages and discriminates 
against countries outside the Lome framework. A united LDCs’ front 
could better achieve its expectations, when participating in inter­
national fora and strengthen its bargaining position when negotiating 
with the EEC or other DCs. A united group of 77 within the UN frame­
work will also enable LDCs to improve their relations, develop 
common programmes, such as common transport projects, exchange 
information and goods, and further develop trade among themselves on 
a larger scale than with developed countries.
(•> i) Agreements with the Mediterranean Countries.
The European Community has concluded both association and co-operation 
agreements /
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agreements with all the Mediterranean countries with the exception
of Libya and Albania. All the agreements were negotiated separately
with each one of the Mediterranean countries and include tariff
reductions, co-operation in capital flows, technology transfer and
development aid. With Israel the first trade agreement was
signed in 1964, which was replaced by two co-operation agreements in
411970 and 1975 respectively. Partial association agreements were
signed in 1969 between the Community and Morocco and Tunisia without
providing financial and technical co-operation. They were replaced
with co-operation agreements in 1976 in the context of an overall
Mediterranean policy. With Yugoslavia, initially in March 1970,
a three-year non-preferential agreement was signed which was renewed
for another five years, and finally was replaced by a preferential
(co-operation) agreement concluded in April 3 980 after two years of 
42negotiations. Association agreements have been signed between
the Community and Malta and Cyprus (1971-1976 and 1972 respectively).
These agreements provided for the progressive establishment of a
customs union. Except for association agreements the Community
43has signed co-operation agreements with the rest of the Mediterr­
anean basin states.
However, after the Paris Summit Meeting of the European Council 
of 7th November 1972, a document concerning a 'global Mediterranean 
policy’ was adopted providing for the establishment of a free trade 
area in industrial goods, certain concessions on agricultural pro­
ducts, industrial and technical collaboration and development aid
44to poorer Mediterranean countries.
In the context of the overall Mediterranean policy, prefer­
ential agreements were signed in 1975 with Spain and Portugal.
Also, co-operation agreements were signed with the Maghreb countries 
(Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) in 1976 for an unlimited period 
and with the Mashrek countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria) 
in 1977 for an unlimited period as well. The co-operation agree­
ments, as well as the association agreements, include financial and
46technical assistance. They include the fields of energy, science
and technology, industry, trade and the environment. The association
agreements with Malta and Cyprus contain in addition a free-trade
area element with the ultimate objective of establishing a eustons 
47union.
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Israel was the first country to negotiate with the EEC an agree­
ment which needs special consideration because of prolonged and 
conflicting interests of the countries involved. , From
the first years of the EEC's existence Israel sought, to negotiate 
an agreement with the Community. The only way that an agreement 
would be compatible with the GATT rules, would be in the form of a 
customs union or a free-trade area, or under any other form provided 
that a waiver under Art. XXV : 5 of GATT has been secured. Israel 
proposed the establishment of a free-trade area under Art. XXIV:5 
but the Commission of the European Community was more in favour 
of a commercial agreement under Art. Ill which would cover all 
measures of trade liberalisation and provisions of financial and 
technical co-operation. But the conclusion of an agreement was 
extremely difficult, because of divergence of opinions on both 
sides. The EEC was concerned that the proposed agreement would 
not be in breach of the GATT rules. Meanwhile, during the Kennedy 
Round nultilateral trade negotiations, liberalisation measures were 
taking place. Israel pointed out her specific problems, for 
example BOP problems, which might justify special treatment, but 
the EEC maintained that these special problems could be raised in 
the GATT for special treatment (e.g. under Arts. XI-XV of the GATT).
Delegations from both sides met repeatedly in 1963, but they failed
48to reach an agreement.
However, the first agreement between EEC-Israel was signed on 
4th June, 1964. This agreement was purely a bilateral trade agree­
ment, and it was very important from the legal point of view of the 
evolution of the commercial policy of the Community. Subsequently 
Israélien 4th October 1966, submitted a new application and re­
quested the replacement of the old agreement by one of association. 
The Commission was rather of the opinion that the agreement should 
only cover industrial products and exclude the agricultural pro­
ducts which would be regulated in the framework of a Mediterranean 
policy. Italy and France expressed the view that the existing 
trade agreement should be extended and that the Community should 
accelerate tariff reductions agreed during the Kennedy Round, in 
particular for products of special interest to Israel. Germany 
and the Netherlands, backed by Belgium and Luxembourg argued for 
a preferential agreement. Long and arduous discussion took place 
over /
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over the form the new agreement was to take. The Commission was
still careful not to contravene the GATT rules. Italy, Belgium
and Luxembourg put forward a new proposal for tariff reduction for
products of special interest to Israel. Nevertheless, the fear
was expressed that this proposal might be in contradiction with 
49the GATT rules. The issue in question was verv complicated
indeed. The matter was debated between Council, Commission and 
Coreper. Meanwhile the overall Mediterranean policy was in the 
course of its implementation. The EEC, within this framework, 
granted preferential treatment to Israel and Spain for their 
citrus fruit (this case is discussed below), and at the same time, 
it requested a waiver in GATT, so as to overcome any probable 
violation of the GATT rules. During 1969 progress was made 
towards a compromise solution. Italy was opposed to a prefer­
ential agreement for Israel, while the Netherlands was the country 
which supported it the most. Finally a 45% tariff preference 
was achieved and in September 1969 another round of negotiations 
for an agreenent took place. The Commission proposed a five-year 
agreement. Official negotiations with Israel started in November 
1969, and ended in February 1970, when a co-operation agreement
was reached. This agreement gave Israel a 45%-50% tariff re-
50duction of her industrial products. It did not constitute a
free-trade area and it was not even proposed as such by the 
parties to the agreement. Consequently, it was criticised by 
the other contracting parties to GATT as being preferential and 
therefore infringing the GATT law.
However, this agreement was submitted to GATT for the usual
examination of its compatibility with the G.A. This case was a
very difficult one indeed, where the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT
had difficulty in reaching even the customary conclusions. Some
members of the Working Party expressed the view that no eliminations
of tariffs or other restrictions on 'substantially all the trade'
took place; that it was a pure preferential agreement contrary 
51to GATT rules. Nevertheless, the prolonged conflict of opinions
in this case was responsible for making the GATT rules more flexible
52in the 1960s. As Henig rightly observes the Community's 
attitude during the 1960s had changed towards GATT. In the early 
stages /
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stages of the first trade agreement with Israel, the Community 
was very concerned about the GATT rules, pointing out that no 
preferential agreement could be contemplated outside the context 
of a customs union or a free-trade area arrangement: but during 
the negotiations of the second agreement with Israel, the 
Community feeling its own strength and confidence in its external 
policy, started to deviate from the provisions of the G.A. by 
concluding this agreement, outside the framework of a customs 
union or free-trade area arrangement. Also, the other prefer­
ential trade agreements concluded between the Community and the 
Mediterranean basin countries (e.g. Mashrek, Maghreb countries,,
Malta, Cyprus) have been submitted to the CONTRACTING PARTIES to 
GATT to be examined as to whether or not they comply with the 
GATT requirements of Art. XXIV. In particular the legal issue
of free-trade area element was considered. No definite con­
clusions were reached at the end. The CONTRACTING PARTIES 
neither prohibited the arrangements nor issued recommendations 
to alter them, nor approved them as they stood. That is, the 
application of Art. XXIV was not determined and the non-preferred 
countries, were left with the option to claim nullification or impairment 
under Art. XXIII or to ask for consultations under Art. XXII, or
to accept the system as a whole. The most common procedure for
53the settlement of disputes arising was that of holding consultations
All the same, the parties to the agreements have argued that 
the agreements were consistent with the GATT requirements and, 
furthermore, that their aims were the same as the objectives set 
out in the General Agreement, that is the liberalisation of trade.
The Community always supported the notion that it had established 
interim agreements leading to FTAs with each one of the Mediter­
ranean countries, and that the requirements of Art. XXIV par. 5-9 
had been fulfilled. It pointed out that Art. XXIV should be 
read in the context of the economic position of the poor Mediter­
ranean countries. On several occasions the Community pointed out 
that previously concluded agreements between the EEC and African 
states with more or less the same provisions, were not defined as 
incompatible with the GATT provisions and that they constituted a 
good precedent. The Community made it clear that it would never 
accept invalidation of this preferential framework, despite the 
fact /
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fact that outside countries, and particularly the USA, maintained
54that the preferential system was illegal. The latter argued
that the Community's agreements did not comply with Art. XXIV of 
the G.A. and therefore that they were contrary to MFN principle 
of non-discrimination.
Some members of the Working Parties set up to investigate 
these agreements, expressed the view that the agreements concerned 
were inconsistent with the provisions of the G.A. in that no plan 
or schedule for the establishment of a free-trade area was provided 
for, nor was there provision for the elimination of the obstacles 
to "substantially all the t r a d e " . i n  particular, in the exam­
ination of the Mashrek countries' (Lebanon^^, Syria , Jordan 
59and Egypt ) agreements, the parties to the agreements argued that 
"the agreements were entirely consistent with the objectives of the 
relevant provisions of the G.A, taken as a whole", and that they 
constituted "a positive contribution to solving the economic dev­
elopment problems of the Mediterranean countries". The represent­
atives of the Mediterranean countries pointed out that special 
favourable treatment should be given to them as LDCs.
60In the agreements with Morocco and Tunisia the parties
argued that the requirements of Art. XXIV:5-9 of a free-trade 
area had been, fulfilled. They pointed out that they were interim 
agreements, leading to free-trade areas and that the elimination 
of obstacles to "substantially all the trade" was not an essential 
condition as to the initial stages of the interim agreement. 
Consequently, they argued that anyway trade was not disrupted but 
further developed and that they would depart from the provisions 
of Art. XXIV:5 only to the extent necessary for the formation of 
these two free-trade areas.
The association agreements between the EEC and Malta 
62and Cyprus was concluded with the objective of establishing a 
customs union within a reasonable length of time. The Working 
Party, likewise, could not reach any definite conclusion as to the 
issue involved.
In the EEC-Spain preferential agreement, the parties
expressed their determination to form a free-trade area or a customs
union so as to comply with the GATT requirements, and this appeared
6 3as a firm undertaking expressed bv the parties.
However,
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However, the Community has had and still has a great interest
in maintaining the agreements with the Mediterranean countries for
64economic, political and strategic reasons. The countries con­
cerned are good customers for EEC industrial products and its 
exports to them represent 12% of total Community exports at MFN 
rates. What is most important is that these agreements make the 
Community secure in the supplies of energy and raw materials, 
(especially because of the particularly good relations of the 
South Mediterranean states with the oil producing Arab countries).
The Community, in the context of its overall Mediterranean policy, 
gives to all Mediterranean countries' exports, duty-free access to 
their industrial products and preferential treatment for most of 
their Mediterranean-type agricultural products, while some other 
agricultural products produced in Southern France and Italy are 
protected under the CAP variable levies. The Community is the 
biggest single trade partner for most Mediterranean countries and
it receives an estimated 50% of their total exports, thereby
65becoming an exceptionally important market for them. The
number of products covered under these agreements is much larger 
than those under the GSPs. .
All the above mentioned agreements have as an ultimate 
objective the liberalisation of trade. In the context of the 
overall Mediterranean policy this aspect needs to be given particular 
attention as, with the entry of Spain into the Community, the EEC 
is likely to become self-sufficient and therefore protectionist in 
several Mediterranean-type agricultural products. These products 
are the very ones which constitute a large percentage of the trade 
of the other Mediterranean countries. It is, however, in the 
interest of these Mediterranean countries to maintain and strengthen 
their trade relationship with the EEC in order to secure markets 
for their agricultural products. Liberal trade policies pursued 
by the EEC would be to the benefit of both groups of countries, 
Tunisia, the main exporter of olive oil to the EEC will be most 
affected by the Spanish accession. There is growing concern, 
however, within the Community for a revision of the CAP and possible 
arrangements in favour of Mediterranean-type products. The 
Mediterranean states, likewise, are increasingly concerned about 
the second EEC enlargement and are proposing the setting up of a 
system /
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system, along the lines of STABEX, for securing their export 
e a r n i n g s . T h e  liberalisation of trade at least within this 
region should be given special attention after the second EEC 
enlargement- It is in the Community's interest that this en­
largement should not have negative effects on trade with the South 
Mediterranean countries. Oji the other hand, it is hard for the 
Community not to try to safeguard some sectors of its economy;
e.g. by negotiating the so-called 'self-limitation agreements'
67in textiles and clothing.
In fact, the Community, as the biggest single trade unit in
the world, is more responsible than any other country or grouping
for maintaining an open system of international trade as far as
it is possible, not only with the Mediterranean countries, but with
those countries which are outside this framework. The citrusB 8fruit waiver case is of particular importance to this study 
from the legal point of view when considering its consequences for 
the GATT legal system and observing its implications for those 
countries outside the preferential area.. In 1969, the Community 
gave preferences for citrus fruit to Morocco and Tunisia. Israel 
and Spain renewed their repeated requests for equal treatment. 
Therefore the Community gave to Spain and Israel a 40% tariff re­
duction for their citrus products; a measure which was contrary to 
GATT. Meanwhile a waiver was requested by the Community, but 
shortly after the Community withdrew its request.
The Community suppliers, particularly the USA, who had been 
seriously affected, at least during certain months, by the intro­
duction of a preferential system,, filed a series of complaints.
Many members of the Working Party to GATT felt that the prefer­
ential system violated GATT and that the waiver was requested after 
the operation of the preferential system. The main objective of 
the waiver was not to grant a trade advantage to Spain and Israel, 
but rather to permit the conservation of the trade advantage that 
Morocco and Tunisia had traditionally enjoyed and which was of vital 
importance for their economies. Nevertheless, although the
waiver request was withdrawn, it provided an indication of the 
goodwill, on the part of the Community, in observing the GATT rules 
especially Art. I of the MFN principle. The citrus fruit waiver 
case /
160
______________________________________
case is particularly important for considering the application
of the MFN princinie and its effect on third countries outside the
69EEC preferential framework. As L. Boselli says "the citrus 
fruit case cannot be considered as an isolated event in the history 
of GATT, On the contrary it is an episode in a long and uneasy 
evolution towards the necessary adaptation of the old rules to new 
forms of world trade organisation. This evolution concerns the 
MFN clause. There is no doubt that this principle has rendered 
inestimable services to international trade permitting it to etolve 
from a bilateral to a multilateral pattern. Nevertheless, its 
rigid application might be in some cases a hindrance to trade 
development", and he continued further that "in the USA-Canada 
automobile agreement many CONTRACTING PARTIES thought that Art.I 
should be more flexible to permit preferential agreements for 
neighbouring countries". In this context the USA, opposing the 
EEC preferences on citrus fruit, maintained the view that the EEC 
preferential system was illegal, under GATT Art. XXIV. After 
long consultations between the parties concerned, they reached a 
compromise solution, that is - the EEC undertook to reduce the 
margin on citrus fruit coming from Mediterranean countries during 
the peak USA export season. The USA achieved its goal of in­
creasing its trade in citrus fruits with the EEC, despite the fact 
that agreements between EEC-Israel and EEC-Spain had been negotiated 
concerning tariff reductions. Apparently, the preferred Mediter­
ranean countries were not affected by this compromise between the 
EEC and the USA because they had not yet increased their production.
The country which was most affected was Brazil, whose citrus fruit
70exports to the Community rapidly decreased.
The case, therefore, illustrates the disadvantageous trade
position of a third and weak country not linked with the EEC with
any sort of preferential trade agreement, and the extent to which
the MFN principle can apply. Preferential agreements have
caused, and are still continuing to cause significant distortions
of trade in favour of the preferred countries, especially in
favour, of the most advanced of them as against the LLDCs' and LDCs' 
71interests. Another important aspect is that problems raised
as a consequence of the establishment of preferential agreements 
are now being resolved through bilateral negotiations outside the 
legal /
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(c) /
legal machinery of GATT, It is a fact, however, that prefer­
ential agreements are negotiated outside the GATT system and they 
are inconsistent with its rules but, on the other hand, they are 
a 'fait accompli' and have proliferated to such an extent that 
their consideration cannot be left out of the GATT framework. To 
this end, as is earlier discussed in Chapter 4, preferential
agreements should be submitted to the GATT procedures and rules
72especially to GATT Art. XXIV.
To sum up, it would seem that the Community was very con­
cerned about the GATT rules during the conclusion of the first 
preferential agreements, that is, the association agreements with 
Greece and Turkey, which were contemplated in the context of a 
customs union arrangement. After the first two decades the 
Community felt its own strength and it rather based its preferential 
agreements in Art.113 (EEC), which agreements do not seem to accord 
with the letter or even the spirit of the G.A. As Henig observed 
in examining the EEC-Israel and EEC-Spain agreements of 1970, "the 
agreements of Israel and Spain of 1970 show the Community's 
intention to build up its external policy on its own rationale.
The first 1964 EEC-Israel agreement shows the difficulties the 
Community faced as a result inherent in the GATT rules: the second
(1970) agreement shows the Community's present confidence in its 
external relations ..." The EEC wanted to present the preferential 
agreements as free-trade areas and used Art. XXIV as a loophole for 
those agreements, although it is hard to say that they really met 
the requirements set out in Art. XXIV. Because of the prolifer­
ation of the preferential arrangements the GATT has increasingly 
become ineffective to deal with this issue and the legal machinery 
of Art. XXIV has proved inadequate to deal with preferential agree­
ments, since a great number of the GATT parties are involved in a 
preferential arrangement of one sort or another. Therefore, the 
GATT system has been weakened as a result of the conclusion of the 
EEC preferential arrangements; in particular the MFN clause has
lost its significance because it has proved impossible to apply
73to a so different level of economic development of states.
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(c) Association as a substitute for an EEC membership 
Agreements between the EEÇ and EFTA countries.
In the late 1940s the OEEC countries, along with Marshall 
aid took some measures (e.g. removal of QRs on imports, the estab­
lishment of the European Payments Union, and the code for liber­
alisation of trade) and were thinking of the creation of a 
European free trade area encompassing non-Communist Europe, 
according to GATT rules. The six countries later to become the 
EEC member states were not satisfied, however, with the proposed 
solution. After the Messina conference was held in 1955 they 
were determined to adopt not only commercial measures, but their 
ultimate objective was an integration of their national economies.
They thought a free-trade area based only on commercial consider-
74ations would disturb and weaken their interests.
On a British initiative in 1956 the OEEC Council of 
Ministers decided to study the feasibility of multilateral co­
operation on trade policy between the six EEC member states and 
the other OEEC states, and particularly to find a solution through 
a general free-trade zone as defined in the GATT. The negotiations, 
under the chairmanship of Reginald Maudling, for the establishment 
of a large free-trade area met with serious difficulties, especially 
after the French refusal to accept any kind of free-trade area
between the six and the other OEEC countries. Finally, the
75negotiations failed to reach a successful conclusion.
Under these circumstances seven European countries out­
side the EEC decided to take any necessary steps to eliminate any 
discrimination in trade as a result of the creation of the EEC, 
and to create a partial version of the proposed Pan-European free- 
trade area. Therefore, on British proposals and on Swedish 
invitation, seven European countries started negotiations, and in 
July 1959 a draft treaty was ready and a final agreement, the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the so-called Stockholm 
Convention, was ready to be signed on 20th November 1960. 
Ratification followed the next year and subsequently the Convention 
was submitted to the sixteenth session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
to /
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to GATT (May-June 1960) for the conventional examination of the
77compatibility issue.
The special problem raised in the EFTA was that the 
Convention covered the free movement of all industrial products, 
but excluded trade in agricultural products, such trade was to 
be carried out through bjlateral agreements between the member 
states. The critics of the Convention, however, were not ready 
to accept the Convention, since it excluded a whole sector of the 
economy and therefore was not consistent with the spirit of GATT. 
The negotiation of the bilateral agreements between the EFTA 
countries for agricultural products was also severely criticised, 
as tending to create preferential agreements and discriminating 
against the other members of the association. On the other hand, 
the parties to the Convention strongly argued that they strictly 
followed the GATT rules and particularly Art. XXIV:8(b). As 
regards the agricultural sector, the case in point, they argued 
that bilateral agreements did facilitate the expansion of trade 
in agricultural products and that this sector was not excluded 
altogether. In any case, they supported the view that the 
'substantially all the trade* criterion had been fulfilled, given 
that the trade in industrial products covered 85% of the total 
trade. The Working Party, however, was unable to reach any
unanimous conclusion, nor did it make any recommendations to the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES. The issue was postponed to the seventeenth 
session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES in autumn 1960. At this stage 
the EFTA partners were ready to furnish additional information 
and to hold further consultations.
However, the main interest in this study has been the legal 
issue of compatibility of the bilateral agreements between the 
EEC and EFTA countries with the GATT rules. The Community has 
negotiated trade agreements separately with each one of the EFTA 
countries, but general principles have been applicable to all. 
Agreements between the EEC and the seven (i.e. Austria, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Iceland, Norway, Portugal and(Finland associated)^ 
EFTA countries, were signed setting up free-trade areas. Agree­
ments between the Community on the one hand and Austria, Sweden 
and Switzerland on the other hand were signed on 22nd July, 1972. 
An interim agreement with Austria had already entered into force 
on /
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79on 1st October, 1972, The agreements with Iceland, Norway
and Finland entered into force on 1st January 1974 respectively.
The U.K. and Denmark former EFTA countries joined the EEC on 1st 
January 1973.
Between the EEC and the EFTA countries the establishment 
of free-trade areas was agreed (not customs unions nor harmon­
isation of legislation^ with the object of removing tariff 
barriers, QRs and non-tariff barriers on all industrial products, 
except for paper and steel and for certain processed agricultural 
products. In the agreements with Austria, Finland, Norway,
Sweden and Switzerland duties on industrial products would generally 
be eliminated in five equal steps by 1st July 1977. In the case 
of a few sensitive products and of the agreements with Iceland 
and Portugal longer periods have been negotiated. In fact, this 
happened ahead of the scheduled time.^^
All these agreements aim "at promoting, by the expansion of 
mutual trade, the harmonious development of conditions of life and 
employment, the growth of productivity and financial stability and 
to contribute to the liberalisation and expansion of world trade".
The EFTA countries, taken as a whole, constitute the largest 
trading partner for the EEC. About a quarter of the EEC's external 
trade goes to EFTA countries and about a fifth of EPTA's external 
trade goes to the Community. These figures show the significance 
of the inter-dependence in the region and the economic and political 
implications of this inter-dependence. There is a common interest,
therefore, on the part of both parties to do anything possible to 
maintain and develop even further these relations, for a high level 
of economic growth and liberalisation of trade. It is their 
common interest, however, that their relations should be expanded 
beyond trade to include other fields as well, such as transport, 
technical and scientific research, protection of the environment, 
the exchange of information, views on economic and monetary 
policies, development aid, energy and industrial policy with the 
ultimate objective of further economic growth and the rising of 
the living standards of their people. Inter-dependence is very 
vital for both groups of countries. For the Community is very 
significant /
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significant as its comfortable trade surplus with the EFTA 
countries enables it to offset its trade deficit with Japan and 
the USA. For the EFTA, it is even more important, since a great
83percentage of its external trade is conducted with the Community.
However, all the free-trade agreements have functioned 
quite well. They have contributed to the removal of trade barriers 
and to the expansion and liberalisation of trade, which have shown 
considerable progress since the establishment of these agreements.
To the countries involved, therefore, the effects of the trade 
agreements are beneficial and trade creating,
A Working Party to GATT was appointed meanwhile, to examine 
whether or not these agreements were in conformity with the GATT 
rules and especially Art. XXIV. The critics of the agreements 
argued that they were not trade agreements, but preferential ones 
and, as such, inconsistent with Art. XXIV. In particular, they 
pointed out that the criteria set out in paras, 5 and 8(b) have 
not been fulfilled. The 'substantially all the trade' require­
ment could not be justified since most agricultural products have 
been excluded from the agreements. They said the plan and schedule 
set up in these agreements was to indicate an interim agreement and 
in no way a complete free trade area. Moreover, they went on to 
argue that the rules of origin (an eminent characteristic of the 
EFTA association) not only became an obstacle to inter-area trade, 
but also raised new barriers to trade. They were especially of 
the opinion that the rules of origin increased restrictions
against third parties and in general they worked against the LDCs'
 ^ 84interests.
However, it is submitted, and this opinion is supported by 
the parties to the agreements, that the EEC-EFTA trade agreements 
created a free-trade area consistent with the requirements of 
Art. XXIV. It included a plan and schedule for elimination of 
customs duties and other restrictive regulations to trade (already 
completed ahead of schedule) and in no way were preferential 
agreements. The sensitive issues of the rules of origin and the 
exclusion of trade of most agricultural products, raised a question 
but /
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but it does not indicate that world trade has been diverted
because of those rules. It is quite clear, nevertheless, that
there have been established free-trade areas between the EEC
and EFTA countries, despite the exclusion of the agricultural
sector. This exclusion seems not to have caused any significant
85trade diversion in world trade ; e.g. the USA trade with EFTA 
countries has not been much affected in absolute terms, at least 
after these agreements came into f o r c e . B u t  even so, tradit­
ionally there has been accepted an exception to MFN clause 
obligations for bordering countries and limited regional arrange­
ments. Especially, in this case, political, historical and geo­
graphical links between the Community and EFTA countries have 
been remarkable. At the end of the day the Working Party was 
unable to reach any unanimous conclusions as to the compatibility 
issue of the agreements with the GATT, nor did it make any recom­
mendations to the parties concerned, nor condemn any particular 
aspect of the agreements as causing problems in the diversion of 
world trade.
Finally, the most important question raised earlier, i.e. the 
impact of the EEC agreements on the GATT system, should be given 
attention here. It has been pointed out that the EEC was con­
cerned with the compatibility of the first agreements with the 
GATT, i.e. the association agreements with Greece and Turkey, 
which were contemplated in the form of a customs union arrangement 
But shortly after, when the EEC started to feel its own strength, 
it rather based its preferential agreements in Art.113, EEC,(CCP), 
which does not seem in accordance with the letter and even the 
spirit of GATT, Subsequently, when association agreements with 
the Mediterranean and African countries were submitted to GATT 
for approval, the EEC maintained that they constituted free-trade 
areas and as such were consistent with the letter and spirit of 
GATT. It particularly maintained that these agreements were in 
line with Part IV of the GATT regarding 'Trade and Development' 
of the LDCs and pointed out the importance of the agreements in 
question for the development and expansion of trade of the LDCs. 
Certainly one cannot deny the benefits of the association agree­
ments for the associates, but there has been clearly established 
a discrimination for the non-associates. This latter group 
argued /
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argued that their position in the group of 77 in the U.N, frame­
work had weakened as a result of the EEC preferential agreements 
with some LDCs. These association agreements involve preferential 
treatment for the associates and they are agreements recognised as 
preferential agreements by the international Community, despite the 
EEC's insistence and constant efforts to present them as free-trade 
areas. The EEC's argument is not convincing and it has not, 
accordingly, been accepted by the other contracting parties to GATT,
From the legal point of view these agreements, as prefer­
ential agreements, are contrary to GATT Art. XXIV, which does not 
allow for regional arrangements other than customs unions or free- 
trade areas to operate legally within its framework. As preferen­
tial agreements therefore, contrary to Art. XXIV, they are inevitably 
contrary to Art. I of the MFN clause, which establishes the principle 
of equality among all contracting parties. However, as the EEC's 
preferential agreements have proliferated to such an extent that 
the weakness of the GATT system is obvious. The MFN principle, on 
which free, fair and equitable world trade is based, has lost its
importance, and it is applied as an exception instead of being the
.rule. On the other hand, one may ask what the GATT system did to 
protect itself from further deterioration. Since consideration 
of the issue of compatibility of the EEC with the G.A., the GATT 
gave way to the EEC. In that case, GATT did not consider the 
legal issue, but it stated that it was 'more fruitful’ to direct 
its attention to the practical problems.
Later, when other regional arrangements came into being,
GATT was called on again and again to examine their relationship and
.compatibility with its provisions. In all cases, despite the 
anparent controversy of the preferential arrangements, the GATT was 
silent. The contracting parties neither prohibited the arrange­
ments nor issued recommendations, nor approved them as they stood.
They tacitly accepted them and left them to operate within the 
system. Therefore, although the EEC’s agreements have weakened 
the GATT system, the blame cannot go altogether to the EEC, but also 
to the GATT system which,from the beginning,allowed preferential 
agreements to operate within its framework despite their inconsist-
'"iency with its letter and its spirit and to develop and further 
proliferate.
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CHAPTER 6.
COMMERCIAL - TARRIF AND TRADE - AGREEMENTS with INDUSTRIALISED 
COUNTRIES.
1. The European Community and the United States of America.
While, during the 1960s, relations between EEC and USA were 
inspired by the concept of interdependence and close economic, 
military and political relationships, in the 1970s this intimate 
relationship has been eroded. Economic recovery in Europe and 
the emergence of Japan as one of the major industrial powers has 
caused a relative shift of economic strength. Western Europe has 
gained an economic strength almost equivalent to that of the USA, 
but for the latter this has meant a relative decline in an almost 
exclusive economic dominance. Relative equality has resulted in 
conflicts over trade, investment and monetary policies. There­
fore, over the course of the 1970s and the first years of the 
1980s EEC-USA relations instead of moving closer, drifted apart, 
mainly as a result of different economic perspectives. Differ­
ences are even more evident now in a period of economic recession. 
Over this period, the EEC started to develop its own independent 
trade policy based on its self-interest rather than on American 
designs. Increasingly and inevitably the EEC has grown into the 
role of a competitor,^ In this context of trade relations, 
counter-attacks between the EEC and the USA are concentrated on 
criticism that trade policies from both sides have been protect­
ionist. The USA has, in particular, criticised Europe for 
its CAP'S, variable import levies and especially export subsidies.
In turn, the Europeans have argued that the USA has been even more 
protectionist and that its continuing trade balance surplus with 2them has demonstrated quite the opposite of the American arguments. 
The USA has, in fact, gained from the creation of the European 
Community. It, the Community, is still the most important trading 
partner for the USA in both industrial and agricultural imports 
and exports. There have obviously been some sectors in point 
which have suffered as a result of the EEC's trade expansion, but 
the overall effect has been beneficial. From 1958 to 1971, the 
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USA has had large balance of trade surpluses with the Community; 
only in 1972 did the USA have a small deficit ($500m.), but this 
was far smaller than the USA trade deficit with Canada or Japan. 
From 1973 and onwards the USA has had a growing trade surplus3with the Community. Much of this surplus is created by USA 
exports of agricultural products.^
Nevertheless, trade policies pursued by the Nixon and later 
Administrations, have damaged relations between the two partners. 
Trade wars have been threatened and have almost emerged over 
particular sectors of the economy, such as agriculture and steel. 
The EEC's trade agreements with third countries have similarly 
caused great concern in the USA, which maintains that these 
special trade agreements have an adverse effect on its economy.
The EEC's preferential agreements with various countries, such 
as the Mediterranean or ACP countries, are unfavourable to USA 
interests. Moreover, the enlargement of the EEC in 1973 to 
include particularly Britain, a major agricultural importer 
from the USA,was not beneficial to the USA economy either.
It is quite noteworthy that despite such important economic and 
commercial links between the USA and the EEC, there have not 
been concluded preferential bilateral agreements, or even relevant 
negotiations between the EEC and the USA, similar to those with 
other third countries; e.g. Mediterranean or ACP countries.
Trade relations between the member states of the EEC and the USA 
are generally conducted at a bilateral level. Economic deals 
are also taking place directly between EEC industries and the 
USA government and industries. However, these trade relations 
and, in particular, relations between the governments of the 
Community member states and the USA are assumed to be conducted 
within the framework of international trade agreements, primarily 
within the GATT and under the auspices of other international 
economic organisations such as OECD, and IMF. Frictions in their 
relations .have inevitably generated problems* Disputes over 
agricultural export subsidies and steel export subsidies have 
caused, and are still causing, concern to both sides.
(i) Agriculture 
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The EEC's Common Agricultural Policy
Agriculture, with Its peculiar nature has proved to be 
the most difficult area, within which liberalisation in inter­
national trade has been attempted. Difficulties arise from an 
economic upturn in the developed countries and faster economic 
growth in LDCs. A large increase of exports of tropical products 
and to some extent increase in non-tropical products like beef, 
tobacco, etc. have added to existing difficulties. The sensitive 
nature of agriculture, the national policies, fluctuations due 
to weather, disease, etc. are also important factors, which tend5to make the market quite unstable.
The EEC Treaty in Arts. 38-43 provides for the establishment 
of a CAP founded on three main principles: the single market for
all EEC member states, Community preference and financial solidarity 
Its main objectives concern increase of farm productivity, stabil­
isation of markets, assurance of fair standards of living for 
farmers, guarantee of regularity of supplies and reasonable prices 
for consumers. These objectives aim further at the interest of 
both producers and consumers. They are to be accomplished by 
protecting internal prices; by the guarantee of minimum import 
prices by means of variable import levies; by the support of 
domestic purchases, which provide that only minimum products will 
be imported, and by export subsidies in case of over-production.^
Variable import levies apply when Community prices 
world markets. They have the effect of limiting imports to the 
Community more than would be the case if no such restrictions7existed. Export subsidies are used when Community prices are 
higher than the corresponding world ones. Thus the Community 
market is to be protected from foreign competition. The system 
of high market prices was adopted at the Stresa Conference in July 
1958. Quantitative restrictions and tariffs were rejected as a 
means of protecting the internal market price in a manner contrary 
to GATT and as being too uncertain. The use of export subsidies 
is the result of the failure to control production and the need 
to remove surpluses from the European market. Export subsidies 
are frequently used because prices in the Community are generally 
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8higher than those of world market.
9The agricultural policy in economic terms has been highly 
protectionist since its conception, especially for those products 
in which the Community has a comparative advantage, e.g. grains. 
This protectionist policy has encouraged over-production, parti­
cularly in some sectors such as grains, sugar, dairy products, 
eggs, poultry, pig-meat, fat, oils and wine. In many agricul­
tural products self-sufficiency has been achieved, especially 
since the first EEC enlargment. V
Over-production and self-sufficiency have led to conflicts 
with other major exporting countries, notably the USA. Confronts 
ation, however, became inevitable after the 1960s, when agricul­
tural production in the developed countries was substantially 
increased. The Eastern European countries for their part 
developed the production of agricultural goods, which could be 
exported to developed countries in West Europe, The NICs
too emerged as large exporters of tropical and non-tropical 
products. The agricultural policies of the major trading nations 
encouraged 'home self-sufficiency and export orientated programs
However, it is of very particular importance to note that 
Arts. 38-47 (EEC) regulate intra-Community trade in agricultural 
products, without extending their jurisdiction to external 
relations. Therefore, trade in agriculture between the EEC and 
third countries is regulated by the same provisions as those 
applicable on industrial products. This means that the CCP 
provisions of the EEC Treaty envisaged in Arts. 110-116, regulate 
the EEC external trade for both industrial and agricultural pro­
ducts. In particular, Art. 110 (EEC) aims to contribute to the 
development of international trade in both industrial and agri­
cultural products, to the progressive elimination of international 
trade restrictions and to the lowering of tariff barriers. With 
particular reference to agriculture, the Community in order to 
achieve this aim has participated in GATT talks, although in 
practice its committments over agricultural issues are very limited. 
It was first suggested, during the Kennedy Round that participating 
countries should put their agricultural policies as such on the 
negotiating table. Differences between the EEC and the USA were 
at that time more than evident. The USA maintained serious 
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objections to the EEC CAP’s price support mechanism and it also
demanded the Community the reduction of the variable import levies
against future increases, something which was rejected by the
C o m m u n i t y . F i n a l l y ,  no agreement was reached mainly due to
persisting USA-EEC differences, and the only positive result
which emerged from the Kennedy Round MTNs was an agreement to
establish an Agricultural Committee within which trade liberal-
12Isation in this sector was to proceed.
However, as the world trade problems have aggravated since 
the monetary crisis of 1971, and the oil embargo of 1973, and as 
the Kennedy Round left a big vacuum in the regulation of inter­
national trade, failing in particular to regulate trade in agri­
cultural products, the GATT parties agreed to proceed to further 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations known then as the Tokyo Round 
MTNs (1973-1979). During this period some progress was made and 
a group was established with responsibility for agriculture..
Also, recently in the GATT Ministerial Conference of November 
24-29, 1982, efforts have resulted in the establishment of a 
relevant committee to study this sensitive issue. The EEC's
approach during the Tokyo Round was that agriculture with its
13unique characteristics should be dealt with separately. At
the Ministerial Meeting, the Community's position was disappointing. 
It, the Community, was not willing to discuss agricultural problems, 
despite the overwhelming pressure from the other contracting 
parties, and especially the USA. Nevertheless, what was finally 
considered fundamentally necessary in the GATT Multilateral 
Agricultural framework was the establishment of a mechanism which 
would provide for exchange of information, active co-operation and 
consultation.
The EEC in practice has done very little to liberalise trade 
in agricultural products. The CAP is indeed very protectionist 
operating in an autarchic manner and attaching little importance 
to its implications for third countries. There is a considerable 
gap between the law as set out in the CCP provisions of the EEC 
Treaty and the EEC practice. EEC largely subsidises its agri­
cultural exports and (as discussed in detail below) it is deemed 
responsible for disturbance of world agricultural markets. The 
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EEC’s movement away from its basic principles and aims contra­
dicts also with the GATT objectives and principles.
However, some reforms are needed, so that, the objectives set 
out in the EEC Treaty are accomplished (Arts. 39 and 110 EEC), with 
particular regard to the interests of the agriculture producing 
countries, especially the LDCs.^^
The main provisions of the USA Agricultural Policy
The USA agricultural policy is as protectionist as the 
EEC's CAP. The USA support for agriculture dates back to the 
years following the First World War. During the inter-war years, 
the USA encouraged a high-price support system for agricultural 
products and applied rather ineffective production restraints. This 
as a result led to over-production and accumulation of surpluses in 
government hands, heavy government expenditure and direct export 
subsidies. In the late 1950s the agricultural policy was directed 
to domestic problems rather than to exports. However, as time 
progressed in the 1960s, USA policy, supported by the labour organ­
isations, was export oriented. Commercial export sales and ex­
pansion of agricultural trade were the main objectives. Subsequently, 
with the extended farm legislation of 1965-70 the USA government, 
having realised how uneconomic the policy was, started to lower the 
support price system towards world market levels. An important 
goal for the USA government became "getting the government out of 
agriculture".^^ Instead "farm incomes were supplemented by direct
payments to those farmers who participated in (progressively
17stringent) supply management programmes".
Simultaneously, as the USA was trying to expand its trade 
in agricultural products, it was concerned for the protection of 
agricultural markets; and enacted legislation to this end. How 
those laws affected the drafting of several GATT clauses, especially 
Arts. XI and XIV remains a difficult question. It is certain, 
however, that in 1947-1948 the USA negotiators tried to tailor 
GATT to their needs, so that no USA provisions would be incompatible 
with GATT and, later, when the Agricultural Adjustment Act was 
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amended in 1948, they added a special provision making it com­
patible with GATT. But in 1951 when the Congress amended the 
Defence Production Act of 1950, it added a section that allowed 
import quotas for oils and fats and certain dairy products. This 
movement was not consistent with GATT and it led to the Netherlands 
retaliation over dairy products; the only case so far to have 
arisen under Art. XXIII of GATT.^^ (See chap.2, the disputes 
procedure, p.45.). Therefore, as the USA realised that a
potential breach of the GATT agreement was imminent, it requested 
in the GATT review session of 1954-1955 a waiver for some agri­
cultural products under Art,XXV:5. This was to waive the USA 
obligations under Arts. II, XI and XVI to the extent "necessary 
to prevent a conflict". However, no time limits were included, nor 
any provision made for reconsideration after a certain time. The
spirit of the waiver thus implied, that it would last as long as
19was necessary to prevent a conflict.
Agricultural policies in the EEC and the USA face the same
problems. The Americans have also tried to stabilise prices and
protect their farmers from imports. The USA too has a support
system similar to the support mechanism of the EEC's CAP with its
target price, intervention price and export subsidies through
refunds. Special mention should be made of indirect subsidies to
the farmers. In this context it is worth noting the statement
20of Mr Brock, the USA Trade Representative, before the Senate 
"if you look at the American agricultural scene we too have 
surpluses that are engineered and supported by the USA government: 
we too have engaged in selling that surplus below market price in 
the world and we too are subject to some criticism in that■respect". 
In particular after the 1960s when new competitors, mainly EEC and 
LDCs, came on the international scene, the USA problems over agri- 
ulture have multiplied. USA agricultural protection is expressed 
by various import restrictions notably imposed (1) by voluntary 
export restraints on her trading partners as well as by direct 
import quota restrictions on foreign products by different means; 
e.g. restriction of meat imports from Latin America on the justi­
fication that they do not meet the USA health standards: (2)
through a Congressional Bill of 1970, which imposed automatic trade 
restrictions on those foreign products which were likely to enter 
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the USA market and (3) through the 1955 waiver which restricts 
agricultural imports into the USA market.
Despite such protectionist measures, and particularly the 
indirect support for agriculture, the Americans constantly com­
plain about the EEC's variable levies and in general the EEC's 
support system for agriculture which in their opinion results in 
unfair international competition. The USA contention has been 
that the CAP is highly protectionist and thereby restricts USA 
exports to the Community, which would be of greater volume if the 
CAP did not exist.. The fact, however, remains that USA agri­
cultural exports to the EEC have, since the establishment of the
CAP, actually increased faster than those to the rest of the 
21world. The USA has had a very comfortable surplus in its
agricultural trade with the Community and in general with the 
22rest of the world. Its agricultural exports contribute to
reverse the steadily worsening balance of payments in the indust­
rial sector. Today most of its agricultural production (more
23than two-thirds) goes for exports.
However, the USA still advocates the liberalisation of 
trade in agricultural products in world markets. In the GATT 
Ministerial Meeting in November, 1982, the USA pressed that agri­
culture be included in the talks, and it demanded that the EEC 
adopt some liberal measures of agricultural trade policy. But 
unfortunately this support only extends to supporting the liber­
alisation of trade in farm products, in which it, the USA, has a
competitive advantage, notably wheat, feedgrains, tobacco, citrus
24fruit, oils and poultry. Warley, in his analysis, says that 
"For commodities in which it (the USA) has no advantage or is 
clearly uncompetitive, its agricultural policies have been 
restrictive and conditions of access to the USA market as restrict­
ive as have been those of Western Europe or Japan. These com­
modities include dairy products, rice, sugar, cotton, manufacturing 
grades of beef, mutton, lamb and wool".
Despite the proclaimed desire for a free-trade approach in 
agricultural products few GATT parties can be persuaded of the 
genuineness of the USA arguments as long as the USA retains the 
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1955 waiver granted for protection of its agricultural production, 
which was to have been adopted only for a limited period of time.
If the USA truly believes in trade liberalisation and it really 
wants some progress towards this goal, it must give up its 
agricultural waiver. The GATT failure to liberalise trade in 
the agricultural sector is partly attributable to this waiver.
Friction between the EEC and the USA over agriculture.
The issue of agricultural trade is the most disputed in 
recent years. Most of the cases brought to GATT concern trade 
in agriculture with constant rivals the major trading countries, 
in particular the EEC and the USA.^^
The Community is the principal trading partner for the
USA and, in the case of the agricultural sector, the EEC remains
the most important market for American agricultural products.
But, since the establishment of the CAP, the EEC became a strong
competitor to USA farming. It has become a competitor not only
in penetrating the USA market, but also in exporting to traditional
26USA export markets. However, both the EEC and the USA face
similar difficulties. The USA is in a very strong position in 
many respects to meet foreign competition. On the other hand,
the Community is more open and penetrable by foreign products and 
meets hard competition in its endeavour to find secure export 
markets. The situation is getting even more difficult due to 
the fact that the volume and the value of the world exports in the 
agricultural sector has been substantially increasing, while 
industrial exports stagnate.
A serious reason for these uneasy trade relations in agri­
culture between the EEC and the USA has been over-production on 
both sides. Over-production has inevitably led to uncertainties 
and confrontations at international level. Disputes over agri­
culture between the EEC and the USA have brought several cases 
to GATT for further consideration. Such disputes date back 
to the first years of the CAP'S implementation and have multiplied 
since the monetary crisis of 1971. (For further information see 
Chap,2, p.45.).
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GATT, the body which regulates trade for both industrial
and agricultural products, has been called on to solve all these
differences. In many instances panels were established. Major
confrontations have led to the citrus fruit case which led to a
compromise solution, and which demonstrates the role which GATT
27plays in solving international trade disputes, to the cheese 
war sometime earlier, which provoked the Netherlands into retal­
iating against the USA exports of grains (the only case of
28retaliation so far) ej^  al.
From 1980 tO present, five out of seven cases brought to
GATT between the two partners concern agriculture. The USA in
bringing the cases to GATT believes that it has strong cause for
bringing certain European Community practices to GATT, All
those cases are presently in the early consultation procedures
of the dispute settlement under Art.XXII and Art. XXIII:1 of the 
29G.A. It is worth noting also that USA producers of poultry,
sugar, wheat flour, canned fruit and pasta have formally complained 
recently (January 1982) to the USA office of Special Trade 
Representative, that Community exports were undercutting USA 
produce on the world markets as a result of subsidies provided 
under the CAP and thereby breaching the GATT Subsidies Code.
The problem, however, is not only the restriction of imports 
into the Community market, but that the Community has in the course 
of time expanded its exports to markets which traditionally be­
longed to the USA, e.g. in the Middle East the USA used to be 
the major supplier of poultry, but now the Europeans have taken’ 
over the market; an action which has made the USA complain that 
the EEC has failed to assume its international trade committments.
Therefore, as the Community takes over a larger part of 
foreign exports, it is being blamed in the USA not only for causing 
market difficulties in the USA market, but also in the LDCs and 
the world in general. The USA particularly blames the EEC's 
CAP for its export subsidies and the system of variable import 
levies, maintaining that this policy is inconsistent with GATT 
trading rules. The EEC's point of view, however, in respect 
of variable import levies is that these measures have been 
negotiated in GATT by the Community, which (GATT) gave appropriate 
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compensation to the other contracting parties whose interests 
were affected. According to this view the GATT partners have 
long accepted the basic principles and mechanisms of the CAP, 
including the system of import levies and export refunds, and that 
the Americans formally accepted the CAP at the end of the Tokyo
Round. Therefore, the EEC has pointed out that export subsidies •>;for primary agricultural products are explicitly allowed under WGATT provided that the export refunds (if they are considered 
export subsidies) are not used to obtain a 'more than an equitable 
share of world markets'.
In fact, (as we have already seen in chap. 2) the Subsidies 
Code in relation to Art. XVI of the G.A. permits subsidies on 
agricultural products. It forbids their use only when they have 
certain effects; e.g. where the subsidies result in the exporting 
country having more than "an equitable share": a very complicated
question, which needs further interpretation and is not yet 
precisely defined. |
Finally, there is growing concern that there is lack of 
common understanding and co-operation between the two parties.
The USA in the first place should abandon its unilateral inter- |
pretation of the GATT law and be more willing to exchange infor­
mation and consult and co-operate with the Community, having |
regard to its advantageous position in regulating international 
trade in agriculture. Its policy has often been unjust to 
third countries. The USA has the power to impose voluntary •Hrestraint agreements and frequently presses the EEC to buy more 
and more agricultural products; (e.g. wheat products for animal 
feeding); promotes grain sales to the USSR while accusing the 
Community of being in the wrong for her desire to import Soviet 
natural gas. USA policy over agricultural problems may be 
qualified as arrogant and aggressive. Despite proclamations ■ »for free-world trade, in fact it, the USA, is moving towards 
protectionist measures. This attitude embraces the USA administ- |
ration one of whose members stated recently - "if the GATT Panel 
was to rule against the Americans (something which is likely to 
happen) in a current case, this could result in the USA pulling ]|
out of the GATT Subsidies Code altogether". After that, one can i
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pose the question whether this is the kind of enforcement of the law 
and pursuance of the liberal trade principles which the Americans 
emphasise. Meanwhile, the USA Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
threatens to retaliate against the EEC export subsidies with sub­
sidies of its own, or with direct payments on individual products.
The USDA has at its disposition a recently approved $170~190m, of
Congressional authorisation for export promotion and it might decide
31to spend it on agricultural trade export promotion.
Agriculture is the most sensitive sector in international 
trade and it will remain so until an international framework 
dealing with those issues has been established. Periodic consult­
ations and co-operation in this field, particularly between the 
EEC and the USA should be established on a regular basis. Con­
sultative committees should be established concerning economic 
competition involving legal questions under GATT. The most 
difficult question of what constitutes "equitable shares in world 
markets" needs further interpretation and consideration. Also, 
the legality of subsidies on agricultural products within the GATT 
framework needs further consideration (see Subsidies). There are 
growing fears that agriculture, if not regulated, may tear GATT 
apart. Current trade disputes over agriculture justify this con­
cern. In fact, some agricultural trade has been regulated through
International Commodity Agreements. (International Sugar Agreements 
(ISA), International agreements on cocoa, meat, dairy products, and 
so on), but many products are left out of international arrangements 
and fall to be regulated by the G.A.
Now as the world recession and weak demand has exacerbated 
trade problems over agriculture, it has become necessary that 
positive steps be taken by both the EEC and the USA. The USA with 
its constant threats to retaliate against the EEC's agricultural 
practices, if it takes action in that direction, may demolish 
the GATT edifice. It is imperative therefore now more than at any 
time that the Agricultural Committee work out systematically any 
acceptable solution to all GATT parties, especially the LDCs whose 
economy is very vulnerable and their export earnings usually depend 
on a specified agricultural commodity. Protectionist measures 
taken by the major trading partners, in particular the EEC and the USA, 
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in order to protect domestic outputs and producers, should be 
reduced and eventually eliminated.
The particular problem of subsidies in agricultural 
products.
Most of the complaints which have been brought to GATT 
have been raised by the USA against the EEC's CAP and, in particular, 
against its subsidised agricultural exports. Likewise, other 
countries such as Australia and Brazil have raised complaints 
against the EEC's sugar policy. However, in the context of this 
study it has been considered important that all these complaints be 
discussed together, since they illustrate the same type of com­
plaint as those made by the USA. Their analysis will help us to 
understand the particular case of the EEC's subsidised agricultural 
exports, and evaluate the impact which the EEC's CAP has on the world 
trading system. Therefore, this issue presents a special legal 
interest, as to the effect which the CAP has on the GATT legal 
system. The question of subsidies in agricultural products is one 
of the most Important questions in the evolution of the external 
trade policy of the EEC in the context of GATT, Whether or not the 
EEC’s subsidies on agricultural exports are legal in respect of the 
GATT provisions, is a fundamentally important issue.
Are the EEC's subsidies on agricultural exports consistent
or not with Art. XVI : 3 of the G.A. and with the Subsidies Code,
which was established during the Tokyo Round? Subsidies are very
common in agriculture, mainly because the cost of— agricultural
products in world markets are generally lower than those prevailing
in the producing countries. In the USA subsidies have been in use
for a long time. Since the term of office of President Roosevelt
(1943-1945) legislation has provided for payments to be made to
farmers to discourage over-production in grain and other commodities.‘
33Currently, other measures, such as payments in kind (pik) direct 
and indirect payments, government purchasing surpluses and support 
price system often take place. In the EEC also subsidies and 
export refunds are common under the CAP.
In accordance with GATT Art. XVI and Art. 10 of the Subsidies
Code /
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Code, export subsidies for primary products (farm, forest and
fisheries) are permitted but there is a limitation to their use.
They can be applied to the extent that the country concerned cannot
obtain "more than an equitable share in world export trade" in the
particular product. (For full discussion see chap. 2 Subsidies Code,
n.34 ). On several occasions Panels in GATT were established to
consider this sensitive issue of subsidies on the export of primary
products. In 1958 a Panel was established to consider this sensitive
issue of subsidies on the export of primary products. This
Panel was established following an Australian complaint about French
subsidised exports of wheat flour to South East Asia, The Panel
issued a mild recommendation to France that she should limit her
exports because she had obtained "more than an equitable share" in
34the South East Asia markets, 
chap. 2, p.3a )•
(This case is earlier discussed in
However,as has been discussed in detail earlier in chap.2 
p. 3 4, since the early 1960s an improved framework has been established 
to consider the case of subsidies; i.e. the establishment of the 
Subsidies Code and the Multilateral Agricultural Committee. An analysis 
of the Subsidies Code and the work of the Multilateral Committee helps 
us to evaluate and understand the effect of EEC export subsidies in 
agricultural products on world trade.
Australia and Brazil have both attacked the EEC's sugar 
policy in terms of Art. XVI : 3 of GATT and Art. 10:3 of the Subsidies 
Code. Both complaints are directed against the EEC that it had 
obtained "more than an equitable share of world trade" in sugar, 
contrary to the above provisions. Neither of the established Panels 
resulted in a definite conclusion as regards the compatibility of the 
EEC practices with Art. XVI : 3 of the G.A. but both concluded that the 
EEC sugar policy had contributed to a depression of prices in world 
markets and that serious prejudice (within the meaning of Art.XVI:1) 
had been indirectly caused to the complaining countries. The Panels 
also pointed out that the EEC had accelerated production growth and 
through the export refunds contributed to a permanent source of 
uncertainty in world markets, in terms of Art. XVI:1.
In the Brazilian case, the Panel specifically found that
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"on the basis of the evidence available to it, it was not able to
conclude that the increased share had resulted in the European
Communities 'having more than an equitable share of world export
36trade in the product' in terms of Art. XVI : 3" Subsequently when
in 1981 and 1982 two Working Parties were established they also
37 38repeated the Panel’s criticisms. Oh the Australian complaint
the Panel noted that the European Community's exports, despite its 
increased share, had displaced Australia's exports only to a limited 
extent and in a few markets, because Australia's exports were bi­
laterally regulated under long-term arrangements and the Panel con­
cluded that "it was not in a position to reach a definite conclusion 
that the increased share had resulted in the European Communities in 
'having more than an equitable share of world export trade' in that 
product" in terms of Art. XVI:3 of the GATT. It was acknowledged 
that the EEC’s sugar policy had depressed world prices and thereby 
serious prejudice had been indirectly caused to Australia, but no 
violation in terms of Art. XVI had been indicated. Likewise, the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT before which the matter was raised, 
adopted a similar decision asserting that the EEC policy had not 
been found inconsistent with the legal rules especially with Art.XVI. 
This is one of the most detailed cases thus far, relating to the 
compatibility of the EEC's CAP with the GATT provisions.
Therefore, although one could argue that the EEC practices 
would be incompatible with the legal rules, due to the depression 
which these practices caused to world markets, yet no inconsistency 
of the EEC's CAP with the international trade rules had been found in 
this case. However, the effect on the effectiveness of the GATT's 
dispute settlement procedures and on the GATT legal system as a 
whole, had been questioned. The decision of the GATT bodies was 
received with much relief in the EEC, but the other exporting countries
were unhappy because the Community's measures had depressed the world
,  ^ 39sugar market.
Agricultural subsidies too have been a major bone of con­
tention between EEC and USA and they will be such until a mutually 
acceptable solution can be found. As regards the sugar policy,
the USA has also lodged in 1982, another complaint under the Subsidies 
40Code. 1
violates /
e. The USA complains that the Community's regime of subsidisation
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violates Arts. 8 and 10 of the Subsidies Code and Art. XVI of the
GATT. In defending its position the EEC maintained that agreements
were reached at the Tokyo Round, according to which the EEC undertook
not to take more than an equitable share in foreign markets and,
41therefore, such questions should not be re-opened.
A number of other complaints were also raised in 1982 by the
USA against the EEC's CAP. Some examples are referred to herein.
(1) A complaint against EEC production subsidies on Greek raisins
pointed out that the USA producers of raisins are deprived of world
markets because of the Community's practices. (2) In the poultry
case, the USA poultry industry maintained that as a result of the
Community subsidies, it has been denied an equitable share in world
markets, particularly the Middle East, which was one of its traditional
markets. (3) In the pasta case, the USA argued that the EEC subsidy
on pasta exports is per se illegal because it constitutes a subsidy
on any "other than primary product" which is prohibited under Art.9
45of the Subsidies Code. In all these and other complaints the
USA maintained that the spirit of the GATT provisions and the 
Subsidies Code had been violated, and requested the EEC to reduce- its 
level of subsidies and to refrain from expanding its share of markets 
with the help of subsidies. The USA is unhappy with the EEC's sub­
sidisation programme, especially now in view of the Spanish entry 
into the Community. A reform of the CAP, so desirable for the 
USA, is, however, the most difficult question for the EEC for various 
reasons. The CAP is vital for the Community and to date it is the 
most complete common policy, the operation of which is, to a large
degree, important for the continued existence of the European 
43Community. In fact, the EEC maintains on every occasion, and it
44did so during the GATT Ministerial Meeting of November 1982 ,
that subsidies on agricultural products are permissible under GATT
Art, XVI and the Subsidies Code and, therefore, there is no need to
re-open this issue, given that the Subsidies Code has only recently
been put into operation (1.1.1980). The Australian proposal for a
standstill for all protectionist measures was not welcomed by the
Community, which is not prepared to make any substantial changes in
its CAP. The Community pointed out that it would be unrealistic to
enforce tougher rules for regulating international trade at a time
45of world recession.
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In the light of these circumstances the USA has reacted by
retaliating and selling 1,000,000 tonnes of subsidised wheat flour
to Egypt and similar potential deals are under way with another ten
countries, and also by threatening to put into the international
market other products in surplus such as cheese and dairy products.
This in turn made the EEC react by lodging an official complaint to
GATT. The Egyptian wheat flour case is likely to determine future
actions in world trade policy. The case has not been definitely
considered by the GATT, but it is likely that the EEC will win the
case. A Panel has already rejected the USA argument that the EEC
subsidies are unfairly undercutting USA exports of wheat flour on 
46world markets.
In this confused situation over export subsidies in agri­
culture and given this agressive trade diplomacy followed by both 
the EEC and the USA, it is important to consider the impact of. the 
EEC agricultural policy on the GATT legal system. At first sight, 
export subsidies strictu sensu in primary products are permitted 
under Art. XVI:3 of the GATT and the Subsidies Code, There is 
no indication whatsoever that the EEC, in subsidising its agri­
cultural exports,acts illegally under the GATT framework. In 
practice, however, things are quite the opposite. There is no 
doubt that uncertainty in world markets has been caused and to some 
extent distortion of free world trade has resulted owing to these 
EEC practices. Such practices have not contributed to freeing 
international trade and therefore are contrary to the spirit of the 
GATT.
It may be submitted that the EEC should exercise some kind 
of restraint in its export subsidies in agricultural trade with a 
view to negotiating agricultural trade issues within the GATT frame­
work in a satisfactory and acceptable way to all parties. It would 
be encouraging if a recent proposal by the Commission for a reform 
of the CAP, takes into consideration the problems raised at inter­
national level and in particular within GATT.
Also the weak competitive position of the LDCs should be 
taken into account. Whereas the USA is able to retaliate against the
EEC’s concerted practices, for example, by selling subsidised products 
to third countries, weak states are not in a position to take such 
measures /
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measures. It is interesting to note that all the complaints which 
have been brought to date, have been brought by industrialised 
countries or by NICs and not by LDCs.
The fact that no cases have been brought to GATT by LDCs 
might indicate that they do not want to upset their relations with 
the EEC or that their agricultural trade has not been affected by 
the EEC's practices, or that they have no confidence in the dispute 
settlement procedure. Certainly, all these arguments play a role, 
but the second one seems to be the most significant. LDCs are not 
agricultural competitors of the EEC. Their agricultural output is 
not even enough to feed their population and their agricultural 
products are not similar to those produced by the EEC. Apart from 
tropical products for which separate arrangements have been made 
(i.e. International Commodities Agreements), LDCs do not produce 
competitive agricultural commodities. Therefore, regulation of 
agricultural trade between the industrialised countries and the LDCs 
does not in practice take place within the GATT leeal system.
This strengthens an earlier argument that the legal basis of the 
GATT agreement is designed to deal with North-North trade problems, 
while leaving aside trade problems between North and South.
(ii) EEC-USA dispute over steel
From 1960 to 1973, that is, in the years of great economic
expansion, production of steel multiplied in Europe and in the world
over. However, since 1974 demand in steel has been dropping at
around 9% p.a. and therefore the steel industry has been seriously hit
47by the economic crisis and the world recession.
In the USA until 1974 steel output was not enough to satisfy 
the internal needs and foreign supplies supplemented it; but in 1974, 
with the gradual recession, industrial production fell by 7.7% and 
GNP fell by 1.2%; subsequently demand for steel declined sharply.
Since then the situation in the industry has been critical.
Over-capacity in Europe and Japan resulted in the increase of 
exports on to the USA market. USA steel companies had to reduce their
production in face of cheaper imports from Europe and Japan. The 
device of voluntary export restraint agreements was put into action.
The /
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The USA government tried to impose voluntary export restraint agree-
48meats on Europe and Japan. However, government representatives
did not have Congressional authorisation to negotiate an agreement
with third countries, and therefore it was decided to approach the
49steel industries directly. The EEC governments (in contrast to
the Japanese who voluntarily offered to curb their exports by
5% - 7%) 'were reported to be upset' by the voluntary limitation of
steel exports, agreed to by their steel industries, because it
50constituted a bad precedent.
The European Community tried to monitor the situation by
cutting production in 1976 rather than by fixing import quotas, which
were not justified under Arts. XIX and XI of GATT. A Committee was
established to study the situation and then the Simonet-Davignon plan,
effective from 1st January 1977, was adopted. In the short-term the
Davignon plan aims at the promotion of the steel industry. In the
long-term the Community, though a net exporter of steel, proposed to
curb imports through a technique similar to that introduced by the
USA (The American trigger price mechanism). Minimum or basic prices
for some products were introduced and bilateral restraint agreements
were negotiated with third countries exporting steel to the Community,
The USA, however, was not directly affected by the Davignon plan
because American steel producers were not typically exporting in
51volume to the Community.
In 1978, as part of the crisis plan for steel, the Commission
of the European Community introduced a series of commercial measures.
They aimed to reach agreements with the Community's major suppliers
and to establish price discipline sufficiently strong to prevent
disruption of the Community market and prevent destabilisation by
52external influences.
However, since the beginning of 1982, and most particularly 
since June 1982, disputes have arisen between EEC and USA over steel. 
Conflict was inevitable because of the continuing serious economic 
recession and of the struggle to preserve markets for home industries. 
After the Versailles Summit Meeting of June 1982, the USA took pre­
liminary measures by imposing countervailing duties against EEC steel 
exports on the grounds that the Community subsidised steel exports 
and /
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and sold at dumped prices on the USA market, in breach of the 
subsidies and anti-dumping Codes of GATT.
In 1982, the USA steel industries themselves brought forty 
cases against eleven foreign countries, inter alia seven EEC member 
states, (The Benelux countries, W. Germany, France, Italy, and the 
U.K.), before the International Trade Commission (ITC) in Washington, 
but not in GATT.
The Community contested that the USA action was contrary
(1) to the consensus reached by the OECD countries in 1977 in which 
they agreed that a period of transition was necessary in order to 
restructure the entire steel industry in the OECD member countries;
(2) to the general balance of advantage reached in the Tokyo Round;
(3) to the maintenance of the open trading system by resisting pro­
tectionist pressures, and by respecting GATT rules, reiterated at
the Ottawa Summit Meeting, and (4) to the principles adopted during
54the Versailles Summit Meeting of June 1982, The Community further­
more contested that in any case, the problems that USA steel producers 
face today are not attributable at all to its exports, but that they 
are the result of the general economic situation in the USA. Given 
that the EEC exports to the USA market had declined in 1981 by 16% 
and that, in any case, its steel exports were very small at around 
5% p.m., such a disturbance of the magnitude which the USA producers 
claim could not have been occasioned by Community a c t i o n s . F i n a l l y ,  
the Community announced that it would resort to GATT and would take 
all appropriate steps to defend its producers' rights, pointing to 
the fact that international agreements are correctly applied and 
in particular that it followed the GATT Code on Subsidies and Counter­
vailing Duties.
Important legal questions remain as to whether these EEC 
subsidies on steel are unfair and, if so, how are they to be defined 
and to what extent they violate international trade rules.
There is no doubt that the GATT Subsidies and Countervailing 
Duties Code is loosely applied (for further details see earlier,chap.
2, p. 34): that is because multilateral negotiations in the 1970s
did not reach any precise solution, neither did the bilateral talks 
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between the EEC and the USA reach such a solution.
The Subsidies Code recognises that governments sometimes
use subsidies to promote their social and economic objectives. What
really matters is if subsidies are unfair in both economic and legal 57terms. If they are unfair the country concerned must refrain from
58using them, and respect internationally agreed rules and principles.
As regards this particular issue, the EEC's view was that the GATT 
Subsidies Code permits governmental assistance to industries under­
going restructuring and that at the very least subsidies should be 
eliminated when the circumstances which made their application 
permissible, have passed. In particular, in the EEC-USA dispute, the 
former argued that it had already reduced its exports by the imposition 
of "voluntary export restraints" by the USA, and that in any case it 
complied with the GATT and with the EEC rules relating to state adds 
to the steel industry. The Community, furthermore, argued that the 
USA action to impose preliminary countervailing duties on its steel 
exports was totally illegal, pointing to the fact that the USA legis­
lators tend to interpret unilaterally the Subsidies Code and, there­
fore, to conclude that EEC steel exports are unfairly subsidised.
This case, if brought to GATT, would be of great legal interest from 
the perspective of international trade rules.
In response to the USA action, the EEC filed complaints in 
GATT against DISC (Domestic International Sales Corporation), and 
sought compensation for injury caused by DISC, What the Europeans 
tried to do was not to take retaliatory measures (although they 
threatened to do so); but to bring pressure to make USA suspend its 
decision about countervailing duties. The EEC could possibly 
retaliate against agricultural synthetic fabrics and against the 
effective subsidies which the USA government granted to the exporters 
who set up DISC, ruled last year by the GATT as being illegal. The 
EEC obviously does not prefer retaliation or trade conflicts, but
59it wants the legal issue of subsidies to be definitively considered.
On the actual facts of the EEC-USA steel dispute, the USA 
threatened to impose heavy tariffs unless the EEC agreed to limit its 
steel exports to the USA markets. In view of this situation the 
EEC offered to cut its exports to the USA market by 5.8% compared with 
last year's 6.4% until the end of 1985. However, this offer was not 
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accepted by the USA administration and more precisely by the USA 
steel producers, who were not willing to drop their complaints 
brought before the International Trade Commission (ITC),^^ The 
situation became more complicated for the EEC, which had not mean­
while secured an internal agreement. Germany did not agree to
limit her exports, maintaining that she has not promoted her steel
62exports with the help of subsidies. However, seconds before the
set time (18.10.82) the EEC governments proceeded with a common plan,
including Germany, to limit their carbon and alloy steel exports to
635.75% and their pipe and tubes for oil and gas to 5.9%
Subsequently a voluntary restraint pact was concluded between 
the USA and the EEC, and thus a nine-month old dispute ended with the 
USA steel producers as winners. The pact was received with much 
relief on both sides of the A t l a n t i c . T h e  agreement will run from 
1st November 1982 to the end of 1985. Meanwhile the Reagan Admin­
istration announced that USA producers had dropped their countervailing 
duties and anti-dumping cuts, against approximately forty EEC steel 
industries. The pact requires EEC sales to be reduced through an 
export licensing system to around 10% below the 1981 level when 
Community sales took 6.4% of the USA market. The EEC was pressed 
to adopt all these concessions in favour of the USA steel industry, 
but, as the EEC Industry Commissioner, Mr V. Davignon said - "the
EEC will be much better off than if the duty threat had been carried 
65through". What, however, remains to be seen is whether the
Europeans honour their undertaking to restructure their steel industry 
so as to eliminate subsidies and whether the Americans will use this 
deal as a precedent for permanent protection of their high cost 
industry. This seems highly unlikely, however, since a few. days 
later the USA appeared to want to include stainless steel in the pact.
The issues from a legal and economic point of view are so 
complex and so many conflicting interests are involved, that no one 
can be in a position to prevent any future confrontations, A 
transatlantic trade war is to nobody's interest and it would further 
deteriorate the already ill-served western alliance.
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In the interest of an orderly trade system, it would be 
desirable to adopt more precise internationally agreed trade rules. 
Concrete interpretation and definition of some disputed rules and 
procedures is needed, notably in this case, of what exactly constitutes 
an unfair subsidy. Consultation and co-operation between all 
countries should become a necessity. The GATT conciliation pro­
cedure should be used to solve any dispute arising, Al] parties 
should recognise that subsidies, quotas, dumping and other restrictive 
measures are the wrong remedies.
Agricultural products and steel are specific examples of the 
threat to free world trade. It is a natural reaction of governments 
to try to protect the interest of their own industries and jobs at 
the expense of imports, but if the practice proliferates it can 
seriously damage the free world trading system. Steel, as well as 
agriculture, is another example, which demonstrates that disputes 
mainly arise between industrialised countries and not between developed 
and less-developing countries. This, furthermore, justifies the 
concern that the GATT is designed to deal with North-North problems.
It illustrates again the fact,that competition is lacking between 
DCs and LDCs. However, the GATT is called to test its legal 
character and ability to react to the problems when difficult economic 
circumstances arise. In that case we are called on to consider 
either that the theoretical assumptions on which GATT is based are 
inherently wrong, or that they are unworkable at times of crises, or 
that in fact,, they are the correct rules which are to be applied 
confidently by the governments and subsequently the problem of trade 
disputes should not arise.
However, it seems likely that the GATT system is not endowed 
with sufficient power to react at times of crises. The successful 
operation of the system during the first two decades of its existence 
might be attributable to the fact that this period of great economic 
expansion did not raise serious economic problems or that the system 
was capable of tackling the problems of the late 1940s and the sub­
sequent years. To now, in the light of changing circumstances 
the GATT system stands unable to cope with the difficulties and to 
solve the disputes arising.
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EEC trade relations with Japan
Trade relations with Japan, partly because of geographical 
distance and lack of common historical background, have no long 
history. They have developed over the last fifty years. Yet, 
even the first years of this period trade relations were limited to 
commercial exchanges, not involving bilateral agreements, nor large 
scale trade relations.
It was only in 1972 at the Paris Summit Meeting that the 
nine launched a plan to open a dialogue with the industrialised 
countries, including Japan. That was the first serious attempt 
ever made to develop close relations with Japan. Then, during the 
Tokyo Round MTNs (1973-1977) the Community tackled the opportunity 
in establishing a permanent body of representatives in Tokyo, and 
made a series of attempts to negotiate very closely with Japan^
High level annual consultations were inaugurated then and both 
bilateral and multilateral economic problems have been discussed.
However, in the 1960s and 1970s, the development of the 
Japanese economy has been remarkable. Japan rapidly expanded its 
manufactured exports, notably cars, motorcycles, television and sound 
equipment, to world markets and established itself as the third indust­
rial economic power after the USA and the EEC. The Japanese expansion, 
nevertheless, was not an economic miracle, but it came as the result of 
its social and economic system. The Japanese penetration in world
markets and especially in the western markets was attributable to its
constant and effective efforts; hard work, discipline, the peculiar
structure of the Japanese economy, the close co-operation between
industry and government, the concentration of industry in few hands
and few sectors (especially in heavy industry) and its well-organised
and export-orientated economic programmes, all these are factors which
have contributed to its dramatic development and success. Japan’s
unique economic system has been developed on the basis of bilateral
national export agreements and international level agreements between
67industries from various branches of the economy.
Nevertheless, this tremendous success of the Japanese economy 
has caused a number of problems and tension in the exporting countries, 
particularly the European countries. The European Community, the most 
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important trading bloc in the world, with its high-level of pro­
duction in manufactured goods, was the first to feel the conse­
quences of the Japanese expansion especially after 1970.' Cheap 
imports of Japanese cars, television sets and other manufactured 
goods caused a series of economic problems in the recession-hit 
European market.
What actually causes major concern in the European Community 
is the NTBs applied by Japan on imports. Of course, NTBs are
difficult to define, identify and be systematically integrated into 
a Code. Conventional NTBs are not the obstacle to free world trade 
but those NTBs associated with voluntary export restraints and other 
restrictions negotiated by non-governmental bodies and not officially 
recorded. An additional difficulty lies in the fact that the GATT 
Secretariat does not maintain a comprehensive inventory of NTBs,
GATT has available whatever information is provided in official 
national documents relating to NTBs. Therefore, non-governmental 
voluntary export restraints negotiated privately between firms are 
not included and since there is no available information relating to 
such NTBs in official national documents, GATT provides no systematic 
list of such NTBs.^^
Already in 1960, Japan in its endeavour to promote its external 
trade and control liberalisation, established a Ministerial Council 
which in collaboration with MITI (Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry) simplified inspection of imported products and con­
tributed to the liberalisation of trade. Subsequently, Japan
participated in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations within the GATT 
framework and, in the context of these negotiations, it maintained 
that it imposed currently NTBs on only twenty-seven products, most 
of which are agricultural. As a result of the Tokyo Round Japan, 
according to official documents, imposes NTBs on about 5% of imported 
manufactured items, compared with 22% in the EEC and 21% in the USA.
Those which are particularly concentrated on footwear and textiles
69are of interest to Community exporters.
During the Tokyo Round MTNs, consultation^ were held between 
EEC and Japan, concerning the current economic problems. The 
Community was very concerned about Japanese exports which are 
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concentrated in a limited number of sectors, about the restriction 
of Japanese imports in products in which Europe has an export interest, 
such as shoes, pharmaceutical and beauty products, chemical and agro­
chemical products and about Japan's small share of imports of manu­
factured goods. The Japanese, however, pledged to improve access­
ibility of Community products to the Japanese market, and committed 
themselves to the reduction of most NTBs which really are a main 
concern of the European exporters. But, despite that declaration,
70the Community alleges that no substantial improvement has been made.
Apart from negotiations at the multilateral level, no trade 
agreement has been negotiated between Japan and the European 
Community, such as those with EEC and Mediterranean countries, or 
ACP countries. In the 1960s, the Community attempted to negotiate 
an agreement with Japan but without success. Therefore, trade 
between the countries concerned is conducted through bilateral 
negotiations within the context of Multilateral Trade Agreements 
such as GATT, and through bilateral negotiations at national level 
between the EEC governments and Japan, or even between industries.
This latter action causes, however, a number of problems in the 
Community and sometimes differences in national treatment of foreign 
imports may lead to the distortion of competition within the
Community and may damage large sectors of Community industry in the
71future.
The implementation of the Common Commercial Policy 
and the development of a Common Industrial Policy towards Japan, 
should be the first and major task ahead for the Community. Without 
it the Community's position will remain weak and vulnerable to foreign 
imports. In order that the Community face the situation and be able 
to compete effectively with Japanese exports the Council of the 
European Community and the European Council made,during 1978, declar­
ations defining the broad lines for a common Community strategy and 
a CCP whose purpose would be to defend Community interests In view 
of the influx of foreign imports, particularly in some sensitive 
sectors. The Community called on Japan to review its economic 
policy by increasing internal consumption of imported goods to open 
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up its markets by removing all NTBs and by moderating its exports
in the sensitive sectors which have seriously been hit by the economic
72crisis and current recession.
The EC Commission too sees that trade with Japan should be
conducted through the implementation of the CCP and the establishment
of a Common Industrial Policy. It argues for an overall Community
73trade policy towards Japan, Consequently, the EC Council was
called on to discuss the proposal and finally adopted the stance to
74move towards a common strategy with Japan. However, despite the
Community's determination that there is absolute need to face Japan 
with a common stance, the Community national governments are still 
negotiating with Japan at national or even at industry level; e.g.
UK and France have negotiated with Japan over car exports.
However, appreciation of the Community's situation was. ex­
pressed by Japan. High-level consultations and negotiations have 
frequently taken place. The Japanese government acknowledge the 
problems caused to the Community by its huge deficit with the former 
and the danger which threatens to break down the world free-trade 
system following on the adoption of protectionist measures by the 
Community. Japan has shown signs of goodwill and understanding by 
declaring its willingness to promote closer collaboration and con­
sultations, and to maintain the open and multilateral trading system
75by moderating its exports which will be to the benefit of all.
Japan also, in parallel with the Commission in Its endeavour to 
improve trade relations with Europe, and to reduce the trade im­
balance, offered to help European businessmen who may have diff­
iculty in penetrating the Japanese market.
The Community has persistently pursued quite a vigorous policy 
and has made a lot of efforts to improve its imbalance with Japan, 
but they have been considered insufficient. Therefore, the EC 
Council has adopted three statements, (25th November 1980, 17th 
February 1981 and 18th and 19th May 1981), expressing its main concern 
about the concentration of Japanese exports in certain sensitive sec­
tors calling on Japan to moderate its exports in view of this situation 
and proposing that the Community should undertake an analysis of all 
the main issues involved. It, the Council, expressed its dis­
satisfaction, that the Japanese had not responded sufficiently to 
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remove the Community’s uneasiness. It urged European businessmen to
take measures to penetrate the Japanese market and to pursuade the
Japanese authorities to open up their market. At the same time
national EEC governments urged Japan to curb her exports in the
77European market, e.g. Germany.
Within the European Community framework many studies have 
been undertaken to consider the Japanese case and to view how the 
situation could be remedied. Therefore, the EEC Economic and 
Social Committee (ECOSOC) adopted an opinion in July 1981,^^ under­
lining that two main courses of action should be pursued: defense
of the Community market and at the same time an offensive strategy 
towards Japan. It proposed, likewise, that the Community should 
adopt an overall policy, but if the member states persist in dealing 
bilaterally at national level with Japan, then they should consult 
with the Commission prior to such negotiations.
In practical terms, however, the Community should restructure 
her industry, make her exports more competitive and pursue constant 
efforts to achieve an effective penetration of the Japanese market.
In order to bring the trade deficit down, the Community should make 
any effort to penetrate the Japanese agricultural market and the 
importing market of the Japanese economy; e.g. food and clothing are
important sectors which offer an excellent export opportunity for the
Community to offset her trade imbalance. A common and coherent
Community policy, by harmonising national policies and setting common
goals for industry, it is maintained should be the task ahead.
High-level consultations between the European Community and 
Japan also continued throughout 1981. The Community’s trade 
deficit with Japan showed for the first time in recent years a
79moderate improvement, particularly the third quarter of that year, 
a small but encouraging phenomenon. Critics, however, say that the 
moderate reduction in the Japanese surplus is not attributable to 
Japanese export restraints, but to fall in demand not only in Europe 
and the USA, but also in other countries like China and the Middle 
East. While this may be partly true, the Japanese have on the
other hand shown signs of goodwill and understanding in their relations 
with the Community. They seem to realise the dangers which might 
be caused to the free-trade system due to tense relations with the 
Community, and are willing to restrain their exports in preference to 
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facing import controls. Certain steps have been taken by Japan 
meanwhile. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
announced tariff cuts in some sectors of special interest to European 
exports, and the then Prime Minister, Suzuki, called on his Ministers 
to forward a plan. Also, at the Ottawa Summit Meeting Japan re­
viewed its commitment to safeguard the "smooth functioning of inter­
national trade".
At the same time the EC Commission and the member states
individually were exerting constant pressure on Japan to improve even
further the adopted measures. The Ten acknowledged that the
Japanese responded to their demands and that the Japanese move was a
'step in the right direction', but they insisted that it was not
enough to improve the imbalance and to bring their trade balance to
82the level they desired. On the Japanese side more tariff cuts
and reduction of NTBs were announced in 1982. Although things 
seemed to be moving in the right direction, yet the Commission con­
sidered that 'no fundamental shift of policy was made', because the 
cuts announced were of minor significance to the Community's exports.
Pressure on Japan to open up its markets should be an everyday
83matter for the Community through the appropriate procedures.
Nevertheless although Japan,after years of laborious con­
sultations and negotiations, has moved towards freeing trade by 
undertaking certain tariff and NTB cuts, yet the Commission found 
these measures unsatisfactory, and proposed to bring the case to 
GATT on the basis of Article XXIII:1, for further discussion, 
particularly concerning the Japanese NTBs. The Community's con­
tention, however, is that NTBs of interest to her have not been
84sufficiently removed. On this proposal from the Commission the
appropriate procedure was followed and the EC Council responded 
with the adoption of a relevant decision in March 1982 that the case 
could be brought to GATT since the benefits expected by the Community 
as a result of successive GATT negotiations with Japan have not been
realised and since the results of bilateral discussion have been
unsatisfactory. The Council in justification of the move issued
a text stating that 'the measures announced by the Japanese govern­
ment aimed at further opening the Japanese market ... but that their 
practical effects on the evolution of trade would be very limited
and could not, therefore, constitute the response expected by the 
85Community’.
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Therefore the Community, feeline that it has not achieved 
what had been expected through bilateral negotiations and con­
sultations, decided to bring the matter under the multilateral 
procedure of Art. XXIII:1, before the GATT, in order to persuade 
Japan to open up its markets and moderate its export policy in 
those sensitive sectors in which the Community had a great interest. 
Art, XXIII:1 provides that the two parties should take part in 
further bilateral talks in GATT, mediated by a third country. If 
no agreement can be reached, a GATT panel can hear the case. The 
EEC requested Japan, through written representations presented to 
the Japanese ambassador in Geneva in April, 1982, to take measures 
to improve rapidly the situation. As a result of this movement 
and of subsequent talks held in Geneva on 18th and 19th May, 1982, 
under Art. XXIII:1 the Japanese government announced new measures 
to improve the situation, and promised that new concessions will be 
made aiming at trade l i b e r a l i s a t i o n . T h e  two countries met again 
outwith the GATT framework to discuss further and to exchange views. 
Japan, as an advocate of the free-trade approach in international 
trade, realises the dangers and the adverse effects of protectionism, 
and has moved a step towards a solution of the trade problems with 
the Community. Japan seems to be aware that her external relations, 
in the light of the trade issue, have become increasingly difficult.
She gives it to understand.that she depends on export markets, and must 
maintain good relations with her partners, in particular because she 
is more vulnerable than any other country , e.g. the USA or even 
NICs, This vulnerability is mainly due to the structure of the 
Japanese economy and her great dependency on developed countries' 
markets. Japan tries actually to correct her vulnerability and 
dependency on foreign supplies of oil and raw materials by operating
joint ventures abroad and selling high-technology; e.g. construction88works in Iran or Argentina. To this effect, Japan agreed to
moderate its exports to the Community, particularly in the electronics 
field.®®
The case brought by the EEC against Japan illustrates the 
GATT's role in the development and promotion of international trade 
relations, and the need for conducting those relations in the context 
of the G.A. Nevertheless, GATT has contributed to the lowering of 
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customs duties of imported products to a remarkable extent which,
in the case of Japan, is 3%, compared with 4% for the USA and 5%
90for the EEC. It has also contributed to the regulation and
reduction of NTBs through the MTNs codes. Certainly, NTBs remain 
currently the most difficult issue, especially as regards those 
which regulate trade and exist outside governmental channels. The 
decision of the EEC Council to bring the case of the Japanese NTBs 
before the GATT under the procedures set out in Art. XXIII:! and 
the following deliberations, illustrates the fact that the GATT 
system gives the weaker party the opportunity to claim its rights 
at a multilateral level. While outcome of this procedure is still 
under consideration, it seems most likely that the parties will 
reach a mutually acceptable solution,.
To sum up, the Community should direct greater attention to 
its relations with Japan, than with any other industrialised country, 
not because of the latter"s huge trade surplus ($14.billion in 1981), 
but mainly because of the complicated Japanese import and export 
trading pattern. Japanese exports are concentrated in a few sectors 
involving high technology and hit the EEC’s heavy industries. Close 
government and industrial co-operation, hard work and discipline, 
high level of productivity and competitiveness, close domestic 
markets, are the principal factors which have made Japan develop as 
an economic superpower. On the other hand, it is extremely difficult 
for the Community exporters to penetrate the Japanese market, partly 
because of the imposition of a large range of NTBs which minimise 
imports of manufactured goods and partly because of the inability 
of the Community to reach a common approach in this field. In the 
past, the Community had found it easier to export to the other 
European countries and also to the neighbouring countries of the 
Mediterranean basin and the ACP countries. Therefore, it had 
attached very little importance to the Japanese market while leaving 
Japanese goods to penetrate its markets. Also other differences, 
such as the way of life of the Japanese people make exports of 
luxurious European products into a quite complicated matter.
One may say, however, that conflicts in the trade field were 
inevitable in the wake of such a tremendous expansion as that of the 
Japanese /
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Japanese export potential. The Japanese, of course, claim that 
their tariffs are already lower than in any other industrialised 
country and, furthermore, that they have undertaken to reduce NTBs, 
which have been liberalised during the MTNs in GATT. It is more­
over a fact that the Japanese success was further helped by the 
lack of unity on the part of the European Community, in the 
commercial and industrial fields. The Commission has not proved 
able to negotiate a common Community approach, in particular because 
it has never been given a clear mandate from the Council to this end. 
Some member states argue that "the Commission should not handle the 
issue but leave it to the industrialists who could then work out 
a solution, whereas others opt for direct bilateral negotiations 
with Japan, arguing that the Commission is not strong enough.®^
However, whatever the circumstances might be, the Community 
has lost out owing to its lack of unity in the commercial and 
industrial fields towards Japan. In particular, the complete 
absence of a Common Community Industrial Policy is very detrimental 
to its interests, and, therefore, the Community must proceed to the 
implementation of such a policy in order to counterbalance its 
huge trade deficit with Japan. The Japanese, of course, have bene­
fited from this lack of unity on the part of the EEC, although it 
is not certain whether and to what extent Japan can, in the long term, 
benefit from this fact. To ease the situation the Commission was 
called upon by the Council to try to facilitate contacts with the 
Japanese, to establish periodic consultations and to pursue studies 
on the concentration of the Japanese exports to the EEC, such as 
Japanese exports of automobiles and high technology equipment.
Furthermore, it, the Commission, has pressed Japan to open up its
92markets and liberalise NTBs.
Nevertheless, despite these efforts, the situation is for 
the Community far from satisfactory, and it will continue to be so 
if no common stance on both industrial and commercial fields is 
not taken and, moreover, if Community industries do not use the 
time to restructure themselves. In the absence of such measures 
the Community may have to restrict Japanese exports to its markets, 
but it is more likely that it may increasingly lose other world 
markets to the Japanese as the latter direct their attentions to 
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other markets in order to export their industrial products.
European exports would have to strengthen their position and increase 
their competitiveness in order to conquer Japanese markets, provided, 
of course, that the Commission and the Council of the European 
Community support them in their endeavours and, in particular, to 
implement a CCP and to lay down the foundations of a Common Indust­
rial Policy.
Further consultations and contacts between the two sides 
should be encouraged and, in particular, more understanding should 
be shown by the Japanese, who apply a very large range of NTBs, not 
consistent in a wider perspective with internationally agreed 
trade principles and rules.
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3. EEC - Australia
In this section relating to EEC-Australia, as well as in 
the next one relating to EEC-Canada trade relations,a brief 
mention is .aade only for the purpose of giving the reader a 
complete picture of the EEC’s trade relations with the industrial­
ised world. This discussion intends to point out the legal issues 
of particular interest to our topic.
Despite historical and cultural links between the Community 
(particularly Britain) and Australia, trade relations have not 
been easy, and open controversies in international fora often 
take place. Restrictive trade and protectionist practices have 
also been mutually ascribed. The main areas of friction never­
theless are the EEC's CAP and some sensitive manufactures such as 
textiles, footwear, and cars. Efforts to improve trade relations 
have been made between the two partners, and periodic consultations 
and mutual visits to Canberra and Brussels have often taken place.
To this end, the Community's opening of an official mission to
93Australia in April 1981, has been seen as a positive step.
Major issues of trade between the two partners are being
negotiated within the MTNs framework. The Community and Australia
are seeking a satisfactory agreement on agricultural issues within
this framework. On this matter the European Parliament on 16th
February 1979 adopted a Resolution on economic and trade relations
between the EEC and Australia calling for appropriate solutions to
be sought in the framework of the MTNs, and at the same time that
94trade relations be improved on a bilateral basis. Under the
umbrella of GATT the two parties succeeded in negotiating in 
September 1980 an agreement over Australia's exports of sheepmeat, 
under which Australia is to limit its exports to the Community.
The sugar issue too has been examined by a GATT Panel in 1980.
Within the multilateral framework, however, trade relations 
have been improved and mutual concessions have led to mutual 
advantages. Concessions by the Community on Australian beef and 
cheese, enable Australia to resume its traditional trade with the 
Community /
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Community, For its part Australia granted the Community concessions 
on a number of industrial and agricultural products. Australia's 
concern, however, is not only the Community's exports to Australian 
markets, but the indirect damage caused to her exports, when the
EEC's farm surpluses flooded Australia's natural markets in South-
95East Asia.
Therefore, differences and competition between the two
parties have frequently caused tension. The Australian accusation
of protectionism in the EEC's CAP has been refuted by the Community
with countercharges of industrial protectionism. High Australian
import duties on certain manufactured products that are in the
Community's interest, and Australia's reluctance to accept traditional
Community exports such as footwear, textiles, clothing, are major
96issues of contention. On this particular matter bilateral and
multilateral negotiations under GATT Art. XIX are still being held 
(in 1983) in the hope of reaching a mutually satisfactory solution.
While Australia’s political links with the Community are no 
longer as strong as they were in the past, in particular because 
Britain has loosened her ties with the Commonwealth and has increased 
her interests in the Community, economic ties remain important for 
both. Australia and the Community compete in some products, notably 
wheat, flour and dairy products and they are involved in mutual and 
frequent countetrraccusations of prdtectionism. Australia specifically 
complains about the EEC's CAP and sugar policy, and also about the 
EEC's, and especially French expansion into traditional Australian 
markets in South-East Asia. However, Australia's trade links are 
now orientated towards Japan, China and South-East Asia rather than 
towards the Community, without of course underestimating the signifi­
cance of co-operation with the EEC and its member states. On the 
political and diplomatic field, Australia, although an OECD country, 
backs the LDCs and advocates a New International Economic Order (NIEO). 
Nevertheless, trade for both sides is a substantial factor for further 
development and the one's markets remains very important for the other.
To sum up, BEC-Australia's trade relations have not caused 
serious tensions for either side, and apart from the sugar case, no 
other complaints have been considered by the GATT Panels or Working 
Parties. The sugar case (discussed earlier in this chapter,p.188) 
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is of particular importance for the evolution of trade relations 
between the EEC and Australia. The consistency of the EEC’s CAP 
with the international trading rules is analysed, while the effect­
iveness of the GATT legal system in solving disputes to this extent 
has been left open to doubt.
I r
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4. EEC - Canada
EEC and Canada have developed good trade relations which
account for a considerable share of their external trade. They
have mutually negotiated beneficial agreements which promote trade
through bilateral contacts; also negotiations have been conducted
in certain international fora such as the annual 'Western Economic
Summits", the OECD and the GATT. The Community has shown great
interest in extending the present system and in developing further
trade relations with Canada so as to rely on it for security of
97supplies of raw materials and oil. * The most important agree­
ment is the European Community-Ganada Co-operation Agreement signed 
on 6th July 1976, which enables both parties to develop and extend 
their economic and commercial co-operation. In a wide context of 
issues it includes trade, industrial co-operation and even enyiron- 
ment and fisheries questions. Under this Agreement the two parties
have agreed to grant each other MEN treatment in accordance with the
.GATT principle of Art.I, and to develop and diversify their trade
through co-operation at the highest level, to promote industrial
98co-operation and to set up a joint Co-operation Committee.
High level consultations (every six months) take place between the 
two parties as a result of the 1976 Co-operation Agreement. They 
cover a series of bilateral trade problems involving industrial and 
agricultural trade.
As a result of this Agreement the volume of trade between
the two parties has considerably increased and Canada, partly because
of this agreement, now is the fifth extra-European trading partner 
99of the Community. In their trade balance, the Community,, except
for the year 1981, has had a small deficit With Canada, but no major 
dispute or trade war has arisen between them.
Despite the free-trade approach which both areas have 
applied in the field of international trade, they both have used 
protectionist measures and have imposed discriminatory restrictions. 
The Community has complained that Canada uses protectionist measures 
for protection of Canadian domestic produce, imposing import quotas 
and restrictions against some products of interest to the Community, 
notably leather footwear. The Community has in turn complained 
that /
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that the Canadian imposition of trade barriers on alcoholic beverages 
are discriminatory. Canada claims to have met its obligations
undertaken during the Tokyo Round MTNs to the effect that it would 
reduce discriminatory measures within eight years. In particular 
the Canadians direct complaints concerning the EEC's CAP arguing 
that it is highly protectionist and creates problems for certain 
exports of their farm products.
However, the Canadian import restrictions applied on foot­
wear imports were the subject of separate consultations held on the 
footwear sector, under Art, XIX of the GATT, in April 1980. The 
European Community contested that Canadian production in 1979 does 
not justify the extension of quota systems beyond the three years for 
which it had originally been introduced. Moreover the Canadians on 
9th July 1982, extended the imposition of quota restrictions on this 
matter until 30th November 1984. Consultations have again taken 
place under Art. XIX of GATT in Brussels on 27th July 1982; the 
Community complained and asked the Canadian authorities to withdraw 
the quota. Both parties accepted that in the absence of an agree­
ment consultations within the GATT framework would take place under 
Art. XXII or XXIII:1, or a GATT Panel might be appointed to resolve 
the dispute according to the GATT rules.
Again as for a long time, the CAP has been the focal point 
of contention on the part of Canada. The Canadians argue that the 
system has generated great surpluses, which are dumped on the inter­
national market with the help of subsidies. Likewise, the Canadians 
are unhappy with the Framework Agreement, which was set in motion in 
1976, pointing out that concessions given by the EEC to the USA are 
not, similarly, given to Canada. Moreover, the Framework Agreement 
has not worked in practice, as it was envisaged and, on some issues - 
such as uranium and fisheries - protracted negotiations have taken 
place.
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CHAPTER 7.
TRADE RELATIONS WITH NON-ASSQCIATED COUNTRIES 
The Generalised System of Preferences (GSP),
In the context of EEC trade relations with non-associated- 
countries and before we examine the individual EEC agreements with 
certain Asian or Latin American countries, it has been considered 
important to discuss and analyse the basic aims and objectives of 
the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). The GSP was intro­
duced in order to establish preferential treatment for all LDCs, but 
its practical importance has been limited to those countries not- 
associated with the Community.because the associated countries enjoy 
greater benefits under their preferential schemes, e.g. Lome countries. 
In fact, preferential treatment for LDCs has been a major concern in 
UNCTAD since 1963, long before the establishment of the GSP. The 
first positive steps for the establishment of the GSP and on UNCTAD 
initiative were taken during the UNCTAD conference in 1964, when 
the participants agreed to the principle that LDCs’ exports needed 
preferential access to the industrialised countries’ markets.^ 
Subsequently, it was the second UNCTAD in 1968 which adopted 
Resolution 21 (II) initiating a generalised non-discriminatory, non­
reciprocal and autonomous system of preferences for the developing
countries in relatively vague terms, not including the concrete range2of products, nor the amount of the preferences. This implies that 
UNCTAD was very concerned, from the very beginning, for the develop­
ment ^nd trade expansion of all LDCs. UNCTAD saw preferential treat­
ment f or LDCs’ exports as an- essential step for their growth and 
industrialisation. This treatment could be expressed through deeper 
tariff cuts and increased quotas in particular for products of special 
interest to LDCs as against products exported by developed countries. 
Meanwhile, as the EEC developed its preferential network with certain 
LDCs with whom it had special historical, political and economic links, 
notably with the Mediterranean basic countries and with the former 
dependencies of its member states in Africa, Pacific and Caribbean, 
UNCTAD was left with no other option but to press even harder for the 
extension /
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extension of preferential treatment to all LDCs. To this
e n d  the GSP was introduced by UNCTAD, which has pursued this 
policy with the ultimate objective of the aduevement of a uniform 
preferential treatment fœ  all LDCs.
The EEC responded to UNCTAD's call for extending preferential 
treatment to all LDCs. It invoked the procedure of Art. XXV of 
GATT, in order to secure a waiver from the MEN clause of Art. I. 
Therefore, the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT decided on 25 June 1971 to 
"waive the provisions of Art. I of the GATT for a period of ten years 
to the extent necessary to permit developed contracting parties to 
accord preferential tariff treatment to products originating in the 
LDCs, with the view not to grant any such treatment to like products 
to other contracting parties provided that any such preferential 
tariff arrangements shall be designed to facilitate trade from LDCs 
and not to raise barriers to the trade to other contracting parties**.^
The GSP has been seen as an instrument of development rather 
than a commercial policy instrument, but it nevertheless involves 
trade, and aims to promote industrialisation of the LDCs to expand their 
trade, to increase their export earnings, to achieve better access to 
world markets for their primary products, to accelerate the pace of 
their economic growth and to collaborate with international organ­
isations, concerned with economic development. It is based mainly 
on the need for economic and political interdependence between the 
developed countries and the developing world. The system is addressed 
to all LDCs but applies it in-practice to the non-associated LDCs in 
Asia and Latin America. This is because certain LDCs, e.g. AGP 
countries enjoy greater benefits under other preferential schemes.
Its primary objectives are to counter-balance the preferences granted 
to associated countries in Africa and the Mediterranean basin and to 
contribute to a better balance in international trade. This can be 
achieved according to the objectives set out by the GSP by tariff
4cuts for products, industrial and processed, originating in the LDCs.
The European Community's GSP came into effect on 1st July,
1971, for a period of ten years and it has been renewed for another 
decade, due to expire at the end of 1990. It is subject to yearly 
reviews and will be in force until 2000. During the first ten years, 
improvements to the system were made, despite the difficult economic 
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situation with which the Community member states had to cope. In 
particular, in 1975 and 1977 modifications to the system were made 
which included both simplification of its procedure and diversification. 
In this context the European Parliament's Development and Co-operation 
Committee recognised the complexity and uncertainty of the system, due 
to which a very small utilisation of the system has been made. Also, 
the UNCTAD, as the international forum responsible for the promotion 
of trade with the developing world, has set up a special Committee on5preferences. In 1977, during the Tokyo Round MTNs, it appealed 
"for deeper tariff cuts and improvements of the GSP by raising or 
eliminating ceilings binding or otherwise, ensuring the security of 
the preferential margins and liberalising the rules of origin".
It stressed the need for special consideration for the LDCs* products 
of special interest to them and not covered by the GSP, and called
gfor an increase of the products covered by it. Individual devel­
oping countries requested,during the Tokyo Round MTNs,the developed 
countries to provide them with more benefits, expansion of trade and 
economic growth. They specifically wanted the DCs to ensure an 
obligation or grant permanent preferential treatment under the GSP.
The DCs have, therefore, responded by expressing their willingness to 
further improve and liberalise the GSP schemes. Following these 
requests, the Ministers of the contracting parties agreed that diff­
erential and more favourable treatment to the LDCs was necessary and 
desirable. They also pointed out that the GSP must be maintained and 
further improved. To this end the CONTRACTING PARTIES decided on
17th December 1979 on the introduction of a 'qualification clause*
7introducing a legal basis for preferences under GATT law. Therefore 
differential and more favourable treatment to LDCs was introduced in 
GATT, but this treatment falls short of the demand of the LDCs for 
the amendment of the legal structure of GATT, for establishing per­
manent preferential treatment for LDCs.
(i) The first GSP (1971)
According to the first (1971) GSP, products are divided 
Into four categories: non-sensitive could enter the Community duty­
free, unless their exports prove to be detrimental to the economy of 
the Community and therefore duties can be introduced on a product by 
product basis. The sensitive were exempted from custom duties up to 
certain /
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certain amounts (ceilings or quotas). Beyond this level the change 
of customs duties set out in the CCT of the EC could be re-applied.
The semi-sensitive were subject to a surveillance system or monthly 
controls. Finally, preferential margins were set for agricultural 
products, particularly for some processed agricultural products. The 
EEC could in this latter case apply the safeguard clause for ’market 
disruption' or threat thereof under Art. XIX of the G.A. and possibly 
suspend the application of the GSP.^
However, each beneficiary country was entitled to export to 
the Community up to a maximum amount or 'buffer'. This measure was 
designed to help the economically backward developing countries, but in 
practice restricted imports from the advanced LDCs, That is because 
only a small number of the beneficiaries were in the position to under­
stand the system and make full use of the opportunities provided. 
Specifically the administrative procedures and the origin requirements 
were too complex for most of the LDCs. This was partly due to the 
insufficient information given by the Community and partly due to the 
fact that organisations in LDCs were not capable of helping their 
exporters.^ Specifically, the rules of origin constituted a quite 
serious barrier for the LDCs exports. The fact that the industrial­
ised countries do not apply identical criteria and rules of origin, 
makes the situation even more complex. On the other hand, the LDCs 
viewed the rules of origin from a different perspective, pointing to 
the special needs of the LLDCs.^^
An analysis of the Community's ten years' experience of the
GSP has shown that despite the relative progress and the improvements
to the scheme year after year, it has not yet fundamentally changed.
The Community's objective, of extending the GSP to include a larger
range of products, especially to the extent that the more backward
developing countries would be given the opportunity to benefit most,
in practice has not largely been achieved. The advanced LDCs, that
is the NICs, were those which have mainly reaped the benefits offered
by the GSP. Their exports to the Community were those which have11amounted to the increase of value of imports from LDCs. It can
be said that the system could have yielded better results if the 
administrative procedures involved were simpler and more information 
was provided to both sides. Due to these complexities traders in 
both /
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both the Community and the developing countries have not been able 
to take advantage of the opportunities offered.
Therefore, neither the Community which acknowledged that there
is 'room for improvement', nor the LDCs seem to have been satisfied
with the operation of the system. A Community Review at the end
of the 1971-1980 scheme, revealed that the GSP needed some improvement,
12while maintaining its main characteristics.
(ii) The New GSP. (1981)
The EC Council adopted on 16th December 1980, a decision to
continue the GSP for a further period of ten years, until the end of
1990, coinciding thus with the development objectives of the UN13adopted for the next ten years, i.e. 1981-1990.
The New GSP is based on the same guidelines as the original one.
It provides further simplification of the system and differentation
of the LDCs' products. It aims at a better balance of preferential
benefits. It is "part of the efforts for better redistribution of
the economic relationship between the industrialised countries and
the LDCs, making them more equitable and closer to the needs of the 
14modern world". It comes in line with the opinion expressed by
UNCTAD for the simplification of the scheme and the abolition of 
overall quotas and ceilings.
Under the new GSP, the categories of products involved are
reduced to two; sensitive and non-sensitive. Agricultural products
form a distinct category, however. The non-sensitive products are
subject only to statistical supervision and can enter the Community
duty-free up to a certain point. Relevant imports can be re-15stricted if they cause 'material injury' in the Community, The
sensitive products are subject to import quotas or ceilings. For all 
beneficiaries shares are allocated in the Community; for the less 
competitive, the ceilings are rather theoretical. The usual rule 
of réintroduction of customs duties will apply when the Community's 
market is disturbed by the GSP e x p o r t s . I n d u s t r i a l  products, non­
sensitive and sensitive including even textiles can enter the 
Community duty-free when they are importing from LLDCs- Both tariff
ceilings /
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ceilings and tariff quotas allow duty-free imports up to a point.
Tariff quotas are the same or a little lower than corresponding 
ceilings, but the main purpose of tariff quotas is to ensure a fair 
distribution of duty-free goods between the EEC member states.
They both have the same aim but only differ in technical and admin­
istrative procedures.. As regards agricultural products, tariff 
reductions apply in place of duty-free treatment. For the econ­
omically most backward LDCs full exemption of all agricultural
products covered by the GSP is provided. Even products like
17tobacco, tin and pineapple are included.
Therefore, the LLDCs can export to the Community duty-free 
regardless of the category of the products, non-sensitive and sensi­
tive, industrial or agricultural, save some limited exceptions. The 
rest of the LDCs can export to the Community their industrial non­
sensitive products duty-free, but if imports causé economic difficulties 
tariff ceilings can be set up. For the sensitive industrial products 
tariff quotas can be set up. When tariff ceilings or tariff quotas 
are reached normal customs duties may be reintroduced. Certain 
exemptions to the rules are provided when certain requirements are 
fulfilled - i.e. rules of origin of goods.
Quotas are shared among the Community member states. The 
beneficiary countries can export to the Community (duty-free) up to 
a maximum amount known as ’butoirs’ or 'buffers’. This measure is 
taken in order to ensure that the advanced LDCs do not use all the 
preferential benefits to the detriment of the weaker.
(iii) Evaluation of the GSP.
An assessment of the 1971 and the new GSP reveals that the 
New System has not been improved, both in terms of the number of 
products included and in terms of a more liberal and broader prefer­
ential access for LLDCs, which need it most. In 1971 the more 
advanced LDCs were those who made the wider use of the GSP. The New 
GSP, however, aims "to be adapted to the new economic conditions in 
international relations and the needs of the Community's industrial 
and commercial policies and must at the same time ensure that the 
preferences offered are utilised more equitably". As regards 
some sensitive products such as textiles and footwear, they are not 
covered even by the new GSP, for which VERs have been arranged between 
the /
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the Community and the LDCs. In particular, there has been no real 
change for textiles even for the LLDCs, mainly because trade in 
textile products is linked with agreements concluded within the MFA.
As the GSP provides for tariff reductions only, it does not 
include financial transfers or measures for industrial and techno­
logical co-operation, nor the reduction of other NTBs. This may 
particularly explain the relatively limited achievements of the 
system. Tariff cuts only are not sufficient to enable the LDCs to 
promote their exports. Tariffs today do not constitute a serious 
barrier to international trade, particularly for manufactured goods.
In the framework of MTNs tariffs have been reduced to a very consider­
able extent, and therefore the GSP has lost its significance because 
of generally low MFN tariff levels. "In fact (it has been acknow­
ledged) that preferences for developing countries were designed to 
remedy some of the problems that arose from MFN provisions. Prefer­
ences for LDCs under specified conditions are complementary and not 
contradictory to the principle of non-discrimination in trade. In 
fact, MFN for the rich and preferences for the poor countries -
two instruments designed to deal with two different problems - would
19appear to be an optimal combination of policies",
In considering the tariff-cuts question and its implications for the
liberalisation of trade of the LDCs with the DCs,data available from
20UNCTAD should be examined. An UNCTAD report in 1973 covering
the year 1970, evaluating the significance of the EC GSP for LDCs,
concluded that in 1970 (before the GSP came into existence), 7% of
the EEC imports from beneficiary countries would have been covered
by GSP. In .1972 only 4.3% to 3.9% of EEC imports have been accorded
preferential treatment under the GSP. Thus, during this period, the
actual contribution of the EEC to the export growth of products
covered by the GSP, was very small. The Commission has recognised
that the GSP is a complex system and needs simplification in order
to work properly. In fact, the Commission has made, and it is still21making, efforts to maintain and improve the system. To this end
in October 1976 it, the Commission, proposed the establishment of a 
"European Agency* capable of dealing with the GSP's problems, to 
co-operate and give information to the countries concerned, in order 
to make "its use easier for the LDCs" Nevertheless, as a result of 
the G8Ps' establishment little international trade has been created.
A /
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A later assessment, also made by the UNCTAD Secretariat for
the years 1975 and 1976, revealed that only 13.4% of products at MFN
rates, exported by LDCs to DCs' markets, received GSP treatment.
The relative increase in comparison with the 1972 year is partly
attributable to the replacement in 1973 of Commonwealth preferences
with the GSP. Specific studies made by UNCTAD on individual
schemes show that trade under preferential rates has not grown by
23any significant amount. The UNCTAD's Special Committee on prefer­
ences estimated that the results of the tariff cuts are not large 
and that, in any event, definite conclusions are a rather
difficult matter, because "complete information on the value of
<7 24imports actually receiving preferential treatment is lacking. The 
25UNCTAD's studies therefore, indicate that the developing world had 
not gained much from the schemes. Nevertheless, whatever the gains 
are, the GAP is beneficial for LDCs at least for some medium or short 
terra needs which otherwise would have not been fulfilled.
In view of this situation, we may come to a conclusion that the 
practical importance of the European Community scheme for the LDCs is 
rather small, and this small importance is further decreased by the 
fact that tariffs are at very low level. The GSP appears to be more 
theoretical than practical and its most positive contribution is the 
encouragement and impetus which it gives to the developing countries 
to move away from inward-looking economies to outward-looking economies, 
to the development of further communications and contacts with devel­
oped economies. Such relationships help in promoting trade schemes 
and in developing and utilising any opportunities offered. Despite 
the relatively small effect which the GSP has had on the LDCs exports, 
the UNCTAD Special Committee on preferences pointed out that prefer­
ences are an important step in providing better access to the markets 
of the developed countries. The benefits, moreover, cannot be 
isolated from other factors such as efficient and competitive product­
ion of industrial goods, foreign investment, proper commercial policies,
dynamic export promotion and marketing and, in addition, collaboration
27with other international organisations.
For the European Community studies concerning the GSP do not 
indicate that it brings any economic benefit to the Community, but it 
is obvious that there are political, social and diplomatic gains from 
the /
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the operation of the scheme. The EEC as has been pointed out 
throughout the thesis, wanted continuation of the already existing 
links with certain countries in the Mediterranean basin of in Africa, 
but on the other hand, it did not want the other LDCs, e.g. in Asia 
or Latin America, which had no special ties with the Community, be left 
out of the preferential framework and be subjected to MFN treatment.
The EEC, furthermore, wanted to promote interdependence with all third 
world countries, which could be achieved through a more lenient treat­
ment of LDCs. This treatment would come into line with the UNCTAD's 
call for special and differential treatment to all LDCs and with the 
GATT's Part IV, which also provides for differentiation of LDCs as 
against the developed countries. Application of the GSP would bring 
benefits to all countries involved and it would eventually enable the 
Community to establish uniform principles for all third world countries, 
in particular, if greater preferences are to be granted through this 
scheme.
As has already been noted above, the Community GSP, although 
it is addressed to all LDCs, it practically applies to the non­
associated countries not enjoying any special or more favourable treat­
ment in their trade relations with the EEC, It is an attempt by the 
EEC to counterbalance in favour of the non-associates the preferences 
granted to the associated countries in Africa and the Mediterranean 
basin. In the context of the commercial and development policy, the
European Community has given, according to a different degree of links 
(free-trade areas, association agreements, co-operation and prefer­
ential trade agreements), different treatment to the various groups of 
countries. In viewing the variety of types of preferences one can 
find that the GSP as to its limited scope, has a relatively limited 
preferential status. The GSP has been seen as a device for partial 
compensation to the non-associates, but in practice its actual effects 
are very limited. (A comparative analysis of the EEC's GSP and of the 
other preferential schemes is later made in the conclusion.)
Differences, however, exist even in the main EEC preferential 
systems, despite the efforts for harmonisation of the numerous 
Community agreements within the framework of the Lome Convention and 
despite the attempts towards an implementation of a common policy 
towards /
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towards the Mediterranean states. In considering the different 
preferential systems, the European Community preferences are granted 
under different means such as tariff cuts, or exemptions provided by 
agreements on industrial, technological, socio-political, financial 
and co-operation aspects or by stabilisation of export schemes for 
export earnings, within certain limits. In the context of the EEC 
preferential systems it is indicated that the EEC’s GSP provides only 
for tariff preferences and does not include any other arrangements.
Therefore, it can be seen as a "subordinate or inferior preferential
 ^ „ 28 system".
With due regard to the fact that the GSP is granted to all
LDCs, two preferential systems may apply; e.g. the association
arrangements with the ACP countries and the GSP, may overlap each
other. Therefore, when a country belongs to two preferential systems
such as an ACP country, she can choose whichever of the systemg she
prefers to apply in respect of the advantages offered. Moreover, if
a product is not covered by the ACP preferences, but is covered by the
29GSP, utilisation of the second scheme may be available. In fact,
the ACP countries or the Mediterranean basin countries enjoy greater
preferences than the non-assopiated countries (including not only
tariff preferences but also financial and technological transfers).
The GSP is actually applied by the associates only when products are
not covered by their arrangements. The EEC was very careful not to
include the main exports of its associated states in the GSP, and
only a very small percentage of special preferential exports was
affected. However, through other preferential schemes the associates
30have received additional advantages in new markets. As a consequence
of this, the non-associated states are very unhappy of the existence of 
the various preferential schemes applied by the Community and therefore 
they have made,and are still making efforts, particularly in UNCTAD, 
towards their abolition.
However, since discrimination could not have been avoided due 
to various preferential systems, in the third UNCTAD Conference in 
1972, it was proposed in the Charter of Algiers that countries which 
enjoyed special preferences (AASM, later Lome, and Commonwealth) could 
receive compensation if they agreed to abandon their preferences and 
thus lose their privileged position as a result of the introduction of 
the /
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a31the GSP, Nevertheless, the UNCTAD's main objective was that all
industrialised countries should treat all LDCs in the same way if 
possible, and that uniformity of the various preferential systems 
should be achieved. But this is extremely difficult to achieve. 
Certainly, the LDCs wanted to include in the GSP as many as possible 
of their primary commodities, whereas some developed countries wanted 
to compensate those LDCs who might have lost their special preferences. 
Also some other LDCs insisted on the maintenance of special relations 
with certain countries; e.g. the ACP associates, because the GSP alone 
did not offer sufficient compensation to them. Likewise, the AASM, 
later ACP countries, wanted to retain preferential provisions instead 
of the GSP.
Finally, we may conclude that despite the UNCTAD's efforts the 
objective of achieving a uniform treatment for all LDCs has not been 
fulfiled. It is not only because of the existence of several pre­
ferential systems, but also mainly because the GSP has not worked 
as envisaged in order to abolish discrimination among the LDCs with 
varying levels of economic development. The continuous existence and 
application of other preferential schemes such as the Lome Convention 
or the Mediterranean policy, constitute obstacles to the improvement 
of the GSP, in particular to the benefit of the economically most back­
ward LDCs, and to the liberalisation of third world trade.
The more advanced countries have benefited most by virtue of their
marketing ability, the ability to know the developed economies'
markets and their ability to comply with the complexities of the GSP 
and the other requirements. On the other hand, the LLDCs have not 
derived any noticeable benefit from the operation of the GSP, mainly 
because they are agricultural countries and their products are subject 
to the restrictions and protectionist measures of the EEC's CAP.
From the legal point of view the GSP has been legally waived from
the MFN clause of Art. I of the G.A. The efforts of the LDCs to
provide part IV of the GATT concerning the "Trade and Development" of
the developing countries, as the legal basis for the GSP, have not
succeeded. When in 1965 and 1966 special treatment was provided for
the developing countries within the GATT framework and an attempt was
made to include the GSP, the contracting parties did not accept such 
32a demand. Especially during the Tokyo Round MTNs, the main object­
ive of the third world countries was to obtain a permanent legal basis 
for /
230
for the GSP into the GATT. If such a demand had been accepted, there 
is no doubt that the existing degree of discrimination and preferential 
treatment in favour of some LDCs would have not existed.
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Agreements with non-associated countries
The EEC has concluded a great number of non-preferential bi­
lateral trade agreements with most LDCs outside the framework of its 
association policy. What is really notable in this policy towards 
third world countries is that the EEC has concluded bilateral agree­
ments with individual countries and not groups of countries mostly in
Asia and Latin America; the only exception being the ASEAN (Assoc-
33iation of South-East Asian Nations ) Group.
Interdependence between the Community and the third world is
vital for both sides. For the EEC the security of supplies of raw
materials and oil is essential for its further economic growth and
well-being of its people. The LDCs constitute in addition a rapidly
developing market for EEC exports, even in periods of economic recess- 
35ion. The LDCs need in turn to import technology from the indust­
rialised countries for expanding and diversifying their industrial 
production. Likewise, LDCs need export markets for their raw materials 
and for their limited, but essential, production of their industrial 
products. Their export revenues would enable them in turn to import 
more goods so essential for their development and economic growth. 
Therefore, both partners need export markets for their economic expansion 
and this can be made possible by the liberalisation of trade.
Non-Associated LDCs in broad terms fall into two categories: those 
with relatively developed economies, which produce similar kinds of 
products as the EEC (the Asean countries, Hong Kong, South Korea), and 
those whose level of development requires financial and technical
36assistance, such as India, Bangladesh, some Latin American countries.
(a) EEC and Asian Countries
Community relations with Asian countries stem from the time when 
Britain had to abandon her Commonwealth preferences with the Asian 
countries and acceded into the Community in 1973. On Britain's 
Insistence preferences,notably with India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
were retained and a declaration of intention with respect to Asian 
countries of the Commonwealth was annexed to the Treaty of Accession 
stating that the Community wished to expand its trade relations with 
these /
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these countries, and to examine jointly any problems in this area
37taking into account the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP).
Consequently, bilateral trade agreements of a non-preferehtial
character were signed with Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in 1975,
and an economic co-operation agreement with India in December 1981
which supersedes a previous bilateral trade agreement signed in 1974.
During this time relations with South Korea were encouraged and
discussions took place on the question of trade relations. Hong
Kong, being considered as a dependent territory of the U.K. has not
39signed any agreement with the Community.
Likewise, the Asean group has signed a co-operation agreement with
the Community and it is the only group of non-associated countries so
far to have negotiated as such with the Community. However, the Asean
group countries, which can be classified as New Industrialised Countries
(NICs) involve both challenges and opportunities for international
trade. Their potential growth has been very impressive and they
present very good prospects for trade. They are well endowed with
natural resources, in particular oil, and constitute a big market
40approximately the size of the EEC in terms of population.
EEC-Asean trade is relatively small, but under the GSP there are 
great hopes for its increase. It has since 1977 increased by 88%.
This is mainly attributable to the GSPs, under which the largest bene­
ficiaries are the Asean group, and India. The GSP is especially 
designed by the Community for the non-associated countries, and it 
gives them the opportunity to export their commodities free of almost 
all tariff barriers. (Further discussion on the GSP is provided eaiiier 
in this chapter.) It is worth noting, however, that most LDCsjnotably 
the Asean group, are unhappy with the GSP, since it retains all NTBs, 
which constitute today the main obstacle to the free movement of goods 
at the international level. During the MTNs, the Asean countries 
have argued with the Community that differential and more favourable 
treatment is needed within the GSP for themselves as well as for the 
other LDCs. They have further pointed out that a system similar to
STABEX for their commodity exports is fundamental for their economic
41growth and expansion. In particular, during the 1977 negotiations
for the renewal of the MFA, concern had been expressed over the grow­
ing EEC protectionist policy over textiles and clothing. It was also 
pointed out that Asean countries have attached great importance to 
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international agreements on raw materials and stabilisation of export 
42earnings.
On the other hand, the Community has pointed out that the GSP is 
a key instrument towards development and trade expansion of the third 
world and gives the LDCs better access to its markets for their 
manufactured goods and that, in any case, the GATT rules are equally 
applied to all countries in Asia.^^
The importance of economic exchanges and development for both 
the EEC and Asian countries is great. For the Community a vast 
market, with more than eight hundred million (800,000,000) people is 
opened up, irrespective of the enormous economic and development 
problems facing them. Already a large amount of Community's exports 
are going into this area. For example, trade between the Community 
and India has been increased during the 1973-1980 period.
The Community's external trade policy in this direction is, how­
ever, not without criticism, particularly with reference to protect­
ionist tendencies. This claim is not far from the truth. In the 
case of Bangladesh (which belongs to the least developing countries),
the Community has negotiated with the former a so-called voluntary
*export restraint agreement over fabrics and jute. Therefore, this
protectionist policy pursued by the Community has deprived Bangladesh 
from export earnings, so essential for her further growth and economic
expansion, in particular as textiles is the most successful manufactured
' • ■■industry and so vital for the development of an LDC.
(b) EEC and Latin American countries.
Despite a great number of similar agreements between the Community
and the developing countries, no overall Community policy has yet
been implemented towards the LDCs or, in this case, towards the Latin
American countries. The Community, after the experience of the
Asean group relations would have preferred to have negotiated with
Latin America as a group, and it has claimed that it was the Latin
American countries who were unable to elaborate an overall
45proposition for mutual co-operation. There is no doubt, whatsoever,
that Latin America is a heterogeneous region, and it is difficult to 
deal with the Community as a group. However, several attempts in 
this respect have been made. Notably, since 1966 several Latin 
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American countries acting as a group suggested the establishment of a
Î
i
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joint committee with powers to bind the EC Commission to matters con­
cerning Latin America, but it did not fulfill its role. Eventually 
a collective body was set up to monitor relations between the two 
sets of countries. Although this body has met relatively few times, 
its contribution is positive. It was able on some occasions to voice 
its objection to the Community's association policy and to the GSP.^^ 
Also, the Latin American countries participated in the group of 77 at
the U.N. and contributed to the definition of the LDCs' common position
47on the North-South issues.
However, the Community has tried to stimulate trade and develop­
ment in Latin America through bilateral contacts. Agreements,based 
on the MFN clause concept, of a non-preferential and co-operation 
character have been signed between the EEC and Latin American countries, 
in order to balance Community trade with the preferred countries in 
Africa and in the Mediterranean basin. A co-operation agreement was
48signed with Mexico in 1975 and a similar one with Brazil the same year.
49A co-operation agreement with the Andean Pact is currently being 
negotiated, but it has not yet been concluded because it has been sus­
pended since July 1980 for political reasons, relating to the coup 
d'etat in Bolivia. Bilateral trade agreements with Argentina (1971) 
and Uruguay (1973) are in force,
Within the context of the MFA as well, bilateral agreements 
applicable since 1st January, 1978, for textiles have been concluded 
between the EEC and Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico,
Peru and Uruguay. They include a great number of textile products 
with a view to maintaining stable exports to the Community.
Apart from the trade agreements mentioned the Community^ since 
1976,has been running a programme of financial and technical co­
operation with non-associated countries, including those in Latin 
America. Specifically, in February 1981 the EC Council adopted a
Regulation on financial and technical co-operation to non-associated
51countries, concerning mainly development projects in agriculture.
The interest of the Community in the Latin American countries appears 
to have grown over the last few years. This is partly due to the 
Community interest in finding new markets during the economic crisis 
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and partly due to the EEC's desire to ensure a regular supply of raw 
materials coming from countries outside Africa. Therefore alternative 
links with Latin America have been considered to be a wise proposition 
for the Community.
It is worth noting that Latin America is of all the Community's
trading partners the least successful, in penetrating its (EEC)
markets. Decline in the Latin American agricultural exports have
been disappointing, partly because the EEC is self-sufficient in the
agricultural sector, and partly because the structure of the Community's
CAP has a protectionist effect. Decline also is evident in Latin
American exports in manufactured goods throughout the 1970s, notably
clothing and leather products, because of the EEC's protectionist
policies in these sectors as well. Thus Latin America has suffered
a decline in exports to the EEC; particularly Brazil who constitutes
the largest Latin American export market for the Community.
Nevertheless, the trade balance is in favour of the Latin52American countries with the exception of 1974 and 1975.
All Latin American countries are covered by the Community GSP 
(Brazil is the second largest beneficiary of the scheme) about which 
many complaints related thereto have been voiced. The Latin American 
countries have especially claimed that it is difficult to understaind 
the system concerned and put it into practice. Furthermore, they 
argue that its coverage is too limited. They urge the Community to 
expand it and include processed products too. The Latin American 
countries hope to stimulate their trade with the Community, get helped 
to industrialise and diversify their economies and specialise in 
sectors where they have clear structural advantages, by being comple­
mentary to the major world markets.
The Community on the other hand, should adjust its industries to 
face increased competition from the outside world. In view of the 
level of competitiveness attained by Latin American countries, eq>ecially 
an advanced country like Brazil, the question of reciprocity has been 
raised by the EEC, pointing out that full respect to the GATT rules in 
trade liberalisation should be accorded.
(c) The Euro-Arab Dialogue
Europe and the Arab world have increasingly become close partners
53as far as both imports and exports are concerned. Fifteen Arab
countries /
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countries are linked with the Community bilaterally by co-operation 
trade agreements or preferential agreements through the Mediterranean
policy or the AGP framework. The EEC's imports from the Arab countries
in 1972 represented 14% of its total imports. In 1974, following
the oil price increase, the figures went up to 22% and the percentage
remained quite high for 1979 that is now 19%, 90% of which represented
fuel imports. Europe is dependent on Arab countries' oil for more
54than 50% of her needs. Also, because of the huge trade surplus
.
with the Community, the Arab countries have the power to increase their 
imports and thus to become attractive trading partners for EEC export­
ers, For the Arab countries, their relationship with the Community
;is crucial. Europe has a tremendous potential in technology and 
services, which the Arabs need for their industrialisation and devel­
opment. They also need agricultural products and foodstuffs from 
Western Europe. This interdependence, therefore, is mutually*’vital.
A dialogue between the Arab League and the EEC was launched in
1973. The energy crisis of 1973 gave the EEC the impetus to open 
negotiations with the Arab League. The Dialogue has passed through 
very difficult stages. Successive meetings were held but different 
approaches were followed by each side. Representatives of both 
sides met in Brussels in November 1973 and in Copenhagen in December 
1973. During these meetings the main question which was put forward 
by the Arabs, concerned the participation of Palestinian representation . 
This question met with a poor response by the Community, primarily
because of pressure from Israel. Finally, in 1974 the two parties
■reached the "Dublin Compromise" according to which there will be two
delegations, one European and one Arab, without specific reference to
■the nationalities of the individual members. However, even after this 
compromise, meetings in Cairo in June 1975,in Rome in July 1975, in 
Abu Dhabi in November 1975, and in Luxembourg in 1976, did not yield 
the expected results.
Finally, the General Committee, the highest authority of the
EEC-Arab Delegation met in Tunis in 1977. That meeting was claimed by
■observers to have been the most positive so far, marked by a sense of 
commitment of most participants. It dealt with such issues as 
transfer of technology, commercial co-operation, the protection and 
encouragement of investment, a number of agricultural products, cul­
tural co-operation and the living and working conditions of 
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migrant workers.
As far as trade co-operation is concerned, the Arabs asked for 
a comprehensive agreement with extensive trade co-operation to be 
concluded between themselves and the Community. A generalised free- 
trade agreement was proposed by the Arab League, but the Community 
representatives were not prepared for such an arrangement and argued 
that the existing bilateral trade agreements were adequate. More­
over, they argued that the two parties had already considered the 
creation of the "Euro-Arab Trade Co-operation Centre"^^ and that 
Arab exports already received sufficiently favourable treatment through 
the European Community's GSP or through the links with the Community, 
either through the Lome Convention or the Mediterranean policy.
The question of tariff-free entry of Arab goods to the Community
was for the Community as crucial as the question of imports of oil.
An interesting question, however, which can be raised, is whether the
Community has adopted a common position in the Euro-Arab Dialogue.
As far as the Community’s common approach is concerned, the Community
was not able to co-ordinate a common policy towards the area, primarily
because it did not want to involve political questions in economic
issues. The Community's primary concern was the adoption of a
Common Energy Policy. For the Arabs the most important part of the
Dialogue was the political question. They viewed political and
economic questions as indispensable. Nevertheless, despite the great
difficulties in dealing with such a multilateral negotiation they
showed a relative degree of unity. They particularly wanted the
Community to adopt a more sympathetic stance towards the Arab position
in the Middle East. In fact, this was not accepted by the Community
and therefore in 1979 the European Dialogue was suspended as a result
of the various, difficulties mentioned, and the refusal by the Community
to adopt a more favourable approach towards the Arab question in the
Middle East. The paradox was, as Mr Claude Cheysson said, "we
entered into the Euro-Arab Dialogue for political reasons ... it is
a political exercise and yet we refuse to talk politics there".
The Dialogue was re-opened in November 1980 again with the hope that
a possible solution would be found and that peace be established in the 
58region. For the Arabs, the political dimension was of primary
concern. This dimension cannot be separated from the economic one if
the Community truly wants to go ahead with a comprehensive commercial 
co-operation agreement.
Nevertheless,
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Nevertheless, the question of the Ten's attitude to the Middle 
East Question, from the political point of view, (which for the 
purposes of this thesis is considered irrelevant), is enormously 
complex and would have to be discussed primarily in the context of 
the development of European Political Co-operation.
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CHAPTER 7,
NOTES
1. Preferences: UN Yearbook, 1964, p.570 ff; the countries
included in the GSP have been recently increased up to 147 
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CHAPTER 8 
AGREEMENTS WITH STATE-TRADING COUNTRIES.
Trade relations between the EEC and the Council for Mutual Econ­
omic Assistance (CMEA), known as COMECON have become closer over the 
years, despite the fact that their evolution has passed through 
difficult stages. In particular, over the last years, i.e. since 1970 
trade between East and West Europe has considerably increased. The 
Community's imports from the CMEA countries, which are mainly composed 
of raw materials and oil, have multiplied threefold and also its exports 
display the same trend (the Community is in surplus with Eastern Europe) 
excluding trade between East and West Germany.^ The CMEA’s share of 
external trade with the Community has also increased. Although the 
volume of trade involved in absolute terms is not substantial, yet the 
growth rates have rapidly increased. Improved economic relations 
imply therefore, greater economic interdependence that could be bene­
ficial to all countries concerned for promoting further economic re-3lationships and political stability in Europe.
In this context, on 11th October 1982, the European Parliament 
adopted a Resolution on the Community’s relations with state trading 
countries and especially with the CMEA countries. The view which was 
expressed was that trade should be liberalised and be placed in the4context of the Helsinki Act, which calls on the signatories to take 
steps to improve commercial and scientific relations.
However, trade relations appear to have developed in a peculiar 
manner. In particular until 1972, that is the year of the commencement 
of the implementation of the CCP of the EEC, trade relations were con­
ducted at bilateral level between the EEC member states or companies on 
the one hand and the authorities of the CMEA states on the other. 
Initially relations between the two blocs were hostile, but since then,
i.e. the early 1970s,they have been characterised by a closer relation­
ship. This hostility arose out of political reasons. The CMEA 
states had not recognised officially EEC and had refused to accept it as 
an entity of international law. They denounced it as an imperialistic 
superpower in its genesis, whose creation have no beneficial effects 
on the communist states. The fear was expressed that a potential EEC 
success /
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success would create threat of expansion of capitalist ideology to5neighbouring Eastern Europe, Meanwhile, the Eastern European
countries could not ignore the economic and political realities deriving 
from the creation of the EEC. The successful experience of the EEC 
as a custons union made the CMEA states reconsider their attitude and 
move gradually away from the policy of non-recognition to a more prag­
matic approach towards the EEC. The great economic expansion of the 
EEC in the course of 1960-1972 period made the CMEA states moderate 
their position and accept the necessity for closer economic co-operation 
with the EEC as this was important for an economic reform of their 
economies.^ The Eastern European countries and, in particular, the Soviet 
Union saw a retardation of growth in their economies, whereas at that 
period EEC's economic growth and trade expansion was remarkable. There­
fore the Eastern European countries wanted to expand their trade growth 
and international trade could become an important factor in that growth. 
Improved economic relations with industrialised countries and, in part­
icular, with the EEC member states would be of fundamental importance in 
that the CMEA countries could acquire technology and other necessary 
means, such as capital, essential for their growth and development. The 
Eastern European countries felt increasingly dependent on West Europe 
for technology and credits and therefore considered that international 
trade and closer collaboration with West Europe would enable them to 
expand their trade, modernise their industries and gain access to world7markets. To this end the Soviet leaders in the early 1970s expressed 
an interest in strengthening integration within CMEA, i.e. in moving 
towards a common foreign trade policy and in moving towards a closer 
trade relationship with the Community. Integration with CMEA and 
consequently the adoption of a common trade policy would help the Eastern 
European states to put an end to the isolation in which they had found 
themselves.^
In this context, the Eastern European countries promoted the idea 
of establishing ' co-operation agreements ' rather than direct trade 
relationships with the West and proceeded in joint ventures with Western 
European industries backed by their governments, in which joint ventures 
the Eastern European countries would supply the most abundant factors 
such as raw materials and labour and Western Europe capital and tech­
nology. This is a practical acknowledgement of the inferior tech­
nological position of the Eastern European countries who increased their 
efforts /
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efforts to diminish the gap, by increased and better use of their own i
resources and by utilising Western technology. Closer collaboration 
with the industrialised countries in the West would benefit the CMEA 
states. The impetus for this closer relationship was facilitated also 
by the holding of the European Security Conference which helped to play 
a very positive role towards a changing attitude to East-West relations.^
Indeed, a more favourable attitude has been recorded on the East 
side towards the EEC. Therefore, the CMEA made a proposal to negotiate 
an "outline global agreement" with the Community, covering all aspects 
of trade, technological, industrial and scientific co-operation.^^
But the Community turned down this proposal. The objectives of the 
CMEA were that it wanted to negotiate as a group with the Community. It
wanted to take a common stance on economic matters, which would facilitate
it in strengthening as a group and further integration, bearing in mind 
the successful experience of the EEC. The Community in return, how­
ever, asked the CMEA states to open negotiations on a bilateral basis, 
covering the whole range of trade, technological and financial co-oper­
ation. The Community pointed out that there was no comparison be- t
tween the two organisations and it could not negotiate with the CMEA
as such. The Community argued that it, itself, constitutes a supra­
national authority and as such has legal personality in international 
law under Art, 210 EEC. Therefore, it has the relevant powers to 
negotiate external trade relations and to take decisions binding on its 
member states, whereas CMEA has no supranational authority and lacks 
corresponding powers to represent its members in their external relations. 
Indeed, the CMEA according to its statutes, is not a supranational organ­
isation and lacks such powers. Its member states are free to negotiate12,with third countries in trade or any other economic matters. CMEA
morever, is a political rather than economic organisation. Its inte­
gration level is very low and it might remain so, as long as the Soviet 
Union plays the dominant role. The level of economic and technological i 
development between the two blocs is also different. A number of 
existing differences make the negotiations difficult, but above all
13political differences cause the most evident problems in negotiations. 
Therefore, the lack of supranational character of the CMEA provides the 
EEC with the legal justification for its refusal to open overall 
negotiations with the CMEA as such. The EEC's viewpoint has. been that 
it can only negotiate trade agreements with the individual CMEA states. 
However, /
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However, the Community refused to open negotiations with CIVIEA on
political matters. Behind these matters, it might be as Peter Marsh^^
says the Community's "wounded price" that the CMEA had not recognised
EEC and had made its approach for global negotiations through the
Council and not through the Commission. Peter Marsh further explains
that the "basic reason for the Community's reluctance to establish
relations might arise in the creation of a countervailing power in the
East, capable of thwarting the EEC's economic and political strategies in 
15the area". Nevertheless, it seems that the Community had seen a
potential development of contacts between the individual CMEA states 
and consequently found no reason to adopt a favourable response to 
CMEA's proposals. A favourable response would strengthen and facil­
itate integration of the CMEA, which would be capable of extending its 
economic dominance in East Europe.
As is discussed earlier, since the early 1970s ideological separ­
ateness between the two organisations has been shifted and a more pro­
gressive and constructive relationship has been remarked. The CMEA 
had abandoned its hostile attitude towards the EEC and approached it 
as a body for discussions on matters of common interest. Meanwhile 
as export markets were of great importance for the maintenance of export 
growth for both groups of countries, they directed a great deal of 
attention to each other. In particular, when Japanese and 
American trade with Eastern Europe started to develop and also when 
increased competition and protectionist tendencies in Japanese and 
American markets restricted EEC exports, West Europe felt a growing need 
for trade expansion and closer co-operation with the East. This need 
gave the EEC the impetus to the construction and implementation of its 
CCP towards the CMEA states.
During 1973, as the Community had to implement its CCP towards the
state-trading countries, four major issues had to be considered: (1) The
Community's role in economic co-operation agreements, (2) the Community's
control over commercial policy matters, such as tariffs, import quotas
and MEN treatment, (3) the outline for a draft common policy and (4) the
17future relations between the EEC and CMEA as organisations.
Co-operation agreements are one of the most important issues in the 
context of the CCP. In this respect it is remarkable that there is no 
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clear provision in the Rome Treaty which would provide for the juris­
diction of the Community to negotiate co-operation agreements. There­
fore this legal uncertainty has led to controversies between the EEC 
member states. France, in particular, objected to the idea that the 
negotiation of co-operation agreements would be a Community matter.
She strongly argued that Art. 113 EEC, the main provision of the CCP, 
does not cover co-operation agreements. Finally, it was agreed that 
co-operation agreements between the EEC member states and the CMEA 
states would remain in the domain of the member states, but the Commission 
could have a small role to play as a co-ordinator and harmoniser of 
such agreements.
To this end, when in October 1973, the Commission made its proposals 
to the Council, it insisted on the need for 'a regular information and 
consultation procedure' prior to the conclusion of co-operation agree­
ments between the EEC member states and state-trading countries,. The 
Council's decision on 22nd July 1974 to introduce*a notification and 
consultation procedure' set up a system whereby members provide inform­
ation to each other and to the Commission on the substance of the co­
operation agreements. This system would contribute to the co-ordination ■ "X:of the member states* policies and would further result in a uniform 
application of the procedures and rules on co-operation agreements 
developed therein. The member states, however, should take all the
necessary measures so as not to violate the CCP. Meanwhile member 
states were to notify the Commission of all agreements already concluded 
and if these agreements included trade matters, to denounce and replace 
them with co-operation agreements.
Therefore, co-operation agreements are to be adopted by the member 
states individually provided that the principles and aims of the CCP 
are respected and also that they do not constitute an obstacle to the 
future implementation of the CCP. The Commission furthermore, under 
the procedure of co-ordination and surveillance of co-operation agree­
ments,plays the role of co-ordinator and harmoniser of foreign economic 
policy towards the CMEA states. This, nevertheless, is the first 
common action of the member states taken for the implementation of the 
CCP. This has been seen (from the point of view of the implementation 
of the CCP)as an important step, in particular as it is taking place 
at a time of growing crisis, high competitive conditions and search for 
world markets.
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At the same time, the Community moved towards greater control
over commercial policy issues, such as import quotas, tariffs and
MFN treatment. In this respect, harmonisation of the Community's
policy was a decisive step. Accordingly, on 7th May 1974 the Council
reiterated the fact that from 1st January 1975, the Community would
have jurisdiction over all trade negotiations, and on 17th September
it was agreed to take all the necessary measures in order to work out
the progressive application of the CCP. Moreover, safeguards for
steel and textiles coming from the Soviet Union and the other Eastern
19European countries, would be included in the CCP.
In the context of the third issue that is, the proposal for a draft
policy towards state-trading countries, the Commission proposed two
lines of action: 1) The creation of a specimen agreement and 2) the
definition of "an autonomous policy, which would be applied immediately
and would simply put a Community label on existing national trade 20legislation." However, the Commission's proposal that the 'specimen
agreement' should also include the potential for developing economic and 
technical co-operation, raised a lot of controversy. The framework of ecO--# 
nomic co-operation agreements was not a Community matter and therefore 
when on 15th October 1974 the Council discussed this proposal concerning 
the inclusion of provisions on economic co-operation, problems arose.
France, again, opposed this proposal maintaining that economic co-op­
eration lay within national competences. Finally, a compromise 
solution was reached according to which the 'specimen agreement' could
contain provisions on co-operation only if a state-trading country 
21requested them, and it was explained that the Community could not 
acquire powers in the foreseeable future, but over a long period of 
time. However, the adoption of this proposal by the Council on 15th 
October 1974, marked an extremely important era of the evolution of 
the external trade policy of the EEC. This provides the Community 
with the legal basis for a CCP towards the East bloc. It is remarkable, 
nevertheless, that this basis has been laid down in such an extremely 
sensitive area where political issues prevail over economic ones.
In response to the 1972 CMEA proposal for the negotiation of an 
'outline global agreement' however, the Commission (as discussed 
earlier in this chapter) which wanted negotiations individually with 
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each Eastern European state, sent a letter to each one of them at the 
end of 1974 asking for the opening of bilateral negotiations on 
subjects such as MFN treatment, import quotas, agricultural trade. 
Subsequently a reply came in 1976 from the CMEA which wanted 
to negotiate with the Community as a bloc. This counter-proposal by 
the CMEA proposed negotiations on trade between the two blocs, including 
mainly MFN treatment, quotas, agricultural trade, safeguards and credits. 
Also, it included matters outside the commercial policy like the 
environment. The Community in turn agreed to negotiate with the
CMEA as an organisation on non-trade matters, but it insisted in 
negotiating with the CMEA states individually on trade matters. Indeed, 
negotiations on non-trade matters have been opened between the two 
organisations. The attitude of the Community, towards the CMEA is 
sui generis indeed. While it promotes contracts and trade negotiations 
with other regional economic groups, such as Lome countries, ASEAN^ 
in this particular case its stance is inconsistent with its previous 
practice.
The issues involved are highly complex. Economic considerations,
but above all political ones, have to be taken into account. Legal
issues are also involved such as the supranational character of the CMEA.
Institutional weakness of the CMEA and in addition non-acceptability
on the part of the EEC of the proposals such as MFN treatment and
23reciprocity create problems. In its latest response, however, the
Community had not mentioned the most important issues of the MFN treat­
ment and the principle of non-discrimination. The Community again 
referred to its earlier proposal of 1974 and requested the CMEA states 
to conclude individual trade agreements.
Romania, as the most outward looking state-trading country, 
responded favourably to the Community's request for the conclusion of a 
trade agreement. The Soviet Union, however, endorsed individual 
agreements between the Community and the CMEA states, because it 
acknowledged the need for the CMEA states to co-operate with the 
industrialised countries in West Europe. The Community, however, by 
negotiating at first in 1976, an agreement on textiles with Romania, 
felt that its objectives of contracting individual agreements with the 
CMEA states had found favourable grounds and therefore that it could 
successfully pursue its policy. The culmination of the Community's 
success /
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success came in 1977 when the Soviet Union expressed an interest in
entering into negotiations with the Community over fishing rights. To
this end the Soviet Union entered in February 1977 into negotiations
with the Community. That happened when the Community in the context
of the adoption of a Common Fisheries Policy proceeded with the adoption
of a 200 mile fishing limit round the EEC waters. This achievement
was twofold for the Community. Firstly, it succeeded in negotiations
with the Soviet Union individually and secondly this can be interpreted
as an indirect but clear and official recognition of the EEC as an
organisation in international law. Also, the Community's growing
competence on trade and economic matters and its right to conduct
external trade policy has been in practice recognised. On the other
hand, the CMEA states, as long as CMEA does not take a common stance and
develop a supranational character, have no other choice but to negotiate
individually with the Community. When CMEA develops a supranational
character and strengthens as a group, only then can it demand bloc
to-bloc negotiations with the Community. Nevertheless, it has been
suggested that a solution could be found if "general guidelines" for25trade relations could be agreed between the two blocs. What is 
needed is that definition of the general guidelines be adopted, which 
would make trade relations between East and West more fruitful and 
easier. At the present, however, it is not difficult for the Community 
to argue that the CMEA states could negotiate individually with the 
former and thereby dynamically pursue its policy.
However, in the context of negotiation of trade agreements, 
Romania's case is worth mentioning. Relations between Romania and the 
EEC date back to 1971 when Romania asked the EEC to include her in the 
GSP and in this respect she was given a favourable response. Then 
relations between the EEC and Romania developed smoothly. In 1976 an 
agreement on textiles was concluded between the two parties concerned, 
which entered into force on 1st January 1978 for five years and was 
renewable.. This agreement has been negotiated within the GATT frame­
work in the context of the MFA arrangement. It was negotiated during 
the second MFA in 1976 when the Community was attempting to restrict 
textile imports. This is the first agreement negotiated between the 
EEC and CMEA state and therefore its political importance was gregt 
for the Community. Romania undertook to reduce its textile exports to 
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the Community. This agreement is very important to the extent that it
has become a precedent for Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland, who undertook
26also to reduce their textile exports to the Community. Furthermore,
the EEC succeeded in negotiating another sectoral agreement on steel 
with Romania in 1978 for one year and renewable. Also, similar arrange­
ments between the EEC and Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslavakia and Poland
27came into effect soon afterwards.
But what is particularly important and of great interest for the 
evolution of the external relations of the Community is that Romania, 
in response to the 1974 Community’s proposal for individual negotiations 
with state-trading countries, offered in 1978 to negotiate an overall 
trade agreement with the Community itself. Therefore, contacts be­
tween Romania and the EEC resulted in the negotiation of an agreement 
on industrial products (other than textiles and steel for which special 
arrangements had been made) and of an agreement establishing a joint 
Committee to administer the former. The agreements were signed on 
28th July 1980. Both agreements were very significant from the
legal, political and economic point of view. They provide in part­
icular the legal framework for trade relations between the two parties. 
The Community had succeeded in negotiating with the individual CMEA 
states. These agreements constitute a good precedent for the Community 
in developing its policy towards the East. Within the joint Committee 
the parties discuss trade problems and also make recommendations 
for adoption of specific commercial poliOy measures consolidating and 
intensifying trade relations. Agricultural products are not included 
as there have been technical arrangements since the end of 1960s.
However, despite difficulties and growing economic crisis, Romania has 
suggested that a new economic co-operation agreement going beyond the
existing trade agreement should be negotiated, provided that the GATT
 ^  ^ 29 rules are respected.
The agreement on industrial products has been negotiated under 
the GATT auspices, (Romania has been a contracting party to GATT since 
1971) and therefore the principle of reciprocity of mutual rights and 
obligations is included. It provides for the highest possible degree 
of liberalisation of certain products, elimination of tariffs, and 
opening /
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opening of quotas for products which have not been liberalised in 
the GATT MTNs. This agreement goes beyond the GATT achievements 
and provides for more trade liberalisation. This agreement, never­
theless, does not constitute a preferential agreement and as such it 
has not been submitted to GATT Special Committee for consideration. 
Therefore, no legal issue has been raised in GATT as regards its 
application. Prom a political point of view this agreement is
significant for both sides. Romania was the country which had objected 
in the early 1970s to the overall negotiations of the CMEA with the 
Community, because of her fear of the Soviet Union’s dominance. She 
had resisted the extension of the CMEA's competence on trade with third
countries. Romania had made it clear that it wanted the CMEA states
30to maintain freedom in trade matters. The Community on the other
hand, had succeeded in exerting its powers in the course of the
31implementation of its CCP.
The case of China is also noteworthy. China is another state-
32trading country with which the Community maintains trade relations.
A non-preferential trade and economic co-operation agreement was signed 
on 3rd April 1978 for five years, renewable, which accords to each 
party MPN treatment. The aim of the agreement is to promote trade 
and each party has tried to attain a balance in their trade. If 
balance in trade is not achieved, a joint committee can study the way 
to remedy the situation. Both sides have undertaken trade liberal­
isation measures and China has undertaken to give favourable consider­
ation to imports from the Community; the latter is committed to in­
crease the liberalisation of imports from China.
China and Romania are the only state-trading countries which can 
benefit from the Community's GSP. Through this scheme China’s overall 
exports to the Community have increased since 1st January 1980, and 
the Community has given under it free access for most of China's indust­
rial goods with certain quantitative limits and reduced tariffs for 
some agricultural exports. In the context of the general framework 
of trade relations an agreement for textiles has been negotiated 
between the Community and China. It was signed on 18th July 1979 and 
came into effect on January 1980 till December 1983, The agreement sets - 
out a five year framework for imports into the Community of Chinese 
textiles and garments from cotton, wool or synthetic and artificial 
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fibres. It provides for an increased access of the products concerned 
into the Community and at the same time it takes account of the 
difficulties presently faced by the clothing industry in the Community. 
Therefore, collaboration and co-operation for closer economic ties has 
been developed between the two partners, which has resulted in their 
mutual benefit.
Therefore, we may say that the Community's objective of negotiating 
itself with the individual CMEA states has succeeded to a considerable 
extent. The agreements with Romania are the most remarkable examples. 
But apart from these official agreements informal contacts have fre­
quently taken place between representatives of the Eastern European 
countries and representatives of the Commission. Fulfilment of this 
objective means for the Community its official recognition by the CMEA 
states and consequently strengthening of its position at international 
meetings and conventions. Trade relations have developed in a remarkable 
and exceptional manner, however, having regard to the fact that the 
Community has succeeded in achieving a common external policy concerning 
commercial matters towards the East bloc countries. In accordance with 
.the CCP provisions the Commission of the EEC has since 1972 the sole 
power to negotiate with third Countries and it can therefore effectively 
represent its member states on commercial policy issues when negotiating 
on a bilateral basis with the CMEA states. In fact, since 1972, the 
EEC member states have not formally negotiated as such with the CMEA 
states on trade matters, nor has the Community itself with the CMEA as 
a bloc. The EEC member states or the EEC private companies under the 
concept of co-operation agreements deal with the authorities of the 
CAÎEA states in industrial, technological and financial co-operation. In 
practice, however, the EEC member states under the auspices of co­
operation agreements often conduct trade negotiations with the CMEA 
states. The EEC member states when negotiating with the other side 
are obliged to consult with their partners at Community level, but 
unfortunately this is not always the case in practice. The Community, 
in order to ensure that co-operation agreements are consistent with 
common policies especially the CCP and to co-ordinate the policies of 
the member states, has set up a special procedure for information and 
consultation. Through this co-ordination process attempts have been 
made to apply the Community principle of a CCP, the implementation of 
which /
254
33which is both essential and extremely difficult.
However, from the legal point of view the achievement of the EEC 
in negotiating individual trade agreements with the CMEA states is 
great, but in practice this seems to be more apparent than real. In 
the context of co-operation agreements between individual member states 
of the EEC and individual East European states, which replaced trade 
agreements between them, significant areas of economic activities are 
regulated. Therefore, major areas of economic relations remain out­
side the Community's competences. The EEC member states still reserve 
for themselves important part of their foreign economic relations with 
the East bloc countries and are not willing to transfer to the Community 
real negotiating power over trade matters. The Community has succeeded 
in having control on CET matters, but on most other matters such as 
trade and industrial policy bilateral East-West arrangements have been 
the rule. In practice, therefore, a real CCP has a long way to go 
until the Community can claim its full and effective application and 
implementation'. The reasons, however, are complex; political, legal 
and economic issues are involved. Indeed, the EEC member states do not 
really want to give up their competence over trade policy matters and to 
transfer them to the Community. Because of these reasons and of the 
sui generis nature of East-West relations the situation is unlikely to 
change, at least for the time being and it seems probable that the EEC 
will fail to bring commercial policy under central Community control.
The successful conclusion of the Kennedy Round, especially as far
as the substantial reduction of world-wide tariffs and the liberalisation
of international trade is concerned, gave the CMEA states the impetus to
move away from the policy of isolation and to collaborate closer with the
industrialised countries. Thus, GATT membership would provide them with
this opportunity. In this context, however, it is worth mentioning that
state-trading countries as such are not accommodated in principle within 
34the GATT system.
Czechoslovakia was a founding member of GATT in 1947. The accession 
of Poland into the GATT system provisionally in 1967 and fully in 1973 
was not easy. The most important question raised at that time was of*what form should the 'reciprocal concessions' of countries with centrally- 
planned economies take, since the trade measures implemented by these 
countries, either may have no direct equivalents in market-type economies 
or may be similar to trade measures in market-type economies."
As /
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As Poland had no customs tariff system special provisions for 
accession had to be worked out. Poland agreed to commit itself to
an annual 7% increase of its imports from the other GATT contracting
36 37parties. Romania also which acceded to GATT in 1971 undertook
commitments in addition to those already undertaken by the other
contracting parties to GATT, in particular to increase imports from
other contracting parties. The Accession Protocols of Poland and
Romania included furthermore safeguard actions beyond the relevant
GATT provisions. On the other hand Poland and Romania demanded the
total abolition of all QRs applied to specific products, and also
38committed themselves to periodic reviews of their trade development.
39The Protocol of Accession negotiated by Hungary in 1973 is similar 
to those negotiated by market type economies, but in addition contains 
elements from the Polish and Romania protocols. Hungary had pressed 
hard too, for the elimination of QRs. This protocol included also a 
commitment by the Community that special trade arrangements with 
Hungary and other state-trading countries would have no discriminatory 
effects.
However the Community, in its trade relations, accords MFN treat-
40ment to those CMEA countries which are contracting parties to GATT,
and even to the Soviet Union which is not a contracting party to GATT,
with the usual exceptions. Indeed for the Soviet Union the situation
is more favourable than for any other CMEA state. Tariffs are not
an obstacle in trade relations, because most of the Soviet Union exports
constitute raw materials and fuels for which no tariffs or very low
41tariffs are levied. But the Community maintains QRs against East I
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European countries' exports and introduces a specific safeguard mech­
anism. On the other hand it argues that despite the existence of
42some QRs on some sensitive products, they are steadily being eliminated.
Many aspects of trade continue to be currently negotiated mostly 
at a multilateral rather than a bilateral level. Restrictions have 
also been eliminated at a multilateral level. Thus the CMEA states 
apart from the Soviet Union and East Germany, as GATT parties, 
negotiate with the Community within this framework on the major trade 
issues. These issues include sensitive products such as textiles 
and steel.
The /
The Community's tariffs do not cause problems for Soviet exports 
of which the bulk are raw materials which can enter the Community 
without obstacle. The remainder are mainly industrial products of 
the type on which very low tariffs can be imposed. In particular, 
in the context of MTNs, tariffs are negligible for most exports of 
the CMEA states.
Restrictive quotas and other NTBs are the factors which affect 
most exports from the Eastern European countries. In this respect 
the EEC claims that quotas for Eastern European and Soviet Union 
products coming into the Community, markets have been increased with 
the only exception thereto being a limited number of some sensitive 
industrial and some agricultural products. For the Eastern Euro­
pean countries restrictions of this kind involve a problem, since a 
quarter of their exports are agricultural products which have to face 
restrictions applied by the CAP. Also, up to one half of their 
exports to the Community are manufactures mostly of sensitive products, 
such as clothing, footwear and china products, which have to face the 
most restrictive policies of the Community. With particular refer­
ence to the latter products, the Community has tried to deal with 
imports of these sensitive products which face structural difficulties 
by negotiating VER agreements.
The East bloc states, therefore, aiming at economic growth and 
expansion and ultimately at the liberalisation of trade, have demanded 
the removal of quotas, reduction of tariffs and import levies and 
other restrictive measures of trade. On their part they claim that
they have taken measures for trade liberalisation and they have contri­
buted to this end by spending their exports earnings on buying products 
from West Europe, especially technology.
With particular reference to GATT, it contains provisions initially 
intended to regulate trade undertaken by state-trading enterprises in 
market-type economies. However, when state-trading countries acceded
to GATT the relevant GATT provisions were to apply to this category 
of states as well. The principal GATT provision relating to state 
trade is provided for in Art, XVII. Also Arts.11:^ and 111:4,8
and an Interpretative note to the Articles relating to QRs should be 
taken into account. These rules establish the non-discriminatory 
treatment /
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treatment of trade and in accordance with commercial considerations, 
provide for limitation of QRs and also provide for exchange of 
information. Therefore, as the state-controlled enterprises in 
market-type economies, similarly state-trading countries in terms of 
their external trade, should respect the same GATT rules and should 
take into account commercial considerations.
Art. XVII of the GATT is the only article which provides for an
additional obligation on the state-trading enterprises and consequently
on state-trading countries than that provided in Art. I of the MFN
principle. That is because state-trading enterprises should treat
all trade in a non-discriminatory manner and behave in accordance
45with commercial considerations. But when an enterprise acts in
accordance with commercial considerations, is an extremely difficult 
question. That is why when Poland, Romania and Hungary acceded into 
GATT, these countries had to commit themselves to special and add­
itional obligations, so as to facilitate their accommodation within 
the GATT system. The different functional structure of their econ­
omies, differences in prices, tariff rates, the non-convertibility of 
most Eastern European currencies, differences in the way state-trading 
enterprises in market type economies and industries in centrally-
planned economies operate, are factors which make the accommodation of
46the centrally planned economies difficult in the GATT system.
Therefore, trade relations between the EEC and state-trading
countries who are contracting parties to GATT, are subject to GATT
rights and obligations and in particular to additional obligations
provided for in Art. XVII. It is remarkable that trade relations
between the EEC and the CIplA states — contracting parties to GATT, have
not raised any single complaint before the GATT and consequently Art.
XVII in respect to those relations has never been invoked. The only
case (involving the USSR) before GATT concerned a system of preferential
tariff quotas which the Greek government granted to the USSR in 1969.
The relevant question concerned the provisions of the special protocol
signed by the Greek government in December 1969, which provides for
special tariff treatment of certain products imported from the USSR
47within specific quota limits. But bearing in mind that the USSR
is not a contracting party to GATT and that Greece was not an EEC 
member state at that time this case has no major importance for 
discussion /
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discussion in the context of this thesis. It is worth noting that 
state-trading activities have not caused any particular problems 
and although state-trading activities could be classified as an NTB
to trade, yet no particular problem has arisen. The relative absence-of GATT activity in the area of state-trading can be interpreted as 
indicating that state-trading does not constitute a significant barrier 
to trade. This view is supported by the fact that state-trading was 
not a major issue in negotiations during the Tokyo Round and also that 
during the last GATT Ministerial Conference of November 1982, this 
issue was not even raised.
However,this absence indicates another limitation and shortcoming 
of the GATT system. No special provisions are included in the GATT 
concerning state-trading in;centrally planned economies and therer 
fore state-trading countries are not adequately accommodated within 
the GATT legal system. This relative absence supports the conclusion 
once again that GATT is designed to accommodate only the industrialised 'countries' interest and that therefore an improved GATT taking into 
account the interests of all world countries is essential for further 
trade liberalisation.
East-West relations constitute an interesting area of study from 
political,legal and economic perspectives. A short move away from 
ideological differences and the acknowledgement of the necessity for 
closer economic co-operation has led to the improvement of East-West 
relations and has helped therefore to reduce the risk of conflicts. 
Bilateral contacts and good will on both sides is an important step 
for further improvement of relations. Nevertheless, it is difficult 
to improve trade relations at a bilateral level. Such an improvement 
would be easier in the framework of multilateral negotiations. There­
fore an improved GATT system to work out existing differences and 
to provide sufficient accommodation of the interests of the state- 
trading countries, would be beneficial to both groups of countries 
and would eventually lead towards greater trade liberalisation.
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PART IV 
CHAPTER 9 .
VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINT AGREEMENTS
Voluntary Export Restraint (VER) agreements are negotiated bi­
laterally between exporting and importing countries, outside the con­
cept of international trade rules. They concern the restriction of 
the volume of exports of a particular product which may cause 'market 
disruption' to the importing country. The term 'voluntary' is some­
what misleading. Export restraints are actually imposed on an exporting 
country which may well prefer to restrain its exports, instead of facing 
unilateral quotas, that otherwise would be imposed against it. If VERs 
were really voluntary, not only the exporting countries would be better 
off under the system of VERs, but the international community as well.
From the legal point of view VERs and quotas may produce the same effects, 
having regard to the fact that both are NTBs to world trade. Neverthe­
less, from the economic point of view, quotas produce more adverse effects 
than those 'voluntarily' agreed upon by an exporting country. The most 
notable example of VER agreements, is the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) 
which regulates trade in textiles and textile products and covers agree­
ments negotiated between developed and developing countries.
Despite the fact that VER agreements were initially accepted as 
measures regulating trade between DCs and LDCs, they have lately pro­
liferated between developed countries. The recent practice shows that 
quite a number of VER agreements are being negotiated between the leading 
economic powers, i.e. the EEC, the USA and Japan,^ and in the last few 
years VERs have regrettably occupied a large part of their external trade. 
Despite the short-term beneficial effects for the countries involved, if 
VERs continue to proliferate they will have far-reaching dangerous con­
sequences for the whole GATT edifice. They are negotiated outside the 
scope of the international trading system and, as such, are not permissible 
under the established international trading system, nor under any rules 
of customary international trade law, nor even under contract law.
VERs are negotiated in areas where the shift of production and the 
export expansion is so rapid and unforeseen that it causes market dis­
ruption and there is not sufficient time for the industries to adjust and 
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meet the foreign competition. VERs are designed to deal with 'sub-2stantial shifts in trade patterns in short periods of time', There­
fore, the problem is the rapid expansion of newcomers in the inter­
national trading scene and their penetration into established markets, 
where penetration may cause market disruption. Unfortunately, GATT 
is not capable of dealing with this problem. GATT should move with 
some speed in order to be able to deal with current events. During 
the ITO negotiations no extensive reference to VER agreements was made, 
but they were discussed in the context of Art. XIX. Of course, VER 
agreements existed at that time, e.g. between the USA and Japan but it 
is worth mentioning that their wide proliferation was not foreseen.
Also when the GATT was established in 1948 penetration of the markets 
had not reached current levels and it was not thought that such pene­
tration would be capable of causing serious economic problems to the 
importing countries.. That is why VERs were left out of the GATT 
system.
VER agreements are thus justified when 'market disruption* is caused 
in the importing country's market, especially in case of a too rapid 
expansion of exports of a particular product coming from newcomers. They 
mainly include the most sensitive sectors, such as textiles, footwear, 
leather goods, electronic goods, automobiles and steel. The most 
characteristic example of them all is the MFA - the Multi-Fibre Arrange­
ment. This is the only agreement negotiated within the scope of inter­
national trade rules. Already in 1961 and 1962 its predecessors, the 
Short Term Arrangement (STA) and the Long-Term Arrangement (LTA) on 
textiles were negotiated, under the auspices of GATT, although they were3in principle contrary to the GATT rules.
VERs, however, bring to some extent a benefit to all partners involved. 
On the part of the exporting country there is the advantage that it is 
involved in the negotiation process and it can maintain some control and 
Influence on the development of the VER agreement during periodic re­
views to which it is subject, whereas quotas can continue to be imposed 
unilaterally by the importing country for a considerable length of time. 
The exporting country is involved in the determination of quotas and it4is up to the importing country to reduce these restrictions. Quotas 
are, of course, subject to international control and especially to GATT 
rules /
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rules (Arts, XI, XII, XIII), but nevertheless growing disrespect of 
the GATT rules makes the negotiation of the VER agreements more attractive. 
The exporting industries as well benefit by not losing markets altogether. 
Industries in the importing country gain relief from foreign competition, 
and the government in the latter can succeed in curtailing imports, with­
out having to impose quotas that can lead to retaliation by other trading 
partners. The importing country, therefore, protects its domestic 
market and satisfies its interested groups by curtailing its imports, 
without having to resort to the extreme of the imposition of quotas, and 
above all can advocate free world trade. For a powerful country, never­
theless, it is not difficult to impose its will on a less developed 
country, by 'negotiating* a VER agreement. There is no need to show 
that its balance of payments position is in such a condition to justify 
QRs (Art. XI of GATT), nor that there is serious injury to its domestic 
market in consequence of increased competition.
However, whatever the beneficial effects of the VERs for the 
countries involved might be, the consequences for the world trading system 
as a whole are not positive to the extent that the international trading 
system, thereby, becomes less competitive. VERs draw their origin back 
to the 1930s when the USA negotiated a number of VER agreements with 
Japan, which had preferred to negotiate her own restraints instead of■ 5having to face restrictions imposed by the USA, Jackson says that 
"these agreements resulted from American pressures and threats of uni­
lateral, permanent and possibly more restrictive action and nothing 
indicates that this pattern has changed since". Other countries such 
as the UK and Canada soon followed the American practice, but VERs pro­
liferated mainly during the late 1960s and to a much greater extent during 
the 1970s. The main shortcomings of these agreements are the complete 
absence of international surveillance and of consultation procedure that 
could take into account the interests which third countries might have 
in these bilateral agreements. The lack of a notification and of a 
consultation procedure is a great disadvantage for third countries and 
their industries, especially for LDCs which are affected by the trade 
diversion caused by these bilateral agreements. This is a particular
complaint of the LDCs which are pressing for a multilateralisation of6the VER agreements.
Only /
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Only textiles have thus far been put under multilateral control.
It is quite desirable, however, that VERs might be replaced by "improved7safeguards operated within an agreed framework". This is not only the 
view of the LDCs acting as a group but also that of the DCs. A report 
produced by the OECD,^ the "Rey Report", supports the view that VERs are 
contrary to the GATT rules, in particular to the MFN clause, and should 
be subject to multilateral control. The Report furthermore states that 
"there has been a recent tendency to increase quantitative controls, 
particularly in the form of 'voluntary' export restrictions introduced 
outside the context of international rules and even sometimes as in the 
case of joint agreements within industries outside the responsibilities 
of governments". The Report thereafter concluded that VER agreements 
are of discriminatory nature and inadequate in dealing with difficulties 
in particular sectors, leaving aside the question of their legality.
VER Agreements and Art. XIX of the GATT.
Art. XIX which is a safeguard clause and the main escape clause of 
the GATT provides for specific emergency action (increased tariffs and 
higher level of quotas set) in critical circumstances. Imports may be 
reduced when there is evidence of 'serious injury* caused to a domestic 
market by an unregulated and too rapid expansion of foreign exports. The 
principal factor for the application of this article is the presence of 
'serious injury' caused to a domestic market. The definition of the 
term 'injury' and when the injury is serious enough to justify the 
emergency action and consequently the application of Art. XIX is a very 
difficult question. Until the terms 'injury' and 'serious injury’ are
exactly defined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES the correct use of Art. XIX is■impossible. Although attempts have been made since 1959. when a GATT
.Working Party on 'market disruption' was established, no concrete
acceptable definition has been reached. Practice, however, reveals
.that both an actual injury and a mere threat of damage fall within the 
scope of this article.
As far as the procedure for the application of Art. XIX is concerned, 
it is as follows; when a party feels that it has suffered a 'serious 
injury* as a result of a sudden surge of imports of a particular product, 
it /
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it may request safeguard action under Art. XIX, To this end it must 
notify the GATT contracting parties, so that a consultation, can take 
place. Such consultation may lead to the granting of compensation to 
parties injured by the protective measures by the country contemplating 
action. However, the normal consultation procedure and thereafter the 
dispute settlement procedure under Arts. XXII and XXIII of the G.A. 
(discussed in Chapter 2 p. 43. ) can be applied. Multilateral sur­
veillance is not largely developed in the case of Art. XIX compared with
other safeguard clauses either provided for in the G.A. or in other
 ^ 10 arrangements.
Art. XIX as a safeguard is contrary to the fundamental principle 
of free trade and trade liberalisation. But it had been included in the 
GATT agreement in order to prevent abuse. It is worth mentioning that 
until the 1970s recourse to this article was requested about fifty times, 
whereas during the 1970s and the early 1980s, Art. XIX has been considered 
as incapable of solving the problems arising from a too rapid expansion 
of exports. It has become more and more evident that application of 
the article in question was difficult in this critical sltage of economic 
development and therefore recourse to safeguards such as DMAs and VERs 
has been increasingly made. Although in legal terms we may say that 
Art. XIX is preferable to VERs because any protective action for the 
injured domestic industry can be taken within the GATT framework, in 
practice VERs have prevailed despite the fact that they have been 
negotiated outside the GATT legal system. In fact, it is the weakness 
of Art. XIX that has led to a proliferation of VERs.
Nevertheless, Art, XIX authorises emergency action, when there has 
been actual or threatened serious injury to a domestic industry and for 
a reasonable length of time in order to help the country facing serious 
injury to overcome the situation. The temporary nature of the pro­
tection should be made clear from the beginning so that domestic and
12foreign suppliers may be informed.
VER agreements are bilaterally negotiated outside the GATT frame­
work, when the domestic market is suffering "market disruption".
Recently VER agreements have proliferated to a dangerous extent and even 
to an extent that GATT is not even informed of their existence. In 
principle /
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principle VER agreements are contrary to international trading rules,
but in practice the system has tacitly accepted them as measures regulating 
trade. There has been a trend that VER agreements be preferred to any 
other substitute restrictive practices which would have been invoked, 
e.g. QRs.
However, contradictory opinions have been expressed as regards the
position of the VER agreements within the multilateral trading system.
Quite a number of authors support the view that once VER agreements
authorise selective measures, they are as such contrary to the GATT legal
system and especially to Art, XIX which prohibits selective measures.
Among them Arthur Dunkel (the present Director of GATT) has expressed
the opinion that VER agreements should be distinguished from the MFA
because of its multilateral negotiation and that they fall "wholly outside 
13the rule of law". Ch the other hand some others support a different view, 
i.e. VER agreements are negotiated within the purview of the GATT legal 
system. They strengthen their argument by adding that many VER agree­
ments have been notified to GATT contracting parties under the procedure 
of Art. XIX.
Marco Bronckers, emphasises that "we could not agree with the 
inference that the GATT (including Art. XIX) does not cover bilateral 
VER agreements. In our opinion these arrangements fall well within the 
grasp of the GATT rule of law, though inadequate enforcement may have 
obscured its full scope. One has to respect the notion that Art. XIX 
does not govern the negotiation of VER agreements because of their 
'voluntary' or 'consensual* nature. Such formalism unduly conceals the 
object of these arrangements which is identical to that of unilateral 
safeguard measures to wit protection against what are perceived to be 
injurious imports".
A solution to the problems can be found in the reform of Art. XIX 
in order to bring VERs under multilateral surveillance, to the extent 
that no import competing industry or its government would choose VERs 
instead of Art. XIX. The reform should aim at making Art. XIX preferable 
to VERs, which consequently should be reduced. At the present Art. XIX 
is cumbersome and difficult to apply and therefore the exporters seem more 
willing to accept VERs instead of Art. XIX action. As regards the 
volume of trade moving through VER agreements, the GATT Secretariat 
estimates /
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15estimates that only 3.5% is affected bv them. But, if this practice
continues to proliferate and occupy a larger part of world trade, there 
will be great danger for the whole international trading system. There­
fore, some measures should be taken in order to extend the application 
of Art. XIX to cover VERs, which, at the present remain outside the scope 
of multilateral surveillance. They should be negotiated after con­
sultation and multilateral control, taking into account also the. interests 
of third countries. The present attitude of the international community 
is that VERs should be controlled at international level, subject to con­
sultation and multilateral control. LDCs, and particularly the NICs, are 
making efforts bo as to bring VERs within the orbit of Art. XIX. The 
USA Congress too, accepted the view that Art. XIX should be extended to 
cover every form of restriction concerning injurious competition and it 
proposed the extension of the MFA example to other industries. On the 
contrary the EEC, since the beginning of the Tokyo Round MTNs, has sugj^sted 
that Art. XIX should be maintained but it should be supplemented by a 
system of ’selective measures’ without compensation schemes and including 
as well, adjustment assistance and multilateral supervision. The EEC 
wanted revision of Art. XIX to the extent that it would permit 'selective 
application' against a country which is the source of injury. Japan 
supported the upholding of Art. XIX and even advocated strengthening it.
All leading DCs as being the principal users of the system had, however, 
a different approach to the problem. Even the principle of MFN was 
under attack by the EEC, although great support has been extended to it 
and to the principle of reciprocity by the other DCs. These differences 
have worsened the situation. The multilateral supervision machinery has 
been, however, clearly supported by the DCs and there has been clear 
support for the view that bilateral restraints should be eliminated.
It has been pointed out already that the USA was the first country 
to negotiate VER agreements, e.g. with Japan. The Community as the 
first trading bloc in the world has followed the USA practice and has 
contributed to the proliferation of VER agreements. It has negotiated 
various types of restraint agreements mainly with the NICs' governments 
or with the industrialised countries' governments or their industries. 
Already since the Tokyo Round the EEC has supported selective safeguard 
measures and in the light of the fact that VER agreements authorise 
selective /
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selective measures one can conclude that the EEC’s practice in this 
particular case is favourable to the creation of VER agreements, when 
special curcumstances are present.
In fact, a sui generis situation has been taking place as VER 
agreements are a new developing area of law in which the Community has 
played a major role in supporting the application of selective measures 
and their submission to Art. XIX, i.e. the multilateralisation of VER 
agreements.
VER agreements have developed in the context of the EEC's
commercial policy, but the view of the Commission is that the negotiation
of such agreements is part of the function of the public authorities.
When they are negotiated on an industry-to-industry basis or more
specifically on an enterprise-to-enterprise basis the Commission's view
17is that such agreements may violate the Community competition rules. 
Therefore the effects of VER agreements internally within the Community 
legal system are not seen in the same light as their effects externally.
VER Agreements and the Tokyo Round
During the Tokyo Round MTNs a Committee on safeguard measures was 
established to study the situation. But no progress was made although 
the Committee continued its work on the revision of Art. XIX. Differences 
of opinion between the leading trading nations made the situation 
difficult: in particular differences between the EEC and Japan grew even
worse. It was at that time the Director General of the GATT introduced 
a draft decision of the Council of Representatives. Accordingly, 
negotiations would take place within the GATT framework and a new 
negotiating committee would be established to deal with the supervision 
of actions under Art. XIX, It is regrettable, however, that even this 
new committee produced no results. The different approaches of the 
DCs to multilateral supervision have been very wide, although there has 
in principle been agreement to it.^^ Also, another subordinate committee 
established within the GATT committee on 'Trade and Development' with 
the task (according to UNCTAD Resolution 131 (V)) of reviewing safeguard 
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actions taken by the DCs, has not produced substantial results. Like­
wise, at the last Ministerial Meeting of the GATT in November 1982, the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES stressed the need for an improved and more efficient 
safeguard system which 'would provide for greater predictability and 
clarity and also greater security and equity for both importing and 
exporting countries', on condition that the general principles of the
GATT were respected and the result would be greater trade liberalisation,
19avoiding the proliferation of restrictive measures.
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Voluntary Export Restraint Agreements 
The Specific Cases.
During the 1970s various types of VER agreements have emerged as 
an instrument for regulating international trade, in the absence of an 
effective restraint policy either at national or multilateral level. In 
the EEC various types of VER agreements, recently termed "safeguards" 
have been negotiated between governments or industries and third countries 
or industries. These VER agreements relate to both industrial and 
agricultural products, such as chemicals, lambmeat, sheepmeat, motor 
vehicles, electronics, steel, footwear, video, tape recorders, television 
sets and tubes, and above all, textiles. For other products too 
apart from the above-mentioned examples, several bilateral restraint 
arrangements have been established between exporting and importing 
countries.
In the following discussion, the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, the 
reasons leading to its conclusion, its impact on the world trading system 
and also some other bilateral restraint agreements, notably agreements in 
electronics, steel, motor vehicles and footwear, are analysed in an 
attempt to examine and evaluate their effect on the GATT legal system.
The EEC approach constitutes the central part of this analysis, but the 
USA approach is also discussed in particular because of its leading role 
in negotiating the Short-Term Arrangement (STA), Long-Term Arrangement 
(LTA), and MuM-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), as well as in negotiating other 
voluntary export restraint agreements.
Textiles
Trade in textiles has a unique characteristic. Textiles is the 
only developed manufacturing sector in the LDCs and it is the first 
and the only sector thus far that has been put under international 
surveillance. Both the Short-Term Arrangement (STA) and the Long- 
Term Arrangement (LTA) on Textiles negotiated in 1961 and 1962 re­
spectively on a USA initiative within the GATT framework have had the 
ultimate objective of increasing international trade in cotton textiles 
in an 'orderly* manner. Their aim was to promote growth of LDCs' 
markets from unregulated and too rapidly expanded exports from low-cost 
suppliers /
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suppliers. According to these arrangements quantitative restrictions 
could be imposed when imports 'cause or threatened to cause market dis­
ruption* . Market disruption is considered to exist when serious20damage to domestic producers occurs or threat thereof.
A Working Party on 'Market Disruption' was established within GATT, 
with a permanent committee to facilitate consultation between all inter­
ested parties and to "suggest multilaterally acceptable solutions con-
21sistent with the principles and objectives of the G.A.".
The LTA was a multilateral arrangement operating within the GATT 
Textiles Committee. Although it was hoped to regulate international 
trade in cotton textiles temporarily, it lasted until the end of 1973 
when it was replaced by the MFA (Multi-Fibre Arrangement) which extended 
the product coverage to include all textile fibres. The LTA was de­
signed to give the importing countries "a breathing space" necessary to 
carry out structural adjustments such as replacement of plant and equip­
ment necessary to help domestic markets to meet foreign competition.
The participating countries (not necessarily contracting parties to 
GATT) agreed that quotas would be imposed instead of tariffs to safe­
guard the textile industry. The quota was to be increased by 5% each
year, with the ultimate objective of achieving free-trade in cotton 22textile products. Therefore, quotas within the GATT framework were
allowed as an exemption to the GATT rules quasi as a waiver, although 
the procedure of Art. XXV was not employed.
The Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) and the GATT
The MFA is an exceptionally interesting case from a legal point of 
view. It is an international arrangement concerning regulation of 
trade in all textile fibres (cotton, wool, natural and man-made fibres) 
and clothing. Its objective is to avoid unilateral import controls, 
unfavourable to exporting and importing countries alike, and to legalise 
an action which violated the most basic principle of the GATT, the MFN 
clause of non-discrimination. Its ultimate objective was to adjust 
the industry and return to liberal trade. The MFA is actually an 
agreed framework which has been put under international surveillance, that 
is operating within the context of the GATT Textiles Committee, under which 
bilateral agreements on textiles can be negotiated, outlining when that 
might /
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might be possible and the nature of the permissible restrictions.
From the legal point of view, although inconsistent with the GATT rules, 
especially with Art. I, it has been exempted from these rules, despite 
the fact that no waiver has been sought, sit was agreed to operate 
within the GATT framework, thus being subject to multilateral survei1lance. 
It legalises quotas and restrictions ~ through which international trade 
in textiles is operating - contrary to the GATT obligations.
The main points of conflict with the G.A, are primarily : - 
(1) Art. I of MFN clause of non-discrimination. The non-discriminatory 
treatment inherent in the GATT rules is replaced by discriminatory treat­
ment against the LDCs' suppliers of low-cost exports. The MFA is de­
signed to regulate trade in textiles between developed and developing 
countries, and therefore can be considered as included in the wider 
concept of North-South relations. It is designed to protect the markets 
of the industrialised countries from low-cost supplies coming from the 
developing world. It does not apply to trade relations between the 
developed countries themselves, where the principle of reciprocity 
applies. (2) The MFA allows quotas to regulate trade and therefore 
contradicts the relevant GATT Articles XI, XII, XIII,which permit quotas 
only in exceptional circumstances.^^
Textiles have been taken out of the GATT system and are treated as
a special case. Trade in textiles is regulated through bilateral
agreements negotiated within the MFA, operating within the context of
25GATT. Keesing and Wolf, in an authoritative analysis on textile 
quotas against the LDCs, say that "the decision which was taken by the 
GATT contracting parties to authorise the operation of this arrangement 
by imposing QRs on imports of textiles from lost-cost suppliers, was 
momentous".
Bilateral restrictive agreements between industrialised countries
and low-cost suppliers constitute the heart of the system. Art. 4 of
26the arrangement provides for export restraint agreements. Such
agreements had been negotiated, even before the establishment of the 
MFA. The USA, the main protagonist of such arrangements, had negotiated 
bilateral agreements before the 1973 MFA with its main suppliers. The 
EEC followed later, however, because of lack of co-ordination of its 
internal policy. Japan and Switzerland have no bilateral agreements 
and yet they have thriving textile industries.
For /
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For the LDCs, textiles is a vital industry for their economies, 
since it is their only successful manufacturing sector, but they had
no other choice but to accept bilateral restrictive agreements àor face unilateral import quotas by the developed importing countries.
It was recognised by some LDCs that an unregulated and sudden increase 
of imports into the DC's markets would create problems, and therefore 
bilateral agreements were preferred instead of unilaterally imposed 
quotas that would have certainly damaged the low-cost suppliers exports.
I'As far as the EEC is concerned, it had at first to co-ordinate 
its Common Textile Policy - arising out of the working of the Common 
External Tariff - and then to negotiate with its main suppliers. The 
different national interests and the interest of the preferential 
countries outside the EEC delayed the conclusion of a common position.
In accordance with the CCP provisions the Community had to reach a common 
position in order to participate in the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) 
under the auspices of GATT. The Community had to show its coherent 
common policy in the external field by exercising its CCP.
.The 1973 Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA)
I
The first MFA, put into effect from 1.1.1974 until the end of
1977, allows a 6% annual growth of quotas compared with the LTA, which
permitted a 5% annual increase and it represents a substantial extension
not only in terms of product coverage and improvement but also in terms
2 7of procedures and institutional arrangements.
''IThe EEC, due to internal differences and difficulties in co- 
ordinating its Common Textiles Policy, did not manage to negotiate bi­
lateral agreements restricting its imports with its main suppliers
, V-;''before the 1973 MFA negotiations. It was only in the Summer 1976 when ;Vi;the Community had succeeded in organising its policy on textiles that
it was in a position to negotiate bilateral restraint agreements with
each one of its main suppliers which, in the main, were NICs, that is,
28some twenty six (26) agreements. It was agreed that the growth of
textile exports would be 6% per annum in most products, but in some
29sensitive products there was to be no growth at all. These twenty six ^
agreements have the same legal structure, but they however differ as to 
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the level of quotas set and as to the different kind of imported products.
Some of them incorporate safeguard clauses or special consultation
clauses, which can be initiated when the level of imports might disturb 
30Community markets. The relevant negotiations took place before the
MFA was due to be re-negotiated. A number of Mediterranean and Lome 
countries under preferential agreements remained completely unrestricted 
and benefited from tariff preferences.
Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark were of the opinion that free
.trade should remain as the rule and imports must not be restricted.
■They were concerned about the Community's development policy. On the 
other hand, Britain, France and Italy were in favour of the adoption of 
protectionist measures. The Community textile industry had to face 
difficult times due to the inability of the Community to co-ordinate 
its common position on textiles, and to the USAs' ability to conclude 
bilateral restrictive agreements before the 1973 MFA, and furthermore 
to some other factors, such as the 1974-1975 world recession.
Certainly quotas already existed and high levels of tariffs on
■textiles were imposed on an emergency basis, but they were unable to 
alleviate the Community's difficult p o s i t i o n . T h e  USA had already 
negotiated bilateral agreements. Japan, although she had no restrict­
ive agreement, yet imposed very many quotas and NTBs which had made its 
market impenetrable.
The Community, therefore, had on several occasions to resort to 
safeguard action, and some of its member states, like Britain and France, 
had to take unilateral measures to protect their industries in summer 
1976.32
The EEC, compared with the other major industrialised countries,
had followed quite a liberal policy. It had alone introduced a three-
year programme for the elimination of restraints, but the large number
of agreements with different supplying countries, made it difficult to
draw any firm conclusions as to the Community's stance. The Textiles
Surveillance Body (TSB) which was introduced under the GATT Textiles
Committee, was not in a position to decide whether or not the Community33had opened up its markets.
The Community had given however special consideration to the LLDCs' 
needs. It proposed that "tariff preferences must be granted to 
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genuine LDCs and should be withdrawn from these countries which no 
longer need them"^^
It is notable that the Community has not included textiles in its 
GSP, although it claims that it is the only major economic bloc to 
grant substantial tariff preferences for textile products. Considering 
the effects of the 1973 MFA on the Community, they have not proved 
beneficial. The provisions of the MFA were loose. They did not
provide for measures of checking the flow of Imports, either because 
the quotas had been set too high (e.g. in relation to Hong Kong), or 
because they exceeded those fixed (e.g. in relation to South Korea).
The Community for some sensitive products could depart in certain cases 
from the normal MFA rules, but despite import restrictions set, e.g. 
quotas,or departure from the GATT rules or tariffs, it had not been 
able to preserve all branches of its industry, especially c l o t h i n g .  
Moreover, within the Community the lack of internal co-ordination of a 
common position, before 1973, had unfavourable effects on its trade 
balance.
The 1977 Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA)
The main objective of the MFA to allow the textile and clothing 
industries to restructure and adjust themselves had remained unfulfilled, 
when it came up for renewal in 1977. Having regard to the unfavourable
consequences of the first MFA, the EEC had first of all to co-ordinate its 
internal position and negotiate bilateral restraint agreements with its
'main suppliers. Therefore, all internal differences had to be sorted 
out, particularly those of export aids and state aids (Art. 92, 93 EEC 
Treaty). All measures, e.g. the removal of trade barriers and the 37avoidance of distortion of competition, had to be taken into account.
(Arts. 85, 86 EEC Treaty).
The EEC approach to a common policy on textiles was not an easy 
process. Apart from the differences between the member states, some 
other persisting differences made the achievement of a common policy a 
very difficult matter. Despite this the Community succeeded however 
in formulating a common policy which can be considered as a major 
achievement of its external trade relations, when we consider the 
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38highly sensitive nature of this declining sector.
The Community also negotiated with the Mediterranean countries* 20on restrictions of their textile exports, but under fierce protest'.
With ACP countries no restrictive measures were taken, but it was made
clear that actions would be taken if their exports constituted a threat
40to the EEC's textile industry. For the Community, the negotiation
of bilateral restrictive agreements, particularly those with the pre­
ferential countries, was not an easy process at all. The USA had 
negotiated before the first MFA bilateral restraint agreements with the 
world main suppliers, and the EEC had to face the hardest pressure and 
demands in bargaining with those low-cost world suppliers.
However, the situation was becoming more and more difficult for
the textile and clothing industries in the DCs. Rising productivity,
weak demand and rising unemployment, made necessary the adoption of
41protectionist measures in the industrialised countries. The EEC
sided with the USA on the imposition of global quotas instead of the
selective approach favoured earlier. Thus, on both sides of the
Atlantic,a common position was reached for the need for protectionist
42measures to help the ailing textile and clothing industries. The
New Arrangement, however, on an EEC initiative incorporated an innovation■negotiated under a protocol providing for 'jointly agreed reasonable
departures' from the MFA, which leaves room for more restrictive actions
for some seven sensitive products. The EEC had insisted that the 1973
MFA provided no efficient protection and it therefore wanted the
'Reasonable Departures' clause to be applied when necessary. This
clause has changed the arrangement fundamentally. "It is a departure
from a departure - a waiver of the provisions of an agreement which
43itself was a derogation from the GATT principles".
From the LDCs' point of view, they wanted no extension of the
protocol of the MFA, and they were concerned at the extent of the duration
of the arrangement. They agreed to the 'Reasonable Departures' clause
provided that the industrialised countries would restructure their
44industries and adapt to the new changing economic environment. The
LDCs were unable at this stage to maintain a common position and they 
particularly complained that the EEC had engineered this situation, 
negotiating with each one of them. They were not happy with the 
arrangement, but in case of collapse of the MFA, there were fears of 
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45imposition of unilateral import controls by the DCs.
The 1977 MFA was not favourable to their exports, the volume of 
which had seriously diminished, compared with the years up to 1976.
The 'Reasonable Departures' clause applying to the most sensitive 
products has led to a serious cut of global quotas. Moreover, when­
ever no specific quotas were determined, an import threshold was 
established in each case and for each exporter which,once reached, might 
lead to the establishment of a quota. This is the so-called 'basket 
procedure’ designed to defend the Community and applies to countries
which have signed the MFA and have no preferential links with the
46Community, and also for Eastern Europe. For the EEC the second MFAj
which was quite restrictive, was reported to be a success. As a
result of the bilateral restraint agreements from 1976 to 1979 textile
imports showed an average annual increase of 4% of volume compared with
an increase of 25% in 1973-1976. For eight sensitive products the
47annual increase was 1.9%. But, despite that trend, the Community
had continued to face difficult times as a result of faster growth of 
imports over exports.
The 1981 Multi-Fibre Arrangement (KtFA) .
As the second MFA was to expire, the industrialised countries,
including the EEC, were pressing forward for the MFA renewal for at
least five years, whereas the LDCs resisted its renewal, or at least the
latter would accept it for no more than four years. Finally in
December 1981 the GATT Textiles Committee agreed by consensus to extend
the arrangement for 1.1.1982 to 31.7.86 - (4i years) under 'fierce
48protest' however from the LDCs,
As far as the EEC is concerned the clothing and textile industries 
are facing even more difficult times. The effect on employment has 
worsened. Notwithstanding all the other difficulties inherent in this 
sector, the EEC’s position moreover has deteriorated owing to disagree­
ment among its member states over the terms attached to the Community’s 
acceptance of the renewed MFA. France, Italy and the UK wanted 
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restrictive agreements, while W. Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark
49were opposed to it. Britain and France warned that they would take
unilateral measures if the EEC Commission was unable to curb cheap 
50imports. G. Shepherd in his Thames Essay on textiles argues that
Germany and Italy could survive competition but France and Britain could
 ^ 51 not.
The bone of contention, however, was the bilateral agreements to 
be negotiated during 1982 between the EEC and its main suppliers. The 
EEC, in the light of the difficulties experienced in this sector, 
demanded the right to introduce certain changes in the bilateral agree­
ments. It particularly wanted to cut imports of the most sensitive 
products from its main suppliers, Hong Kong, S. Korea and Taiwan. It 
wanted to introduce an anti-surge clause, in order to prevent a sudden 
increase of imports from the low-cost countries, and also to strengthen
certain existing provisions such as the 'basket extractor mechanism' and
52the provisions against fraud.
On the other hand, the LDCs were uneasy about the protectionist 
measures taken by the industrialised countries and demanded freer trade 
in textiles. They expressed concern about the 'Reasonable Departures' 
clause which was supposed to be a temporary feature of the MFA. Further­
more, they emphasised the even more discriminatory character of the MFA
against the LDCs' exports, pointing out that it helped the developed 
countries to increase trade among themselves. The hard and continuous 
negotiations with the industrialised countries caused the LDCs to adopt 
a common stance on the MFA re-negotiation. This is an important devel­
opment in the third world stance, to face difficulties and to press for
freer trade and elimination of the restrictions put.by the industrialised 
54countries.
However, the Commission had to negotiate hard during 1982 for re­
negotiation of the bilateral restrictive agreements with its main 
suppliers with the view to obtaining a reduction in the global quotas. 
Both sides followed a very tough line. Fourteen (14) LDCs out of 
twenty-six (26) were opposed to the 1982 bilateral a g r e e m e n t s . I n  
November 1982 Brazil was the first of the remaining to negotiate with
the Community an import restraint pact, followed by Singapore, Malaysia 
and the Phi] 
suppliers /
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suppliers (e.g. Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan) remained behind. The
Community had repeatedly said that if no agreement were reached, that
would mean that it would pull out of the MPA by the end of 1982 and it
57would impose unilateral import controls. Finally, after hard bargain­
ing under the internationally agreed MFA, a compromise formula was 
agreed with Hong Kong.^® The Community had originally sought a 12% 
import cut, but finally 6.3% and 8.3% import cuts were agreed on five 
sensitive products (T-shirts, trousers, blouses, sweaters and shirts). 
Consequently, only Argentine was left and the EEC, after intense and 
often bitter negotiations, signed the MFA to run until the end of July 
1986.39
Although the Community succeeded in achieving the reduction of 
global quotas, yet the situation in the textile and clothing industries 
is far from ideal. The consumers organisations complained that the 
bilateral agreements would result in higher prices for the consumers.
The COMITEXTIL also complained against the Commission for the deterior­
ating situation in the sector. It made it clear that the single re-
60newal of the MFA is not enough to cope with the increased competition. 
The European Parliament also stated that "there is need for imports to 
be controled from low-cost suppliers, according to the quotas agreed", 
and it furthermore requested "the renewal of the quotas agreed from time 
to time so that imports must not exceed demand", pointing out the dis­
ruptive effects which the USA exports particularly cause to the European
,  ^ 61 market.
As has been pointed out above the MFA covers trade on textiles and 
textile products between DCs and LDCs. This means that trade relations 
in this sector between the EEC and the USA are regulated outside the MFA 
framework and are subject to the GATT rules, in particular to the 
principle of reciprocity. Therefore, bilateral restraint agreements 
similar to those negotiated between the EEC and the developing countries 
have not been negotiated between the EEC and the USA.
However,after extensive negotiations no one is pleased with the 
New MFA. The LDCs see their only manufactured sector excluded from the 
developed countries' markets, while their exports are replaced by the 
DCs' exports. Likewise, the EEC is unhappy because its industry faces 
very critical times, despite increased restrictive measures imposed 
under the 1981 MFA.
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Evaluation of the Multi-Fibre Arrangements.
-  I
The MFA can be considered as a VER agreement, although it greatly
differs from other VER agreements. While VER agreements are negotiated
outside the concept of international trade rules, the MFA is the :|
only one which remains within the orbit of the GATT rules. It is a
departure from the normal GATT rules, although no waiver has been re-
quested. It functions within the GATT Textiles Committee, whose body,
the Textiles Surveillance Body (TSB) controls QRs imposed and all kinds
of restraints imposed by industrialised countries, and also the bilateral
agreements stipulating that all existing QRs on textiles unilateral or
62negotiated should be notified in detail to the TSB.
The DCs, when they established the MFA, paid attention so as not 
to c on f1ict with other GATT rules such as Arts, XIX, XII, VI and XVI,
They started out from the position that there is need to safeguard their 
domestic markets in case of market disruption from unregulated and too 
rapid expansion of low-cost exports. They did not intend to violate 
any rules of international trade law. The peculiarity of the arrange­
ment is that it sets quotas for textiles, in contrast to tariff regulated 
trade for all the other products, under the GATT provisions. It 
regulates trade in textiles among DCs and LDCs, but leaves aside trade 
among the industrialised countries themselves. In this way the MFA
■  i ; ' lhas sought to balance the interests of the LDCs and DCs alike. While 
stressing the need for further economic and social development of the 
LDCs by allowing gradual expansion in trade on textiles, at the same 
time attempts to safeguard the industrialised countries’ textile and 
clothing markets from sudden and unregulated import penetration from /v|low-cost suppliers, with the ultimate objective of liberalising trade in k 
textiles.
'ÎThe original MFA of 1973 was more liberal than the subsequent 
ones. The second 1977 MFA mainly due to the EEC's insistence became 
more restrictive and the third one even more. Although it was hoped 
that the MFA would be a temporary arrangement to help the textile 
industry to adjust, twenty years have already passed and still the 
industry has not restructured and faces further more critical times.
■■There is no doubt, that restrictions grew worse under the second 
and third MFA. Instead of moving towards opening quotas and the 
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liberalisation of trade, even more and more restrictive measures
applied. Imports permitted under the third MFA are considerably lower
than those permitted under the previous ones. Therefore, the impact
of the MFA on the LDCs' trade does not seem to be favourable. The
LDCs, in particular the NICs, point out that the MFA is very restrictive
and discriminates against their exports. On the other hand they
recognise that they would have to face unilateral import controls
justified under the provisions of Art. XIX of the G.A. if the MFA did
not exist. In fact, the NICs are those most affected because they are
the most competitive suppliers and because the set quotas can be reached 63very quickly. Therefore, the MFAs have primarily worked against
the NICs, but they have also affected the LLDCs, which could follow the
path of industrialisation, as did Hong Kong or South Korea, since trade
in textiles and particularly clothing, is the most advanced manufactured
sector of their economies. The impact on employment in the LDCs is
even more unfavourable than that in the industrialised countries. This
is because the clothing industry is a labour intensive industry and
there has been a considerable shift in production from industrialised
countries to developing countries. The jobs lost in LDCs are more than
64those gained in industrialised countries. Finally, the most harmful
effect on the LDCs is the restriction of exports in products, e.g.
clothing, in which they have a comparative advantage. What is the
impact of the textiles and clothing exports of the LDCs on the developed
countries economies, is not very clear. Several studies undertaken
have shown that imports from low-cost countries with whom the EEC has
negotiated bilateral restrictive agreements, today reach the level of
around 45% of its total imports. It is clear, however, that exports
from industrialised countries are more disruptive to the Community
market. For example, the USA exports are, in fact, twice as great
65as those from Hong Kong, the biggest of all suppliers from LDCs.
Keesing and Wolf, in an excellent analysis on textile quotas 
against LDCs,^® argue that if increased penetration from LDCs had not 
occurred between 1973 and 1978, domestic apparel in North America might 
have grown a little over 15% instead of 10% that it did. In West 
Europe, the corresponding figures would be 11% instead of 6%. For 
textiles, given that the textile industry still remains in the hands of 
the /
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the DCs, that figure would be much lower. They also considered the
question of what would have been displaced by the growth of imports
from LDCs in recent years. In answering these questions, they also
relied upon the results of a study undertaken by Jose de la Torre, on
behalf of the Georgia World Congress Institute in the USA, concerning
67the clothing industry in the USA and in West Europe. The latter
study revealed that net changes in the trade balance with all countries 
between 1970 and 1976 led to a loss of about 67,000 jobs in the clothing 
industry in the USA, and about 76,000 jobs in the EEC. The study points 
out that the productivity growth is a much more important cause of job 
losses than changes in net trade.
Nevertheless, the Community spokesman in the GATT Textile Committee
said that between 1973 and 1979 the lost jobs in both industries are well68over 700,000 and the situation is getting even worse. Thus, imports :cause grave concern for the Community's textile and clothing industries.
They are not only imports from LDCs, but they are primarily imports
from the DCs, especially the USA. The latter are more disruptive and
they are the greatest threat to the EECb industries. In 1979 alone,
imports from the USA went up to 74.5%. Of course, imports are not the
only factor for the grave problems which the textile and clothing
industries face today. Numerous studies show that the losses of jobs
are due more to productivity growth pursuant to technological advances
69than to changes in trade. In fact, productivity competitiveness in
the textile and clothing industries in the industrialised countries have
improved considerably since the negotiation of the bilateral restrictive 
70agreements.
In addition to the accelerated growth of imports and the product­
ivity growth, weak demand in the Community has resulted in difficulties 
in the industries concerned and it has led to the displacement of a great 
number of workers. As a consequence, COMITEXTIL, national governments,
pressure groups, are all pressing the Community for more import restrict 
ions. In view of this situation protectionist measures have been taken 
by DCs. These protectionist measures, however, have accelerated the "f
rise in productivity and have certainly imposed a substantial cost in 
higher prices for consumers. Rising in productivity, creating unemployment, 
involves a "vicious circle" from which no one is likely to escape.
Therefore/restrictions imposed under the MFA and the bilateral 
agreements /
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agreements negotiated under it have not proved beneficial to DCs either. 
Jobs have not been secured: unemployment has been rising, as well as
prices for the consumers. Adjustment and not restrictions seem to be 
the commendable effort for the EEC and the other industrialised countries 
in general. The STA, LTA and MFAs subsequently were all established 
with the view to giving the DCs 'a breathing space' to adjust their 
industries, and to enable them to meet foreign competition. Currently, 
after two decades of "managed trade" in textiles and textile products, 
the DCs have proved unable to tackle the problems of adjustment and 
competitiveness. The Commission EC has made efforts to help the 
industries to adjust and overcome the difficulties. Thus, aid pro­
grammes have been launched and consultations with industry frequently 
71take place.
Adjustment, certainly, is not an easy process in the Community, as
long as protectionist attitudes prevail and diversification into new areas
of economic activity proves to be a complex matter. If adjustment had
taken place, there would have been more hope for an orderly return to
more liberal trade. The importance of adjustment in the textile and
clothing industries for the developed and developing countries alike has
72been emphasised in the first Report, of the Brandt Commission, which 
states :
"The great challenge for the North is to cope with the difficulties of 
adjustments so that world trade can expand to see its trade with the 
South as an opportunity, to see it not only as part of the problems, but 
as a part of the solution. In the end the failure of the mature indust­
rial economies to adjust to the realities of international competitiveness 
may deprive them of their prosperity and impose a costlier and more 
disruptive adjustment than those which their current measures of protect­
ion attempt to postpone".
After all, neither the LDCs, nor the industrialised countries are 
happy with the MFA. For the LDCs it has curtailed the export growth 
of their most developed sector with detrimental results to their economies 
as a whole. Their serious concern, indeed, is of how long it would 
last. It has been accepted by them in preference to unilateral import 
controls, which might have been imposed by the industrialised countries 
and in view of its supposedly temporary character.
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On the other hand, the EEC has sought to improve its textile and 
clothing industries and to alleviate unemployment. The problems 
however, in the industry are more acute today than they were twenty years 
ago. Imports have increased, in particular from the developed countries 
(e.g. USA), covered by the concept of reciprocity. Closures are more 
frequent, and unemployment is higher than ever. Consequently, the MPA 
has not proved sufficient to stop imports into the Community because it 
only covers trade in textiles between DCs and LDCs leaving aside trade 
in textiles between industrialised countries. The ultimate objective 
of the Community, that is the adjustment of its industry, has met with 
numerous difficulties. In the EEC the effects of the MPA are less 
beneficial than for the other industrialised countries because it fails 
to co-ordinate quickly enough its internal common position. Because 
of different national interests and different structures of the national 
industries, a two-way approach seems likely to continue as far as the 
MPA exists. The protectionist policy led by Britain, France and Italy 
and the liberal policy followed by West Germany, Denmark and the Nether­
lands, is likely to arise again if the EEC is called on to re-negotiate 
the MPA.
The next questions, however, are as to what would have happened in 
the absence of the MPA and what should be done now. In the absence of 
the MPA it is probable either that the GATT rules would have changed in
order to allow the introduction of quotas or any other kind of restrictions
.in textiles and clothing, especially after the 1974-1975 world recession, 
or unilateral import controls would have been imposed by importing 
countries to safeguard domestic markets. As far as the second question 
is concerned, that is what should be considered as more commendable; 
it might be possible to liberalise trade in textiles according to a time­
table, according to which quotas would be then liberalised and eventually 
eliminated, similar to the kind of timetable that was used in liberalising 
tariffs during major rounds of international trade within the framework
of an agreed international agreement. Therefore, bilateral agreements
■under the MPA could be replaced by a Safeguard Code pursuant to the GATT
73rules.
In conclusion, restrictions on international trade are in no one's 
interest and they benefit neither the LDCs, nor the DCs. A programme 
for /
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for the liberalisation of quotas should be progressively substituted by 
liberal trading rules. Reduction of LDCs' exports means in retrospect 
nothing else, but reduction of their imports coming from DCs and stag­
nation of the world economy as a whole. Legal rules derived from such 
a situation cannot be beneficial to the international community of 
trading states as a whole.
2. Motor Vehicles.
Largely expanded exports of motor vehicles, particularly from Japan 
and other industrialised countries, have caused grave concern in the 
Community and in the USA as well. In the USA, due to domestic pressure, 
an agreement with Canada was negotiated on automobile products in 1965, 
with the object of liberalising trade. For this agreement the USA was 
granted a waiver under Art.XXV:5 of GATT in respect of Art.1:1.^^
In the USA growing tension in trade of motor vehicles led the USA
Administration to take anti-dumping actions, which finally resulted in
the conclusion of a three-year USA-Japanese VER agreement in 1980, which
75is liable to be extended for another three years. Domestic producers
and Trade Unions pointed out that imports were causing substantial injury
to the USA industry and they therefore exerted some pressure on the
76Japanese, under a threat of retaliatory action.
In the EEC, the automobile industry suffered the most. Exports 
from Japan and East Europe had flooded the Community market and low- 
priced automobiles had made domestic products uncompetitive. Dialogue 
with its trading partners had often taken place, but the situation was 
still difficult. This situation was worsened by the lack of a common 
approach to the problem. Italy maintains QRs. The UK industry holds 
regular contacts with the Japanese automobile manufacturers association 
with the aim of reducing sales to the UK market, or of establishing joint 
ventures of the type, for example, between Honda and British Leyland 
(a co-operation agreement has already been signed). France also announced 
import quotas on cars coming from Japan. Co-operation agreements re­
lating to trade in the vehicles sector have recently been sharply increased, 
(e.g. /
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(e.g. Honda and British Leyland, Nissan and Alfa Motor Iberica and
Volkswagen) with the object of technological co-operation and development
of techniques which "would enable everyone to play the free-trade game
77and comply with the GATT rules".
Meanwhile, the Community has already introduced a system of
surveillance of imports of certain motor vehicles and some other products,
which system was extended in December 1982. Furthermore, the Community
intends to extend the system to imports of motor cycles, video tape
78recorders and light commercial vehicles, originating in Japan. In
view of this situation domestic pressure groups and national governments
are constantly asking for some kind of arrangement with Japan, The
Commission EC, after several efforts, found it hard to persuade Japan to
agree on voluntary export restraints. Instead, in 1981, the Japanese
committed themselves to limit exports, in particular in Belgium and
Germany and also in the EEC as a whole. Nevertheless, at the end,i.e.
on 14,2,1983, a voluntary export restraint agreement concerning ten (10)
sensitive products, including cars, was negotiated between the EEC
79.Commission and Japan.
3. Footwear.
Another sector which has been hard hit by low-cost exports into 
the industrialised countries is the leather footwear industry. In the 
USA the industry found it difficult to compete with the low-priced imports. 
The International Trade Commission (ITC) in 1975-1976 after investigations 
recommended tariff increases and quotas against low-cost imports, 
especially those coming from Italy, South Korea and Taiwan. The President 
instead preferred to negotiate bilateral restrictive agreements in the 
form of Orderly Marketing Arrangements (DMAs) with South Korea and Taiwan, 
which, however, terminated in 1981. An informal VER agreement was also 
negotiated with Italy, although the Italian government made no specific 
commitment to limit exports to the USA market, and the only official 
Italian government position was that it placed exports of shoes under a 
system of surveillance.^^
In the EEC, decline in the industry is attributable partly due to 
cheap /
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cheap imports from developing countries, notably Hong Kong, South Korea, 
Taiwan and China, and partly due to restrictions imposed by Australia, 
Canada, the USA and Japan. In addition to this, no common approach 
nor common safeguard measures have been applied. Member states have 
resorted to various methods of protection. Certain member states 
apply QRs and others like the UK and France have had informal bilateral 
restraint contacts with several exporting countries, such as South 
Korea, Taiwan, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania.
4, Electronics
Successful expansion of Japanese external trade in the 
electronics sector and other advanced consumer goods, has also caused 
grave concern to certain importing countries. Multilateral agreements 
do not exist, but only some bilateral restrictive agreements.
In the USA, the ITC in 1977 found that the domestic industry had
been injured by increased Japanese exports and recommendedtintroduction
82of quotas or increase on import duties. in accordance with the provisions 
of Art. XIX of the GATT.
In the EEC, the huge trade imbalance with Japan has caused anxiety 
in the Commission and the member states. Since the 1970s several plans 
for tackling the problems have been prepared. Individual member states
in the Community want their own way. France and Italy already imposed 
restrictions and in the UK the industry had applied safeguard measures 
against particular exporting countries, notably South Korea. A common 
defensive position of all industries seems to be the only answer to the 
question. To this end a common European front is the only answer and 
it is encouraging that a common approach between Grundig and Philips has 
been considered.®^
Having regard to the critical situation of the electronics industry, 
the Community has repeatedly requested Japan to make her markets more 
accessible by cutting tariffs and extending quotas and by restraining 
her exports to the Community. The EEC, however, threatened that in 
case of no response by the Japanese it would bring the matter before the 
GATT and take unilateral measures. Also, the EEC Commission has made 
several efforts to help European industries penetrate the Japanese market. ; 
To /
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To this end the Commission made an investigation and asked the European
companies operating already in Japan, about the prospects of new enter-
preneurs wishing to establish a company in Japan. Answers varied and
85the Commission has begun preparations for a new inquiry. In
parallel with the Commission's initiative European manufacturers and 
unions are fighting to make their goods more accessible to the Japanese 
market.
The major European electronic industries, Grundig and Philips
asked the Commission for an anti-dumping investigation into the
activities of Japanese producers of video tape recorders. Likewise,
the confectionery manufacturers are fighting for tariff cuts given that
tariffs on confectionery products in Japan are the highest compared with
those imposed by any other industrialised country. Even more pressure
on the Japanese government was exercised by the EEC, which in December
1982, decided to launch official proceedings within the GATT in order to
intensify international pressure on Japan to liberalise imports and
eventually to press Japan into concluding VER agreements on some sensitive 
8Vproducts. These efforts resulted in high level consultations between
the Commission and the Japanese government, with the object of removal
and reduction of import tariffs on eighty-one (81) items and especially
on certain sensitive products, such as video-tape recorders, television
sets and tubes, cars, certain types of machine tools and fork-lift
trucks. Also, simplification of import procedures on the part of Japan
on several items and VER agreements on items that are likely to cause88'significant' problems, was considered. Special consideration was
given to the conclusion of a voluntary export restraint agreement on
video-tape recorders and at the GATT Ministerial Meeting of November
1982, Japan committed itself to make determined efforts to avoid measures
which would limit or distort international trade. Japan seemed ready
for export restraints on the condition that anfi-dumping charges brought
by Grundig and Philips against video-tape recorders (VTBs) manufacturers,
under Art. XXIII:2 of GATT, would be withdrawn and French measures of
checking all video-tape recorder imports at the small port of Poitiers89would be cancelled.
Finally, after long consultations and conflicting views expressed 
by Japanese officials and European Commission representatives, Japan 
agreed /
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agreed on 14th February 1983 to cut their exports to the EEC on ten (10) 
highly sensitive products, including video-tape recorders. This is the 
first VER agreement signed between the European Community and Japan in 
this sector; it also includes a provision, according to which the 
Japanese will facilitate the imports of European products especially
video-tape records, although the implementation of this provision is
 ^ , 90uncertain.
As this VER agreement is yet to be implemented, the EEC has 
exerted more pressure on Japan to liberalise its policies and has re­
requested the GATT to establish a Working Party to examine whether exist­
ing Japanese practices are too restrictive. Further rounds of talks
between the two parties have taken place within the G.A. and a Working
Party is currently examining the relevant trade problems and the reasons
91for the huge trade imbalance between the EEC and Japan.
5. Steel.
Friction over trade in steel products between industrialised 
countries often takes place and international trade in steel has been
on several occasions regulated through bilateral restrictive agreements.
.(The row over steel between EEC and USA is considered earlier in Chapter 
6, p.192 ). In the USA domestic pressures leading to successive threats 
for retaliatory action and imposition of quotas has resulted in announce­
ments by the EEC and Japan to limit exports to the USA.
However, agreements between EEC and USA industries on ’voluntary*
limitation of steel exports were not welcome by the EEC governments as
they constitute a bad precedent. They have supported the view that
difficulties in the USA steel industry were not attributable to EEC
exports, which constituted a very small percentage of total steel imports 92into the USA.
After a conclusion of a VER agreement in Autumn 1982, between EEC 
and USA, which will run until the end of 1985, the Community national 
governments have been urged by the Commission to cut down steel output 
and to fix minimum prices. This was the new Davignon approach, urging 
less /
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less output, more courageous closure programmes and sets of minimum
prices. However, on the other hand, the national steel industries were
urging import cuts and have been asking their governments to take steps
93to protect them against cheap Imports.
Complaints from USA steel producers were directed mainly against 
subsidies, although it was doubtful if subsidised steel in the EEC 
caused injury to the USA. But existence of subsidies gives the American 
producers a powerful political weapon. These complaints in accordance 
with the GATT rules lead to consultations and, most likely in the end, 
to the possibility of a political settlement. The legal and political 
procedures run in parallel. In this particular case, the aim of the
USA producers is to conclude a VER agreement, which will have legally 
binding effects.
Despite limited exports of steel by Japan and the EEC, and the arrange­
ments made therewith, fresh threats of retaliation has been subsequently 
directed by the American producers against the exporting countries con­
cerned. Accusations in the USA have been made against the EEC and the 
Japanese steel industries of applying "discriminatory and illegal trading
practices" and of "flagrantly victimising" the steel industry by carving
94out the world steel market into spheres of influence. They criticised
the EEC and Japan for having negotiated a world-wide market sharing agree­
ment in 1978, according to which the Japanese would limit their exports 
west of the "Suez Canal" and the Europeans to the Far East, India and 
Pakistan. They said there are no quota limitations in this area but 
Japan and Europe operate a price-fixing agreement. A particular com­
plaint from the USA steel makers, that the MFN principle has been violated, 
was filed with the USA government. Individual steel makers cannot 
complain directly to GATT because the notion of direct effect of the GATT 
has not been recognised by the USA government. Instead, when the USA
government considers it necessary it can file a complaint to GATT.
However, no further proceedings were followed, because it was agreed in
the USA Steel and Iron Institute, that this would further deteriorate the
95already tense international trade relations.
As has been discussed throughout the present chapter several VER 
agreements, apart from the MFA, have been negotiated on a bilateral level, 
between governments or industries and outside the GATT framework. The 
agreements /
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agreements are contrary to the GATT rules and in particular they violate 
Art. I, the MFN principle, of the GATT. In fact, VER agreements have 
proliferated to a dangerous extent by shifting international'trade from 
a multilateral to a bilateral concept or to so-called 'managed trade'.
Their contribution to solving world trade problems is, however, under 
question. Have VER agreements achieved the purposes for which they 
were established? Have they removed friction between states? Recent 
history has shown that these measures have done little to remove friction. 
The EEC-USA row over steel illustrates the fact that friction can, in the 
immediate future, arise again. In fact, their proliferation leads to 
increased protectionism. There is no doubt that some sensitive industries 
should be protected for some period of time in order to be given a 
"breathing space" to adapt to the new economic environment, to adjust and 
compete, but it is not certain if these arrangements provide the correct 
safeguards.
Art. XIX of the GATT, which constitutes the main safeguard of the G.A., 
has unfortunately been unable to cope with current world trade problems.
The Contracting Parties to GATT have accepted that MFAs operate under its 
auspices without the parties to the Arrangements having to secure a 
waiver in accordance with Art. XXV:5, but for no other VER has any formal 
arrangement been made. For the time being, no other VER agreement, 
apart from the MFA, has been negotiated within the GATT system, but it is 
certain that if a similar case were to be brought before the GATT, it 
could do nothing else but accept it. Thus while VER agreements are 
contrary to international trading rules, specifically to the G.A., in 
practice the international Community has tacitly accepted them as measures 
regulating trade.
The situation as described illustrates that the GATT agreement and 
specifically Art. XIX, has proved increasingly ineffective to deal with 
current problems. International trade in various sectors, except textiles, 
has moved out of the GATT system, that is from a multilateral level to a 
bilateral one. As such, VER agreements have weakened the international
trading system. In fact, the way world trading problems are regulated 
today is markedly different from that provided in the G.A.
Practice is markedly different from the law. Support has been expressed 
for revision of Art. XIX, in particular to incorporate VER agreements 
within /
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within the scope of multilateral surveillance and control whilst taking 
into account the interest of third countries not involved In a particular 
VER agreement. #The currently prevailing situation further strengthens 
the view that the GATT system is obsolescent and increasingly ineffective 
to deal with current world trade problems.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSIONS
The contents of Chapters 2 - 9 in the present thesis raise a 
number of legal questions of both general and specific nature. Questions 
of a general nature refer to the basic assumptions underlying the legal 
framework of international trade and its effectiveness which is con­
stituted by GATT, while questions of specific nature relate to the con­
tribution which, for example EEC practice in its external trade relations 
is making towards the progressive evolution and adaptation of the system 
which currently exists. These specific legal problems, i.e. the EEC's
external trade relations were examined in the context of the general legal 
framework of international trade, i.e. of the GATT agreement, and their 
discussion and analysis constituted the main body of the present thesis.
Specificically, in Part I, the thesis analysed the legal basis of 
the General Agreement, evaluated its contribution to the development of
international trade and pointed out the weaknesses of the system, with
■particular attention to the role of GATT in resolving international trade 
disputes. Also the external trade law and practice of the EEC were 
analysed with due regard to the CCP's effects on the evolution of the GATT |
legal system and therefore on the international trading system. Part II
discussed the participation of the EEC as a customs union in the GATT and
the legal questions it raises especially relating to the crucial question
of compatibility with the GATT legal system. In this context the legal­
ity or otherwise of the EEC preferential agreements within the international 
trading framework was analysed, while in Part III the EEC trade agreements 
with third countries, industrialised and developing countries alike, was 
surveyed. Particular attention was paid to the EEC’s preferential net- 
work with the AGP and Mediterranean countries. The legality of the 
preferential agreements, their compatibility with the GATT provisions and 
their effects on the non-associated countries were examined. As shown, 
EEC's relations with the industrialised countries and in particular with
the USA, has raised one of the most problematic questions, i.e. the legal 
.question of the impact of the EEC subsidised exports of agricultural 
products on the GATT rules; the question of the legality of the CAP with 
its export refunds has been a major bone of contention. In the last part, 
Part IV, the EEC's role in negotiating VER agreements and their legality 
under the GATT rules, in particular Art. XIX, were considered. Absence 
of international surveillance on VER agreements, with the only exception 
of the MFA arrangement and the failure of the VER agreements to take 
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account of the interests of third countries were pointed out.
The GATT agreement deriving its economic rationale from liberal 
trade theories and in particular from the theory of comparative advantage 
and specialisation postulated by Adam Smith and his followers, has been 
seen,since its inception in 1947, as the central international trade 
institution, under the auspices of which a large part of international 
trade is conducted. The remarkable expansion of trade in the 1950s and
in particular in the 1960s resulted in the relative prosperity of postwar 
economies. The economic growth experienced mostly by developed countries, 
including the EEC member states, has been remarkable. Industrial and 
agricultural goods produced in the developed countries were needed by DCs 
and LDCs alike. In particular LDCs which had, meanwhile, gained their 
independence from colonial rule, started to develop an outward-orientated 
policy and imported a great volume of goods essential for their economic
growth and development. Energy and raw materials were supplied at cheap
rates to the DCs and labour in DCs was relatively cheap. But above all
no controversies arose about the security of export markets. During this 
period GATT, despite its institutional weakness, worked relatively well.
This Could be explained in two ways, either because GATT was capable of 
responding to the needs and economic realities and therefore to the 
problems which arose at that time, or because no major problems arose as a 
consequence of conflicts between the contracting parties. The second
alternative explanation is, however, more plausible, i.e. that no major 
problems had arisen as states were engaged in trade expansion and further 
economic growth. When problems did arise or disputes came before the 
GATT, they did not present serious difficulties in their settlement. 
Economic problems were not so pressing and governments were able to 
co-operate. Tariffs, which constituted the major obstacle to the free 
movement of goods, had been gradually reduced.
The GATT agreement, as part of the doomed ITO, was designed to deal
primarily with tariff matters but, in view of the failure to establish an
ITO, GATT became the single multilateral international trade organisation, 
which was called on to deal with a considerable number of trade matters 
other than tariffs arising at international level.
At this point it may be helpful to refer again to the discussion 
-in Chapter 2 relating to- the fundamental question with respect 
to the legal nature of GATT. What is the legal nature and above all the 
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legal quality of GATT? Does the functioning of GATT imply that it, the 
GATT, constitutes a legal instrument? This question may seem, at least 
formally, justified in the light of the argument that GATT is not, after 
all, a formally ratified instrument and hence not binding; it is not, 
in strict legal terms, a legally relevant instrument. Such a radical or 
simplistic answer is not easy to defend with reference to what constitutes 
or does not constitute law in the sphere of international law. GATT is, 
formally, an international agreement, and has been treated as an inter­
national organisation by the contracting parties irrespective of the fact 
whether it is ratified or not. Is GATT a normative framework of 
reference? In answer to this question it is best to refer both to the 
intentions and to the practice of the contracting parties to deal with 
GATT as if it were a normative system. This, despite the fact that the 
system is incomplete, for example it lacks detailed methods of settlement 
of disputes and penalties for breaches of the Agreement.
After adopting the view that GATT, by virtue of the customary 
practice of its contracting parties, has to be treated as a normative 
framework of reference, i.e. as the de facto International Trade Organ­
isation, constituting the foundation for international trade conduct, the 
next question to be dealt with is whether it is an adequate system on 
which the system of international trade can rest. The answer to this 
question is not definitely affirmative or negative. The fact that new
dimensions in the practice of the contracting parties have developed, in the 
form of trade restrictions, may be interpreted as an indication that its
effectiveness is open to question. Nevertheless, the contracting parties :;|îhave sought to strengthen, improve and enhance it, so as to cover major 
areas of economic activities, which have been left out of the scope of the 
G.A.
However, since the monetary crisis of 1971 and the oil embargo of 
1973, international trade has slowed down. World recession, unlimited 
production, reduced demand, expensive energy and raw materials, expensive 
labour in DCs, agricultural self-sufficiency, the tremendous expansion of 
the Japanese external trade in industrial goods, relatively cheap labour 
in the New Industrialised Countries (NICs) and the emergence of the latter 
as competitors in the international trade scene, have put free-world trade 
under severe restraint.
Unforeseen / l|
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Unforeseen and too rapid changes in world trade patterns have 
had an unfavourable impact on the legal assumptions underlying the world 
trading system. The GATT agreement, designed to accommodate gradual 
changes in international trade patterns,has been unable to cope with sub­
stantial shifts of trade patterns in short periods of time. The funda­
mental GATT principles, i.e. the MFN principle of non-discrimination and 
the principle of reciprocity have been challenged as to their significance. 
Their application to states at different levels of economic development 
has become, therefore, a very complicated matter.
There is no doubt whatsoever that the MFN principle has contributed 
to the liberalisation of trade, in particular to the extent that it has 
permitted the system to evolve from a bilateral to a multilateral system. 
Nevertheless, continuous deviation from its application under the current 
economic climate makes it extremely difficult to accept that the MFN 
principle is still held to be as important as it once was. Exceptions
to its application, notably included in Part IV of the G.A. which accords 
differential and more favourable treatment to LDCs, in Art. XXIV, per­
mitting the formation of customs unions and free-trade areas and the 
establishment of the GSP for the benefit of the LDCs have all undermined 
the basic GATT principles and in consequence the GATT legal system as a 
whole. All these circumstances lead us to consider whether the 
twin principles of the MFN and reciprocity are the dominant tenets on which 
international trade should currently be based. In theory they have been 
seen as the most important means for establishing equality and achieving 
free non-discriminatory world trade. In practice, however, the extent 
to which they can apply has been questioned. To date experience has 
shown that they have been unable to be applied even with the greatest
degree of flexibility. The MFN objectives may be questioned in the
light of the fact that its application today is becoming the exception 
rather than the rule. The principle of reciprocity has been supple­
mented by the principle of non-reciprocity in particular in favour of the 
LDCs, but it is worth noting that after the Tokyo Round a drift back 
towards reciprocity has been developing, promoted by the.EEC and the USA 
with respect to certain NICs. The Community has been, however, a 
leading force in moving towards non-reciprocity.
Therefore, in the light of these developments, the GATT provisions 
are not always respected, and the GATT has consequently been deprived of
the basis on which it has relied.
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As has been discussed throughout this thesis, the G.A. was 
initially established to reduce and eventually eliminate tariffs and 
in this respect GATT has been quite successful. Through MTNs'
Rounds, tariffs have been substantially eliminated. The GATT agree­
ment based on the assumption that world trade should be based on a 
free non-discriminatory trading system has prohibited in general the use 
of barriers to trade, in particular NTBs, as the most serious obstacles 
to the free movement of goods. However, exceptions permitting quotas 
have been made possible either through reference to corresponding terms 
written into the GATT Articles or later permitted under a waiver or 
another arrangement, such as the MFA,when special criteria are met. 
Moreover, the G.A. has permitted the imposition of some restrictive 
measures to safeguard domestic industries or producers, provided that 
special reasons exist, e.g. as those permitted under Art. XIX (Emergency 
Action on Imports of Particular Products), or negotiated through' the 
MTNs.
Despite this general prohibition, however, various restrictions 
of a non-tariff character have emerged. Under various forms restrict­
ions of a semi-legal or illegal character are frequently applied today 
and have replaced tariffs. NTBs are used to a dangerous extent in one 
form or another and have, therefore, undermined the GATT legal system. 
Protectionist measures by DCs have multiplied, directed not only against 
LDCs* exports, but also against DCs* exports. Quotas or other restrict­
ive practices, either authorised or not under the GATT system have been 
extensively used and their proliferation has had negative effects on the 
system. For areas of conduct which are not covered by the G.A, the
use of NTBs has taken unprecendented dimensions. (For further information 
see Chapter 2).
NTBs were the main item of the agenda during the Tokyo Round, but 
the complexity and sensitivity of the issue gave no great hope for their 
liberalisation. The Agreements, or the so-called Codes, established 
during the Tokyo Round and the revised Anti-Dumping Code established 
during the Kennedy Round, whilst being an improvement of the GATT 
system, have proved insufficient to further trade liberalisation. The 
Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, as the most important, has 
not been capable of limiting subsidised exports which distort international 
trade. A major limitation in the system lies in the fact that there is 
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îlack of an efficient mechanism to interpret and define concisely vaguely formulated legal terms, such as "material injury", 'fequltable 
share", "market disruption" e_t aJ. It is certain that as long as 
those terms are not multilaterally interpreted, problems will continue 
to arise and to cause tension. In particular, as far as subsidised 
exports are concerned, major disputes will arise between developed 
countries, despite the existence of the subsidies Code. This is
Imainly due to the inability of the Subsidies Code to tackle the 
problems, notably define and interpret with precision, and on an agreed 
multilateral leve^ disputed norms of legal ambiguity and give them a 
more concretely applicable and possibly enforceable effect in practice.
The disputes settlement mechanism is another area which deserves 
special attention. Consultation has been seen as the first step and 
the necessary prerequisite for the settlement of disputes, until a 
satisfactory solution has been reached. The importance of the con­
sultation procedure has been frequently stressed, as one of the most 
fundamental factors in the settlement of disputes, not to say perhaps 
the best method for achieving the best results. There is growing need 
amongst trading countries to consult and co-operate especially in 
emergency situations until a satisfactory solution has been found. The 
contribution of the consultation procedure may prove to be remarkable 
in the sense that it may potentially be capable of dealing with disputes. 
However, consideration of the concrete cases of disputes reveals that 
the existing dispute settlement machinery is not capable of coping with 
the disputes which have arisen. In the GATT the only articles
concerning dispute settlement are Articles XXII and XXIII. As they 
had been designed to deal with trade disputes at their early stages, 
they are incomplete and consequently they have proved unable to settle 
certain disputes. Growing criticism over the inadequacy of the 
dispute settlement machinery is currently more than evident.
Working Parties and Panels constitute the principal bodies before 
which disputes are brought for consideration. However, the inadequacy,
■in particular of the Panels, is acknowledged. This is due to the fact
that the role of Panels or Working Parties is not well defined. Through­
out this thesis we have, in many cases, observed their ineffectiveness 
and inadequacy. Their findings and recommendations are characterised
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by Inconclusiveness and indecisiveness. Disputed legal terms have
not been defined and interpreted definitively. In almost all cases 
considered by Panels or Working Parties, no concrete conclusions have 
been reached. For example, the Ineffectiveness of the GATT Panels is 
illustrated in the sugar subsidies cases, brought against the EEC’s 
sugar policy by Australia and Brazil (discussed in Chapter 6). Panels 
have proved to be ineffective and they often have referred the cases to 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES. They, Panels, usually play the role of a
mediator or conciliator. In principle their members are appointed
as independent of their governments, but in practice they cannot act 
in isolation of their own government policies. Accordingly, Panels
are vulnerable to political influence which leads them to reach no 
definite conclusions or recommendations. In the light of this situation 
confidence in the system is lacking. In consequence, enforcement of 
weak decisions or findings cannot be expected.
Therefore, an effective mechanism for the settlement of disputes 
is of fundamental importance for the proper functioning of the GATT 
system. Such a mechanism, either in the form of a Court or some form 
of independent evaluation, is the heart of every system at every level, 
national or international. At the Public International level,
the International Court of Justice, or at European level the European 
Court of Human Rights have been established with the ultimate objective 
of defining and interpreting disputed legal norms and finding solutions to 
the problems. In a highly sensitive area, such as international 
economic relations, the lack of an adequate mechanism to settle disputes 
constitutes a serious shortcoming of the international trading system 
and there has been acknowledged the need for the establishment of an 
effective mechanism whose decisions should have binding effects. The 
GATT rules (Arts. XXII and XXIII) are not adequate and therefore improve- 
ment is necessary. The ITO contained detailed provisions for estab­
lishing Panels for the settlement of disputes. A reference to those
provisions might guide us, so as to improve and further elaborate the 
system. However, establishment of a respectable dispute settlement
system which would provide for an adequate enforcement procedure is 
needed, in order to give effect to the relevant decision or findings 
and furthermore make the whole GATT system applicable and effective.
Furthermore /
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Furthermore, it is worth noting that no sanctions of any kind 
(apart from retaliation) are provided. It is believed by most authors, 
as an example, Jackson, that sanctions at international .level are jnapproptiate 
but it is submitted that sanctions at international economic level can 
work and in particular make the weak states feel security and trust in the* - 
system.
However, some improvement in the dispute settlement system was 
made during the Tokyo Round. It is significant that individual pro­
cedures for the settlement of disputes have been established in the 
Subsidies Code and in the Code on Government Procurement. Furthermore, 
it has been proposed that a separate dispute settlement code be estab­
lished. But for the time being so many conflicting interests are 
involved so as to make the establishment of such a code an extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, matter.
Notwithstanding the limitations of the dispute procedure, it is 
important to point out one of its benefits. It may provide the weak 
state with the opportunity to present its problems at multilateral level 
and gives greater hope for a more equitable and just settlement, than 
would be the case if the dispute were solved at bilateral level.
The question of whether the GATT legal structure is suitable to 
accommodate DCs and LDCs' interest alike is of fundamental importance.
The GATT agreement in principle accommodates both DCs and LDCs. The 
text of the agreement, as it was envisaged in 1947, makes no particular 
reference to favourable treatment for LDCs, with the exception of 
Art, XVIII which placed weak states in a more favourable position.
In paragraph 4 it provides that a contracting party which is in the
"early stages of development can deviate from the provisions of .......
this Agreement". However, gradual preferential treatment has been 
accorded to LDCs. This has been achieved, through Part IV added to 
GATT in 1964, and providing for a more favourable and differential 
treatment to LDCs. The introduction of the GSP under a GATT waiver 
and also the Enabling Clause established during the Tokyo Round MTNs 
have, in fact, been seen as a permanent legal basis for differential 
and more favourable treatment for LDCs. But despite this move, a 
great degree of disparity exists today between developed and developing 
countries. The EEC, the USA and Japan are those countries which 
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dominate GATT affairs and are the major beneficiaries from the 
operation of the GATT. They have sufficient bargaining power to 
achieve their objectives. On the other hand, LDCs do not have the 
same bargaining and political power as that exercised by DCs, nor do 
they have the power to retaliate, nor to push for liberalisation of 
trade in products in which they have particular interest. The LDCs 
position is still very inferior. Despite preferential treatment,
LDCs have not greatly benefited from membership of GATT. Protection­
ism in the developed countries has had detrimental trade effects on 
the LDCs. Protestionist measures have been introduced at a time when
LDCs had started to develop outward orientated economies. Protect­
ionism, combined with reduced demand, has had very negative effects on 
the LDCs' export growth. The particular example of textiles illustrates
this problem. There has been some beneficial effects on the LDCs'
trade, but they are not sufficient to help LDCs to develop further and 
compete with the industrialised world. In this context some LDCs, 
the most advanced, i.e. the NICs have emerged as competitors on the 
international trading scene. This shows the gradual shift of econ­
omic power from developed to developing countries and a change in the 
pattern of world trade. It'is imperative that the NICs should use 
their competitive power in international fora, participate fully and 
assume more responsibilities, in order to gain a more advantageous 
position. Their political influence and increasing bargaining power
should be used to the greatest possible extent so as to bridge the gap 
between developed and developing countries.
The existing legal system, based on the principle of equality 
and non-discrimination and the principle of reciprocity has been 
challenged by the participation of the LDCs, The principles concerned * 
have lost their dominant importance and therefore,the GATT system has 
been deprived, to some extent, of its legal foundation. In fact, the 
GATT system, despite the preferential treatment embodied in it and 
accorded to LDCs, does not seem suitable to sufficiently accommodate 
LDCs' interest, and enable them to meet the expectations for greater 
economic growth and industrialisation.
Products which are included in the liberalisation process 
during the MTNs under GATT auspices are mainly those produced in DCs, 
whereas products which are of interest to LDCs are mainly excluded from 
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the liberalisation process (e.g. textiles and footwear in which LDCs 
have a comparative advantage). Tariff cuts are greater on products 
traded among DCs. For textiles and footwear, apart from the quotas 
imposed, there are in addition higher tariffs. Although special 
favourable treatment is provided for LDCs, the higher tariff rates 
applied on LDCs' exports are, nevertheless, inconsistent with the 
spirit of the "special and more favourable treatment" that is expected 
to be granted to LDCs.
For Least Developing Countries (LLDCs) their participation in 
GATT has yielded minimal benefits. Their voice has not been strong 
enough during MTNs. Even in Part IV of the G.A. no mention is made 
of the very particular needs of the LLDCs. However, LDCs and 
primarily the NICs should take the lead and increase their voice at 
international level, with the ultimate aim of changing the GATT legal 
structure and bringing it up to date. LDCs, although unhappy with the 
existing legal system have not made any proposal to replace it. In 
general terms LDCs have to a limited extent benefited from their parti­
cipation in GATT and they want the principal provisions to be maintained, 
provided that exceptional treatment for them should be permanently 
established within GATT.
One cannot deny that the GATT system, despite the shortcomings 
and limitations has, to some limited extent, helped the LDCs to develop 
and diversify their economies. It has, at least, assured the LDCs 
that there is a multilateral body to which they can resort against the 
abusive power of other powerful parties. What is fundamentally 
important for the LDCs is an assurance that the rules and principles of 
the system are observed by the major trading partners.
Finally, despite the shortcoming of the GATT system, it is of 
fundamental importance that the LDCs participate in it. If LDCs were 
altogether excluded from the system, it may be possible that their 
economic position would be far worse, because bilateral dealings to 
which LDCs would be exposed are not preferable to multilateral negot­
iations .
A possible improvement might be to develop the international 
trading system in such a way as to incorporate different economic 
groupings and diversify them in accordance with their geographical 
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position and above all the stage of their economic development. For 
example a classification of countries as industrialised, advanced 
developing countries, developing countries and least developing countries 
according to their GNP could prove beneficial. Common rules and
principles could be established applicable to the greatest possible 
extent to all countries and also separate provisions suitable to each 
particular group, could be provided in accordance with each group's 
particular needs and interests. This consideration stems from the 
assumption that NICs cannot be given the same treatment as LLDCs, or 
leading industrialised countries, equivalent treatment to weak states, 
because of their classification as DCs.
GATT was created by the major trading nations and its rules 
reflect the attempt to accommodate their particular needs and Interests, 
failing to take account of the particular problems of the LDCs. The 
DCs views and in particular that of the EEC's on the world trading 
system and the rules governing it have turned into a demand expressed 
by the DCs to see it accepted and applied by the LDCs. The addition
of Part IV to the G.A. has alleviated the harder economic problems of
the LDCs to some extent, but it has not established a different legal 
position for them. The legal structure of GATT has not yet been 
amended so as to establish a permanent differential treatment, whenever 
needed, for the developing world. More favourable treatment which is 
essential for their growth and industrialisation and for ensuring
stability and world peace, should be accorded to LDCs. Thus, it is
imperative that the DCs should make the concerns of the LDCs their own, 
discuss their problems and grant more concessions to countries in need.
In the light of the uncertainty and lack of clarity related to the GATT 
rules, uncertainty related to economic problems will continue to prevail.
In the context of the existing international trading system as 
described throughout this thesis, and specifically in Chapter 2, the 
EEC has been called on to submit to multilateral trading rules the 
operation of its common external trade policy and should make every 
effort to observe those rules and principles when negotiating with 
third countries or participating in Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
(MTNs),
In the implementation of its CCP the EEC has to take into 
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account the interests of third countries, whether contracting parties 
to GATT or not. The area which undoubtedly comes under the 
Community's competence is the area of control over the CET. On most 
other matters such as trade, industrial, monetary and technological 
matters the Community has no real competence. Beyond the Community's 
competence, the member states may negotiate bilateral friendship 
trade agreements with non-member states, provided that the agreements 
concerned will not constitute an obstacle to the implementation of the 
CCP. That is due to the limitations inherent in the Treaty of Rome 
which omits consideration of several aspects of commercial policy.
Difficulties arise in the application and implementation of the 
CCP because of the ambiguity of certain EEC Treaty provisions and in 
particular Art. 113. Art. 113 is written in general terms and no
details are given for the adoption of a CCP. In fact, the common 
application of the CCP is extremely difficult. Many issues and con­
flicting interests are involved sometimes inside the Community and 
sometimes outside it, so that the commercial policy cannot be a common 
one in the sense of the CAP, but remains rather a co-ordination of 
policies exercised by the member states based on uniform principles and 
taking into consideration the interests of third countries. Even 
the founders of the Treaty had found it difficult and they had not 
agreed on the concept and application of the CCP. The uncertainty 
over legal issues and its high vulnerability to political influences 
make the implementation of the CCP an extremely difficult matter.
We have seen throughout the present thesis that a CCP has not 
been implemented,on several occasions. For example, when the EEC 
had negotiated with Japan on various issues, a common Community stance 
was not achieved. In the Euro-Arab Dialogue, for purely political 
reasons, no common approach has been achieved. In the EEC's relations 
with the Eastern European countries although a CCP in principle had 
been adopted, yet in practice it is more apparent than real. In the 
latter case co-operation agreements are concluded on a bilateral basis 
by member states with the Eastern European countries in accordance with 
a consultation procedure. Also, when the Community was negotiating 
for the first MFA no common Community approach was attained at that 
stage. The same appeared in negotiations with some other countries
or groups of countries. Certainly it is not always the Community
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which is responsible for this approach. The CCP falls within the 
area of International economic relations and it is affected by their 
regulation. A common approach on commercial matters is extremely 
difficult to achieve. This may be attributable to the fact that the 
CCP is addressed to the outside world and therefore it is fragmented 
in view of the different legal, economic, political and social 
conditions, governing international economic relations. For example
different conditions exist for the Associated states, for industrialised 
countries, for non-Associated countries, for state-trading countries 
and so on.
Within the GATT framework, the Community is presumed to have 
exclusive competence over commercial policy issues. In this context 
it, the Community, has taken a common stance on tariff matters and 
also in some other areas of commercial activity negotiated within its 
context. On tariff matters, the G.A. and the Community have both
contributed to the reduction of tariffs. The EEC, by taking a common
stance on CET matters, has contributed to the liberalisation of tariffs. 
It might be possible that if GATT had succeeded in negotiating effect­
ively in other commercial policy issues such as NTBs, this would have
a favourable effect on the evolution of the Community's Commercial 
Policy. Nevertheless, having regard to the inadequacy and the 
ineffectiveness of GATT the CCP could not be very successful. This 
is one reason which explains the Community's inability to implement 
its CCP. On the other hand if the Community had succeeded in 
formulating a CCP towards the outside world that would be favourable 
to the evolution and development of the GATT. Therefore, both the 
EEC and the GATT are highly interrelated and the behaviour of the one 
has an immediate impact on the other.
Nevertheless, the CCP is important in regulating trade among 
states, despite its fragmentary character and lack of uniformity. It 
might be useful if common principles could apply to all countries, but 
separate provisions should be established applicable to different 
categories of countries according to their economic position. The 
founders of the Treaty realised how difficult the implementation of a 
common policy was and therefore in Art. 113, EEC, they did not provide 
detailed rules for the implementation of a common policy. It seems 
that they had perceived and understood the implications which a common 
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commercial policy could have had in recent years, but they could not 
agree on rules especially in the external sphere.
fJo far, the Community's embryonic commercial policy has not 3
proved beneficial to the evolution of the GATT system. In particular, 
the Community's as such and its member states' protectionist tendencies 
in recent times have had unfavourable effects. As each country and 
each industry tries to protect itself from foreign competition , the 
CCP can hardly reach the level of a common policy in many respects. 
Individual interests and political forces involved in a so highly 
important area of international economic relations make a common 
approach extremely difficult.
One important question to be asked is whether the EEC external 
trade policy has contributed to integration or disintegration of GATT. 
The answer to this question is very difficult. It is clear that the 
Community's policy has not helped GATT to integrate. If the CCP had 
been implemented applying common rules and principles to the outside 
world that would mean for GATT that it could be in a position to benefit 
from the implementation of the CCP and therefore in the long-run broaden 
its objectives and fulfil its aims.
In general, however, the Community's policy can be beneficial 
on the GATT system as long as the Community pursues liberal trade 
policies towards the outside world. If the Community follows pro­
tectionist policies then we cannot expect its contribution to the GATT 
system and to the world economy as a whole, to be beneficial.
In the EEC, the ECJ has recently dealt with some cases and
opinions concerning the external relations of the Community, (see 
Chapter 3). In this context, it will gradually build up a system of 
Community common law applicable to the Community’s external relations 
which,in the course of time,can become more precise and detailed. Thus
the ECJ will build up a body of case law, which may contribute to the
general development of law at the international economic level.
One of the most problematic areas in the context of the EEC's 
external trade relations falling within the jurisdiction of the GATT 
system, which has been considered in the present study concerns the 
EEC's approach to the third world, i.e. the EEC’s Association policy. 
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Since the establishment of the EEC this issue has been one of the 
most disputed and controversial. The GATT agreement and in particular 
Art. XXIV provides that customs unions or free-trade areas' are permitted 
to operate within its framework, provided that their aims and objectives 
are not contradictory to its (GATT rules). In fact, regional arrange­
ments were to be included within the GATT system. Although in the
late 1940s few regional arrangements existed, they have been encouraged 
within the multilateral framework in order to increase freedom of trade, 
integration between economies, to accelerate development and promote 
rational allocation of world resources. Regional arrangements had
been seen as gradual steps towards freer non-discriminatory world trade 
and therefore Art. XXIV was included in the GATT. It was envisaged 
that free world trade would be, at first, achieved gradually through 
smaller international economic groupings and later would take place 
at international level. Art. XXIV was seen as an important attempt
to increase world trade and help the world trading system develop.
Art. XXIV has put regional arrangements under multilateral control and 
has tried to maintain a balance between those countries participating 
and those not participating in regional arrangements.
Apart from customs unions or free-trade areas however, no other 
regional arrangements have been permitted within the GATT system. With ; 
particular reference to preferential agreements they are forbidden, 
except those previously in existence. Instead the G.A. provides for 
the system of a waiver from its rules, which can be obtained when a 
certain action is not in conformity with the GATT rules. It is worth 
noting that the EEC is the only bloc which has negotiated a large number 
of preferential agreements. In the case of the early preferential agree? 
ments a waiver could have been obtained by the EEC, but felt that 
there was no need to do so. The existence of the preferential agree­
ments and their further proliferation has raised several questions 
however. In particular their application and their submission to
the concept of regional arrangements and their impact on the GATT legal 
system has been examined. In accordance with the GATT rules, when
regional arrangements are formed they should be submitted to GATT for 
approval. Therefore, all preferential agreements should be
submitted to GATT, although there is no need to do so in the case of 
other agreements, such as commercial agreements. The particular
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aspects of the regional arrangements should be examined in the light 
of the GATT rules. So far the GATT has approved all regional arrange­
ments which have been submitted to it, although they were not in full 
compliance with its requirements.
The EEC, which is based on a customs union, was submitted for
■scrutiny to GATT. The EEC which is considered to be the only complete 
customs union so far had been subjected to a great deal of criticism.
Its CET, its QRs provisions, its agricultural provisions and in particular 
its provisions concerning association with overseas countries and 
territories of the member states were the main legal issues, which were 
discussed by the Working Party. But the question which became the
bone of contention concerned the EEC's association policy. Long and 
arduous discussions took place concerning this issue,and different 
opinions were expressed by the contracting parties. The interests of 
the EEC and of the LDCs had to be taken into consideration. The EEC 
had pressed hard that the association provisions be considered as being 
in compliance with the GATT rules. The LDCs outside the associated 
policy framework were at that time either under colonial rule or too 
weak to react. The USA supported the EEC in its arguments and so did 
the other major industrialised countries.
The GATT Working Party tried to reconcile the interests of both 
the EEC and the LDCs and interpret the relevant issue very broadly.
Some members of the sub-group strongly criticised the EEC association 
policy as being contrary to GATT. During the negotiations and "in 
several instances reconciliation of interests was brought about by 
adopting measures that were in violation of the GATT rules or at least 
close to the line". (See above Chapter 4, p. 113. ). The statement of 
the Working Party that "it would be more fruitful if attention could 
be directed to specific and practical problems, leaving aside for the 
time being questions of law and debates about the compatibility of the 
Rome Treaty with Art. XXIV of the G.A," was very characteristic of the 
adherence to the practical problems and to their potential influence 
which has marked the future of the preferential agreements. In the 
end the Working Party, despite controversies on the various issues 
involved, did not explicitly approve the EEC as a customs union con­
sistent with the GATT rules, neither did it recommend any measure to 
be taken, nor disapprove the arrangement as it stood.
An /
316
An important legal question which can be raised at this point 
of the discussion is whether Art. XXIV makes the formation of a customs 
union or a free-trade area dependent upon an approval on the part of 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT. From the foregoing analysis it is 
obvious that Art. XXIV does not empower the CONTRACTING PARTIES to set 
the necessary conditions for a legal formation of a regional arrange­
ment such as a customs union. The contracting parties are only 
competent to find out whether such arrangements are compatible with 
Art. XXIV or not This means that ithas been the CONTRACTING PARTIES
which have determined the compatibility of the EEC Treaty with the 
provisions of the G.A., without having examined whether the EEC as 
a customs union meets the necessary requirements or not. In 
particular, the issue of preferential agreements was accepted within 
the GATT system in practice as a measure regulating international 
economic relations. The Working Party's report was characterised
by its vagueness and inconclusiveness. The report, however, has 
constituted a precedent on which all subsequent preferential agreements 
have relied to justify their position as measures complying with the 
GATT rules. This case illustrates the fact of how the leading 
trading powers (EEC, USA) have influenced GATT affairs and how the 
GATT system gave way to the EEC's demands. In consequence the GATT's 
legal structure has been weakened by the EEC's participation and 
gradually become ineffective to deal with these particular problems.
Thereafter the EEC negotiated a great number of preferential 
agreements, e.g. with AASM, later Lome countries, and with the 
Mediterranean countries. In every case when an association agreement 
is negotiated it is submitted to GATT for consideration. Specifically 
the Yaounde Conventions, the Arusha Convention, the Lome Convention, 
the association agreements with Greece and Turkey, the association 
agreements with all Mediterranean countries were submitted to the 
appropriate procedure in GATT. No definite conclusion was reached 
in any single case. The provisions concerning the association agree­
ments of the EEC Treaty have been tacitly accepted within the GATT 
system and they have constituted a precedent for following association 
agreements, In all cases pragmatic considerations had to be taken 
into account. The EEC’s point was that the essential principles
of free-world trade have been maintained and that its association 
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agreements have not violated the spirit of GATT, In particular 
after the GATT amendments in 1955 and 1964 the EEC had maintained that 
the principle that LDCs should receive differential and more favour­
able treatment was accepted by the international Community and has been 
contained in a number of important issues of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
The Community had strongly supported the maintenance of preferential 
agreements especially after the application of its global Mediterranean 
policy. It further maintained that preferential agreements aim 
primarily at the economic and social benefits of the LDCs and therefore 
the objectives and aims of the agreements coincide with the objectives 
and aims of the G.A. and the EEC. Treaty. In fact, after the amend­
ment of GATT and the addition of Part IV, preferential agreements are 
accorded more sympathetic treatment in GATT. Furthermore, it seems 
that the aims and objectives of Part IV coincide with the Lome 
Convention which aims at the improvement of standards of living and 
at the economic development and industrialisation of the LDCs.
In this context an important question which can be treated 
concerns the effects of the preferential agreements on the countries 
involved, on those not involved and on the world trading system.
There is no doubt that the countries involved have benefited from 
preferential agreements. Even the hardest critics cannot deny the 
beneficial effects. Nevertheless, there are complaints for example
in ACP countries about the EEC’s sugar policy and the limited effects 
of the STABEX system, but the overall impact is beneficial. On the 
other hand the non-as so dated countries are unhappy because they feel 
discriminated against and point out that the association agreements 
have worked to their detriment. There is no doubt that preferential 
agreements cause distortions in favour of the preferred countries, 
especially for the most advanced of them as against LDCs' and LLDCs' 
interests. The citrus fruit case discussed in Chapter 5, which ended 
in a compromise between the EEC and the USA, has illustrated the dis­
advantageous trade position in which a third country (Brazil) found 
itself, because it did not have links with the EEC in any kind of 
preferential agreement. Comparing the EEC’s preferential agreements,
notably the Lome Convention and the association policy with the 
Mediterranean countries, with the agreements with the non-associated 
countries or those outside the preferential framework we may reach the 
following conclusions :
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The associated countries enjoy more benefits than any other 
LDCs or groups of LDCs. They have duty-free access to the EEC.
Tariffs and QRs have been substantially reduced. For example, the 
Lome Convention is more generous in trade co-operation in agriculture 
where practically all GSPs schemes are relatively weak. The
associated countries want the maintenance and Improvement of the 
association agreements. Even for sensitive products like textiles 
the association agreements contain no additional restrictions.
Financial and technical support is provided for the associated 
countries. The Lome Convention which is the most favourable arrange^ 
ment provides the STABEX system for the stabilisation of export earnings 
and furthermore it, the Lome Convention, establishes the principle of 
non-reciprocity.
For the non-associated countries on the other hand financial 
and technological aid is not provided on the same basis as applicable to 
associated partners, and their exports to the Community are relatively 
limited. Furthermore, no scheme parallel to STABEX has been estab­
lished, which could provide for security of their export earnings. Of 
course it is not easy to assess exactly the advantages enjoyed by assoc­
iates, but it is certain that the EEC is not prepared to make similar 
concessions to the non-associates, nor is it prepared to establish a 
global policy towards the LDCs. The EEC, however, being aware of the 
fact that links with the LDCs are essential for its progress and 
economic prosperity and that some kind of balance should be attained 
between associates and non-associates, was the first to implement its 
GSP in 1971, obtained in a form of a waiver from the GATT obligations.
The GSP grants all LDCs a relatively limited preferential status. It 
does not include financial transfer or measures for industrial and 
technological co-operation, nor does it include provisions for reduction 
of NTBs, and it cannot counterbalance the benefits given to the associates. 
Further, the GSP is of uncertain continuance and its reductions can be 
withdrawn unilaterally, without any reference to multilateral procedures. 
Also reductions at an MFN basis cannot be promoted.
Therefore, the GSP has not proved sufficient to offset the 
advantageous position attained under preferential agreements. The 
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non-associated countries consequently criticise the preferential 
agreements for the fact that they cause significant distortion of
trade in favour of the preferred countries. The discriminatory
character of the preferential agreements is stressed by many critics 
who believe that even if justified as FTAs, they would still be dis­
criminatory. On the other hand the EEC has been criticised for its
attempts to follow the tactics of "divide and rule" towards the LDCs
and therefore, to prevent them from uniting. This is a particular 
problem in the light of current depressing economic problems,
A global approach for all LDCs is favoured by UNCTAD. However,
this demand for uniform treatment to all LDCs has met with a lot of 
difficulties. The Brandt Report I, also supports a global approach
towards the LDCs, facilitating thus their export opportunities in a 
uniform manner. It envisages that the industrialised world including 
the EEC should help the poor and it argues for the adoption of a radical 
change in their relations so as to open their markets to LDCs' exports. 
This could be achieved within the framework of the North-South Dialogue 
or within the GATT framework. In the GATT a separate approach for 
LDCs has already been achieved but the classification of the LDCs as 
advanced developing countries, developing countries and least developing 
countries, might help the establishment of a more fair and equitable 
world trading system, according to which each particular group should 
be accorded different treatment, in accordance with its economic 
development. This would seem a rational way of proceeding particularly
if the GNP of each country were to be taken into account.
The Community has not reached a common external trade policy 
in respect of all LDCs, but deals separately with each group. That 
approach has been criticised as weakening the negotiating position of 
the LDCs within GATT. Such a common position is extremely difficult 
to achieve, since the LDCs* degree of development varies and therefore 
a common approach to the problem might not only be difficult but might 
prove unfavourable to the LLDCs. For example, as the EEC maintains,
LDCs should not be given the same treatment as NICs. The letter's 
exports which are advanced and competitive should be more tightly 
regulated. Therefore, it is submitted that a change in trade rules 
with the third world is needed. With particular reference to NICs, 
the EEC Commission urges that they should assume some kind of responsib­
ility and that differential and more favourable treatment should be 
granted to remaining LDCs,
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A global approach towards LDCs should focus on the social and 
economic progress of the LDCs and particularly the least developed 
countries. A global approach can be achieved by granting more 
preferences to the non-associates and by not extending them to 
associates, in particular to the ACP countries. Such an approach 
would be beneficial to the Community’s external trade relations to the 
extent that controversies arising would be solved and criticism against 
its development policy would be diminished.
Nevertheless, the global approach forwarded by UNCTAD is
difficult to achieve and implement. The EEC is not prepared to grant■other LDCs the same preferences as to the associates in particular for 
the time being under the depressing economic climate of deepening 
recession and growing unemployment.
The EEC is the only trading bloc in the world which has 
developed thus far the system of preferential trade agreements. What­
ever the limitations of these arrangements might be, there are certain 
beneficial effects for the countries involved. . For the EEC, in , . 'K
particular, there are certain economic (e.g. security of supplies of
:
raw materials), but above all political gains. The USA now proposes 
to offer to a number of countries in the Caribbean basin, non-reciprocal 
and preferential treatment access.
However, these preferential agreements pose a dilemma to the 
world trading system. Preferential agreements are not incorporated in 
Art. XXIV and therefore are not legal under the GATT system and in
particular Art. I of the MFN principle. In practice, however, they
.have proliferated and have been accepted as measures equivalent to free 
trade areas. Their existence in practical terms creates no problems 
in GATT. Dam has expressed the view that preferential agreements
should be subjected to the same treatment under Art.XXIV as customs unions or 
free-trade areas. It seems that today this is the best proposition 
that can be made about the specific problems of preferential agreements 
and their position in the world trading legal system.
As we have seen throughout Chapter 5 association agreements 
involving a preferential character or any other preferential agreements 
concluded by the Community have been submitted to the GATT appropriate 
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procedure for consideration, according to its rules. The EEC's
■■i 
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approach is that they constitute free-trade areas and therefore are in 
full compliance with the GATT. This approach has not been explicitly 
accepted nor rejected, however, by the GATT Working Parties. Prefer­
ential agreements have been tacitly accepted as measures regulating 
trade within the GATT system. In fact, their proliferation has made 
the GATT increasingly ineffective and its legal machinery of Art.XXIV 
inadequate to deal with the relevant problems arising from these agree­
ments. In consequence, the MFN principle has been violated by pre­
ferential agreements. Although the GATT system in principle prohibits 
preferential agreement, in fact it has encouraged the formation and 
proliferation of such agreements. In consequence it is the GATT 
system itself which did not adheie to the rigid application of Art. I.
The EEC in the course of time has shown a preference Tor the 
conclusion of preferential agreements. As we have seen during the 
negotiation of the first agreements, i.e. the association agreements 
with Greece and Turkey and the first agreement with Israel»the EEC 
was very concerned about the respect for the GATT rules, whereas later 
it showed a clear preference.for preferential agreements and therefore, 
it did not act in full compliance with the GATT rules. GATT, however,
has shown its institutional weakness, when it was called upon to con­
sider the first preferential agreements. Already, since the consider­
ation of the EEC compatibility and in particular the compatibility of 
its association provisions with the G.A. and thereafter in the con­
sideration of all the preferential agreements presented to GATT (e.g. 
association agreements with Greece and Turkey, association agreements 
with the Yaounde countries, the Arusha Convention, the Lome Convention 
and association agreements with Mediterranean countries), it was 
always the GATT which gave way to the EEC, As the proliferation of 
preferential agreements has weakened the MFN principle,the GATT system 
as a whole has consequently been undermined. Art. XXIV as it stands 
now has proved insufficiently capable of coping with existing economic 
and legal issues and therefore needs to be revised and updated, in order 
to have more control over regional arrangements. Therefore, an 
amendment of Art. XXIV in order to embrace all regional arrangements is 
recommended. The incorporation of preferential agreements into the 
GATT /
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IGATT framework (i.e. Art. XXIV) would sufficiently safeguard the 
interests of the non-associated countries, whose interest should be 
taken into account. Such an incorporation within the GATT system, 
however, might guarantee uniform preferential treatment to all LDCs. 
Already LDCs favour this approach. UNCTAD is pushing forwards for 
the adoption of this approach. The Tokyo Round has recognised 
that preferentional treatment to LDCs should be accepted as a permanent 
feature of the world trading system, rather than as a temporary solution.
However, extreme caution is needed in drawing conclusions in 
such a highly sensitive issue. In fact, preferential agreements 
have fragmented the GATT legal system and in general the world trading 
system. As a consequence of the proliferation of preferential
agreements the EEC faces the allegation of wrecking the GATT trading 
system. But the blame cannot go altogether to the EEC. It is
the GATT which has tacitly allowed preferential agreements to operate 
within its framework and has deprived itself of its legal background, 
the MFN principle and the principle of reciprocity.
Therefore, the EEC with its extensive preferential framework 
has weakened the GATT system.. On the other hand it, the EEC, has 
been a powerful force in regulating world trade and it has contributed 
to changing the GATT system, so that there is need to be adapted to 
the new conditions and new economic realities. Thus the EEC has 
contributed to the establishment of the differential and more favour­
able treatment to LDCs, in particular to the associated countries and 
to the establishment of the principle of non-reciprocity towards the 
ACP countries, incorporated in the Lome Conventions.
In considering the compatibility issue of the EEC with the 
G.A. and in particular with Art. XXIV, a very•important legal question 
can be raised relating to the legal status of the EEC Treaty within the 
GATT legal system. This question has never been raised or considered 
by GATT bodies, while it is open to question whether a customs union 
could accede to GATT under Art. XXIV. (Art. XXXIII admits accession 
of customs territories into the GATT provided that a customs union is 
recognised as "a government acting on behalf of a separate customs 
territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external 
commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this 
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Agreement"), The fact, however, remains that the GATT^ despite the 
existence of a large number of customs unions, free-trade areas and 
interim agreements has not as yet developed precise rules for the 
interpretation of Art. XXIV and for the legal status of those arrange­
ments in GATT. In this context, the EEC has gradually replaced 
its member states in their external relations, although member states 
still have some role to play by concluding jointly with the Community 
the so-called ’mixed agreements’ or by exercising the voting power.
The EEC since the Dillon Round has been accepted as a separate entity 
to conclude tariff and non-tariff matters within the GATT framework.
The contracting parties to GATT have raised no question as regards the 
EEC's participation and have tacitly accepted the EEC's right to 
exercise rights and fulfil obligations under the GATT. The EEC is 
not a full contracting party to GATT and therefore its position is 
sui generis. While it has been integrated ipso jure as a de facto 
contracting party within the GATT, the question of gradual substitution 
of the member states in terms of the general principles of Treaty 
law or in terms of customary law has remained purely theoretical in 
GATT practice. For example, since the early 1970s, the EEC has 
substituted its member stateb in the dispute settlement procedure.
Disputes are directed against the EEC as a customs union and not 
against its member states. At the same time the EEC member states 
have not been deprived of their legal membership status. Double 
participation by the EEC and its member states have been effected 
without the need for following a formal procedure. The GATT has 
avoided any precise and legal definition concerning the legal status 
of the EEC in GATT, as practical considerations have prevailed.
It is a fact, however, that international law has not yet 
developed generally accepted rules on the legal issue of succession 
of international organisations to the rights and obligations of their 
member states and on their participation in other international 
organisations (e.g. the EEC in GATT). This sensitive legal issue f
has been tackled not by the establishment of relevant legal rules but 
by adherence to pragmatic approaches. There are these pragmatic 
considerations, nevertheless, in GATT and in MTNs committees which 
have resulted in the difficulty of determining precise legal rules.
As a consequence of this, in GATT practice most of the legal issues 
raised since the creation of the EEC and thereinafter during MTNs 
have remained theoretical.
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As has been discussed in Chapter 6 agricultural trade has 
been one of the most disputed and controversial issues. The G.A. 
makes no distinction between industrial and agricultural products, 
neither does it make explicit reference to agriculture. The EEC
Treaty provisions, on the one hand, apply to both industrial and 
agricultural products, but particular reference to the latter is made 
including special provisions relating to agriculture in Arts. 38-47.
In practice, however, identical treatment is not accorded in GATT for both 
categories of products. Agricultural products are treated as a 
separate sector more or less outside the GATT system. When the
G.A. was drafted it was felt that there was no need to include 
separate provisions concerning agriculture. Later when agriculture 
started to cause problems the USA obtained a waiver in 1955 and 
thereafter it, the USA, was neither in a strong position to negotiate 
over agriculture, nor wanted to give up its agricultural waiver. The 
EEC on the other hand attached greater importance to the development of 
the CAP and obviously wanted to limit its international commitments.. 
This attitude might be attributable, however, to the sensitive nature 
of agriculture. The need to stabilise farm incomes, to ensure 
national security in difficult periods, to secure food supplies in case 
of fluctuations due to weather, disease, etc., have made the regulation 
of trade in this sector an extremely complicated matter. However, 
due to the sensitive nature of agriculture, protection has become 
inevitable. The EEC's CAP has stemmed from this perspective, and
established a system of high guaranteed prices, in order to stabilise 
incomes and secure food supplies. Agriculture has caused concern
since the EEC's establishment. When in 1957 the GATT Working Party was 
established, with the aim' of examining the most important areas which 
might be in conflict with the G.A., agriculture was one of the four 
main legal issues for consideration. The inconsistency or not of
the provisions concerned (i.e. Arts. 38 - 47 EEC.) with Art. XXIV:4 
had specifically to be examined. Sub-group C which was appointed
to examine this issue, had to examine minimum import prices and the 
development of long-term agreements of the EEC Treaty and the problems 
that might arise as a result of their implementation. Therefore,
the argument put forward by the EC that no barriers to trade had been 
raised by the EEC's CAP to other contracting parties had to be taken 
into consideration. The USA, the major protagonist in GATT affairs 
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had a similar support system mechanism and therefore was . .
not in a position to press for free agricultural trade nor did it 
desire to do so in products covered by its own support system . The 
voice of the LDCs was non-existent at that time and no other country 
or group of countries was a major agricultural producer and therefore 
in a position to criticise the EEC's agricultural policy.
Under these circumstances the majority of the sub-group 
considered that it was impossible to determine the compatibility of 
the agricultural provisions with the G.A. In particular it considered 
that "neither the EEC provision as such, nor the Community Institutions 
had acted contrary to their international commitments".
Nevertheless, the agricultural policy has been the most con­
troversial issue throughout the history and life of GATT. Several of 
the major disputes in GATT have arisen over agriculture and especially 
between the EEC and the USA. Some cases illustrate the high in­
volvement of the EEC's agricultural policy in the most difficult 
disputes which have arisen within the GATT framework. For example, 
the "cheese war" case, the only case which resulted in retaliation known 
as the "Netherlands retaliation", involved agriculture. The citrus 
fruit waiver case involving agriculture was directed against the EEC,
The sugar complaints by Australia and Brazil involved agricultural 
products and were also directed against the EEC. Currently most of 
the trade disputes involve agriculture (e.g. Egypt wheat flour case).
It is remarkable, however, that all those disputes involve one or 
another way the EEC. The consideration of the above and other cases 
throughout the present thesis, has illustrated the fact, that the EEC's 
agricultural policy has disturbed world markets. This disturbance is 
due to the price support system, established with the purpose of 
stabilising domestic markets and incomes. The CAP to this end has 
encouraged high prices which have led to increased output by exceeding 
its domestic requirements. Surpluses have had to be disposed of with 
the help of the required subsidies.
The CAP with its high subsidised exports has, therefore, created
strains not only in the industrialised countries but also in some LDCs 
as well, which produce competitive agricultural products (e.g. the 
Mediterranean countries). Even in the Lome Convention there is some 
restraint on agricultural products. The GSP also does not allow duty­
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free access into the Community of agricultural products.
Although the GATT provides for the same treatment for 
industrial and agricultural products, agriculture is the sector which 
has not sufficiently been subjected to the liberalisation process. In 
practice it is not included in GATT. In particular the EEC has not 
accepted within the GATT framework similar treatment for industrial 
and agricultural products. It proposes that agriculture be treated 
separately. Agricultural committees have been established within 
GATT but no progress has been made towards trade liberalisation. The 
EEC attaches great importance to its CAP and in the GATT Conference in 
November 1982 it made it clear that nothing can be agreed which might 
adversely affect its CAP. The EEC refused to accept any commitment 
to include agriculture in the working of the procedures of the multi­
lateral trading system. The USA supported the view that agriculture 
should be included in the negotiations, but any common approach was 
upset by the EEC’s separate declaration over agriculture in the 
Conference.
Trade in agriculture is a peculiar case within GATT. The 
structure of the Community's agricultural policy, with its high price 
support system mechanism is contrary to the GATT approach to free-world 
trade. Therefore the agricultural policy as such does not fit within 
the GATT system. Agriculture is a peculiar sector by its nature and
remains such in the way it has developed and functioned thereafter.
The EEC and the USA both have high protection systems in agriculture.
In the USA indirect payments to farmers, indirect subsidies, restrictive 
import policies, subsidised exports and in the EEC the high price 
support system mechanism, heavily subsidised exports, variable import 
levies, produce the same results. For the USA the 1955 waiver is 
still in existence. Consequently the USA is not in a position to 
push towards trade liberalisation in agricultural products, unless it 
is prepared to give up its agricultural waiver, an action which is un­
likely to take place. The EEC on the other hand with its high pro­
tective mechanism and with its powerful political machinery does not 
intend to accept the regulation of agricultural trade within the GATT 
system. The GATT failure to liberalise trade in agriculture is due
to these two trends: the insistence of the USA to retain its waiver
and of the EEC to treat agriculture as a separate sector.
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Agriculture is a highly important area for all countries for 
many reasons. For the EEC its CAP is even more important because it 
provides one of the bases for its continuance and unity.
In the major agricultural producing countries and notably in 
the EEC many forms of protection have been employed, which are damaging 
to world markets. Alternative measures are also difficult to apply, 
as long as agriculture is excluded from international scrutiny. In 
particular subsidies as discussed in Chapter 6 distort international 
trade and also production in the sense that production is discouraged 
in countries with lower costs. According to Art. XVI of GATT, export 
subsidies for primary products are explicitly allowed under the GATT 
rules, provided that export refunds are not used to obtain "more than 
an equitable share of world markets". The EEC maintains that agri­
cultural products, as primary products, can be subsidised and has often 
been accused of subsidising its exports. It resorts to Art. XVI to 
justify its actions. However, many legal questions have arisen as 
regards this issue, for example, when are the subsidies unfair? What 
constitutes an 'unfair subsidy'? What is "equitable share"?. Lack 
of an appropriate body to interpret these ambiguous terms constitutes 
a very serious shortcoming of the system. The Australian and Brazilian 
complaints against subsidised EEC sugar exports illustrate the ineffect­
iveness of the Panels in reaching definite conclusions as to whether 
the EEC had obtained "more than an equitable share in world markets". 
Therefore, more concrete rules on subsidies are required. As we 
have seen, neither Art. XVI of the G.A., nor the Subsidies Code have 
proved sufficient to deal with particularly difficult legal problems.
The interests of third countries are not sufficiently taken into 
consideration. Furthermore , recession has made the task harder. 
Subsidies are now used for the same purposes as tariffs and other trade 
restrictive devices which GATT was established to reduce. Common 
understanding and co-operation is fundamentally important. Adoption 
and implementation of à common position about interpretative problems 
is a delicate and very difficult area. In particular in agricultural 
issues adoption of a common position is extremely difficult. Many 
interests are involved both in the EEC and the USA,where powerful farm 
producer lobbies influence foreign economic policy-making of the relevant 
governments. /
328
governments. The USA tends unilaterally to interpret important 
terms, such as what are ’equitable shares', which the other countries 'do not accept.
The EEC's point is that its subsidies on agricultural products 
are not illegal under GATT Art. XVI : 3 and the Subsidies Code. For 
example in the sugar cases no inconsistency of the CAP with international 
trading rules has been found. The Panels did not definitely conclude 
whether or not the EEC had obtained more than an 'equitable share' of 
world trade in sugar and therefore, whether or not the EEC's action 
was compatible with Art. XVI : 3 and the Subsidies Code. But, never­
theless, they concluded that the EEC sugar policy had disturbed world 
marke ts.
Recently, however, a number of complaints have been raised 
by the USA against the EEC's CAP. Since 1980, in particular, the 
number of complaints directed against the CAP have multiplied. The 
USA maintains that the EEC has deviated from the principles arid aims
as set out in its preamble and Arts. 110 and 38-47 of the EEC Treaty,
and that the CAP contradicts the GATT rules and in any case violates 
the spirit of the GATT. On the other hand, the EEC maintains that
its agricultural practices are in conformity with the GATT rules and
the Subsidies Code and the other relevant agreements reached during the 
Tokyo Round have only recently been put into operation. The EEC
furthermore stresses that subsidies on agricultural products are 
permissible under GATT Art. XVI:3 and Art. 10 of the Subsidies Code.
However, USA complaints against the CAP illustrate the fact 
either that the EEC's practices violate the rules of GATT or that this 
revival of complaints gives the Reagan Administration the hope that the 
EEC farm policy might change through direct pressure and official 
complaints to the GATT. Obviously the USA's aim is to oblige the 
EEC to make more concessions and that is why it, the USA, maintains ihat 
the EEC's agricultural trade has distorted world trade. The USA is 
not blameless in this matter, since it has long had a waiver for its 
agricultural protectionism and it is now threatening retaliation.
The main problem today, however, is over-production and self- 
sufficiency in all the leading world trading powers. Therefore, un­
certainty and confrontation at world level are unavoidable. Restrictions 
result from this practice. Problems are aggravated by the fact that 
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agriculture has long been kept av/ay from any form of international sur­
veillance. It is worth noting in this context that the EEC in 
economic terms seems to win the cases brought against its CAP before 
the GATT in the sense that the conclusions of the Panels tend to a 
more favourable treatment to the EEC than its adversaries. It is 
argued that this is because the Community is a powerful trading power 
making excellent diplomatic representations and preparing its documents 
in such a way so that no one can overturn its arguments. The major 
question remains as to the impact of the CAP on the world trading 
system. Although export subsidies on primary products are permitted 
under Art. XVI:3 of the GATT and the Subsidies Code (Art. 10:3) there 
is no indication whatsoever that the EEC in subsidising its agricultural 
exports is acting illegally within the GATT framework. In practice 
however, the situation is quite the contrary. There is no doubt that 
some sort of uncertainty has been introduced into world markets and to 
some extent distortion of world trade has resulted. Such practices 
have not contributed to liberalising international trade in agriculture 
and therefore are contrary to the spirit of the G.A. and depress world 
markets. The EEC should exercise some kind of restraint over export 
subsidies, with a view to liberalising agriculture within GATT in a 
manner satisfactory and acceptable to the greatest possible extent to 
all contracting parties.
Another very important area which has been the subject of 
study in the present thesis relates to the EEC's involvement in 
negotiating VER agreements, which have had a great influence on world 
trade law. Most of the VER agreements are negotiated outside the 
scope of the GATT framework with the only exception being the MFAs.
This means that all VER agreements, apart from the MFAs, have been 
negotiated bilaterally outside the concept of international trade rules, 
outside multilateral surveillance.
VER agreements are negotiated outwith the rule of GATT law 
and constitute a derogation from the basic principles of GATT, in 
particular the MFN principle, to the extent that they have shifted 
international trade from a multilateral to a bilateral level. Never­
theless in practice they have tacitly been accepted as measures 
regulating trade and they are preferable to other restrictive measures 
or to quotas. But although their practical importance cannot be 
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denied, in particular as far as sensitive industries are concerned, yet 
their legal basis raises many questions. VER agreements are designed 
to deal with "substantial shifts in trade patterns in short periods 
of time". They are negotiated in areas where difficulties arise due
to the unforseen and too rapid expansion of exports which cause market 
disruption and where the domestic industries are unable to meet foreign 
competition. They aim at the reduction of imports which disturb
markets.
VER agreements result from the weakness of the GATT system 
which does not provide sufficient safeguard provisions preventing or 
discouraging resort to VER agreements outside the norms of the inter­
national trading system. The GATT system has not adequately dealt
with this specific problem. VER agreements produce to some extent 
the same results as quotas and they are both NTBs. For NTBs unfor­
tunately, not much progress has been made despite the fact that during 
the Tokyo Round efforts were made so as to reduce NTBs. In the context 
of NTBs, VER agreements and OMAs have not even been considered. 
Multilateralisation of VERs is very important, therefore, as multi­
lateralisation would help the system improve. LDCs complain about
the adverse effects of the VERs on their exports (e.g. textiles, footwear) 
and are pressing that VERs should be subjected to international control.
The main safeguard clause is Art. XIX which provides for 
regulation of trade in some sensitive areas. Art, XIX authorises the 
contracting parties to take protective measures for domestic industries, 
when certain criteria are met. It is designed to reduce imports
and to safeguard domestic markets, when there.is evidence of serious 
injury. It is to cover emergency situations and for a limited period 
of time. In practice, Art. XIX has not proved adequate to cope with 
emerging difficulties , and has been ineffective in coping with VER 
agreements,
Multilateral surveillance over VER agreements would certainly 
benefit all countries involved, but not those outside VERs since the 
interests of third countries are not taken into account. The pro­
liferation of VERs is detrimental to the world economy. Anxiety 
therefore, concerning the prospects of international trade and the GATT 
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system is widespread. Absence of multilateral surveillance was 
evident during the Tokyo Round, where no rules concerning VER agree­
ments were adopted. Also the GATT Conference of November 1982 did 
nothing to prevent VER agreements, nor to improve the GATT safeguards 
rules. Therefore, the spread of protectionism and bilateral trade 
dealings have emerged as a threat to the GATT principle of multi­
lateral trade.
In the light of this situation, an effective safeguards system 
is needed to face the difficulties, either through the revision of 
Art. XIX or by the establishment of a Safeguards Code, A Safeguards 
Code is currently under discussion within the GATT system, but it has 
proved difficult to establish a suitable legal framework. It is 
recognised that a multilateral control system of VERs is needed, although 
the major trading powers are not keen to move in this direction. Multi­
lateral surveillance needs to be strengthened in order to prevent the 
abuse of both selective and global safeguard measures. This system 
should include an agreed framework of rights and obligation.
It is worth noting once more, that one of the most serious 
obstacles in the development of liberal trade rules is the absence of 
an interpretative machinery for the definition and interpretation of 
certain legal norms, such as "market disruption", which today remain un­
resolved within the GATT system. An improved safeguards system is 
needed, whether in the form of a revised GATT Article or a Code which 
would be capable of dealing with emerging difficult situations, so as 
to enable industries to adjust. For the LDCs especially, an effective 
and open safeguard system is so important for the further growth of 
their exports. Therefore, adjustment should be the task ahead and 
not protective measures. Protection is not an alternative to adjust­
ment . Nevertheless, certain sensitive industries need protection in 
order to adjust and compete, but unlimited use of VERs leads to 
different results. Protection whenever necessary should be brought 
within the GATT system, where it would be under pressure of i n t e r ­
national control and subject to bargaining. This is the rationale 
behind introducing safeguard clauses into any multilateral economic 
text. VERs in fact represent the inability of industries to adjust
to competitive pressures and to co-operate. This tendency towards 
bilateralism and sectoralism is a great danger to order and prosperity 
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in the world economy. The negative consequences of VERs are more 
depressing, when the governments having already used VERs and having 
overcome the difficulties, are unwilling to make the necessary adjust­
ments which the system demands, and for which VERs are normally adopted. 
Protective measures within the context of Art. XIX or within the appro­
priate codes should therefore be established as an exception and not as 
a rule, aiming at helping the sensitive industries to cope with current 
difficulties.
The particular example of textiles deserves, however, special 
attention. Textiles is the most developed manufacturing sector in 
LDCs and they attach great importance to this sector as the basis for 
their industrialisation and export growth. Since the early 1960s the 
need for an orderly arrangement of trade in textiles has been recognised. 
The MFAs have been negotiated within the GATT system as a legal basis 
for regulating trade in textiles. Therefore, respect for the GATT 
rules and for multilateral surveillance has been acknowledged. Having 
regard to the fact that the MFAs are the only arrangement negotiated 
within GATT, their significance on the world trading system is remarkable. 
The MFAs are an exception and it can be said an unavoidable exception 
and derogation from the GATT rules. In fact, no waiver was requested, 
but these arrangements constitute measures equivalent to waivers. On 
the other hand if no such arrangements had been negotiated, MFAs either 
would have been negotiated outside the GATT system, as with other VER 
agreements, or an amendment to the GATT rules would have taken place 
or import quotas would have been established unilaterally to reduce 
imports. The MFA came into existence in order to avoid unilateral 
import controls, unfavourable to importing and exporting countries and 
to legalise an action which would violate the most basic principle of 
GATT, the MFN principle of multilateral trade. Accordingly, trade in 
textiles is regulated through bilateral agreements, which are subjected 
to multilateral control. However, particular attention was paid to 
the MFA when it was negotiated, in order to bring it into line with the 
other GATT rules, such as Arts. XIX, XII, VI and XVI. The participating 
countries stressed the need to safeguard their domestic industries in 
case of "market disruption" arising out of unregulated expansion and too 
rapid influx of imports from low-cost suppliers.
The LDCs are unhappy with the MFAs. They restrict imports
and /
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and prevent LDCs from industrialising. It is regrettable that 
restrictions in trade in textiles came into being when LDCs had developed 
export orientated policies in this sector. The DCs, in particular the 
USA and the EEC have developed very protectionist measures and they have 
negotiated a series of bilateral restrictive agreements. The EEC has 
negotiated with its Associated countries (e.g. Mediterranean countries) 
restrictive agreements and even with some LLDCs such as Bangladesh.
Also its GSP does not include textiles in the category of products which 
can enter the Community duty-free. Despite this the EEC claims that 
it is the only major economic bloc which grants substantial tariff 
preferences for textiles. The fact, however, remains that tariffs
on textiles are higher than in any other manufactured sector (more than 
10%) .
The MFAs are designed to protect sensitive industries In DCs 
and give them "a breathing space" to adjust and also to maintain further 
economic growth and social development in LDCs, with the ultimate 
objective of liberalising trade in textiles. Yet in practice the 
MFAs grew very restrictive in particular the second and even more the 
third. It was hoped that the MFA would be a temporary arrangement,
yet adjustment has not taken place and it has developed as a permanent 
feature in regulating international trade in textiles. Therefore, so
far, the objectives of the MFAs have not been fulfilled as was originally 
envisaged.
The textiles sector in DCs undoubtedly faces critical times 
and a kind of protection is even recognised by LDCs as being necessary. 
This is due to many reasons, primarily to high productivity growth and 
to reduced demand. The LDCs have strongly protested against the 
extension of the MFA, in particular when the third MFA was to be re­
negotiated. During these negotiations LDCs were uneasy about the 
protectionist measures taken by industrialised countries and demanded 
free trade in textiles.
For the LDCs and in particular the NICs, the impact of the MFA 
is not favourable. MFAs grew more restrictive and discriminated 
against their exports. This discrimination is more than evident in 
the light of the reciprocal arrangements applying in trade relations 
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between developed countries. NICs are substantially affected, but 
the magnitude of the damage done to LLDCs is more detrimental, for it 
affects a great part of their economy. The impact on employment in 
those countries has also unfavourable repercussions, having regard to 
the fact that the clothing industry especially is a labour intensive 
industry and the most prosperous in LDCs. This damage to exports in 
products in which LDCs have a comparative advantage in consequence affects 
the world economy as a whole.
Numerous studies undertaken on this matter indicate that imports * 
from low-cost suppliers in the EEC market do not cause such a market 
disruption as that created by other factors (e.g. productivity growth). 
Also imports from DCs are detrimental to the EEC industries and more 
disruptive than imports from LDCs. The MFAs have not proved bene­
ficial to DCs either, because adjustment has not taken place. Only 
if adjustment takes place would there be some hope for an orderly 
return to liberal trade, order and prosperity. Otherwise, as
long as protectionist attitudes prevail, there would be no such hope. 
Consequently, the MFA has not proved sufficiently flexible to reduce 
low-cost imports into the Community, neither to enable the industry to 
adjust and compete.
An important point which should be stressed is that the MFAs 
are designed to control trade in textiles and textile products between 
developed and developing countries, whereas the respective trade 
relations between industrialised countries are subject to reciprocal 
treatment. As far as the other VER agreements are concerned (e.g. 
agreements in vehicles, footwear, electronics, steel) they have been 
negotiated between the industrialised countries involving notably Japan.
In these areas of economic activities, Japan's success and tremendous 
expansion of industrial products and the need to dispose of them on 
world markets, has created stress in particular in the EEC and the USA 
markets. In consequence, Japan's participation in the GATT is 
attributable to changing the pattern of world trade law to a certain 
extent.
The problem of accommodating Japan into the GATT system has 
raised many questions. A new evolving trading force, which emerged 
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as the most competitive power as against developed countries industrial 
goods, especially high technology goods, was to participate in the GATT 
system. A shift from multilateralism to bilateralism in the relations 
between the EEC and the USA on the one hand and Japan on the other is 
evident in the discussion of the VER agreements. These bilateral 
dealings constitute a serious threat to the multilateral trading system.
Another important point which arises in the context of the VER 
agreements and as far as the EEC is concerned, is that individual EEC 
member states went their own way and on several occasions have negotiated 
bilateral restrictive agreements with third countries. For example 
before the negotiation of the 1977 MFA France introduced unilateral 
import quotas. Italy also already imposed restrictions. In the 
U.K. the industry had taken protective measures against imports from 
South Korea. These bilateral dealings between the EEC member states 
and third countries are not limited to the textiles sector. In the 
electronics sector national measures are often taken, especially when 
a common Community approach is delayed. In the motor vehicles sector 
similar measures have also been taken, e.g. between the U.K. and Japan 
and between France and Japan to control trade and thus the respective 
member states have attempted to protect their own national interests.
The national activities of the member states is an expression of bi­
lateralism and therefore have distorting effects on the international 
trading system in particular on the GATT system. Economic nationalism 
is a step backwards when what is needed is an increasing attempt to find 
multilateral solutions to common trade problems.
Finally the question of what is the impact of the VER agreements 
on the GATT legal system deserves special attention. VER agreements 
produce the same results on thé GATT system as do preferential agreements, 
although their legal perspectives differ. And in this case it is the 
GATT system and in particular Art. XIX which has not proved able to 
cope with the current situation and has tacitly accepted VER agreements 
as measures regulating international trade in some sensitive sectors.
The relevant agreements have been evolved as a permanent feature of 
international trade and as such have weakened the GATT legal system to 
a great extent. Bilateralism has gained at the expense of multi­
lateralism. VER agreements are negotiated outside the rule of GATT 
law and therefore the GATT law is not respected. Waivers have not 
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been requested and an orderly and efficient safeguards system has 
not yet been established, mainly because the major trading nations are 
not prepared to accept any changes in the international legal trading 
system. VER agreements have not only weakened the legal system, but 
have been unable to remove friction. Instead their proliferation has 
led to increased protectionism. The international trading system has 
become less competitive and VER agreements do not take into account the 
particular interests of third countries which do not participate in 
these arrangements.
As is evident throughout the present thesis, there is a gap 
between the international legal trading system, as it was envisaged in 
1947 and as it now operates. The problems discussed in GATT meetings 
in 1948 were different than those discussed today. For example, 
discussions on market disruption were very rare. The GATT in the 
course of time has not proved capable of responding to new needs and 
challenges. The legal structure of GATT was designed to deal with 
limited issues, and it has not been considerably extended in order to 
cover significant areas of economic activities which today need to be 
considered in the context of the international trading system. Such 
areas include direct foreign investments, intra-firm trade, trade in 
services and other features of modern trading relationships. The legal 
structure of GATT as initially set up cannot cope with the current 
complex problems of adjustment. The GATT Articles are concerned with 
trade problems without taking into account the need for adapting the
rules to the new realities. The GATT is narrowly based in tariff
and trade issues and leaves aside any broader issue of international 
economic policy.
Despite real changes in world trade, limited progress has been 
made in rule-making. The GATT has not adapted its rules to the changes 
in new economic conditions. The change in rules has not followed the
flow of economic activities. The Codes,although an improvement to the
GATT system,do not really represent an effective mechanism to overcome 
acute trade problems. During the Tokyo Round no substantial improve­
ment to the system has been made. Also during the GATT Ministerial 
Conference of November 1982, legal problems have not been discussed.
The mechanism which deals with trade disputes is not adequate to deal 
with disputes arising. The lack of an interpretative machinery or a 
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Court to define and interpret ambiguous legal norms has been pointed out 
The need for an effective and adequate system is therefore something 
which has repeatedly been pointed out. Such a system should make
Î
I
any effort to stop distorting activities and any action, which causes ■B;immediate damage to the cause of free world trade, which is still ;accepted as a virtue.
The weakness and the inability of the G.A. to meet the new 
challenges is mainly due to the fact that the leading trading nations 
are not ready to accept any change which might affect their immediate 
interests. With particular reference to the EEC, it makes insufficient 
efforts to change the international legal trading system. In fact, 
it wants to preserve it, otherwise concessions should be made in 
favour for the LDCs. A very characteristic example is the refusal 
of the EEC to include agriculture in the system. The LDCs and the
weak DCs are inadequately represented in the GATT negotiating process. 
Despite the fact that considerable part of economic power has passed 
to certain NICs, the advanced DCs are not prepared to make con- 
cessions and resist any change in the international trading rules.
In the light of the present degree of malfunction of the 
international trading system, greater attention should be paid so as to 
allow the system to adapt itself to evolving circumstances and to give 
some practical effects to GATT declarations. Multilateral procedures 
and rules are preferable to bilateral negotiation. Arthur Dunkel, the 
present Director General of GATT has repeatedly stressed the importance 
of multilateral rules and the respect for those rules. Every departure 
from the rules,as has been discussed earlier, weakens the system and 
destroys the confidence which the contracting parties should have in it. 
Multilateral trading rules, sufficient to cope with current difficulties 
are essential to the improvement of well being and peace. An 
efficient system, based on multilaterally accepted rights and obligations 
should be developed to such an extent so as to ensure credibility and 
discipline and providing the basis for abstaining from any bilateral 
dealings. Such a system is of interest to both developed and developing 
countries.
Therefore GATT, despite its limitations and shortcomings,^ 
remains the key multilateral trade organisation, which should be pre­
served and improved, preparing the grounds for the emergence of a 
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sufficient international trading system, accepted by the International 
Community and being the product of joint efforts made by GATT and UNCTAD. 
NICs should play a major role and continue their efforts towards this 
purpose. DCs, such as the EEC member states should respond to LDCs 
demands for the establishment of an efficient system.
To sum up, the effects of the EEC, as an international entity 
in terms of international law, on the GATT legal system should be 
pointed out. Throughout the present thesis it has been evident that the 
Community, together with its member states, exercises an external trade 
policy which in most cases is characterised by common action, in the 
form of 'mixed agreements'. The EEC (together with its member states)
as the most important trading bloc in the world is a principal factor 
influencing GATT affairs and contributing as such to evolving the GATT 
legal system. The EEC is, in addition, the first complete customs
union submitted to GATT, and has raised as a result many legal questions. 
In this context the compatibility of the EEC Treaty with the GATT agree­
ment has been examined. In particular the concept of preferential
agreements has raised legal questions still unresolved, but constituting
precedents for future arrangements. Consequently particular attention‘needs to be paid to the fact that crucial legal questions have been left 
undetermined and became of secondary importance, whereas practical con­
siderations prevailed. Many questions raised in this respect have
remained academic and purely theoretical, since it has been considered 
'more fruitful' that practical approaches be adopted. Problems have
not been resolved through legal procedures, as legal rules have con­
sequently not sufficiently developed. The CONTRACTING PARTIES have
remained the main authority to determine crucial legal questions by 
attaching particular importance to practical considerations. For 
example, the EEC's determination as a customs union in GATT in the light 
of Art, XXIV, preferential agreements and subsequently ambiguous legal 
norms have been treated with reference to practical considerations.
The EEC as a dominant factor in GATT affairs has exerted a 
major influence on the GATT system. The Most Favoured Nation (MFN)
principle, the main pillar of GATT has been to a noticeable extent 
substituted by the principle of differential and more favourable treat­
ment for LDCs. The EEC was the first to accord the LDCs more favourable 
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treatment through preferential agreements and it might be considered 
as having been instrumental for the incorporation of Part IV in GATT in 
1965, which provides for differential and more favourable treatment 
for LDCs. It is thus realistic to say that the MFN has been weakened 
as a result of the EEC’s trade practices, such as the negotiation of 
numerous preferential agreements and also the proliferation of VER 
agreements to which the EEC is a party. Also the GATT principle of
reciprocity has been substituted to a certain extent and as far as the 
LDCs are concerned, by the principle of non-reciprocity incorporated 
in the Lome Conventions. Thus the two fundamental principles of
GATT have been affected, and one may even say weakened, as a result of 
the EEC practices. As is indicated, the EEC in its external trade
field has adopted different types of agreements in accordance with the 
economic situation of each country or group of countries. The EEC
has recognised the problems inherent in different situations and there­
fore has contributed to developing different forms of trade rules or 
international legal rules (e.g. the principle of non-reciprocity), which 
are more in accordance with the problems that actually exist. That 
is, the EEC's practice has contributed to evolving international trading 
rules in a practical direction.
In particular, the EEC has contributed to changing the legal 
structure of GATT, although limited progress in rule-making has been 
made. A great development in international trade relations has taken
place since 1947, but the respective legal rules have not sufficiently 
kept pace with them. GATT should not, however, remain indifferent to
this development and evolution which is partly attributable to the 
creation and practice of the EEC. It should adapt its rules more
completely to economic realities and challenges of modern times. In 
this respect, it is noteworthy that an adequate interpretative machinery 
in GATT has not been developed to interpret and consider ambiguous legal 
norms; pragmatic considerations cannot be dominantly applied and lead 
to legally satisfactory results.
The EEC has contributed to the revision and to some extent 
improvement of the GATT legal system by participating in the MTNs. These
negotiations have led to the establishment of agreements or codes that 
regulate some modern features of international economic relations, e.g. 
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subsidies. With particular reference to agriculture, the EEC 
however, has played a rather adverse role by refusing to negotiate 
within the GATT framework on this sensitive sector of the international 
economy.
Another very important legal question raised in the context of 
the GATT is the legal status of the EEC in GATT, that is, the partici­
pation of an international organisation in another international 
organisation. This involves in the case of the EEC, three legal 
systems, national. Community and international. As indicated in the 
present thesis, the external trade policy of the Community is deter-
.mined not least by mixed agreements; therefore, the common external 
policy of the Community is the product of co-ordination of national and 
Community policies. On the other hand, the effects of an international 
organisation (GATT) on another organisation (EEC's) legal order and 
the determination of the direct effects of the former on the latter is 
an extremely important legal question which is currently still develop­
ing within the Community legal system. The ECJ has during the last
years examined this question in several cases, and it has manifested 
a tendency to uphold the notion of direct effects of GATT within the 
Community legal order, thus contributing to the development and 
improvement of international trade relations by co-ordinating the GATT 
system with that of the Community.
The EEC has helped in evolving the GATT legal system more than 
any other international entity or group of countries. However, this 
underlines not least the need to adopt within the GATT a machinery 
necessarily capable of promoting the emergence of new rules and 
interpreting and adapting the old ones. A major shortcoming and
limitation of the system is therefore the lack of an appropriate 
machinery to interpret and develop new rules systematically. In this 
context, the EEC, in possession of the greatest experience and traditions 
in international trade relations, should take the lead in adopting the 
necessary measures to improve the legal machinery of the GATT system 
and thus improve it. The Community and its member states are to a 
great extent capable of influencing the success or weakening of the 
GATT. They should initiate measures promoting stronger international 
rules adaptable to changing international circumstances. The need 
for an improved multilateral trading system is beyond any question, 
therefore the Community should, and could, proceed towards this end.
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APPENDIX
RELEVANT GATT ARTICLES
Article I
General M ost-Favoured-N ation Treatment
I. With respect,to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on 
or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the 
international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect 
to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all 
rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and 
with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, * 
any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting 
party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall 
be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating 
in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
2. The provisions of paragraph I of this Article shall not require the 
elimination of any preferences in re sp ^ t of import duties or charges which 
do not exceed the levels provided for in paragraph 4 of this Article and which 
fall within the following descriptions:
(а) Preferences in force exclusively between two or more of the terri­
tories listed in Annex A, subject to the conditions set forth therein;
(б) Preferences in force exclusively between two or more territories 
which on July I, 1939, were connected by common sovereignty or 
relations of protection or suzerainty and which arc listed in Annexes 
B, C and D, subject to the conditions set forth therein;
(c) Preferences in force exclusively between the United States of 
America and the Republic o f Cuba;
{d) Preferences in force exclusively between neighbouring countries 
listed in Annexes E and F.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to preferences between 
the countries formerly a part o f the Ottoman Empire and detached from it 
on July 24, 1923, provided such preferences are approved under para­
graph 5 1 of Article XXV, which shall be applied in this respect in the light 
of paragraph 1 of Article XXIX.
t  The authentic text erroneously reads ** sut>.paragraph 5 (a)
4. The margin of preference * on any product in respect of which a 
preference is permitted Under paragraph 2 of this Article but is not speci­
fically set forth as a maximum margin o f preference in the appropriate 
Schedule annexed to this Agreement shall not exceed:
(a) in respect of duties or charges on any product described in such 
Schedule, the difference between the most-favoured nation and 
preferential rates provided for therein; if no preferential rate is 
provided for, the preferential rate shall for the purposes of this 
paragraph be taken to be that in force on April 10, 1947, and, if 
no most-favourcd-nation rate is provided-for, the margin shall not 
exceed the difference between the most-favourcd-nation and pre­
ferential rates existing on April 10, 1947;
(b) in respect of duties or charges on any product not described in the 
appropriate Schedule, the difference between the most-favourcd- 
nation and preferential rates existing on April 10, 1947.
3U2
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In ihc case o f  the contract ing parties named  in Annex G,  tlic date o f  Apri l  10, 
1947, referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and  (/;) o f  this paragraph  shall be 
replaced by the respective dates set forth in that Annex.
■t. No piodiîcî ol (lie <cffito(\ (>l any coiiiraeling (lafly im[H)rled into 
I lie icffilory ol any o l  lier coniractmj' ,  par ly sliall lie subject to ant i-dumping 
o( eouniervaihng duty iiy reason of the e.semplion of  such product  from 
duties or taxes borne by the like product  when destined for consumpt ion 
in the country o f  origin or exportat ion,  or  by reason o f  the refund o f  such 
duties or  taxes.
5. No product of the territory of any contracting party imported into 
the territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to both anti­
dumping and countervailing duties to compensate for the same situation 
of dumping or export subsidization.
6. (a) No contracting party shall levy any anti-dumping or counter­
vailing duty on the importation of any product of the territory of another 
contracting party unless it determines that the effect of the dumping or 
subsidization, as the case may be, is such as to cause or threaten material 
injury to an established domestic industry, or is such as to retard materially 
the establishment of a domestic industry.
(6 ) The C o n t r a c t in g  P a rties may waive the requirement o f sub- 
paragraph (a) of this paragraph so as to permit a contracting party to levy 
an anti-dumping or countervailing duty on the importation of any product 
for the purpose o f offsetting dumping or subsidization which causes or 
threatens material injury to an industry in the territory of another contract­
ing party exporting the product concerned to the territory o f the importing 
contracting party. The C o n t r a c t in g  P a r ties  shall waive the requirements 
of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, so as to permit the levying of a 
countervailing duty, in cases in which they find that a subsidy is causing 
or threatening material injury to an industry in the territory o f another 
contracting party exporting the product concerned to the territory o f the 
importing contracting party.*
(c) In exceptional circumstances, however, where delay might cause 
damage which would be difficult to  repair, a contracting party  m ay levy 
. a countervaiiing duty for the purpose referred to in su(>panigraph 0 )  o f 
this paragraph without the p rior approval o f  the G o n t t^ c t in o  P a rtie s ; 
Provided that such action shall be reported immediately to the CONTRACTING 
P a rtie s  and that the countervailing duty  shall be withdrawn prom ptly if 
the CoNTRACnNG P a rtie s  disapprove.
7, A system for the stabilization of the domestic price or o f the return 
to domestic producers o f a primary commodity, independently o f the move­
ments o f export prices, which results at times in the sale o f the commodity 
for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like 
commodity to buyers in the domestic market, shall be presumed not to 
result in materia^ injury within the meaning o f paragraph 6 if it is determined
by consultation among the contracting parties substantially interested in 
the commodity concerned that:
(а) the system has also resulted in the sale o f the commodity for export 
at a price higher than the comparable price charged for the like 
commodity to buyers in the domestic market, and
(б) the system is so operated, either because o f the eficctivc regula­
tion of production, or otherwise, as not to stimulate exports unduly 
or otherwise seriously prejudice the interests of other contracting 
parties.
3h3
Article XI *
General Elimination o f  Q uantitative Restrictions
t. No prohibitions or restrictions other  than duties,  taxes or  other 
charges, whether made cfTcctivc through quotas,  import  o r  export  licences 
or other measures, shall be inst ituted o r  maintained by any contract ing 
party on the importat ion o f  any  product  o f  the terri tory o f  any othe r  con­
tracting party or  on the expor tat ion or  sale for export  o f  any product  
destined for the territory o f  any othe r  cont ract ing  party.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend to 
the following:
(а) Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent 
or relieve critical shortages o f foodstuffs or other products essential 
to the exporting contracting party;
(б) Import and export prohibitions or restrictions necessary to the 
application of standards or regulations for the classification, 
grading or marketing o f commodities in international trade;
(c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, imported 
in any form,* necessary to the enforcement o f governmental 
measures which operate:
(i) to restrict the quantities o f the like domestic product permitted 
to be marketed or produced, or, if there is no substantial 
domestic production o f the like product, o f a domestic pro­
duct for which the imported product can be directly substituted; 
or
(ii) to remove a temporary surplus o f the like domestic product, 
or, if there is no substantial domestic production of the like 
product, of a domestic product for which the imported product 
cad be directly substituted, by making the surplus available
to certain groups of domestic consumers free of charge or at 
prices below the current market level; or
(iii) to restrict the quantities permitted to be produced of any 
animal product the production of which is directly dependent, 
wholly or mainly, on the imported commodity, if the domestic 
production o f that commodity is relatively negligible.
Any contracting party applying restrictions on the importation o f any 
product pursuant to sub-paragraph (c) of this paragraph shall give public 
notice of the total quantity or value o f the product permitted to be imported 
during a specified future period and of any change in such quantity or 
value. Moreover, any restrictions applied under (i) above shall not be 
such as will reduçc the total o f imports relative to the total o f domestic 
production, as compared with the proportion which might reasonably be 
expected to rule between the two in the absence of restrictions. In deter­
mining this proportion, the contracting party shall pay due regard to the 
proportion prevailing during a previous representative period and to any 
special factors* which may have aficcted or may be affecting the trade in 
the product concerned.
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Article XII •
Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance o f  Paym ents
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XI, any 
contracting party, in order to safeguard its external financial position and 
its balance of payments, may restrict the quantity or value of merchandise 
permitted to be imported, subject to the provisions of the following para­
graphs of this Article.
2. (a) Import restrictions instituted, maintained or intensified by a
contracting party under this Article shall not exceed those necessary:
(i) to forestall the imminent threat of, or to stop, a serious decline 
in its monetary reserves, or
(ii) in the case of a contracting party with very low monetary 
reserves, to achieve a reasonable rate of increase in its reserves.
Due regard shall be paid in either case to any special factors which may 
be affecting the reserves of such contracting party or its need for reserves, 
including, where special external credits or other resources arc available 
to it, the need to provide for the appropriate use of such credits or resources.
(6) Contracting parties applying restrictions under sub-para­
graph (a) o f this paragraph shall progressively relax them as such condi­
tions improve, maintaining them only to the extent that the conditions 
specified in that sub-paragraph still justify their application. They shall 
eliminate the restrictions when conditions would no longer justify their 
institution or maintenance under that sub-paragraph.
3. (a) Contracting parties undertake, in carrying out their domestic 
policies, to pay due regard to the need for maintaining or restoring equi­
librium in their balance of payments on a sound and lasting basis and to 
the desirability o f avoiding an uneconomic employment of productive 
resources. They recognize that, in order to achieve these ends, it is desir­
able so far as possible to adopt measures which expand rather than contract 
international trade.
(b) Contracting parties applying restrictions under this Article may 
determine the incidence of the restrictions on Imports of different products 
or classes o f products in such a way as to give priority to the importation 
of those products which arc more essential.
(c) Contracting parties applying restrictions under this Article 
undertake:
(i) to avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial or economic 
interests o f any other contracting party;*
(ii) not to apply restrictions so as to prevent unreasonably the 
importation of any description of goods in minimum commer­
cial quantities the exclusion o f which would impair regular 
channels of trade; and
(iii) not to apply restrictions which would prevent the importation 
o f commercial samples or prevent compliance with patent, 
trade mark, copyright, or similar procedures.
{d) The contracting parties recognize that, as a result of domestic 
policies directed towards the achievement and maintenance of full and 
productive employment or towards the development of economic resources, 
a contracting party may experience a high level of demand for imports 
involving a threat to its monetary reserves of the sort referred to in para­
graph 2 (a) of this Article. Accordingly, a contracting party otherwise 
complying with the provisions of this Article shall not be required to with­
draw or modify restrictions on the ground that a change in those policies 
would render unnecessary restrictions which it is applying under this 
Article.
4. (a) Any contracting party applying new restrictions or raising the
general level o f its existing restrictions by a substantial intensification of 
the measures applied under this Article shall immediately after instituting 
or intensifying such restrictions (or, in circumstances in which prior con­
sultation is practicable, before doing so) consult with the C o n t r a c t in g
P arties as to  the natu re o f  its  b a la n ce  o f  p a y m en ts  d ifficu ltie s , a ltern a tiv e  
c o rrectiv e  m easu res w h ich  m a y  be a v a ila b le , a n d  th e  p o ss ib le  e ffec t o f  the  
restr iction s o n  the e c o n o m ic s  o f  o th e r  c o n tr a c tin g  parties ,
(6) On a date to be determined by them,* the C o n t r a c t in g  
P arties shall review all restrictions still applied under this Article on that 
date. Beginning one year after that date, contracting parties applying 
import restrictions under this Article shall enter into consultations of the 
type provided for in sub-paragraph (a) o f this paragraph with the C o n ­
t r a c t in g  P arties annually.
(c) (i) If, in the course o f consultations with a contracting party 
under sub-paragraph (a) or (6) above, the CONTRACTING Parties find that 
the restrictions arc not consistent with the provisions o f this Article or 
with those of Article XIII (subject to the provisions o f Article XIV), they 
shall indicate the nature of the inconsistency and may advise that the restric­
tions be suitably modified.
(ii) If, however, as a result o f the consultations, the C o n t r a c ­
t in g  Pa rties  determine that the restrictions arc being applied in a manner 
involving an inconsistency o f a serious nature with the provisions o f this 
Article or with ihoscof Article X III (subject tO the provisions o f Article XIV) 
and that damage to the trade o f any contracting party is caused or threatened 
thereby, they shall so inform the contracting party applying the restrictions 
and shall make appropriate recommendations for securing conformity 
with such provisions within a specified period o f time. If such contracting 
party does not comply with these recommendations within the specified 
period, the C o n t r a c t in g  Pa r t ie s  may release any contracting party the 
trade of which is adversely affected by the restrictions from such obliga­
tions under this Agreement towards the contracting party applying the 
restrictions as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances.
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{d) The C o n t r a c t i n g  P a r t ie s  shall invite any contracting party 
which is applying restrictions under this Article to enter into consultations 
with them at the request of any contracting party which can establish a prim a  
fac ie  case that the restrictions are inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Article or with those of Article X llf  (subject to the provisions of Article 
XIV) and that its trade is adversely alTccted thereby. However, no such 
invitation shall be issued unless the C o n t r a c t i n g  P a r t ie s  have ascertained 
that direct discussions between the contracting parties concerned have not 
been successful. If, as a result of the consultations with the C o n t r a c t i n g  
P a r t ie s ,  no agreement is reached and they determine that the restrictions 
arc being applied inconsistently with such provisions; and that damage 
to the trade of the contracting party initiating the procedure is caused or 
threatened thereby, they shall recommend the withdrawal or modification 
of the restrictions. If the restrictions arc not withdrawn or modified
within such time as the C o n t r a c v in g  P ar ties  may prescribe, they may 
release the contracting party initiating the procedure from such obligations 
under this Agreement towards the contracting party applying the restric­
tions as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances.
(e) In proceeding under this paragraph, the C o n t r a c t in g  P arties  
shall have due regard to any special external factors adversely affecting 
the export trade of the contracting parly applying restrictions.*
( f )  Determinations under this paragraph shall be rendered expedi­
tiously and, if possible, within sixty days of the initiation of the consulta­
tions.
5. If there is a persistent and widespread application of import restric­
tions under this Article, indicating the existence of a general disequilibrium 
which is restricting international trade, the C o n t r a c t in g  P a rties  shall 
initiate discussions to consider whether other measures might be taken, 
cither by those contracting parties the balances of payments of which arc 
under pressure or by those the balances of payments of which arc tending 
to be exceptionally favourable, or by any appropriate intergovernmental 
organization, to remove the underlying causes of the disequilibrium. On 
the invitation of the C o n t r a c t in g  P a r t ie s , contracting parties shall partici­
pate in such discussions.
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Article  X III  *
Non-discritninalory Adm inistration o f  Q uantitative Restrictions
1. No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting 
party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other 
contracting party or on the exportation of any product destined for the 
territory of any other contracting party, unless the importation of the like 
product of all third countries or the exportation of the like product to all 
third countries is similarly prohibited or restricted.
2. In applying import restrictions to any product, contracting parties 
shall aim at a distribution o f trade in such product approaching as closely 
as possible the shares which the various contracting parties might be expected 
to obtain in the absence o f such restrictions, and to this end shall observe 
the following provisions;
(n) Wherever practicable, quotas representing the total amount of 
permitted imports (whether allocated among supplying countries or 
not) shall be fixed, and notice given o f their amount in accordance 
with paragraph 3 (b) o f this Article;
(6) In cases tVi which quotas are not practicable, the restrictions may 
be applied by means o f import licences or permits without a quota;
(c) Contracting parties shall not, except for purposes of operating 
quotas allocated in accordance with sub-paragraph (d) of this 
paragraph, require that import licences or permits be utilized for 
the importation of the product concerned from a particular country 
or source;
(d) In cases in which a quota is allocated among supplying countries, 
the contracting party applying the restrictions may seek agreement 
with respect to the allocation of shares in the quota with all other 
contracting parties having a substantial interest in supplying the 
product concerned. In cases in which this method is not reason­
ably practicable, the contracting party concerned shall allot to 
contracting parties having a substantial interest in supplying the 
product shares based upon the proportions, supplied by such 
contracting parties during a previous representative period, o f the 
total quantity or value o f imports o f the product, due account 
being taken of any special factors which may have aflected or may 
be alfccting the trade in the product. No conditions or formalities 
shall be imposed which would prevent any contracting party from 
utilizing fully the share o f any such total quantity or value which 
has been allotted to it, subject to importation being made within 
any prescribed period to which the quota may relate.*
3. (a) In cases in which import licences are issued in connection with 
import restrictions, the contracting party applying the restrictions shall 
provide, upon the request o f  any contracting party having an interest in 
the trade in the product concerned, all relevant information concerning the 
administration of the restrictions, the import licences granted over a recent 
period and the distribution of such licences among supplying countries; 
Provided that there shall be no obligation to supply information as to the 
names of importing or supplying enterprises.
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(6) In (he ease of import restrictions involving the fixing of quotas, 
the contracting party applying the restrictions shall give public notice of 
the total quantity or value of the product of products which will be per­
mitted to be imported during a specified future period and of any change in 
such quantity or value. Any supplies of the product in question which 
were en route at the time at which public notice was given shall not be 
excluded from entry; Provided that they may be counted so far as practicable, 
against the quantity permitted to be imported in the period in question, 
and also, where necessary, against the quantities permitted to be imported 
in the next following period or periods; and further that if any
contracting party customarily exempts from such restrictions products 
entered for consumption or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption 
during a period of thirty days after the day of such public notice, such 
practice shall be considered full compliance with this sub-paragraph.
(r) In the case of quotas allocated among supplying countries, the 
contracting party applying the restrictions shall promptly inform all other 
contracting parties having an interest in supplying the product concerned 
of the shares in the quota currently allocated, by quantity or value, to the 
various supplying countries and shall give public notice thereof.
4. With regard to restrictions applied in accordance with paragraph 
2 (d) of this Article or under paragraph 2 (c) of Article XI, the selection 
of a representative period for any product and the appraisal of any special 
factors • aflccting the trade in the product shall be made initially by the 
contracting party applying the restriction; Provided that such contracting 
party shall, upon the request o f any other contracting party having a sub­
stantial interest in supplying that product or upon the request of the C o n ­
t r a c t in g  Parties, consult promptly with the other contracting party or 
the C o n t r a c t in g  Pa rties  regarding the need for an adjustment o f the 
proportion determined or o f the base period selected, or for the reappraisal 
of the special factors involved, or for the elimination of conditions, for­
malities or any other provisions established unilaterally relating to the alloca­
tion of an adequate quota or its unrestricted utilization.
5. The provisions of this Article shall apply to any tariff quota insti­
tuted or maintained by any contracting party, and. in so far as applicable, 
the principles of this Article shall also extend to export restrictions.
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A rtic le  X IV  *
Exceptions (o (he Rule o f  Non-discrimination
I. A contracting party which applies restrictions under Article XII 
or under Section B of Article XVIII may, in the application of such restric­
tions, deviate from the provisions of Article XIII in a manner having equiv­
alent clfcct to restrictions on payments and transfers for current international 
transactions which that contracting party may at that time apply under 
Article VIII or XIV of the Articles o f  Agreement o f the International 
Monetary Fund, or under analogous provisions of a special exchange 
agreement entered into pursuant to paragraph 6 o f Article XV,*
2. A contracting party which is applying import restrictions under 
Article XII or under Section B o f Article XVIII may, with the consent o f 
the C o n t r a c t in g  Pa r t ie s , temporarily deviate from the provisions of 
Article XIII in respect o f a small part o f its external trade where the benefits 
to the contracting party or contracting parties concerned substantially 
outweigh any injury which may result to the trade of other contracting 
parties.* *
3. The provisions o f Article XIII shall not preclude a group of territories 
having a common quota in the International Monetary Fund from applying 
against imports from other countries, but not among themselves^ restric­
tions in accordance with the provisions of Article XII or of Section B of 
Article XVIII on condition that such restrictions are in all other respects 
consistent with the provisions of Article XIII.
4. A contracting party applying import restrictions under Article XII 
or under Section B of Article XVIII shall not be precluded by Articles XI 
to XV or Section B of Article XVIII o f this Agreement from applying 
measures to direct its exports in such a manner as to increase its earnings 
of currencies which it can use without deviation from the provisions of 
Article XIII.
5. A contracting party shall not be precluded by Articles XI to XV, 
inclusive, or by Section B o f Article X VIII, o f  this Agreement from applying 
quantitative restrictions:
(а) having equivalent effect to exchange restrictions authorized under 
Section 3 (6) o f Article VII o f the Articles o f Agreement o f the 
International Monetary Fund, or
(б) under the preferential arrangements provided for in Annex A of 
this Agreement, pending the outcome o f the negotiations referred 
to therein.
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Article  XVI *
Subsidies
Section A—Subsidies in General
1. If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including 
any form of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly 
to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any pro­
duct into, its territory, it shall notify the C o n t r a c t in g  Pa rties  in writing 
of the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the estimated efleet of the 
subsidization on the quantity o f the affected product or products imported 
into or exported from its territory and of the circumstances making the 
subsidization necessary. In any case in which it is determined that serious 
prejudice to the interests of any other contracting party is caused or threat­
ened by any such subsidization, the contracting party granting the subsidy 
shall, upon request, discuss with the other contracting party or parties 
concerned, or with the C o n t r a c t in g  Pa r ties , the possibility of limiting 
the subsidization.
Section B—Additional Provisions on Export Subsidies *
2. The contracting parties recognize that the granting by a contracting 
party of a subsidy on the export of any product may have harmful effects 
for other contracting parties, both importing and exporting, may cause 
undue disturbance to their normal commercial interests, and may hinder 
the achievement of the objectives of t.his Agreement.
3. Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of 
subsidies on the export o f primary products. If, however, a contracting
party grants directly or indirectly any form of subsidy which operates to 
increase the export of any primary product from its territory, such subsidy 
shall not be applied in a manner which results in that contracting party 
having more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product, 
account being taken of the shares o f the contracting parties in such trade 
in the product during a previous representative period, and any special 
factors which may have affected or may be affecting such trade in the pro­
duct.*
4. Further, as from I January 1958 or the earliest practicable date 
thereafter, contracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or in­
directly any form of subsidy on the export o f any product other than a 
primary product which subsidy results in the sale o f such product for export 
at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like product 
to buyers in the domestic market. Until 31 December 1957 no contracting 
party shall extend the scope o f any such subsidization beyond that existing 
on I January 1955 by the introduction o f new, or the extension of existing,
/subsidies.*
5. The C o n t r a c t in g  P a r t ie s  shall review the operation of the pro­
visions of this Article from time to time with a view to examining its 
effectiveness, in the light of actual experience, in promoting the objectives 
of this Agreement and avoiding subsidization seriously prejudicial to the 
trade or interests of contracting parties.
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’ Article XVII 
S ta te  Trading Enterprises
L* (a) Each contracting party undertakes that if it establishes or 
maintains a State enterprise, wherever located, or grants to any enterprise, 
formally or in effect, exclusive or special privileges,* such enterprise shall, 
in its purchases or sales involving either imports or exports, act in a manner 
consistent with the general principles o f non-discriminatory treatment 
prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures affecting inlports 
or exports by private traders.
(b) The provisions o f  sub-paragraph (a) o f this paragraph shall be 
understood to require that such enterprises shall, having due regard to the 
other provisions o f this Agreement, make any such purchases or sales 
solely in accordance with commercial considerations,* Including price, 
quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of 
purchase or sale, and shall afford the enterprises of the other contracting 
parties adequate opportunity, in accordance with customary business 
practice, to compete for participation in such purchases dr sales.
(c) No contracting party shall prevent anÿ enterprise (whether < 
not an enterprise described in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph) undi 
its jurisdiction from acting in accordance with the principles of sul 
paragraphs (a) and (6) of this paragraph.
2, The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply j 
imports of products for immediate or ultimate consumption in government] 
use and not otherwise for resale or- use in the production of goods * f< 
sale. With respect to such imports, each contracting party shall accoj 
to the trade of the other contracting parties fair and equitable trcatmcn
3, The contracting parties recognize that enterprises o f the kin 
described in paragraph I (a) of this Article might be operated so as to crea 
serious obstacles to trade; thus negotiations on a reciprocal and mutual 
advantageous basis designed to limit or reduce such obstacles arc of imporj 
ancc to the expansion of international trade.*
4, (a) Contracting parties shall notify the C o n t r a c t in g  P a rties e 
the products which arc imported into or exported from their territories b 
enterprises of the kind described in paragraph 1 (a) of this Article.
(b) A contracting party establishing, maintaining or autHorizin 
an import monopoly of a product, which is not (he subject o f a concession 
under Article II, shall, on the request o f another contracting party havin 
a substantial trade in the product concerned, inform the C o n t r a c t in i 
P arties of the import mark-up * on the product during a recent represent 
ative period, or, when it is not possible to do so, of the price charged on th 
resale of the product.
(c) The C o n t r a c t in g  P a r t ie s  may, at the request o f a contract 
ing party which has reason to believe that its interests under (his Agreemen 
are being adversely aflTcctcd by the operations of an enterprise of the kirn 
described in paragraph I (n), request the contracting party establishing 
maintaining or autliorizing such enterprise to supply information about it 
operations related to the carrying out o f the provisions o f this Agreement
(d) The provisions o f this paragraph shall not require any contract 
ing party to disclose confidential information which would impede lav 
enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would pro 
judicc the legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises.
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Article X V II I  *
Govcnmu'ntal Assistance to Economie Development
1. The contracting parties recognize that  the a t t ainment  o f  the objec­
tives of  this Agreement will be facilitated by the progressive development
of their economics,  part icularly o f  those contract ing parties the economics 
of  which can only support  low s tandards  o f  living * and arc in the early 
stages o f  development.*
2. The contracting parties recognize further that it may be necessary 
for those contracting parties, in order to implement programmes and 
policies of economic development designed to raise the general standard 
of living of their people, to take protective or other mcastires aflTecling 
imports, and that such measures arc justified in so far as they facilitate the 
attainment of the objectives of this Agreement. They agree, therefore, 
that those contracting parties should enjoy additional facilities to enable 
them (a) to maintain sufficient flexibility in their tariff structure to be able 
to grant the tariff protection required for the establishment of a particular 
industry * and (6) to apply quantitative restrictions for balance of payments 
purposes in a manner which takes full account of the continued high level 
of demand for imports likely to be generated by their programmes of eco­
nomic development.
3. The contracting parties recognize finally that, with those additional 
facilities which arc provided for in Sections A and B o f this Article, the 
provisions of this Agreement would normally be sufficient to enable con­
tracting parties to meet the requirements o f their economic development. 
They agree, however, that there may be circumstances where no m esure 
consistent with those provisions is practicable to permit a contracting 
party in the process of economic development to grant the governmental 
assistance required to promote the establishment of particular industries* 
with a view to raising the general standard o f living o f its people. Special 
procedures arc laid down in Sections C and D of this Article to deal with 
those cases.
4. (o) Consequently, a contracting party the economy o f which can 
only support low standards o f living * and is in the early stages o f develop­
ment * shall be free to deviate temporarily from the provisions o f the other 
Articles o f (his Agreement, as provided in Sections A, B and C o f this 
Article.
(6) A contracting party the economy o f which is in the process o f 
development, but which does not come within the scope o f sub-paragraph (a) 
above, may submit applications to the CoNtRAcnNG P a rtie s  under Section 
D of this Article.
5. The contracting parties recognize that the export earnings of con­
tracting parties, the economies o f which are o f the type described in para­
graph 4 (a) and (b) above and which depend on exports of a small number 
of primary commodities, may be seriously reduced by a decline in the sale 
of such commodities. Accordingly, when the exports of primary commod­
ities by such a contracting party arc seriously a fleeted by measures taken
by another  contracting party,  it may  have resort  to the consul ta t ion p ro­
visions o f  Article XXII o f  this Agreement .
6. The C o n t r a c t i n g  P a r t i e s  shall review annua lly  all measures 
applied pursuant to the provisions o f  Sect ions C  and D o f  this Article.
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Section A
7. (n) If a contracting parly coming within the scope of paragraph
4 (fl) of this Article considers it desirable, in order to promote the establish­
ment of a particular industry * with a view to raising the general standard 
of living of its people, to modify or withdraw a concession included in the 
appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement, it shall notify the C o n ­
t r a c t in g  PARTitis to this effect and enter into negotiations with any con­
tracting party with which such concession was initially negotiated, and with 
any other contracting party determined by the C o n t r a c t in g  P a rties  to 
have a substantial interest therein. If agreement is reached between such 
contracting parties concerned, they shall be free to modify or withdraw 
concessions under the appropriate Schedules to this Agreement in order 
to give effect to such agreement, including any compensatory adjustments 
involved."
(/>) If agreement is not reached within sixty days after (he noti­
fication provided for in sub-paragraph (a) above, the contracting party 
which proposes to modify or withdraw the concession may refer the matter 
to (he C o n t r a c t in g  P a rties , which Shall promptly examine it. If they 
find that the contracting party which proposes to modify Or withdraw the 
concession has made every effort to rcpch an agreement and that the 
compensatory adjustment offered by it is adequate, that contracting party 
shall be free to modify or withdraw the concession if, at the same time, 
it gives effect to the compensatory adjustment. If the C o n t r a c t in g  
Parties do not find that the compensation offered by a contracting party 
proposing to modify or withdraw the concession is adequate, but find that 
it has made every reasonable effort to offer adequate compensation, that 
contracting party shall be free to proceed with such modification or with­
drawal. If such action is taken, any other contracting party referred to 
in sub-paragraph (a) above shall be free to modify or withdraw substantially 
equivalent concessions initially negotiated with the contracting party which 
has taken the action.*
Section B
8. The contracting parties recognize that contracting parties coming 
within (he scope of paragraph 4 (a) of this Article tend, when they arc in 
rapid process of development, to experience balance of payments difftcultics 
arising mainly from efforts to expand their internal markets as well as 
from (he instability in their terms o f trade.
9. In order to safeguard its external financial position and to ensure 
a level of reserves adequate for the implementation of its programme of 
economic development, a contracting party coming within the scope of 
paragraph 4 (a) of this Article may, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 
10 to 12, control the general level of its imports by restricting the quantity 
or value of merchandise permitted to be imported; Provided that the import 
restrictions instituted, maintained or intensified shall not exceed those 
necessary;
(a) to forestall the threat of, or to stop, a serious decline in its monetary 
reserves, or
(Ô) in the case of a contracting party with inadequate monetary 
reserves, to achieve a reasonable rate of increase in its reserves.
Due regard shall be paid in cither case to any special factors which may 
be affecting the reserves of the contracting party or its need for reserves, 
including, where special external credits or other resources arc available 
to it, the need to provide for the appropriate use of such credits or resources.
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10. In a p p ly in g  th ese  restr ic tio n s , the c o n tr a c tin g  party  m ay d eterm in e  
their in c id en ce  o n  im p o rts  o f  d ifferen t p ro d u cts o r  c la sse s  o f  p rod u cts in 
such a w a y  as to  g iv e  p r iority  to  the im p o r ta tio n  o f  th o se  p rod u cts w h ich  
arc m ore essen tia l in the ligh t o f  its p o lic y  o f  e c o n o m ic  d e v e lo p m en t;  
Provided that the r e s tr ic tio n s  arc so  a p p lied  as to  a v o id  u n n ecessa ry  d a m a g e  
to  the c o m m erc ia l o r  e c o n o m ic  in terests o f  a n y  o th e r  c o n tr a c tin g  party  
and not to  prevent u n re a so n a b ly  the im p o r ta tio n  o f  an y  d escr ip tio n  o f  g o o d s  
in m in im u m  co m m e r c ia l q u a n titie s  th e  e x c lu s io n  o f  w h ich  w o u ld  im pair  
regular c h a n n e ls  o f  tra d e; a n d  Provided  fu rth er  th a t the r es tr ic tio n s  arc  
not so  a p p lied  as to  p reven t th e  im p o r ta tio n  o f  co m m e r c ia l sa m p le s  or  
to  prevent c o m p lia n ce  w ith  p a te n t, trade m ark , c o p y r ig h t  o r  s im ila r  p ro ­
cedures.
11. In carrying out its domestic policies, the contracting party con­
cerned shall pay due regard to the need for restoring equilibrium in its 
balance of payments on a sound and lasting basis and to the desirability 
of assuring an economic employment o f productive resources. It shall 
progressively relax any restrictions applied under this Section as condi­
tions improve, maintaining them only to the extent necessary under the 
terms of paragraph 9 o f this Article and shall eliminate them when condi­
tions no longer justify such maintenance; Provided that no contracting 
party shall be required to withdraw or modify restrictions on the ground 
that a change in its development policy would render unnecessary the restric­
tions which it is applying under this Section,*
12. (n) Any contracting party applying new restrictions or raising 
the general level o f its existing restrictions by a substantial intensification
o f  the m ea su res a p p lied  u n d er  th is S e c t io n , sh a ll im m e d ia te ly  a fter  in stitu tin g  
or in te n sify in g  su ch  r estr ic tio n s  (o r , in c ir c u m sta n c e s  in  w h ich  prior c o n su lta ­
tion is p ra ctica b le , b e fo re  d o in g  so )  c o n s u lt  w ith  th e  C o n t r a c t in g  P a rties  
as to  the n atu re o f  its b a la n ce  o f  p a y m e n ts  d iff icu lt ie s , a ltern a tiv e  c o rrec tiv e  
m easures w h ich  m ay  be a v a ila b le , a n d  the p o s s ib le  e ffect o f  the restr ic tio n s  
on the e c o n o m ie s  o f  o th e r  c o n tr a c t in g  p a rties .
(/;) On a date to be determined by them,* the C o n t r a c t in g  
Parties shall review all restrictions still applied under this Section on that 
date. Beginning two years after that date, contracting parties applying 
restrictions under this Section shall enter into consultations of the type 
provided for in sub-paragraph (a )  above with the C o n t r a c t in g  P a r ties  at 
intervals of approximately, but not less than, two years according to a 
programme to be drawn up each year by the C o n t r a c t in g  Pa r t ie s ; 
Provided that no consultation under this sub-paragraph shall take place 
within two years after the conclusion o f a consultation of a general nature 
under any other provision o f this paragraph.
(c) (i) If, in the course o f consultations with a contracting party 
under sub-paragraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph, the C o n t r a c t in g  
Parties find that the restrictions arc not consistent with the provisions of 
this Section or with those o f Article XIII (subject to the provisions of 
Article XIV), they shall indicate the nature of the inconsistency and may 
advise that the restrictions be suitably modified.
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(ii) If, however, as a result of the consultations, the C o n t r a c ­
t i n g  P a r t i e s  determine (hat the restrictions are being applied in a manner 
involving an inconsistency of a serious nature with the provisions of this 
Section or with those of Article XIII (subject to the provisions of Article 
XIV) and that damage to the trade of any contracting party is caused or 
threatened thereby, they shall so inform the contracting party applying 
the restrictions and shall make appropriate recommendations for securing 
conformity with such provisions within a specified period. If such 
contracting party does not comply with these recommendations within 
the specified period, the C o n t r a c t i n g  P a r t i e s  may release any contracting 
party the trade of which is adversely aficclcd by the restrictions from such 
obligations under this Agreement towards the contracting party applying 
the restrictions as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances,
(d) The C o n t r a c t in g  Pa r ties  shall invite any contracting party 
which is applying restrictions under this Section to enter into consultations 
with them at the request o f any contracting party which can establish a 
prima facie case that the restrictions arc inconsistent with the provisions 
of this Section or with those of Article XIII (subject to the provisions of 
Article XIV) and that its trade is adversely a fleeted thereby. However, 
no such invitation shall be issued unless the C o n t r a c t in g  Pa rties  have 
ascertained that direct discussions between the contracting parties concerned
have not been successful. If, as a result of the consultations with the 
C o n t r a c t in g  Parties no agreement is reached and they determine that 
the restrictions arc being applied inconristently with such provisions, and 
that damage to the trade of the contracting party initiating the procedure 
is caused or threatened thereby, they shall recommend the withdrawal or 
modification of the restrictions. If the restrictions arc not withdrawn 
or modified within such time as the C o n t r a c t in g  Parties may prescribe, 
they may release the contracting party initiating the procedure from such 
obligations under this Agreement towards the contracting party applying 
the restrictions as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances.
(e) If a contracting party against whicfi action has been taken in 
accordance with the last sentence o f sub-paragraph (c) (ii) or id) of this 
paragraph, finds that the release o f obligations authorized by the C o n ­
t r a c t in g  Pa rties  adversely affects the operation of its programme and 
policy of economic development, it shall be free, not later than sixty days 
after such action is taken, to give written notice to the Executive Secretary * 
to the CONTRACTING PARTIES of its intention to withdraw from this Agree­
ment and such withdrawal shall take effect on the sixtieth day following 
the day on which the notice is received by him.
i f )  In proceeding under this paragraph, the Co n t r a c t in g  Pa r ties  
shall have due regard to the factors referred to in paragraph 2 of this 
Article. Determinations under this paragraph shall be rendered expedi­
tiously and, if possible, within sixty days o f the initiation of the consultations.
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Section C
13. If a contracting-party coming within the scope of paragraph 4 (a) 
of this Article finds that governmental assistance is required to promote 
the establishment of a particular industry * with a view to raising the general 
standard of living of its people, but that no measure consistent with the 
other provisions of this Agreement is practicable to achieve that objective, 
it may have recourse to the provisions and procedures set out in this 
Section.*
14. The contracting party concerned shall notify the C o n t r a c t in g  
Pa rties  of the special difficulties which it meets in the achievement of the 
objective outlined in paragraph 13 o f this Article and shall indicate the 
specific measure affecting imports which it proposes to introduce in order 
to remedy these difficulties, It shall not introduce that measure before 
the expiration of the time-limit laid down in paragraph 15 or 17, as the 
case may be, or if the measure affects imports o f a product which is the 
subject o f a concession included in the appropriate Schedule annexed to
' See Prcfaoc. ,
this Agreement, unless it has secured the concurrence of the C o n t r a c t in g  
Parties  in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 18; Provided that, 
if the industry receiving assistance has already started production, the 
contracting party may, after informing the C o n t r a c t in g  Pa rties , take 
such measures as may be necessary to prevent, during that period, imports 
of the product or products concerned from increasing substantially above 
a normal level.*
15. If, within thirty days of the notification of the measure, the 
C o n t r a c t in g  P a rties  do not request the contracting party concerned 
to consult with them,* that contracting party shall be free to deviate from 
the relevant provisions o f the other Articles o f this Agreement to the extent 
necessary to apply the proposed measure.
16- If it is requested by the CONTRACTING P a r ties  to do so,* the con­
tracting party concerned shall consult with them as to the purpose of the 
proposed measure, as to alternative measures which may be available 
under this Agreement, and as to the possible effect of the measure proposed 
on the commercial and economic interests o f other contracting parties. 
If, as a result of such consultation, the C o n t r a c t in g  P arties agree that 
there is no measure consistent with the other provisions o f this Agreement 
which is practicable in order to achieve the objective outlined in paragraph 
13 of this Article, and concur* in the proposed measure, the contracting 
party concerned shall be released from its obligations under the relevant 
provisions of the other Articles of this Agreement to the extent necessary 
to apply that measure.
17- If, within ninety days after the date o f the notification of the 
proposed measure under paragraph 14 o f (his Article, the C o n t r a c t in g  
P a rties  have not concurred in such measure, the contracting party concerned 
may introduce the measure proposed after informing the C o n t r a c t in g  
P a r ties .
18. If the proposed measure affects a product which is the subject of 
a concession included in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agree­
ment, the contracting party concerned shall enter into consultations with 
any other contracting party with which the concession was initially nego­
tiated, and with any other contracting party determined by the C o n ­
t r a c t in g  P arties to have a substantial interest therein. The C o n t r a c t in g  
P arties shall concur * in the measure if they agree that there is no measure 
consistent with the other provisions of this Agreement which is practicable 
in order to achieve the objective set forth in paragraph 13 of this Article, 
and if they arc satisfied:
(o) that agreement has been reached with such other contracting 
parties as a result of the consultations referred to above, or
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{i>) if no such agreement has been reached within sixty days after the 
notification provided for in pa ragraph  14 has been received by 
the C o n t r a c t i n g  I’AKTtiLS, that  the contracting party having 
recourse to this Section has made all reasonable efforts to reach 
an agreement and that the interests o f  other  contracting parties 
arc adequately safeguarded.*
The contracting party having recourse to this Section shall thereupon be 
released from its obligations under the relevant provisions of the other 
Articles of this Agreement to the extent necessary to permit it to apply 
the measure.
19. If a proposed measure of the type described in paragraph 13 of 
this Article concerns an industry the establishment o f which has in the 
initial period been facilitated by incidental protection afforded by restric­
tions imposed by the contracting party concerned for balance of payments 
purposes under the relevant provisions of this Agreement, that contracting 
party may resort to the provisions and procedures of this Section; Provided 
that it shall not apply the proposed measure without the concurrence * 
of the C o n t r a c t in g  Pa r ties .*
20. Nothing in the preceding paragraphs of this Section shall authorize 
any deviation from the provisions o f Articles I, II and XIII of this Agree­
ment. The provisos to paragraph 10 of this Article shall also be applicable 
to any restriction under this Section.
21. At any time while a measure is being applied under paragraph 17 
of this Article any contracting party substantially affected by it may suspend 
the application to the trade o f the contracting party having recourse to this 
Section o f such substantially equivalent concessions o r other obligations 
under this Agreement the suspension o f which the Contracting Parties 
do not disapprove; * Ptovided that sixty days* notice o f such suspension 
is given to the Contracting Parties not later than six months after the 
measure has been introduced or changed substantially to the detriment 
of the contracting party affected. Any such contracting party shall afford 
adequate opportunity for consultation in accordance with the provisions 
o f Article XXII o f this AgreemenL
Section D
22. A contracting party coming within the scope o f sub-paragraph 
4 (6) o f this Article desiring, in the interest o f the development o f its econ­
omy, to introduce a  measure o f the type described in paragraph 13 of 
this Article in respect o f the establishment o f a particular industry * may 
apply to the Contracting Parties for approval o f such measure. The 
Contracting Parties shall promptly consult with such contracting party
and shall, in making their decision, be guided by the considerations set 
out in paragraph 16. If the C o n t r a c t in g  P a rties  concur * in the proposed 
measure the contracting party concerned shall be released from its obliga­
tions under the relevant provisions of the other Articles of this Agreement 
to the extent necessary to permit it to apply the measure. If the proposed 
measure affects a product which is the subject of a concession included in 
the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement, the provisions of 
paragraph 18 shall apply.*
23. Any measure applied under this Section shall comply with the 
provisions of paragraph 20 of this Article.
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A rtic le  XIX
Emergency Action on Im ports o f  Particular Products
1. (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect
of the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, 
including tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the territory 
of that contracting party in such increased quantities and under such 
conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers 
in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting 
party shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for 
such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend 
the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or rnodify the concession.
(b) If any product, which is the subject of a concession with respect 
to a preference, is being imported into the territory of a contracting party 
in the circumstances set forth in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, so 
as to cause or threaten scriOus injury to domestic producers of like or 
directly competitive products in the territory of a contracting party which 
receives or received such preference, the importing contracting party shall 
be free, if that other contracting party so requests, to suspend the relevant 
obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw^ or modify the concession in 
respect of the product, to the extent and for süch time as may be necessary 
to prevent or remedy such injury.
2. Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the pro­
visions of paragraph I o f  this Article, it shall give notice in writing to the 
C o n t r a c t in g  Parties as far in advance as may be practicable and shall 
afford the C o n t r a c t in g  P a r ties  and those contracting parties having a 
substantial interest as exporters o f the product concerned an opportunity 
to consult with it in respect o f the proposed action. When such notice 
is given in relation to a concession with respect to a preference, the notice
shall name the contracting party which has requested the action. In 
critical circumstances, where delay would cause damage which it would be 
difficult to repair, action under paragraph 1 of this Article may be taken 
provisionally without prior consultation, on the condition that consulta­
tion shall be effected immediately after taking such action.
3. (a) If agreement among the interested contracting parties with 
respect to the action is not reached, the contracting party which proposes 
to take or continue the action shall, nevertheless, be free to do so, and if 
such action is taken or continued, the affected contracting parties shall then 
be free, not later than ninety days after such action is taken, to suspend, 
upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on which written notice 
of such suspension is received by the C o n t r a c t in g  Pa r ties , the applica­
tion to the trade of the contracting party taking such action, or, in the case 
envisaged in paragraph 1 (6) o f  this Article, to the trade o f the contracting 
party requesting such action, o f  such substantiklly equivalent concessions 
or other obligations under this Agreement the suspension o f which the 
C o n t r a c t in g  P a rties  do not disapprove.
(6) Notwithstanding the provisions o f sub-paragraph (a) of this 
paragraph, where action is taken under paragraph 2 of this Article without 
prior consultation and causes or threatens serious injury in the territory 
of a contracting party to the domestic producers of products affected by 
the action, that contracting party shall, where delay would cause damage 
difficult to repair, be free to suspend, upon the taking of the action and 
throughout the period o f consultation, such concessions or other obliga­
tions as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the injury.
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A r t i c l e  X X t l
Consuhotiott
1. Each contract ing par ty shall accord sympathet ic considerat ion to, 
and shall afford adequate oppor tuni ty  for consul ta t ion regarding,  such 
representations as may be made by ano the r  cont ract ing party with respect 
to any matter  affecting the operat ion o f  this Agreement .
2. The C o n t r a c t i n g  P a r t i e s  may. at the request o f  a contracting 
party, consult  with any cont ract ing party or  parties in respect o f  any 
matter  for which it has not  been possible to find a sat isfactory solution 
through consul tat ion under  paragraph 1.
Article X Xin 
Nullification or Impairment
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing 
to it directly or Indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired 
or that the attainment o f any objective of the Agreement is being impeded 
as the result of
(а) the failure o f  another contracting party to carry out its obligations 
under this Agreement, or
(б) the application by another contracting party of any measure, 
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation.
the contracting party may, with a vîcrw to the satisfactory adjustment o f  
the matter, make written representations or proposals to the other con­
tracting party or parties which it considers to  be concerned. Any con­
tracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the! 
representations or proposals made to it.
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting 
parties concerned within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is o f the 
type described iq p a r a ^ p h  1 (c) o f  this Article, thèm àtter may be referred 
to the G oN T R A cnN O  P a r t ie s , The C q n t r a c t in o  PARTIES shall promptly 
investigate any m atter so referred to them and shall make appropriate 
recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be: 
concerned, or give a  ruling oh the matter, i s  appropriate. The CONTRACTING 
Pa rties  may consult with contracting parties; with the Economic and Social 
Council o f the United Nations an d  with any appropriate intcr-govemmcntal 
organization in cases where they consider such consultation necessary. If the 
’ COn t r a c t in o  P a r t ie s  consider that the éirçumstanccs are serious enough 
to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties 
to suspend the application to any other contracting party o r parties of 
such concessions o r other obligations under this Agrcerhcnt as they deter­
mine to be appropriate in the circumstances. If the application to any 
contracting party o f any concession or other obligation is in fact suspended, 
that contracting party shall then be free, not later than sixty days after such 
action is taken, to give written notice to the Executive Secretary* to the 
C o n t r a c t in g  P a rties of its intention to withdraw from this Agreement 
and such withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth day following the 
day on which such notice is received by him.
See  P reface.
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Article X X IV
Territorial Application— Frontier Trajjic— Custom s Unions 
and Free-trade Areas
1. The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the metropolitan 
customs territories of the contracting parties and to any other customs 
territories in respect of which this Agreement has been accepted under 
Article XXVI or is being applied under Article XXXIII or pursuant to 
the Protocol of Provisional Application. Each such customs territory 
shall, exclusively for the purposes of the territorial application of this 
Agreement, be treated as though it were a contracting party; Provided 
that the provisions o f this paragraph shall not be construed to create any 
rights or obligations as between two or more customs territories in respect 
of which this Agreement has been accepted under Article XXVI or is being 
applied under Article XXXIII or pursuant to the Protocol o f Provisional 
Application by a single contracting party.
2. For the purposes o f  this Agreement a customs territory shall be 
understood to mean any territory with respect to which separate tariffs 
or other regulations o f commerce arc maintained for a substantial part of 
the trade o f such territory with other territories.
3. The provisions o f  this Agreement shall not be construed to 
prevent:
(а) Advantages accorded by any contracting party to adjacent countries 
in order to fadlitate frontier traffic;
(б) Advantages accorded to the trade with the Free Territory of Trieste 
by countries contiguous to that territory, provided that such 
advantages arc not in conflict with the Treaties of Peace arising 
out o f  the Second World War.
4. The contracting parties recognize the desirability o f increasing 
freedom o f trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of 
closer integration between the economies o f the countries parlies to such 
agreements. They also recognize that the purpose o f a customs union or 
o f a free-trade a tea should be to facilitate trade between the constituent 
territories and not ^o raise barriers to the trade o f other contracting parties 
with such territories.
5. Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, 
as between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs 
union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement 
necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area; 
Provided that:
(a) with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading 
to the formation of a customs union, the duties and other régula* 
lions of commerce imposed at the institution of any such union 
or interim agreement in respect of trade with contracting partiel 
not parties to such union or agreement shall not on the whok 
be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence o f the dutici 
and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent terri' 
tories prior to the formation of such union or the adoption of sue! 
interim agreement, as the case may be;
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(6) with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading 
to the formation of a free-trade area, the duties and other régula' 
lions of commerce maintained in each of the constituent Icrritoric: 
and applicable at the formation of such free-trade area or the adop 
lion of such interim agreement to the trade of contracting partie: 
not included in such area or not parties to such agreement shal 
not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding dutie: 
and other regulations of cornmcrcc existing in the same constitucn' 
territories prior to the formation of the free-trade area, or interim 
agreement, as the case may be; and
(c) any interim agreement referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and (6 
shall include a plan and schedule for The fdrniation of such a 
customs union or o f such a free-trade area within a rcasonabh 
length of time.
6. If, in fulfilling the requirements o f sub-paragraph 5 (a), a contracting 
party proposes to increase any rate of duty inconsistently with the pro 
visions of Article II, the procedure set forth in Article XXVIII shall apply 
In providing for compensatory adjustment, due account shall be taken o 
the compensation already afforded by the reductions brought about it 
the corresponding duty of the other constituents of the union. I
7. (a) Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs unioi 
or free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation o 
such a union or area, shall promptly notify the G o n t r a c t in g  P a r t «e 
and shall make available to them such information regarding the proposer 
union or area as will enable them to make such reports and rccommcnda 
tions to contracting parties as they may deem appropriate.
(6) If, after having studied the plan and schedule included in ai 
interim agreement referred to in paragraph 5 in consultation with the partic
to that agreement and taking due account o f the information made available 
in accordance with the provisions of sub-paragraph (n), the C o n t r a c t i n g  
P a r t i e s  find that such agreement is not likely to result in the formation 
of a customs union or of a free-trade area within the period contemplated 
by the parties to the agreement or that such period is not a reasonable 
one, the C o n t r a c t i n g  P a r t i e s  shall make recommendations to the parties 
to the agreement. The parties shall not maintain or put into force, as 
the case may be, such agreement if they arc not prepared to modify it in 
accordance with these recommendations.
(c) Any substantial change in the plan or schedule referred to in 
paragraph 5(c) shall be communicated to the C o n t r a c t in g  Parties, 
which may request the contracting parties concerned to consult with them 
if the change seems likely to jeopardize o r delay unduly the formation of 
the customs union or of the free-trade area.
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8. For the purposes o f  this Agreem ent:
(a) A c u s to m s  u n io n  shall  be u n d e r s to o d  to m ea n  the subs t itu t ion  o f  
a s ing le  c u s t o m s  terr itory for  tw o  or  m o re  c u s t o m s  territories, so  
that
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, 
where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, 
XIV, XV and XX) arc eliminated with respect to substantially 
all the trade between the constituent territories of the union 
or at least with respect to substantially all the trade in products 
originating in such territories, and,
(ii) subject to the provisions o f paragraph 9, substantially the 
same duties and other regulations o f commerce arc applied 
by each of the members o f the union to the trade of territories 
not included in the union;
(b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or 
more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive 
regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted 
under Articles XI^ XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) arc eliminated 
on substantially all the trade between the conriituent territories 
in products originating in such territories.
9. The preferences referred to in paragraph 2 o f Article I shall not be 
affected by the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area but 
may be eliminated or adjusted by means o f negotiations with contracting 
parties affected.* This procedure o f negotiations with affected contracting 
parties shall, in particular, apply to the elimination o f preferences required 
to conform with the provisions o f paragraph 8 (a) (i) and paragraph 8 (6).
10. The CONTRACTINC P a r i i i j s  m a y  by a iw o - th ir d s  m ajo r ity  approvt  
proposa ls  which d o  not  fully  c o m p ly  w ith  the req u irem en ts  o f  paragraph*
5 to 9 inclusive, provided that such proposals lead to the formation of a 
customs union or a free-trade area in the sense of this Article.
11. Taking into account the exceptional circumstances arising out ol 
the establishment of India and Pakistan as independent States and recog­
nizing the fact that they have long constituted an economic unit, the con­
tracting parties agree that the provisions o f this Agreement shall not prevent 
the two countries from entering Into special arrangements with fcspeci 
to the trade between them, pending the establishment of their mutual 
trade relations on a definitive basis.* '
12. Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as 
may be available to it to ensure observance o f the provisions of this Agree­
ment by the regional and local governments and authorities within its 
territory.
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Article XXV
Joint Action by  the Contracting Parties
1. Representatives o f  the contracting  parties shall meet from time to 
time for the purpose o f  giving effect to those provisions o f  this Agreem ent 
which involve joint action and, generally, with a view to facilitating the 
operation and furthering the objectives o f  this Agreement. Wherever 
reference is made in this Agreement to the contracting parties acting jo in tly  
they are designated as the C o n t r a c t i n g  P a r t i e s .
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is requested to con­
vene the first meeting of the C o n t r a c t in g  Pa rties , which shall take place 
not later than March I, 1948.
3. Each contracting party shall be entitled to have one vote at all 
meetings of the C o n t r a c t in g  P a r ties .
4. Except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement, decisions o f 
the C o n t r a c t in g  P a rties  shall b e  taken by a majority of the votes cast.
5. In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this 
Agreement, the C o n t r a c t in g  P a rties  may waive an obligation imposed 
upon a contracting party by this Agreement ; Provided that any such decision 
shall be approved by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast and that such 
majority shall comprise more than half o f the contracting parties. The 
C o n t r a c t in g  Parties may also by such a vote
(i) define certain categories of exceptional circumstances to which 
other voting requirements shall apply for the waiver o f obligations, 
and
(ii) prescribe such criteria as may be necessary for the application of 
this paragraph.f
Article XXXVI 
Principles and Objectives
I.* The contracting parties,
(o) recalling that the basic objectives o f  this Agreement include the 
raising of standards o f living arid the progressive development 
o f the economics of all contracting parties, and considering that 
the attainment of these objectives is particularly urgent for less- 
developed contracting parties;
(6) considering that export earnings o f the less-developed contracting 
parties can play a vital part in their economic development and 
that the extent o f this contribution depends on the prices paid by 
the less-developed contracting parties for essential imports, the 
volume of their exports, and the prices received for these exports;
(c) noting, that there is a wide gap between standards of living in less- 
developed countries and in other countries;
(d) recognizing that individual and joint action is essential to further 
the development of the ecoriomies o f less-developed contracting 
parties and to bring about a rapid advance in the standards of 
living in these countries;
(e) recognizing that international trade as a means o f achieving eco­
nomic and social advancement should be governed by such rules 
and procedures—and measures in conformity with such rules and 
procedures—as are consistent with the objectives set forth in this 
Article;
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( / )  noting that the C o n t r a c t i n g  P a r t i e s  may enable Icss-dcvclopcd 
contracting parties to use special measures to promote their trade 
and development;
agree as follows.
2. Tlicrc is need for a rapid and sustained expansion of the export 
earnings of the Icss-^JcvcIopcd contracting parties.
3. There is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that less 
developed contracting parties secure a share in the growth in internationa 
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.
4. Given the continued dependence of many less-developed contracting 
parties on the exportation of a limited range of primary products,* there i; 
need to provide in the largest possible measure more favourable and 
acceptable conditions of access to world markets for these products, and 
wherever appropriate to devise measures designed to stabilize and improve 
conditions of world markets in these products, including in particular 
measures designed to attain stable, equitable and remunerative prices, thus 
permitting an expansion of world trade and demand and a dynamic and 
steady growth of the real export earnings o f these Countries so as to provide 
them with expanding resources for their economic development.
5. The rapid expansion of the economies of the less-developed con-, 
tracting parties will be facilitated by a diversification * of the structure o f 
their economics and the avoidance of an excessive dependence on the export 
of primary products. There is, therefore, need for increased access in 
the largest possible measure to markets under favourable conditions for 
processed and manufactured products currently or potentially of particular 
export interest to less-developed contracting parties.
6. Because of the chronic deficiency in the export proceeds and other 
foreign exchange earnings of Icss-develbpcd contracting parties, there are 
important inter-relationshijps between trade and financial assistance to 
development. There is, therefore, need for close and-continuing collabora­
tion between the Contracting Parties and the international lending 
agencies so that they can contribute most effectively to alleviating the 
burdens these less-developed contracting parties assume In the interest of 
their economic development.
7. There is need for appropriate collaboration between the C o n ­
t r a c t in g  Pa r ties , other intergovernmental bodies and the organs and 
agencies of the United Nations system, whose activities relate to the trade 
and economic development ofless-cfevcloped countries.
8. The developed contracting parties do not expect reciprocity for 
commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove 
tariffs and other barriers to the trade o f less-developed contracting 
parties.*
9. The adoption of measures to give effect to these principles and 
objectives shall be a matter o f conscious and purposeful effort on the part 
o f the contracting parties both individually and jointly.
3 6 5
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